JAGAT NARAYAN, J.—This is a plaintiffs revision application against an order of the Civil Judge, Ajmer, setting aside an award which was made in his favour. This order was confirmed on appeal by the learned District Judge, Ajmer. 2. The material facts are these. Shri Lajpat Rai, plaintiff, was appointed a lecturer in the D.A.V. College, Ajmer, on 16 7-51. He was confirmed on 16-7-53 on 28-9-53 and an agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant incorporating the terms of his employment. The defendant is the Arya Samaj Shiksha Sabha, Ajmer. It is a registered body, which runs the D. A. V. College, Ajmer. Para 9 of this agreement provides for termination of the services of the plaintiff on the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (f). Para 11 of the agreement provides for arbitration in case of any dispute arising from the termination of services, fey a tribunal consisting of the Vice-Chancellor for the time being of the Agra University, a judicial officer not below the rank of the District Judge nominated by the Chancellor and a person (not connected with the D. A. V. College, Ajmer) nominated by the Executive Council of the Agra University. 3. The plaintiff felt aggrieved by the order terminating his services and on his application a Tribunal was appointed in accordance with the agreement consisting of the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University, the District Judge of Agra as nominee of the Chancellor and Shri R. G. Gupta, Advocate, as nominee of the Executive Council of the Agra University. 4. Before the above Tribunal held a sitting, it was discovered by the Chancellor of the Agra University that the D. A. V. College, Ajmer, had ceased to be affiliated to the Agra University. He accordingly sought legal opinion and was advised that the authorities of the Agra University had no jurisdiction to appoint a Tribunal to decide the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant Under the direction of the Chancellor his Secretary wrote a letter dated 26-12-1957 to the Registrar of the Agra University embodying the above opinion. The Registrar of the Agra University thereupon sent all the papers pertaining to the case to the Registrar of the Rajasthan University for taking such action as the latter University may think fit to take. 5. The Registrar of the Agra University thereupon sent all the papers pertaining to the case to the Registrar of the Rajasthan University for taking such action as the latter University may think fit to take. 5. The Syndicate of the Rajasthan University thereupon passed a special resolution appointing a Tribunal to decide the dispute. This Tribunal consisted of the Vice Chancellor of the Rajasthan University, Shri L. S. Mehta, District Judge, Jaipur City as Chancellors nominee and Shri S. S. Saxena, Director of Education, Rajasthan as the nominee of the Executive Council of the Rajasthan University. 6. Both the parties appeared before the above Tribunal and after considering the evidence produced by them and after hearing the parties it gave an award in favour of the plaintiff. It held that none of the charges brought against the plaintiff by the defendant had been substantiated and the termination of his services was wrongful. It also held that the order terminating his services was void as the defendant had failed to get approval of the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University to the order as provided under section 25-C (2) of the Agra University Act 1926. Further it held that the order was bad as the prior approval of the Education Department was not taken in accordance with the circular letter of the Director of Education, Ajmer No. 3453—3562/52 dated 27-2-52. The operative part of the award runs as follows:– "In the result we hold that the impugned order of the D.A.V. College management, terminating the services of Shri Agarwal, is inoperative and that Shri Agarwal should be treated as a member of the service of the D.A.V. College. Ajmer, with effect from the date of his services had been terminated and we further hold that he is entitled to recover all the arrears of his salary." 7. The plaintiff filed an application in the Court of Civil Judge, Ajmer, on 30-5 59 for getting the award filed in Court for passing a decree in accordance with it. This application was registered as a suit and summons was issued for the defendant for 15-7-59. On 7 7-59 Shri D D. Bhargava, Advocate, appeared before the Court on behalf of the defendant and on 6-8-59 he filed an application, in which two objections were taken against the award. This application was registered as a suit and summons was issued for the defendant for 15-7-59. On 7 7-59 Shri D D. Bhargava, Advocate, appeared before the Court on behalf of the defendant and on 6-8-59 he filed an application, in which two objections were taken against the award. One was that there was an error apparent on the face of it inasmuch as the contract embodied in the agreement was for personal service and could not be specifically enforced in view of sec. 21 of the Specific Relief Act. The other was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award as it was not constituted in accordance with the agreement between the parties. 8. The first objection was upheld by both the courts below. They did not go into the second objection. 