ORDER The petitioner Tronglaobi Pisciculture Co-operative Society Ltd., by its Chairman, Maimom Iboton Singh of Kiyam Siphai village under Thoubal Police Station obtained rule nisi under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against (1) the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, (2) the Union Territory of Manipur and (3) Khundrakpam Khamba Singh of Kiyam Siphai village calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued quashing the order of the first respondent dated 8-12-1964 passed by him in C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1964, under which 1.77 acres of land covered by new Dag No. 4004 situate in Kiyam Siphai village was ordered to be settled in favour of the 3rd respondent under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (Act XXXIII of 1960), hereinafter called as the Act of 1960. 2. The respondents showed cause. 3. The brief facts of the case leading to the institution of the present writ petition are thus. An extent of 16.62 acres of land covered by patta No. 96/l(A) Thoubal Tahsil situate in Kiyam Siphai village formed part of Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226, having been declared as such under Section 16 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (Regulation 1 of 1886) which was made applicable to Manipur. It was temporarily settled by the Government in 1953-54 with the Waithou Phumnon Fishing Co-operative Society Ltd. The said Society enjoyed the land as lessee of the Government till 1961-62, during which period the third respondent was employed as Chowkidar of a brick-field and was allowed to occupy a portion of the land. The Society was dissolved in 1962-63. 4. Some of the members of the aforesaid Society, who are landless agricultural workers, proposed to form a Pisciculture Co-operative Society and to have the above-mentioned land settled with the latter for piscicultural purposes. The Deputy Commissioner of Manipur submitted to the Government of Manipur proposal to de-reserve the said land from Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226 to settle it with the petitioners Society. The first respondent accorded sanction to the dereservation of land measuring 5 paris out of the said Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226 in favour of the petitioners Society and described the boundaries of the land. They are Waithou Fishery and foot-path on the northern side and on the three remaining sides there are "Burma Road and hill". Vide Ext. The first respondent accorded sanction to the dereservation of land measuring 5 paris out of the said Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226 in favour of the petitioners Society and described the boundaries of the land. They are Waithou Fishery and foot-path on the northern side and on the three remaining sides there are "Burma Road and hill". Vide Ext. A/1 dated 1-5-1962 certified copy of the order of the first respondent. 5. The petitioners Society was registered on 16-8-1962 as Tronglaobi Pisciculture Cooperative Society Limited with 42 landless agricultural workers as members, who reside within a distance 2 kilometres from the said land. The Deputy Commissioner passed an order (under Section 14 (1) of the Act of 1960 and Rules 8 (ii) and 12 (a) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962) settling the land with the petitioners Society. He directed that the petitioners Society should lay an earthen boundary bund, so that 5 paris might be separated from the Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226. He described the land settled with the petitioner by the same boundaries as mentioned in Ext. A/1. Vide Ext. A/2 certified copy of his order dated 8-12-1962. 6. In the course of the survey and settlement operations in 1962-63, it was discovered that the actual extent of the land is 6- pans and not 5 paris. The entire extent was put in the name of the petitioner in the Dag Chitha prepared in 1962. Vide Ext. A/7 certified copy of the Dag Chitha. There were criminal proceedings between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent regarding the excess land. When the third respondent interfered with the disputed excess portion of the land, the S. D. M. Thoubal directed him to execute a bond under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code for keeping the peace in N. F. I. R. case No. 21 of 1963. Vide Ext. A/10 certified copy of the police report and the order of the S. D. M. dated 21-2-1964. Again, when the third respondent interfered with the petitioners possession of the land, the S. D. M., Thoubal restrained him by an order under Section 144 (2), Criminal Procedure Code from causing any interference. Vide Ext. A/8 certified copy of his order in Criminal Misc. Case No. 8 of 1964 dated 9-4-1964. Again, when the third respondent interfered with the petitioners possession of the land, the S. D. M., Thoubal restrained him by an order under Section 144 (2), Criminal Procedure Code from causing any interference. Vide Ext. A/8 certified copy of his order in Criminal Misc. Case No. 8 of 1964 dated 9-4-1964. Subsequently, the S. D. M., Thoubal, restrained both the parties from interfering with the disputed extent of area. Vide Ext. A/9 certified copy of his order in Criminal Misc. Case No. 8 of 1964 dated 17-7-1964. Finally, the third respondent entered upon the disputed land and raised a long bund. 7. The petitioners Society filed an application dated 15-5-1964 before the Director of Settlement and Land Records stating the facts and requested him to assess all the available land within the boundaries described in Exts. A/1 and A/2 in favour of the petitioner. It also objected to proposal for settlement of any portion of the land with the third respondent. On the report of the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer, Thoubal and of Shri A. K. Biswas, Deputy Settlement Officer having the powers of the Survey and Settlement Officer under the Act of 1960, Shri A. C. Bhattacharjee Settlement Officer having the powers of the Director of Settlement and Land Records passed an order on 12-8-1964 approving of the recording of the entire area of 16.62 acres in the name of the petitioners Society and recording the third respondent as an encroacher in respect of 1.77 acres within the said land. Vide Ext. A/3 certified copy of their orders. 