JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - In this case as the record stands the trial court has committed grave procedural mistake amounting to illegality and material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The summons which were served on the defendant under Order 5 of the C. P. Code mentioned 13-2-1967 as the date of hearing. In the summon there was also a direction for filing of the written statement on 6-21-967. The summons were served on the defendant but 13-2-1967 was declared a holiday in connection with the general elections. The courts were re-opened on 23-2-1967 and on that day the suit was called up for hearing. The defendant did not appear. The Court then passed an order that the suit would proceed ex-parte. Several other dates were then fixed for final hearing of the suit but the defendant never appeared and ultimately on 11-5-1967 the suit was decreed ex-parte against the defendant. On 30-5-1967 the defendant made an application under Or. 9, Rule 13 of the C. P. Code for setting aside of the ex-parte decree. It was admitted by the defendant that the summon was served on her. But she pleaded that her inability to appear before the court on the various dates fixed was due to her illness and she being out of station at her daughter's place where she got ill and had to remain there for a long time. It was also pleaded that when she returned in the month of May to Kanpur she came to know that the suit was decreed ex-parte against her. The learned Munsif rejected the application of the defendant holding that she had failed to make out sufficient cause for her failure to appear on the date fixed. On appeal the learned Civil Judge confirmed the orders of rejection passed by the learned Munsif, hence this revision. 2. Sri K. M. Dayal, learned counsel for the defendant applicant, submitted that the summons of the suit not having been duly served on the defendant the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to proceed ex-parte under Rule 6 of Order 9 and the ex-parte decree passed subsequently ought to have been set aside on the finding that the summons were not duly served irrespective of the circumstance that the defendant was not able to satisfy the court that she had sufficient cause for not appearing on the date fixed in the suit. Sri A. B. Saran. learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff opposite party, countered by submitting that no such plea was ever raised by the defendant in the courts below and this Court in its re-visional jurisdiction ought not to entertain such a plea for the first time. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the defendant herself admitted that the knew of the date 28-4-1967 fixed in the suit and she having failed to explain satisfactorily the causes for her absence on that date the court below was justified in refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree. The contention was that even assuming that the summons were not duly served the subsequent knowledge of the dates fixed in the suit as far as the defendant was concerned, would preclude her from taking up the stand that the original order passed by the court to proceed ex-parte was illegal and without jurisdiction. 3. In my judgment the subsequent knowledge on the part of the defendant of the dates fixed in the suit would be immaterial when on the record it is found that the summons were not duly served on the defendant. Under Rule 6 of Order 9 the court is not empowered to proceed ex-parte against the defendant unless it is proved that the summons were duly served. It is obvious that when the defendant is absent on the first date of hearing there would be no occasion for any plea to be raised before the court that the summons were not duly served. Thus it is the duty of the court itself to satisfy itself that the summons were duly served before proceeding to hear the suit ex-parte against the defendant. Once I am right in holding that it is the duty of the court to do so then even at any subsequent stage in the proceedings in the suit if any date is fixed and the defendant comes to know of it that would not remove the defect which has crept in the re-cord and the order passed under R. 6 of the Order 9 of the Code to proceed ex-parte will continue to remain an illegal order. Further a party cannot be penalised simply because it has not specifically taken any plea pointing the mistake of the court. Further a party cannot be penalised simply because it has not specifically taken any plea pointing the mistake of the court. It is not necessary to raise such a plea as it would be a matter of record in proceedings itself. A party can be penalised for not raising a plea if it pertains to any thing done by the adversary but if the court itself commits any procedural error whether or not a party raises any specific plea it would be immaterial. I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party that the defendant not having raised any plea regarding the due service of summons in the courts below, ought not be allowed to raise it for the first time in revision. I think the very object of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court is to correct the record. When the record is summoned under Section 115 of the C. P. Code by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction it becomes its duty to correct the record if it is found to be defective, no matter any party has raised any such ground in revision or not; if in the circumstances of the case it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. After summoning the record the High Court can pass any order it deems fit. I think I would be justified in quashing the ex-parte proceedings and the decree passed in pursuance thereof in the suit if I find that the summons were not duly served on the defendant. 