ORDER This revision petition is preferred against the order of the District and Sessions Judge, Mysore, passed on 10th October, 1968, in Crl. R.P. No. 2 of 1968 on the file of his Court. By that order he confirmed the order passed by the City Magistrate, Mysore on 13th December, 1967, discharging the accused persons who are respondents in this revision petition and directing that the seized car (MYN 2514) should be returned to accused No. 1. The facts necessary for the disposal of this petition briefly stated a re that the petitioner filed a complaint before the City Magistrate, Mysore, for the offence punishable under sections 379 , 411 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged by the complainant that he is the owner of the motor vehicle bearing No. MYN 2514 which is 1962 model, Ambassador car; he entered into a hire-purchase agreement with the first accused who is respondent No. 1 in this petition and borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 10,000 repayable on monthly instalments of Rs. 1.000. The terms of the agreement were that if the complainant failed to pay the instalment in accordance with the terms of the agreement, the first accused would be entitled to take back the possession of the vehicle. It was stated that the complainant had committed default in the payment of the instalments and there was some correspondence between the complainant and the accused No. 1 in that regard. It was the case of the complainant that on 1st August, 1967 at about 5 P.M. he had parked his car in the compound of his residential house situated at Mysore and he went to the City. When he returned home, he found his car missing from his compound. On enquiry he came to know that the second accused who is the second respondent in this revision petition acting upon the instructions given to him by the first accused broke open the window pane on the driver's side and took away the car forcibly from the complainant's premises. The second accused then took the car to Bangalore and handed it over to the first accused. The complainant proceeded to Bangalore the same night and there he found his car being parked in front of the shop of the first accused. The second accused then took the car to Bangalore and handed it over to the first accused. The complainant proceeded to Bangalore the same night and there he found his car being parked in front of the shop of the first accused. He then returned to Mysore and lodged a complaint against both the accused on 2nd August, 1967 in the Court of the City Magistrate, Mysore. In support of his complaint the complainant examined himself, No witnesses were examined on his behalf. The plea taken by the accused was that the first accused had deputed the second accused to Mysore to collect the hire-purchase amount from the complainant. He had also given instructions to the second accused to take possession of the car if no payment was made. The second accused went to Mysore and contacted the complainant and asked him to pay the arrears of instalment amount and when the complainant did not comply with his request, he demanded the possession of the vehicle. The complainant himself delivered the vehicle along with the keys. The second accused, thereafter took the vehicle and hand it over to the first accused. On consideration of the evidence, the trial Court found that the offences charged against the accused persons were not established beyond any reasonable doubt, and discharged both the accused. In a revision, the Sessions Judge was of the view on the basis of the evidence on record that the complainant did not succeed in proving his case against the accused. He therefore dismissed the revision petition. Mr. Byrappa, learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the Courts below have not taken into consideration the telegram sent by the accused No. 1 to the complainant and which was received by the latter at 11 p.m. on 2nd August, 1967. The telegram reads: “As per clause 14 of the agreement, we have re-possessed the vehicle No. MYN 2514…………….” It was urged by him that this document indicates that possession of the vehicle had been taken over by the accused forcibly. His grievance was that if the Courts below had taken this document into consideration, which being the material piece of evidence, no one can say what its effect would have been on the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below on the basis of the appreciation of evidence. His grievance was that if the Courts below had taken this document into consideration, which being the material piece of evidence, no one can say what its effect would have been on the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below on the basis of the appreciation of evidence. His second contention was that whatever the conclusion reached by the Courts below with regard to the allegations made in the complaint petition, the order of the lower Court directing that the vehicle should be returned to the first accused is erroneous. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the respondent acted bona fidely in claim of his right under the hire-purchase agreement. Therefore, no dishonest intention can be imputed to them which is sine qua non of an offence punishable under section 411, Indian Penal Code. He also argued in this connection that the dishonest intention which is essential for the offence of theft which is known as animus furande is lacking in the case. Therefore, no conviction can be based against the accused for the offence punishable under section 379, Indian Penal Code. He referred to two decision of the Supreme Courtviz.,Suvvari Sanyati Apparao and another v. Bodoepalli Lakshminarayana and another1. Chandi Kumar Das Karmarkar v. Abanidhar Roy2. He also referred to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Rajendra Kumar Ruia v. State of West Bengal3. The obstacle in the way of the complainant is that the concurrent finding of both the Courts below is to the effect that on the evidence produced in the case, it cannot be held that a case is made out against the accused-persons. It is well established that the initial burden of proving his case is always upon the prosecution or the complainant as the case may be. The reasons given by the lower Court for arriving at his conclusion are: 1. If the second accused took forcible possession of the car as alleged by the complainant after breaking open the window pane on the driver's side in the presence of his brother and driver as deposed by him (by the complainant), his brother and driver would not have allowed the second accused to take the vehicle as such. 2. It is the case of the complainant that the second accused took the vehicle by using not the normal switch key but some other switch key. 2. It is the case of the complainant that the second accused took the vehicle by using not the normal switch key but some