9. So far as the first objection is concerned, the ground, on which it was upheld by the courts below, is not correct. Sec 25-C(2) of the Agra University Act runs as follows : — "Every decision by the management of an affiliated college, other than a college maintained by Government, to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith to the Vice Chancellor and, subject to the provisions to be made by the Statutes, shall not take effect until it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor." 10. On behalf of the defendant it was alleged that the approval of the Vice Chance lor to the removal of the plaintiff was taken on 31-1-1957. The letter of the Vice Chancellor indicating his approval was not produced before the Tribunal. But assuming that approval was communicated on 31-1-1957, this cannot be regarded as an approval of the decision of the management to terminate the services of the plaintiff. The Managing Committee took a decision to terminate the services of the plaintiff on 8-3-57. No approval of the Vice Chancellor taken before that date could bring into effect the decision of the Managing Committee under the provision of sec.25-G (2) of the Agra University Act. 11. The Managing Committee took a decision to terminate the services of the plaintiff on 8-3-57. No approval of the Vice Chancellor taken before that date could bring into effect the decision of the Managing Committee under the provision of sec.25-G (2) of the Agra University Act. 11. If the D.A.V. College, Ajmer had remained affiliated to the Agra University after 8-3-57, the decision of the Managing Committee dated 8-3-57 to terminate the services of the plaintiff would not have come into effect and the order of the Tribunal holding that the plaintiff continued in the service of the D. A. V. College, Ajmer, would have been correct. In that case the plaintiff would have been entitled to reinstatement and to the arrears of salary from the date of his reinstatement. The circular letter of the Director of Education of Ajmer dated 27-2-52 had no statutory force and non-compliance with it could not make the order terminating the services of the plaintiff void. The Director of Education, Ajmer, could only have stopped the Government aid to the institution for not complying with the direction contained in it. 12. I am however, of the opinion that the statutory safeguard, which plaintiff had under sec. 25-C(2) of the Agra University Act, no longer remained available to him when the D. A. V. College, Ajmer, ceased to remain affiliated with the Agra University. The following notification appeared in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 14-2-1957 EDUCATION (B) DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Jaipur, February 5, 1957 No. D. l9346/Edu./B/56.—It is hereby notified that consequent on the Reorganization of States all Degree Colleges in the Ajmer area affiliated to the University of Agra will henceforth be affiliated to the University of Rajputana. 13. Steps for completion of necessary formalities with the two Universities have already been taken. S. P. SINGH BHANDARI Secretary to the Government. 14. The D. A. V. College, Ajmer, ceased to remain affiliated to the Agra University and was affiliated to the Rajasthan University before the order dated 8 3 57 was passed by the management. The Rajasthan University Act does not contain any provision similar to that contained in sec. 25-C(2) of the Agra University Act. 15. 14. The D. A. V. College, Ajmer, ceased to remain affiliated to the Agra University and was affiliated to the Rajasthan University before the order dated 8 3 57 was passed by the management. The Rajasthan University Act does not contain any provision similar to that contained in sec. 25-C(2) of the Agra University Act. 15. The provision with regard to arbitration of any dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant contained in para 11 of the agreement was incorporated on account of mandatory direction contained in statute 6 framed under the Agra University Act which was in force when the agreement dated 28-9-53 was executed. In 1954 it was embodied in the Agra University Act by the addition of sec. 25 C(l). Sec. 25-C(2) was added to the Agra University Act at the same time. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff is that under sec. 120 and 121 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, he continued to remain entitled to the same safeguards after the formation of Rajasthan and after the affiliation of the D.A.V. College, Ajmer to the Rajasthan University. These sections read as follows : "120. Power to adapt laws.—For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of one year from the appointed day, by order make such adaptation and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. "Explanation—In this section, the expression "appropriate Government" means— (a) as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in the Union List, the Central Government ; and (b) as respects any other law— (i) in its application to a Part A State, the State Government, and (ii) in its application to a Part C State, the Central Government. "121. Power to construe laws—Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under sec. "121. Power to construe laws—Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under sec. 120 for the adoption of a laws before the appointed day, any court, tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to any State formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, construe the law in such manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the court, tribunal or authority." 16. In my opinion the above sections have no application to the present case. The D. A. V. College, Ajmer, could have continued to remain affiliated to the Agra University inspite of the merger of Ajmer with Rajasthan. The Agra University Act was not a law applying to the erstwhile State of Ajmer. It only applied to such colleges as were affiliated to the Agra University. The Rajasthan University Act also does not apply to all the colleges situated in Rajasthan. It is only applicable to such Colleges as are affiliated to the Rajasthan University. 