4. The crucial question that falls for determination is whether the summons can be said to have been duly served on the defendant. It is not disputed that 13-21967 was a holiday on which the courts were closed. The summon which is on record shows that 13-2-1967 was fixed as the date of first hearing of the suit. The court, being closed on that date it was impossible for the defendant to do any thing that she was required to do in pursuance of the summon. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Firm Kundan Lal Brindaban v. Firm Bani Prasad Baijnath Prasad, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. The court, being closed on that date it was impossible for the defendant to do any thing that she was required to do in pursuance of the summon. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Firm Kundan Lal Brindaban v. Firm Bani Prasad Baijnath Prasad, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 76 : "The due service of summon has a reference not merely to the mode of service, but to the propriety of the summons where it fixes a date of hearing, on which date by reason of the delay in service or of some action of the court itself or of its officer, or by reason of a governmental order, it is not possible for the defendant to do what he is asked to do and the case cannot be taken up." 5. The same principle of law has been laid down in the case of Nanda Dayaram fat v. Raja Ram Ramaji fat, A.I.R. 1964 MP 261. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party attempted to distinguish the above said cases on two grounds. His first submission was that the question of law for consideration that arose in the said cases related to the interpretation of the phraseology used in Article 164 of the old Limitation Act as to the meaning of the words "duly served". The second ground was that on the facts in the said cases there was always an uncertainty as to the next date of the sitting of the court. I do not think any of these grounds can be said to be grounds of distinction. The principle on which the decision has turned in the said cases is very clear and there is no reason to hold that if for the purpose of Article 164 due service' is not accomplished when the date of hearing mentioned in the summon is a holiday, why the same consideration should also not apply for finding out whether the summons were duly served for the purposes of Rule 6 of Order 9 of the Code. The uncertainty as to the date when the court would next sit has also no material bearing. The uncertainty as to the date when the court would next sit has also no material bearing. Once the date which was mentioned in the summons as the date of hearing is found to be a holiday on which the court does not sit and the defendant cannot do what he is required to do, there is no rule of law casting upon him the burden to find out on which other date he should appear. Learned counsel for the opposite party strenuously urged that every body knew the fact that the court would re-open on 23-2-1967 and it was the duty of the defendant to appear before the court on that date, but the learned counsel has not been able to show me any rule of law which imposes that duty on the defendant. 6. It was then faintly suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite party that 6-2-1967 being the date fixed for filing of written statement under Rule I of Order 8 of the Code that meant that the defendant was required to appear for filing of written statement and it would be deemed that 6-2-1967 was the date of hearing fixed by the summon and that not being a holiday the court was justified in proceeding ex-parte under Rule 6 of Order 9 of the Code. I am not impressed with this line of argument. Rule 1 of Order 8 itself distinguishes between the date of hearing in the suit and the date of filing of the written statement. The phraseology of Rule 1 of Order 8 itself militates against this argument. The date of filing of the written statement cannot be confused with the date of hearing of the suit. Under Order 5 of the Code the summon has to mention the date of hearing of the suit and not the date of filing of written statement. Thus I find that summons of the suit was not duly served on the defendant and the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to proceed ex-parte. The order passed by the learned Munsif on 23-2-1967 was illegal and without jurisdiction. The decree passed in pursuance thereof was illegal. A grave procedural error thus has crept into the record. Thus I find that summons of the suit was not duly served on the defendant and the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to proceed ex-parte. The order passed by the learned Munsif on 23-2-1967 was illegal and without jurisdiction. The decree passed in pursuance thereof was illegal. A grave procedural error thus has crept into the record. Rule 13 of Order 9 leaves no option with the court but to set aside an ex-parte decree if it is found that the summons were not duly served on the defendant. The application of the defendant, therefore, under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code ought to have been allowed and the ex-parte decree against her set aside. 7. For the reasons given above, I allow this revision, and set aside the order of the courts below. I further allow the application of the defendant under Order 9 Rule 13, C. P. Code, and by setting aside the ex-parte decree direct that the suit to be restored which will now be heard and decided in accordance with law. 8. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs of this revision.