JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiff-trust Shri Deo Parashnathji at Sagar is directed against an order of the Second Additional District Judge, Sagar, dated 4th August 1967, holding that it had not been duly registered as a public Trust under the madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 and directing in terms of section 32 (1)thereof that the proceedings in suit shall remain stayed until the trust gets itself duly registered as such, ( 2. ) THE material facts are these. The parties admittedly stand in the relation of landlord and tenant. The plaintiff sued for ejectment of the defendant from a house belonging to the trust, alleging itself to have been registered as a public trust. The defendant, however, pleaded section 32 (1) as a bar to the tenability of the suit, on the ground that the trust had not been validly registered. The Minutes of the proceedings, Ex. P-11, show that the application under section 4 for its registration as a public trust had been entertained by the Deputy Commissioner, Sagar as the Registrar of Public Trusts and forwarded for enquiry and report to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Sagar. In due course, the Additional Deputy Commissioner recommended that the trust be registered as a public trust, vide his report dated 23-10-1954 to the deputy Commissioner. It, however, appears that the file, although marked to the Deputy Commissioner, was, in fact, dealt with in the final stages, by one shri S S. Shukre, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sagar, who, styling himself as the "personal Assistant and Registrar, Public Trusts, Sagar", passed the impugned order dated 12-11-1954, registering the plaintiff-trust as a public trust under section 6 of the Act. It is the validity of that order which is in question in these proceedings. ( 3. ) AFTER a trial of the relevant issues, the learned Judge had previously held that though the plaintiff was a public trust, it had not been validly registered in the manner required by law and accordingly, made a direction that it should get itself duly registered. Against that order, the plaintiff had filed Shri Deo parasnathji v, Kanhaiyalal Komalchand Godre (Civil Bern. Against that order, the plaintiff had filed Shri Deo parasnathji v, Kanhaiyalal Komalchand Godre (Civil Bern. No. 888 of 1865.) which was allowed by Shiv-dayal, J. , by his order dated 1-11-1965 and the suit remanded for a trial on the following additional issues :-"7- Whether the order dated 12-11-1951 was passed by Shri 8- S. Shukre, Personal Assistant and the Registrar of Public Trust? 8. If so, whether Shri Shukre was the authority competent to act as Registrar, Public trusts, under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951?" On issue No. 7 the learned trial Judge has now found that the impugned order, ex. P-1 dated 12-11-1954, was passed by Shri S. S. Shukre in his capacity as the personal Assistant and Registrar of Public Trust, Sagar, and on issue No. 8, that Shri Shukre was not an authority competent to act as the Registrar of Public Trusts under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951. He has further held that section 34-A, inserted by the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1964 (XVII of 1964) does not validate the impugned order, because there was no "order in writing" by the Registrar of Public trusts, delegating all or any of his powers and duties to him, as envisaged by that section. The contention that Shri S. S. Shukre had acted within his jurisdiction, in registering the plaintiff-trust as a public trust can hardly be accepted. In Shall Fariduddin v. Mohd. Akbar (1957 N L J 651.) the Nagpur Bench (Mudholkar and Kotval, JJ.) of the Bombay High Court held that the Deputy Commissioner is a persona designata under section 3 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts act and consequently he alone can act as the Registrar of Public Trusts. A similar question arose for consideration in this Court in Budhulal v Registrar of public Trusts (1864 M P L J 887.) wherein Naik and Bhargava, JJ. , following the view in Shah fariduddins case supra), held that the principles enunciated therein fully applied and as the Collector was a persona designata under the Act, he alone could act as the Registrar of Public Trusts and no one else. In that view, the learned Judges struck down an order of the Additional Collector Jabalpur, purporting to act as the Registrar of Public Trusts, stating that his action in doing so was wholly without jurisdiction. In that view, the learned Judges struck down an order of the Additional Collector Jabalpur, purporting to act as the Registrar of Public Trusts, stating that his action in doing so was wholly without jurisdiction. That being so, the question is, whether Shri s. S. Shukre was on 12-11-1954, competent to act as the Registrar of Public trusts. On that aspect, Gourishanker Agarwal (D. W. 8) has stated that at the relevant time Shri S. S. Shukre was only a Senior Deputy Collector (perhaps, what he means is that he was an Extra-Assistant Commissioner), and that testimony stands unrebutted. This indicates that Shri S. S Shukre was not the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar on 12-11-1954 and therefore had no authority to act as the Registrar of Public Trusts. Although this witness was unable to tell us who was the Deputy Commissioner or the Registrar of Public Trusts in that district on that day, the learned trial Judge has taken the care of scrutinising some of the issues of the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra of that period and these indicate that Shri T. C. A. Srinivasavardhan, I. A. S. (now on deputation to the Government of India, in the Ministry of Home Affairs) was the then deputy Commissioner of Sagar and was in that capacity, therefore, the Registrar of Public Trusts. It must accordingly be held that Shri S. S. Shukre had acted without