8. The third respondent preferred a memorandum of appeal D/-26-9-1964 under S. 93(1) (c) of the Act of 1960 to the first respondent against the order of the Settlement Officer D/-12-8-1964 in C. C. Revenue Appeal No. 5 of 1964. The first respondent allowed the appeal on 8-12-1964 and granted settlement of 1.77 acres out of the disputed land in favour of the third respondent and ordered that the remaining excess land should be settled with the petitioner society. 9. Hence, the present petition for an appropriate writ to quash the order of the first respondent dated 8-12-1964. 10. The first respondent allowed the appeal on 8-12-1964 and granted settlement of 1.77 acres out of the disputed land in favour of the third respondent and ordered that the remaining excess land should be settled with the petitioner society. 9. Hence, the present petition for an appropriate writ to quash the order of the first respondent dated 8-12-1964. 10. The respondents 1 and 2 filed a counter affidavit narrating the facts that the third respondent filed N. L. Case No. 261 of 1962 on the file of the A. S. and S. O. (B), Thoubal seeking settlement of 3 sangams within Waithou Fishery area claiming that it was in his possession, that the Supervisor Kanungo recommended his application, that the third respondent had also filed another petition Misc. Case No. 333 of 1963 A. S. and S. O. (B) before the Director of Settlement and Land Records for the same relief, that the petitioner filed Misc. Case No. 986/1964/A. S. and S. O. Thoubal for assessment of land revenue in respect of the excess area of acres 4.12, claiming that it was included within the area settled by the Deputy Commissioner on 8-12-1962 as seen from Exts. A/1 and A/2 and that the Director of Settlement and Land Records held in favour of the petitioner while the first respondent set aside his order on appeal by the third respondent. 11. The third respondent stated in his counter affidavit that the order of the Director of Settlement and Land Records dated 12-8-1964 is illegal, that the third respondent has been in possession and enjoyment of the excess land, that only 5 paris, i.e., ac. 12.50 of land was settled with the petitioners Society, that the Society has no right to the remaining excess land and that the first respondent properly settled 1.77 acres of land in favour of the third respondent. 12. The first question that arises for determination is whether the land mentioned within the 4 boundaries described in Exts. A/1 and A/2 which has been subsequently found to be 6- paris, that is, 16.62 acres was settled with the petitioner or whether only 5 paris, equal to 12.50 acres of land mentioned in Exts. A/1 and A/2 was settled in favour of the petitioner society. In other words, the question is whether the boundaries prevail over the extent. A/1 and A/2 which has been subsequently found to be 6- paris, that is, 16.62 acres was settled with the petitioner or whether only 5 paris, equal to 12.50 acres of land mentioned in Exts. A/1 and A/2 was settled in favour of the petitioner society. In other words, the question is whether the boundaries prevail over the extent. Though the extent of the land was described as 5 paris i.e., 12½ acres of land in both Exts. A/1 and A/2, the land, which was settled with the petitioner, was described by boundaries. The northern boundary was described as Waithou Fishery and foot-path. The eastern, western and southern boundaries were described as "Burma Road and hill". It transpired in the Survey and Settlement operation of 1962-63 that the land is actually 6- paris, equal to 16.62 acres and not 5 paris i.e., 12½ acres. The contention of the respondents counsel is that the extent was described as 5 paris in both Exts. A/1 and A/2 and that therefore 5 paris of land only were settled with the petitioners Society. Though, it is true to say that the extent was described as 5 paris, the land which was settled with the petitioner was further identified by boundaries. It appears that there is a mound between the low-lying area and the Burma Road and the hill on the southern side which is the material boundary in this case. It also appears that when the land was enjoyed by Waithou Soirel Fishery No. 226, the third respondent was employed as Chowkidar of a brick-field and was allowed to occupy a portion of the mound. So, he has been in possession of the elevated portion of the mound. But, in view of the fact that the land described within the boundaries mentioned in Exts. A/1 and A/2 was settled with the petitioners Society, it follows that the boundaries must prevail. It can be seen from Ext. A/3 also that the area allotted is bounded by Burma Road and hill on the southern and the western sides. According to the petitioners counsel the Burma Road and the hill on the southern side are in a zig-zag condition. It is immaterial whether a portion of the land settled with the petitioner is low-lying and another portion is like a mound, inasmuch as, the fixed boundaries have to prevail over the wrongly mentioned measurements. According to the petitioners counsel the Burma Road and the hill on the southern side are in a zig-zag condition. It is immaterial whether a portion of the land