17. It is note-worthy that sec. 25-C(2) was added to the Agra University Act in 1954 after the plaintiff and the defendant entered into the agreement dated 28-9-53. The provision contained in the subsection became applicable when it was enacted and ceased to apply when the D. A. V. College, Ajmer, ceased to remain affiliated to the Agra University. 18. I accordingly hold that the order of removal passed against the plaintiff by the management on 8-3-57 was not void. It was merely wrongful as held by the Tribunal. There was an error apparent on the face of the award inasmuch as it was held in it that the plaintiff continued in service. But on the finding that the removal of the plaintiff from service was wrongful, he would be entitled to damages for wrongful termination of his services. The courts below erred in dismissing the application of the plaintiff under sec. 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act. The award should have been remitted to the Tribunal for determining what damages for wrongful dismissal should be awarded to the plaintiff. 19. The defendant filed D. B. Civil Writ No. 213 of 1959 against the plaintiff, the members of the Tribunal and the University of Rajasthan, in which both the parties filed a number of documents. The award should have been remitted to the Tribunal for determining what damages for wrongful dismissal should be awarded to the plaintiff. 19. The defendant filed D. B. Civil Writ No. 213 of 1959 against the plaintiff, the members of the Tribunal and the University of Rajasthan, in which both the parties filed a number of documents. By the consent of the parties, these documents were read in evidence in this case. At page 31 of this file is a copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan in the Education Department to the Registrar of the Rajputana University dated 29-1-1957, which runs as follows : "I am directed to inform you that consequent on the integration of Ajmer Mewara in Rajasthan it will be in the fitness of things that the following four colleges of Ajmer Mewara are affiliated to the University of Rajputana with immediate effect. The terms and conditions on which these colleges have enjoyed recognition from the Agra University can be taken as the basis of recognition : 1. Government College, Ajmer. 2. D. A. V. College, Ajmer. 3. Savitri Girls College, Ajmer. 4. Government College, Beawar. "Early steps may kindly be taken to do this so that the staff of these four colleges in Ajmer Mewara may enjoy the advantages of the new elections that are likely to take place in the University of Rajputana for the various University Bodies. "The question of examinations of 1957 and 1958 is left to the University of Rajputana to arrange and negotiate with the University of Agra. So far as the Government is concerned, these colleges now are affiliated to the University of Rajputana." 20. On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that under the above order the provisions of the Agra University Act and statutes continued to apply to the D. A.V. College, Ajmer. In my opinion there is no such order contained in this letter. Only a suggestion had been made by the Government that the terms and conditions on which the colleges named in the letter had enjoyed recognition from the Agra University may be taken as the basis of recognition. 21. In my opinion there is no such order contained in this letter. Only a suggestion had been made by the Government that the terms and conditions on which the colleges named in the letter had enjoyed recognition from the Agra University may be taken as the basis of recognition. 21. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that the parties agreed to the arbitration of the dispute by a Tribunal consisting of the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University, a judicial officer nominated by the Chancellor of the Agra University., a nominee of the Executive Council of the Agra University and the Tribunal which adjudicated the dispute consisting of the Vice Chancellor of the Rajasthan University, judicial officer nominated by the Chancellor of the Rajasthan University and a nominee of the Syndicate (Executive Council) of the Rajasthan University, had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The reply on behalf of the plaintiff to this contention is that the defendant is estopped from raising this objection now, as the defendant appeared before the Tribunal and contested the claim of the plaintiff before it without disputing its jurisdiction. 22. The factual position is this. The plaintiff filed his written claim before the Registrar of the Rajasthan University. The Registrar sent a copy of this claim to the defendant and asked for a reply This reply was sent to the Registrar with the following covering letter, which is at page 105 of the file of the writ petition:— "589/11/59. 5th Nov., 1958. To The Registrar, University of Rajasthan, JAIPUR. Subject :—Tribunal Appointed to consider the petition of Shri L. R. Agarwal. Dear Sir, Please refer to your letter No. Ar/849/41868 dated the 5th September, 1952 alongwith copy of the written statement submitted by Shri Lajpat Rai Agarwal in regard to the termination of his services by this College. Enclosed please find a reply (5 copies) to the petitioners statement along with following enclosures :— 1. Appendix I and II. 2. Charge sheet. 