F Shamsuddin And Brothers v. The Special Tahsildar For Land Acquisition
1969-02-10
V.P.GOPALAN NAMBIYAR
body1969
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. 1. This writ petition is to quash the land acquisition proceedings in respect of T.S. 52 Block No. 1 Ward 11 of Calicut Municipality. The land sought to be acquired measures 12 cents, and contains two houses. The S.4 notification was published in the Kerala Gazette dated 10-7-1962 and S.6 declaration, in the gazette dated 16-7-1962. The proceedings were initiated under the (Central) Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, and the urgency provisions were invoked to the acquisition under S.17(4) of that Act. Para.6 of the counter affidavit admits that proceedings subsequent to S.6 declaration were continued under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act 1961 (Kerala Act 21 of 1962) which came into force on 1-4-1963 and that the award was passed on 31-10-1966, under S.11 of the said Act. 2. On these facts, Counsel for the petitioner raised three points: (1) that the acquisition was for a company under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and therefore S.17 would not be available; (2) that the invocation of the urgency clause was not proper and justified, as the land in question was neither waste nor arable land with respect to which alone the urgency provisions could be invoked; and (3) that the proceedings having been started under the Central Acquisition Act 1894 could not be continued, under the Kerala Act and therefore proceedings subsequent to the S.6 declaration are liable to be quashed. 3. Regarding the first point, the petitioner's arguments were based on the submission that the acquisition was for the St. Vincent Industrials, Kozhikode. Para.2 and 8 of the counter affidavit make it clear that the acquisition was for the Industrial Training Centre St. Vincent Industrials, Kozhikode. The files produced by Counsel appearing for the Respondents also have made the position clear that the acquisition was for the purpose of housing the Industrial Training Centre needed for the trainees. However, even in Para.8 of the counter affidavit, it is stated: "The contention of the petitioner in ground B is untenable. As the acquisition is for the Industrial Training Centre, the exercise of powers of S.17 has been invoked and it comes under the definition of S.17(2)(b). Sub clause (1) of clause (6) of S.17(2) provides that the land can be acquired for the purpose of any library or educational institution.
As the acquisition is for the Industrial Training Centre, the exercise of powers of S.17 has been invoked and it comes under the definition of S.17(2)(b). Sub clause (1) of clause (6) of S.17(2) provides that the land can be acquired for the purpose of any library or educational institution. The acquisition in question is for housing the Industrial Training Centre needed for the trainees which comes under the definition of Educational Institutions. The St. Vincent's Industrials, Kozhikode is owned by the Catholic Diocese of Calicut which is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 and it is a 'Company' as defined in the Land Acquisition Act. It is not denied that the Catholic Diocese of Calicut is a Society registered as detailed and therefore, it is a 'company'. That being so and St. Vincents Industrials being only one of the Institutions owned by the diocese, I submit that the acquisition in this case is for Company'. In view of the statement in the counter affidavit I shall proceed on the basis that the acquisition was for a company. Even so, what was urged by counsel for the petitioner was that by S.39 of the Act, the provisions of S.6 to 37 shall not be enforced except with the previous consent of the Government and after execution of an agreement with the company; and that under S.40, such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government is satisfied either on the report of the Collector, under S.5A(2) or by an enquiry held as provided, about the matters specified in clauses (a) and (b) of S.40(2). Clauses (2) and (3) of S.40 provide the manner in which the enquiry is to be held. It was argued that the satisfaction by a Report under sub-section 2 of S.5A is a necessary preliminary to the according of the sanction under S.40(1) and that the same cannot possibly be had if the enquiry under S.5-A be dispensed with, under S.17(4). There is a fundamental fallacy underlying this argument. On the terms of the S.40 the consent can be given not only on satisfaction arrived at from a report under S.5A, but even after an enquiry held as provided under Clause.2 and 3 of S.40.