jurisdiction in passing the order in question. ( 4. ) THE only other contention, namely, whether section 34-A, inserted by the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1964, applies to the facts of the case, really does not arise for the reason that there was no "order in writing" by the Registrar of Public Trusts, "delegating all or any of his powers", to Shri S. S. Shukre, as envisaged by that section. The futility of the contention is apparent on the terns of the section itself, which reads: "subject to the provisions of this Act and to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, the Registrar may, by order in writing, delegate all or any of his powers and duties under this Act to any revenue officer of his district not below the rank of Sub-Divisional officer. " On a plain construction of this section, it would appear that the requirements are twofold : (i) there has to be an order in writing by the Registrar, delegating all or any of his functions to any Revenue Officer; (ii) such Revenue Officer to whom the powers are delegated should not be below the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. Now, the very first requirement, namely, the existence of an "order in writing", which is a sine qua non to the applicability of the section, is not fulfilled and, therefore, there is no necessity to enquire whether the second requirement is there or not. In that view, it must be held that section 1 34-A of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, does not apply to the circumstances of the case. In dealing with this aspect, the learned Judge has observed : "the impugned order dated 12-11-54 was passed in the office of Deputy Commissioner Sagar in Case No. 72 of 1953-54 (Major Head 33 and Minor Head 9 ). This file was requisitioned in original from the office of Registrar of Public Trusts Sagar. I have carefully gone through this file with the help of the learned counsel for both the parties. I am unable to find therein any order in writing by which all or any of his powers and duties under the M. P. Public Trusts act were delegated by the Registrar of Public Trusts to Shri S. S. Shukre on or before or even after the impugned order was passed by Shri S. S Shukre on 12-11-54. Clearly the impugned order was passed by Shri Shukre without authority. I am clear in my mind that section 34-A of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1964 also does not help the plaintiff. " ( 5. ) THE learned counsel appearing for the parties have, however, urged before me the following contentions which are of some importance, namely,- (i) Whether a Distribution Memo issued by the Deputy Commissioner (now the Collector), by virtue of his powers as such, could be regarded as an "order in writing", within the meaning of section 31-A ibid: and (ii) Whether an Extra Assistant Commissioner (now a Deputy Collector)was a Revenue Officer below the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. Strictly speaking, as already stated, these questions do not arise on the facts found. Strictly speaking, as already stated, these questions do not arise on the facts found. Nevertheless, since they have been argued at some length, it has become necessary for me to deal with them, as the questions raised are of frequent occurence. ( 6. ) PRIOR to the insertion of section 34-A, there was no provision in the act for the delegation of his powers by the Registrar of Public Trusts. However, in keeping with the principle that the grant of express power carries with it by necessary implication all subsidiary and ancillary powers which are reasonably necessary for its effective exercise, a provision was made in section 34, enabling the delegation of an enquiry to a subordinate agency, namely,-"where in any case an enquiry is to be made by the Registrar under this Act, he may himself make the enquiry or may forward the case for investigation and report to any revenue officer not below the rank of a Deputy Collector. " The Registrar could under that section himself make an enquiry in any case, or, forward the same "for investigation and report" to any Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner (now a Deputy Collector ). That, however, was not a provision for "delegation of powers" under the Act, and there could admittedly be no delegation by the Registrar beyond the letter of the section. ( 7. ) IN view of the multifarious duties which the Deputy Commissioner had to perform, it was not possible for Deputy Commissioners to carry out the functions of the Registrar of Public Trusts, and invariably it became a matter of practice for them to assign their powers under the Act to Additional Deputy commissioners or to officers subordinate to them. In Budhalals case (supra), naik and Bhargava J J. , stated that an Additional Deputy Commissioner could not arrogate to himself nor could he be delegated the powers to perform the functions of a Registrar of Public Trusts, notwithstanding the provision contained under section -A (3) of the G. P. Land Revenue Act, 1917, which empowered an Additional Deputy Commissioner to exercise all the powers and discharge all the duties imposed on a Deputy Commissioner under that Act, or, by any other enactment, in respect of cases or class of cases made over to him by the deputy Commissioner of the district. That conclusion rested on their view that a Deputy Commissioner acted as a persona designata under section 3 (1) of the Act and consequently, he alone could function as the Registrar of Public trusts. An Additional Deputy Commissioner could not, therefore, exercise the powers and for perform the duties imposed upon the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Public Trusts Act, by reason of mere allocation of such work to him by the Deputy Commissioner. A fortiori, an officer subordinate to him, viz. , an Extra Assistant Commissioner, could not have usurped to himself nor could he be delegated any of the powers