other switch key. He has also stated in the evidence that he still possess the switch key, door key and the petrol tank key; but he did not produce them before the trial Court. If the same had been produced, that circumstances would have gone to show that the second accused had used some other device to take the car by breaking open the window pane of the car on the driver's side. 3. That it is borne out by the evidence that the house of the complainant is situated in a thickly populated area of Mysore City. If, according to the complainant, the car had been taken away by the second accused forcibly there would have been certain commotion and the persons residing in that locality would have come to know about it. 4. If really the second accused had removed the vehicle from the premises of the complainant in the manner alleged by him (the complainant), the complainant would have lodged the complaint before the police as soon as he came to know about it. The Court below on the above reasons has come to the conclusion that the complainant did not succeed in proving his case. The finding arrived at by both the Courts below is a finding of fact, which cannot be challenged in revision. In view of the finding arrived at by the Courts below, it is not possible to hold that Exhibit P-1 could be said to have any materiality in the case. It is in the evidence of the complainant that when the vehicle was removed from his premises, his brother and servant were present on the spot. Obviously those two persons were the persons who had witnessed the occurrence. Their evidence was of material character; but they have not been examined on behalf of the complainant. It appears from the record that more than one adjournment were allowed to the complainant to produce his evidence. But even then, the complainant failed to examine these two persons. In this situation of the case, it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the Courts below finds no support in the material on record. It appears from the record that more than one adjournment were allowed to the complainant to produce his evidence. But even then, the complainant failed to examine these two persons. In this situation of the case, it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the Courts below finds no support in the material on record. Since the offence alleged by the complainant against the accused is not established by the evidence of the complainant himself the telegram (Exhibit P-1) cannot have any relevancy or materiality on the evaluation of evidence for the simple reason that the initial burden of proving his case was on the complaint, As already mentioned above, Mr. Vedanta Iyengar, the learned Counsel for the respondent cited two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above in support of the proposition that the accused persons were bona fide acting on the claim of their right under the hire-purchase agreement. The plea taken up by the accused persons, as stated above, was to the effect: “When the second accused demanded possession of the vehicle, the complainant himself delivered the vehicle along with the keys.” In effect the plea taken in defence on behalf of the accused is that the complainant himself delivered the vehicle along with its keys to the accused No. 2. In view of this plea, the question of mens rea or dishonest intention which is an essentia 1 ingredient for the offence of theft cannot have relevancy to the case. Further the principle laid down in the cases cited must be read in the context of the particular facts of the case. Consequently all the cases cited on behalf of the respondents cannot have relevancy to the instant case. In House of Lords decision reported in Quinn v.Leathern.1 Per L. Halisbury observed: “Now before discussing the case, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have often stated before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found, they are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular tacts of the case, in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may serve to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code where as every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. It is obvious that it is very difficult for a Judge to lay down a bare principle of law detaching from the facts and circumstances of the case. Any principle laid down by him must be governed and qualified by the facts and circumstances of the case. However, on the reasons stated above, I think, the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is unsustainable. The concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below cannot be challenged in this Court sitting in revision. The second contention that had been advanced on behalf of the petitioner was with regard to the order of the Court below relating to the disposal of the property. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner being the owner of the vehicle No. MYN 2514 being not in dispute in this case, the lower Court was wrong in making an order for the return of the vehicle to accused No. 1. Mr. Byrappa relied on the decision in Nandiram v. State of Gujarat1. Inder Singh's case2. Sama's case3, Emperor's case4 in support of his contention. In the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Nandiram v. State of Gujarat1, it was observed: “In cases of this character, possession by itself would not be a true criterion for the return of the same to a person from whom it has been seized or attached by the police in relation to a case against him. In my view the person on whose name the motor vehicle stands with the registering authority, would be entitled to remain in custody thereof and not any other person unless he is able to establish his superior title or claim over it.” In that case, the order of disposal of property was made during the pendency of the proceeding. “In Brojendra Chandra v. Sama3, it was observed: “ section 517 deals with the disposal of property after the conclusion of the trial. “In Brojendra Chandra v. Sama3, it was observed: “ section 517 deals with the disposal of property after the conclusion of the trial. But when there is no further prospect of any further attempt to prove the accused had stolen the bus or committed any offence with reference to it, the proper order to make is to handover the bus to the man with whom it had been at the beginning.” In Inder Singh v. Jaswant Singh2, it was observed: “Where the petitioners claimed stating that they had purchased the property in dispute and gave it to one of the respondents on hire purchase but he sold it fraudulently to the other respondent, prayed for the possession of the property. Held, that although the presumption was that the person in actual possession of the property was its owner until facts were proved otherwise, since the petitioners were the original purchasers of the property and so