There is a fundamental fallacy underlying this argument. On the terms of the S.40 the consent can be given not only on satisfaction arrived at from a report under S.5A, but even after an enquiry held as provided under Clause.2 and 3 of S.40. There was a satisfaction after such enquiry in this case, and the argument of the petitioner's counsel, that by reason of S.40(1), the dispensation of the enquiry under S.5A was not valid and proper must fail. 4. It was then contended that the land acquired is neither 'waste' nor 'arable' land in respect of which alone immediate possession could be taken under S.17(1), and in respect of which an invocation of the urgency clause, could be made under S.17(4). That the land acquired is neither 'waste' nor 'arable' land seems clear enough from its uncontroverted description as of an extent of 12 cents in the heart of the Calicut Municipality with two buildings standing thereon. This cannot certainly be waste land, nor can it be arable land (vide Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. The State of U.P. ( AIR 1967 SC 1081 ). But the power to invoke the urgency clause is conferred by Clause.4 of S.17 of the Act which reads as follows: "17 - (4). In the case of any land to which in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of S.5A shall not apply and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under S.6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under S.4, sub-section (1).
and S.17(2) of the Act reads: "17 - (2): Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances: "Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof atleast forty eight hours' notice of his intention so to do or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience." The above clause has been amended by Madras Act 21 of 1948. S.2 of which, in so far as is material, reads as follows: "In S.17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (a) to sub-section (1), the following Explanation shall be added, namely: - "Explanation - This sub-section shall apply to any waste or arable land, notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or temporary structures such as huts, pantals, or sheds." (b) in the first paragrpah of sub-section (2) (i) before the word "Whenever" at the commencement, the following shall be inserted, namely:- "In the following cases that is to say" (ii) the portion beginning with the word "Whenever" and ending with the words "access to any such station" shall be lettered as clause (a) and after the clause as so lettered the following clause shall be inserted, namely:- "(b) whenever in the opinion of the Collector it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land - (i) for the purpose of any library or educational institution'. 5. The result of this Madras Amendment is, that S.17(2) of the Act, in its application to cases governed by the Madras amendment (that the present case is governed by the amendment is not disputed) stands enlarged and widened to the extent of the various clauses introduced by the said amendment.
5. The result of this Madras Amendment is, that S.17(2) of the Act, in its application to cases governed by the Madras amendment (that the present case is governed by the amendment is not disputed) stands enlarged and widened to the extent of the various clauses introduced by the said amendment. Such was the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Government (AIR 1964 SC 121) and Sarju Prasad Saha v. The State of U.P. ( AIR 1965 SC 1763 ). In those decisions of the Supreme Court the amendment introduced by U.P. Government to S.17(1) of the Central Land Acquisition Act was by way of an adding a separate clause as clause A to S.17(1) of the Act between 17(1) and 17(2). It was held that so long as S.17(4) did not contain any corresponding amendment, but was restricted only to S.17(1)(2), the amendment introduced by S.17(1)(A) could not be comprehended within S.17(4). But here the position is different. By the Madras Amendment, clause (2) of the Central Land Acquisition has, so to say, been substituted by a new clause. As pointed out by my learned brother Govindan Nair J. in his judgment in O.P. No. 2467 of 1962, as a result of such substitution, the substituted clause (2) introduced by the amendment is available for action under S.17(4). What is relied on in support of the present acquisition, is the portion of the above amendment referring to acquisition for the purpose of any library or educational institution. From the averments in Para.2 and 8 of the counter affidavit and from a perusal of the files, I am satisfied that this was an acquisition for the purpose of an educational institution, and therefore the invocation of the provisions of S.17(4) of the Act was proper and valid. 6. The last of the contentions urged by the petitioner's counsel is well founded, and must be accepted. It was ruled in Gopinatha Pillai v. The State of Kerala and another ( 1968 KLT 205 ) that proceedings initiated under the Cochin or Travancore Land Acquisition Act, cannot be continued under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, subsequent to its coming into force. It was further held that they cannot be continued thereafter even under the provisions of the prior Acts.
It was further held that they cannot be continued thereafter even under the provisions of the prior Acts. The former of these propositions was sustained on appeal in the judgment in Writ Appeals 191, 193 and 194 of 1967. The latter, was left open. Whether the proceedings can be continued or not under the provisions of the Central Land Acquisition Act subsequent to the passing of the Kerala Act, it is clear in the face of the above rulings, that the continuance of the proceedings subsequent to S.6 declaration under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act cannot be sustained. 7. I therefore allow this O.P. and quash all proceedings relating to the acquisition subsequent to S.6 declaration. 8. The O.P. is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.