settled with the petitioner is low-lying and another portion is like a mound, inasmuch as, the fixed boundaries have to prevail over the wrongly mentioned measurements. The incorrectly described quantity has to be rejected as falsa demonstratio. This proposition of law cannot be disputed. Vide passage at page 760 of the Indian Evidence Act by Sarkar 8th Edition and Subbayya Chakkiliyan v. M. Muthia Goundan, AIR 1924 Mad 493, Baker Ali v. Amir Ali Meah, AIR 1939 Rang 396, Palestine Kupat Am Bank Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Palestine, AIR 1948 PC 207 and A. Basavapunnareddy v. K. Krishnayya, AIR 1966 Andh Pra 260. That the respondents 1 and 2 understood that the settlement covered the entire land within the 4 boundaries described in Exts. A/1 and A/2 is clear from Exts. A/5 and A/6, under which the arrears of land revenue and other dues were realised from the former Waithou Phumnom Fishing Co-operative Society Limited for the entire area and from Ext. A/7 under which the name of the petitioners Society was registered with reference to the entire 16.62 acres of land. Though the record of rights under Chapter V of the Act of 1960 is not yet finally published, Ext. A/7 is admissible in evidence to show that the entire land in question was mutated in the name of the petitioners Society. The weight to be attached to this entry is, of course, a different matter. Exts. A/8 to A/10 show that the third respondent was also restrained by the S. D. M. from interfering with the disputed land. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner did not rely on Exts. A/5 to A/10 before the 1st respondent and that it cannot rely on them in the High Court. He cited Basant Singh v. Janak Singh, AIR 1954 All 447, Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 , M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 , Nawasaiah v. District Collector, Kurnool, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 253 and Commr. of I.-T., Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. Sri Raja Reddy Mallaram, AIR 1964 SC 825 in support of his contention. of I.-T., Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. Sri Raja Reddy Mallaram, AIR 1964 SC 825 in support of his contention. The first three decisions lay down that the question of Jurisdiction of a Tribunal to pass an order cannot be challenged in a writ petition. The fourth case lays down that the plea of illegality of assessment, which was not raised at any stage cannot be raised in a writ petition. The last case decided that a question, not arising out of the order of a Tribunal and out of the question referred to the High Court by the Tribunal, cannot be raised before the Supreme Court in an appeal against the answer given by the High Court upon the reference. But, Exts. A/5 to A/10 were filed by the petitioner along with the reply affidavit. They too can be looked into. Disputed questions of fact have to be decided on the basis of affidavits and a plea taken in the affidavit-in-rejoinder can also be considered. Vide Sri-la Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarasannia v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1578 and Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 . 13. Secondly, it is to be seen from Ext. A/1 that the first respondent accorded sanction to the de-reservation of the land within the 4 boundaries for piscicultural purposes. In Ext. A/2 the petitioner was directed to use the land in question only for piscicultural purposes. So, the de-reservation of the land within the 4 boundaries was made only for piscicultural purposes. Under Section 2 (b) of the Act of 1960, "Agriculture" includes "pisciculture". But, the first respondent did not mention in his order in C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1964 (vide Ext. A/4) for what purpose 1.77 acres of land, out of the excess land, were settled with the third respondent, though he settled the remaining excess land of 2.35 acres with the petitioners Society. The land could be settled only for some agricultural purposes including pisciculture. But, Ext. A/4 does not show that the excess of 1.77 acres was granted to the third respondent for agricultural purposes. Besides, no order was passed for fresh de-reservation of the excess land in favour of the third respondent. 14. The land could be settled only for some agricultural purposes including pisciculture. But, Ext. A/4 does not show that the excess of 1.77 acres was granted to the third respondent for agricultural purposes. Besides, no order was passed for fresh de-reservation of the excess land in favour of the third respondent. 14. Thirdly, according to the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Allotment of Land Rules, 1962, which were framed by the first respondent in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 98 of the Act of 1960, the third respondent could not be preferred for allotment of the land in question. For, under Rule (6) (ii) of the said Rules, in allotting land for agricultural purposes, a landless agricultural worker should be preferred in the order of preference individually mentioned in Rule 6. Under Rule 8 of the said Rules, when there are claims by an individual and a registered Co-operative Society constituted for the purpose for which the land is to be allotted, then the Society has to be given the land in preference to the individual. So, in this regard, the learned Chief Commissioner erred in allotting the land to the third respondent in preference to the petitioners Society. 