the ostensible owners of it, even though the property was in the possession of the respondent at the time of its seizure by the police, the property should be returned to the petitioners as the ostensible owners entitled to the possession of the property.” In this case also the order of disposal of property was made by the Court during the pendency of the proceeding. In Emperor v. Haribandhu Patro4, it was laid down: “Under section 523, the articles should he made over not to the person from whom it was seized hut to the person found entitled to possession. What is the proper order to pass under section 523 must depend upon the facts of each case. Where property is taken by violence the Magistrate should order restoration of the status question” It is evident that the order in this case had been passed under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Counsel for the petitioner maintained that the principle laid down in the cases cited above should be made applicable to the present case. In the instant case, admittedly the vehicle was produced from the possession of Accused No. 1. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the fact that complainant is the owner of the vehicle in question is not in dispute in this case. In the instant case, admittedly the vehicle was produced from the possession of Accused No. 1. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the fact that complainant is the owner of the vehicle in question is not in dispute in this case. Therefore, he submitted that the lower Court was not right in directing the vehicle to be returned to Accused No. 1 even though the same had been produced in the Court from his i.e., the accused's possession. It is true that in the case where the question of bona fides and title by purchase or otherwise arise, the complainant should be left to his remedy in the civil Court. The function of the criminal Court is to make an order as to the disposal of the property in a criminal proceeding before it. Ordinarily, when it is held that no offence has been committed in respect of the property in the custody of the Court, the Court should restore it to the person from whose possession it was seized. But in exceptional cases where the circumstances so warrant and evidence so indicates that it would not be equitable to restore it to the possession of the person from whose possession it was produced, the Court may, in the proper exercise of its judicial discretion, restore it to the person who in its opinion, is the person best entitled to its possession, even though the accused has been acquitted or discharged due to incomplete or insufficient evidence. In the present case. I am of opinion that it cannot be a proper exercise of discretion to hand over the property back to the possession of the accused. It is an undisputed fact in this case and it was admitted by the parties during the course of their arguments before me, and also as is borne out” by para.4 of the Judgment of the lower Court, that the petitioner is the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, he would be the person best entitled to the property. In Brojendra Chandra v. Sama1, it has been observed by Rankin, C.J., in the penultimate para of the judgment: “In the present case, it seems to me that the much better order to make would be to direct this car to be handed back to the applicant before us. Therefore, he would be the person best entitled to the property. In Brojendra Chandra v. Sama1, it has been observed by Rankin, C.J., in the penultimate para of the judgment: “In the present case, it seems to me that the much better order to make would be to direct this car to be handed back to the applicant before us. Then if the complainant really has a right to get the bus back on the ground that there has been default in payment of the hire instalment, it will be quite open to him to bring proceedings in the proper Court, namely the Civil Court.” The above observation is aptly applicable to the instant case. If the intention of the Legislature was only to deliver such property to the person from whose possession it was seized or produced, then the word ‘entitled’ to possession in section 517(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unnecessary and the Legislature could have laid down that such property should be delivered only to the person from whose possession it was recovered. Therefore while determining the question as to who is the person entitled to the possession of the property, it is for the Court to say from the other circumstances also and not from one isolated circumstance alone as to who is the person entitled to get back the possession of property as envisaged in section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the ownership and title of the complainant is not in dispute in this case, it has to be concluded that he is the person who is entitled to the car in question. Neither the trial Court nor the Sessions Judge has considered this aspect of the case while making an order with regard to the disposal of the property. As a matter of fact, no reasons are given whatsoever by the trial Court in its order relating to the disposal of the property and the reasons which the Sessions Judge has given are stated in para.8 of his Judgment which is as follows: “The only other question remains to be considered is whether the order made by the Court below in directing delivery of the motor vehicles to the first accused is valid in law. Admittedly, the car in question was seized from the possession of the first accused. Admittedly, the car in question was seized from the possession of the first accused. The lower Court came to the conclusion while discharging the accused that the complainant has failed to make out a case alleged against them much less a case for theft. Under the circumstances it is my view that the lower Court was right in making an order directing the delivery of the vehicle to the first accused from whom it was seized.” Obviously the learned Sessions Judge has overlooked that the ownership of the complainant was not in dispute in the case. In view of the reasons stated above. I find force in the contention advanced on behalf of the complainant (who is the petitioner before me) that it cannot be held on the circumstances proved or admitted in the case that A-1 is entitled to the possession of the car merely on the ground that the car was produced from his possession. Therefore, I set aside the order passed by the Courts below regarding the disposal of the property and direct that the car in dispute, viz, Ambassador car bearing Registration No. MYM 2514, shall be given to the possession of the complainant who in the circumstances established in the case is the person best entitled to its possession. As per above modification, this revision petition is dismissed. I give no order as to costs. S.V.S.-----Petition dismissed.