and duties of the Registrar of Public Trusts. ( 8. ) WHILE interpreting a provision like section 34-A it must be borne in mind that statutory powers cannot be assigned without statutory authority to do so. It must, therefore, bear a strict construction. Now, that section speaks of an "order in writing" by the Registrar of Public Trusts, delegating all, or any of his powers and duties under the Act. The words used obviously contemplate the making of a separate "order in writing? by the Registrar after due application of his mind, and not a mere administrative direction in the nature of a Distribution memo issued by a Deputy Commissioner (now the collector) for allocation of revenue work within his district. There is a distinction between an order of delegation of certain statutory functions and the administrative power of allocating business to particular officers. Even assuming that a delegation of powers under section 34-A is an administrative function, nevertheless such delegation could not be achieved by the issue,. of, a Distribution Memo for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the section speaks of the Registrar of Public Trusts and not the Deputy Commissioner of a district. Secondly, the making of an "order in writing" has to be after due application of his mind, and, therefore, it is not a mere ministerial act. Thirdly, issuance of a Distribution memo implies the existence of a power in several persons, and it merely allocates the work for administrative convenience, while a delegation under section 34-A results in conferral of jurisdiction on a particular officer in respect of functions of a quasi-judicial nature. In my view, when section 34-A speaks of an. Thirdly, issuance of a Distribution memo implies the existence of a power in several persons, and it merely allocates the work for administrative convenience, while a delegation under section 34-A results in conferral of jurisdiction on a particular officer in respect of functions of a quasi-judicial nature. In my view, when section 34-A speaks of an. "order in writing", it implies the making of a general or special order by the Registrar of Public Trusts in his capacity as such, which must clearly define the nature of the functions that are assigned thereby. ( 9. ) EVEN if a Distribution Memo could be regarded as a general order by the Registrar of Public Trusts resulting in a delegation of all, or, any of his powers under the Act, the question would still remain whether such delegation of powers to Shri S. S. Shukre was permissible in terms of section 34-A. The answer to that question must be in the affirmative, for reasons I shall presently state. Although Shri Shukre was not the Sub-Divisional Officer of Sagar but an Extra Assistant Commissioner who was functioning as the Personal Assistant to the Collector, still he was not an officer below the rank of a Sub-Divisional officer. Under section 12 (1) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, 1917, the government was empowered to place an Assistant Commissioner of the First class in charge of one or more sub-divisions of a district, and such Assistant commissioner was called a Sub-Divisional Officer, who exercised the powers specified under second schedule thereof. It is urged by the non-applicant that all Revenue Officers were by reason of sections 10 and 13, subordinate to the sub-Divisional Officer, but that contention cannot be accepted. Section 10 dealt with different categories of Revenue Officers. No doubt, it placed a Sub-Divisional Officer higher than an Extra Assistant Commissioner, but this was a mere placement of Revenue Officers with reference to the nature of their duties under the Act. That did not imply that an Extra Assistant Commissioner was necessarily lower in rank to a Sub-Divisional Officer because the latter himself was drawn from the cadre of Assistant Commissioners. Now, the expression "assistant Commissioner" has been defined in section 2 (2) to include an Extra Assistant Commissioner. Under section 12 (1) the State government was empowered to place any Assistant Commissioner of the. Now, the expression "assistant Commissioner" has been defined in section 2 (2) to include an Extra Assistant Commissioner. Under section 12 (1) the State government was empowered to place any Assistant Commissioner of the. First class in charge of one or more sub-divisions of a district. The classification of extra Assistant Commissioners of the First and Second Classes depended upon their passing Departmental Examinations, and there was nothing sacrosanct of an Extra Assistant Commissioner being placed in the First Class because all that it implied was that he had passed the Departmental Examination and. was, therefore, eligible for appointment as a Sub- Divisional Officer. It would thus appear that a Sub-Divisional Officer did not belong to any separate cadre of his own which was higher in rank than that of an Extra Assistant Commissioner. In the old Mahakoshal region, an Assistant Commissioner of the First Class could either be an officer belonging to the Indian Administrative Service or be drawn from the cadre of Extra Assistant Commissioners of the First Class. A sub Divisional Officer could, therefore, be an Extra Assistant Commissioner of the First Class, i. e. , be of the same cadre, and, therefore, equal in rank. ( 10. ) SECTION 13 did not make Extra Assistant Commissioners subordinate in rank to a Sub-Divisional Officer. That section merely provided that unless otherwise directed by the Commissioner, every Revenue Officer in a Sub-Division would be subordinate to a Sub-Divisional Officer. Now, the officers who were subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Officer in a Sub-Division were (i) the Tahsildar, and (ii) his Naib Tahsildars. For all these reasons, it must be held that the second requirement of section 34-A was fulfilled in the preens case. That conclusion, however, would be of no avail