15. Fourthly, there is also a lacuna in the order of the first respondent. Under Section 14 (1) of the Act of 1960, it is the Deputy Commissioner who alone can allot land belonging to the Government for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling houses, in accordance with the rules. The Administrator can allot land under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act for the purpose of an industry or for any purpose of public utility on such conditions as may be prescribed, or he may entrust the management of any such land or any rights therein to the Gram Panchayat of the village established under any law for the time being in force. Under Rule 6 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961, a Revenue Officer may exercise any power or discharge any function, which may be exercised or discharged as the case may be by any officer subordinate to him, save as otherwise provided by the Act of 1960. Under Rule 6 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961, a Revenue Officer may exercise any power or discharge any function, which may be exercised or discharged as the case may be by any officer subordinate to him, save as otherwise provided by the Act of 1960. So, the first respondent could not exercise the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, who is subordinate to him, in view of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, under which it is only the Deputy Commissioner who can allot land of the Government for agricultural purposes. But, the first respondent could direct the Deputy Commissioner to allot the land of 1.77 acres (if he is otherwise competent to do so) to allot the land to the third respondent. But, Ext. A/4 shows that the learned Chief Commissioner stated that the third respondent encroached upon 1.77 acres of land out of the excess area of 4.12 acres, that considering that he is also a landless person, that he encroached upon the land and that he was in possession of it for about 7/8 years, it would meet the ends of justice, if 1.77 acres of land were settled with him, while the remaining excess land was settled with the petitioners Society. The third respondent states in para 4 of his counter affidavit that the first respondent acted within his jurisdiction in granting settlement of the land in favour of the third respondent. The order of the first respondent as per Ext. A/4 is an order granting settlement of the land of 1.77 acres in extent in favour of the third respondent and not a mere direction to the Deputy Commissioner to allot the said land to him. So, in this regard also the order of the first respondent is illegal. 16. The petitioners learned Counsel contended that under S. 94 (1) (a) of the Act of 1960, the third respondent should have filed C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1964 within 30 days from 12-8-1964, the (date of?) order of the Settlement Officer in N. L. Case No. 61 of 1962-A. S. S. O. (B) and Misc. Case No. 986/1964-A. S. and S. O. Thoubal and that, therefore, the appeal was incompetent. Case No. 986/1964-A. S. and S. O. Thoubal and that, therefore, the appeal was incompetent. No doubt, under S. 94 (1) (a) of the Act of 1960, the appeal should have been preferred within 30 days from the date of the order. But, the Settlement Officer decided the case in the absence of the third respondent. Under Rule 135 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961 he was bound to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in deciding the cases. But, he passed the order without hearing the third respondent. So, his order is a void one. A "void" judgment has been defined as one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally. Vide the definition of void judgment" at page 1745 of Blacks Law Dictionary - 4th edition. Vide also Haopha Tangkhul v. Vakam, AIR 1958 Manipur 20 . The order of the Settlement Officer does not bind the 3rd respondent and can be ignored by him. As such, it cannot be said that C. C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 5 of 1964 could not be entertained by the first respondent after the expiry of the period of 30 days. 17. The learned counsel for the respondents formulated the following contentions in support of their plea that the writ petition is not maintainable. Firstly, he urged that under Section 85 of the Assam Cooperative Societies Act (Assam Act 1 of 1950), which is applicable to Manipur the writ petition by the Chairman of the Society is not maintainable. This contention is not correct. Section 85 lays down that every registered Society shall be deemed to be a body corporate by the name, under which it is registered with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power to hold property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it was constituted. In the present case the petitioner is the Society. But, the petitioner has further added in the cause title that it is represented by the Chairman Maimom Iboton Singh. So, the petitioner filed the writ petition as a body corporate. 18. In the present case the petitioner is the Society. But, the petitioner has further added in the cause title that it is represented by the Chairman Maimom Iboton Singh. So, the petitioner filed the writ petition as a body corporate. 18. The second contention of the respondents Counsel is that the petitioner also applied to the Director of Settlement and Land Records on 15-5-1964 to grant excess land in its favour and that, therefore, it is estopped from contending that the entire land within the 4 boundaries was settled in the first instance with the petitioner. An estoppel may operate under Section 115, Evidence Act, if a person, by his declaration, act or omission intentionally causes or permits another person to believe a thing to be true and act upon such belief, then the former is estopped from denying the truth of the thing. Vide also page 1559 of Vol. 2 of AIR Commentaries on the Constitution of India - First Edition and Shiv Narain v. Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur Region, Jaipur, AIR 1953 Raj 1 . But, in the present case it is clear from para 5 of the writ petition that the petitioner never alleged that the excess land should be granted to it under a fresh settlement. But para 5 shows that the petitioner laid a claim to the excess land on the ground that it was included in the original settlement of the entire land included within the boundaries mentioned in Ext. A/2. So, there is no question of estoppel. 19. But para 5 shows that the petitioner laid a claim to the excess land on the ground that it was included in the original settlement of the entire land included within the boundaries mentioned in Ext. A/2. So, there is no question of estoppel. 19. The third contention of the respondents is that this writ petition is barred by the provisions of Section 159, of the Act of 1960, which bar any suit or other proceedings in respect of any matter arising under the Act, and which provide for remedy by way of a suit if a question of title is involved between the parties, except as otherwise provided in the Act and that the petitioner had a remedy under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act to file a civil suit within a period of six months from the date of the order of the Deputy Commissioner whom the petitioner should have approached for settlement of the excess land or within a period of six months from the date of the order passed in appeal or in revision against his order and that the petitioner should have resorted to the special procedure prescribed by the Act of 1960. He relied on G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam, AIR 1952 SC 192 , Ram Chandra Malpani v. State of Assam, AIR 1963 Assam 168 and Kailashchandra v. District Judge, Bhopal, AIR 1963 Madh Pra 218, in support of his contention that when there is an alternative remedy, no writ petition lies. But, now it is too late in the day to advance such an argument. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the existence of an alternative remedy is not always a bar. It is pre-eminently a matter of discretion. Where the remedy suggested is not equally convenient or efficacious or effective and when it involves very onerous, expensive and lengthy proceedings, a writ lies. Vide Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1321 , Addl. Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Shantilal and Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 , Ist I.-T. Officer, Salem v. Short Brothers (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 81 , Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Commr. of Commercial Taxes, AIR 1967 SC 1401 and Surgical Dressings Mfg., Co., Pvt. Ltd., Amritsar v. Punjab State, 1968 Lab IC 722 (Punj). Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Shantilal and Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 , Ist I.-T. Officer, Salem v. Short Brothers (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 81 , Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Commr. of Commercial Taxes, AIR 1967 SC 1401 and Surgical Dressings Mfg., Co., Pvt. Ltd., Amritsar v. Punjab State, 1968 Lab IC 722 (Punj). Vide also my own latest decision in Iuwangjao Kabui v. Union of India, 1968 Lab IC 1145 (Manipur). 20. The last contention of the respondents Counsel is that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and interfere with the orders of the tribunals. He relied on the passage at pages, 2882, 2884, 2885, 2892 and 2903 in Vol. III of AIR Manual, 2nd Edition and AIR 1952 SC 192 and Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 . But, the foundation for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the existence of a legal right and its infringement. Vide K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, 1954 SCR 738 : ( AIR 1954 SC 207 ), Pramatha Nath Mitter v. Chief justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1961 Cal 545 (SB), Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 , State of Punjab v. Suraj Parkash Kapur, AIR 1963 SC 507 and State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 685 . In the present case, the petitioner had legal right to the entire land covered by the 4 boundaries mentioned in Exts. A/1 and A/2. Its right was infringed by the order of the first respondent and it is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 21. The respondents counsel pointed out that the petitioner did not make any prayer for any relief in the writ petition and that, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. It may be seen that this contention is not wholly correct. In paragraph 10 (a) the petitioner states that a rule nisi should be issued to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued quashing the impugned order and the proceedings mentioned in the writ petition. No doubt, if the entire order of the first respondent evidenced by Ext. In paragraph 10 (a) the petitioner states that a rule nisi should be issued to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued quashing the impugned order and the proceedings mentioned in the writ petition. No doubt, if the entire order of the first respondent evidenced by Ext. A/5 is set aside, that portion of the order under which he granted the settlement of the remaining 2.35 acres in favour of the petitioner will also be quashed. But, the petitioner will be entitled to settlement of the entire excess land. 22. In the result, the rule nisi is made absolute and the order of the first respondent evidenced by Ext. A/4 is set aside. It is hereby ordered that all the excess land should be settled with the petitioner Society and that the 3rd respondent should be recorded as an encroacher. The petitioner is entitled to costs. Pleaders fee - Rs. 100.00 nP. Petition allowed.