3. Shri L. R. Agarwals reply. 4. 47 copies of correspondence etc. I may, however, add that since the University while appointing the Tribunal has also raised the question of the legality of the matter, this reply is without prejudice to any right of the management to question the legal basis of Universitys reference of the case to the Tribunal or its decision. 4. 47 copies of correspondence etc. I may, however, add that since the University while appointing the Tribunal has also raised the question of the legality of the matter, this reply is without prejudice to any right of the management to question the legal basis of Universitys reference of the case to the Tribunal or its decision. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Tara Chand Secretary, Dayanand (A.V.) College, AJMER." The argument on behalf of the defendant is that in the beginning the Registrar carried on the correspondence on behalf of the Tribunal and so the recital contained in the last para of the above letter to the effect that the reply was without prejudice to any right of the management to question the legal basis of the Universitys reference of the case of the Tribunal, should be taken to be an objection raised before the Tribunal. I am unable to accept this contention. There is no material from which it can be inferred that this letter was ever brought to the notice of the Tribunal or to the notice of the plaintiff or that it formed a part of the record of the Tribunal. Further no objection was taken even in this letter that the Tribunal appointed by the Rajasthan University was not competent to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. What was mentioned was that the reply was being filed without prejudice to any objection which the defendant might raise in future regarding (1) the legal basis of the reference of the case by the Rajasthan University to the Tribunal, and (2) the decision which might ultimately be given by the Tribunal. This did not amount to taking an objection that the Tribunal was not competent to decide the dispute. It is not disputed that no such objection was taken by the defendant in the presence of the Tribunal when it heard the case. I am firmly of the opinion that the defendant having taken a chance of getting a favourable decision from the Tribunal could not turn round and challenge its jurisdiction when the award went against it. 23. This Tribunal could have adjudicated upon the dispute with the consent of the parties. The defendant by his conduct intimated that he had no objection to the dispute being decided by it although it could not do so lawfully. 23. This Tribunal could have adjudicated upon the dispute with the consent of the parties. The defendant by his conduct intimated that he had no objection to the dispute being decided by it although it could not do so lawfully. Thereby he induced the plaintiff to prosedute his case before the Tribunal which he might not have done if an objection had been taken. The defendant is therefore estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 24. This view is supported by both Indian and English authorities. I may refer to the following cases :— Abdul Shakur vs. Muhammad Yusuf (1); Jagmohan vs. Suraj Narain (2); Arbn. Jupiter General Insec. Co. Ltd. vs. Corporation of Calcutta (3); Union of India vs. K.P. Mandal; (4) Pioneer Engineering Works vs. Union of India (5); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dalmia Iron and Steel Ltd. (6); Chowdhari Murataza Hossein vs. Muasumat Bibi Bechunnissa (7) Donald Campbell & Co. vs. Jeshraj Girdhari Lal (8); and Macaura vs. Northern Assurance Company, Limited, and others (9). 25. In the Union of India vs. K. P. Mandal (4) (supra) the arbitration clause in a contract for execution of certain work by A with the Government of India provided that except where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and disputes arising out of or relating to the contract would be referred to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer, Eastern Aviation Circle II. Disputes arose between the parties and the Government appointed one M. as an arbitrator to adjudicate on the made by it against A and informed A about the appointment. Both the parties knew that in was not competent to act as arbitrator according to qualification laid down by the arbitration clause. A not only submitted to the arbitration of M on the Governments claim but also put forward a counter-claim against the Government for adjudication by the same arbitrator. He took part in the proceedings from beginning to end. He agreed to extensions of time for filing the award and when the award went against him sought to set aside the award on the ground that M was not competent to act as arbitrator. It was held that the rule of estoppel binds A and prevented him from contending that M was not qualified under the terms of the agreement of arbitration in the dispute. It was held that the rule of estoppel binds A and prevented him from contending that M was not qualified under the terms of the agreement of arbitration in the dispute. It was observed in this case: "A representation in order to attract the rule of estoppel need not always be a representation of a physical fact, but may as well be the representation of an attitude or a state of mind, inasmuch as the state of mans mind is as much a matter of fact as the state of his digestion. "If a man, either by words or by conduct, has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words, or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. "Generally speaking, if a party has an interest to prevent an act being done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge act not to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license." 