to the applicant, because of the admitted non-fulfilment of the first requirement, namely, the absence of an order in writing by the Registrar of Public Trusts delegating his powers to Shri S. S. Shukre. What appears to have happened is this. As mentioned earlier, the application for registration of the plaint;ff-trust under. section 4 had been entertained by the Deputy Commissioner in his capacity as the Registrar, who forwarded the same for enquiry and report to the Additional deputy Commissioner. What appears to have happened is this. As mentioned earlier, the application for registration of the plaint;ff-trust under. section 4 had been entertained by the Deputy Commissioner in his capacity as the Registrar, who forwarded the same for enquiry and report to the Additional deputy Commissioner. The Additional Deputy Commissioners report, although marked to the Deputy Commissioner, was dealt with by Shri S. S. Shukre, being his Personal Assistant, treating this to be a routine matter, along with other administrative papers. It is needless for me to stress that the procedure adopted was wholly irregular, and the order impugned must, therefore, be regarded as nullity. ( 11. ) MUCH of this discussion, though academic in nature because section 34-A does not on its terms apply to the facts of the present case, is, however, necessary in order that the powers that be, may realise the inadequacy of the madhya Pradesh Public Trusts (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1964, which has failed to achieve the object and purpose for which the legislation was enacted. That object, as stated in the long title of that Act, is : "validation of all things done, proceedings and actions taken and orders passed under the principal Act. " No doubt, a provision like section 34-A had to be introduced, in keeping with the decision of this Court in Dayalal Meghji and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1962 MPLJ 849 -A I R 1962 M P 343.) wherein Dixit G. J. and Pandey J. laid down:, "an invalid or illegal act can be validated by a subsequent statute of the competent legislative authority if the validating statute authorises the doing of the act at the time when it was done. In the absence of such authorisation for the doing of the act, the validation would be futile as that would only amount to an attempt to exercise a power which ex hypothesis did not exist. " The mere insertion of section 34-A in the principal Act as a provision enabling the delegation of powers by the Registrar of Public Trusts would not, however, ipso facto, result in any ex post facto delegation. " The mere insertion of section 34-A in the principal Act as a provision enabling the delegation of powers by the Registrar of Public Trusts would not, however, ipso facto, result in any ex post facto delegation. It would still be necessary, in view of the language used in that section, to enquire in each case when the question arises, whether in that case there was, in fact, an order in writing by the Registrar, delegating all, or, any of his powers under the Act. Although section 34-A has been given a retrospective effect by section 3 of the Validating act, and has to be read and construed as if it had formed part of the principal act from the commencement thereof, that section not being factually in existence, there would not, in actual practice, be any such order, as contemplated by its terms. From a practical point of view the efficacy of section 34-A is, therefore, somewhat illusory. ( 12. ) WE are then left with section 4 of the Validating Act which reads: "4. Validation of things done, actions and proceedings taken and orders passed by certain officers under the principal Act-Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal act, all things done, proceedings and actions taken and orders passed by the officers whose names and designation are specified in the Schedule below purporting to act as Registrar under the principal Act at any time prior to the 10th July, 1964 shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been, validly done, taken or passed as if the Registrar of the district to which they were for the time being posted had, at all material times empowered them in this behalf under section 34-A and the validity of any such thing done, action or proceedings taken or order passed shall not be called into question in any Court of law or before any authority whatsoever, on the ground of defect in the delegation of powers to any such officer. " The ambit of this section has been curtailed for no apparent reason, by the use of the expression "certain officers" in the long title, and the use of the words "by the officers whose names and designation are specified in the Schedule below", along with the enumeration of certain 20 officers by name and designation in the Schedule appended. In my view, this was wholly unnecessary. In my view, this was wholly unnecessary. The result of this strange provision is that the validation is only in respect of proceedings taken and order passed by Additional Collectors in the districts of jabalpur and Durg alone. Whether the curtailment of the operation of section 4 was by deliberate design or was merely a draftsmans mistake, it is necessary that appropriate legislation is introduced for removing the lacuna which appears, by extending the operation of that section to all the districts of the old mahakoshal region. If I may say so, there is no reasonable basis for such discriminatory legislation which restricts validation to certain districts only. It may be that in the districts of Jabalpur and Durg such defect existed in a large number of cases where orders had been passed by Additional Collector, but that hardly justifies in restricting the operation of the section when similar defect existed in other districts as well. ( 13. ) THE result is that the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50, if certified. Application dismissed.