26. On behalf of the defendant it was sought to distinguish the above case on the ground that a counterclaim was put forward there by the party subsequently raising an objection and it had asked the arbitrator to adjudicate upon it. That, in my opinion, makes no difference. The principle underlying the decision is that the court will not permit any of the parties to lie by or act in an indecisive manner as to obtain the benefit of the award if it is in his favour and endeavour to have it set aside if it is not This principle in fully applicable to the present case, the facts of which are similar to the facts of the case in Union of India vs. K.P. Mandal(4) (supra).There the arbitration was done by another Superintending Engineer in place of the Superintending Engineer named in the arbitration agreement. In the present case the Tribunal was constituted of corresponding authorities of the University of Rajasthan instead of those of the University of Agra, which was provided for in the agreement. 27. The defendant was unable to cite any authority in which a different view might have been taken. The facts of Khurdah Go. Ltd. vs. Raymon & Go. (India) Private Ltd.(10) are distinguishable. In that case the contract was void as it was prohibited by the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1958. The arbitration agreement formed part of this contract and was, therefore, equally void. It was held that the arbitrators were not competent to decide the question of the validity of the contract. It was observed that the agreement of reference being void there was no submission which was alive on which the arbitrators could act and the proceedings before them were wholly without jurisdiction. In the present case it is not disputed that the agreement of reference was valid. 28. I would like to make it clear that the principle enunciated above is only applicable to the case of an arbitration tribunal where parties have agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration under a private agreement. This principle is not appli-cable to a statutory or judicial tribunal. For the parties can by their consent confer jurisdiction on an arbitrater not named in the agreement. But by such consent they cannot confer jurisdiction on a statutory or judicial tribunal. 29. Sec. 16(1) of the Arbitration Act runs as follows : "16(1) "The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit — (a) where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matter, refered; or (b) where the award is so idefinite as to be incapable of execution; or (c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it." 30. The above provision empowers the court to remit any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators for reconsideration. The above provision empowers the court to remit any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators for reconsideration. The decision of the Tribunal that the termination of the service of the plaintiff was wrongful, does not suffer from any error apparent upon the face of the record. But its decision that the plaintiff conti-nued in service and is entitled to recover all the arrears of his salary with effect from the date from which his services were terminated to the date of his reinstatement is erroneous in the law on the face of it. The written statement of claim filed before the Tribunal by the plaintiff is at pages 132 to 135 of the writ petition. In this he has claimed damages for wrongful dismissal. This was one of the matters referred to the Tribunal for decision. The Tribunal can be asked to reconsider the limited question as to what damages the plaintiff is entitled. 31. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that para 11 did not authorise the Tribunal to determine the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled for the wrongful termination of his service. I am unable to accept this contention. Under para 11 "any dispute arising in connection with clause 9 of the contract was to be referred to arbitration." These words are sufficiently wide so as to entitle the Tribunal to determine what damages for wrongful termination of service should be awarded to the plaintiff. 32. Accordingly I allow the revision application in part as indicated above, quash the order of the appellate court setting aside the award, and remit the award to the Tribunal for reconsideration in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The Tribunal shall only determine the damages which should be awarded to the plaintiff for the wrongful termination of his services. 33. I am informed that all the members constituting the Tribunal namely Shri G.C. Chatterji, the then Vice Chancellor, Shri S. S. Saxena, nominee of the Syndicate and Shri (now Justice) Lehar Singh Mehta, are available. The Civil Judge, Ajmer shall serve notices on them enquiring whether they are willing to act. If any of the members is not willing to act, he shall call upon the parties to nominate a substitute and in case of their failure to do so, appoint a substitute. The Civil Judge, Ajmer shall serve notices on them enquiring whether they are willing to act. If any of the members is not willing to act, he shall call upon the parties to nominate a substitute and in case of their failure to do so, appoint a substitute. He shall then fix a time within which the Tribunal shall reconsider the award in the light of the above judgment and file it in court with the necessary modification. 34. In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this revision application.