Ramakrishnan, J.- This appeal is filed by the Plaintiffs 1 and 3 to 5 in O.S. No. 17 of 1956 on the file of the District Court of East Thanjavur at Nagapattinam. There is a long anterior history of litigation between the principal contestants. Since the scope of the appeal is limited to a few points in controversy, we will refer to the prior history of the litigation, only to the extent it is necessary for the disposal of the appeal. The suit properties belonged to one Jainambu Nachial whose only daughter was Sabia Ammal. Both these ladies died of a sudden attack of Cholera on 3rd June, 1926. It is now beyond dispute that the mother died first and the daughter died afterwards. Jainambu Nachial, before her death on 19th February, 1926, executed a settlement deed in favour of her daughter Sabia giving her the properties mentioned in schedules A to A-3 and B to B-2 of the plaint. On Sabia’s. death, the properties settled on her devolved upon her husband Mohamed Ismail Rowther, the first defendant in the suit, as well as her paternal uncle Mohamed Ali, each taking a half share. On the death of Jainambu a half share in the plaint C and D Schedules was taken by her brother Sheik Mohamed Rowther, who is the husband of the first plaintiff in the suit, Sabura Ammal. The other half share of Jainambu, on her death, devolved on her daughter Sabia and, on the latter’s death, that share devolved in moieties on the first defendant and Mohamed Ali. Mohamed Ali conveyed his half share in all the properties thus acquired by him by succession, to Noor Mohamed, son of the first plaintiff. This Noor Mohamed died subsequently and his heirs are his mother, who is the first plaintiff and his brothers and sisters, plaintiffs 2 to 4. The second plaintiff died pending the suit, and his widow was impleaded as the fifth plaintiff. On the basis of the above allegations, the plaintiffs claimed one half share in Sabia’s properties (A to A-3 and B to B-2 of the plaint schedule) and a three fourth share in Jainambu’s properties (those mentioned in C and D Schedules), whereas the remaining share belonged to the first defendant. On the basis of the above allegations, the plaintiffs claimed one half share in Sabia’s properties (A to A-3 and B to B-2 of the plaint schedule) and a three fourth share in Jainambu’s properties (those mentioned in C and D Schedules), whereas the remaining share belonged to the first defendant. On various dates within 12 years prior to suit, the first defendant sold some of the properties to several alienees, who are defendants 2 to 25 in the suit. The first defendant died pendente lite, and defendants 26 to 31 were brought on records as his legal representatives. The plaintiffs claimed that they and the contesting first defendant owned the properties as co-owners, and the suit was brought for partition and separate possession of the plaintiffs’ share mentioned above. In equity, the properties alienated by the first defendant to the alienees might be allotted to the first defendant, an alienating co-sharer. There was also a prayer for directing accounts to be taken of the income from the properties from the date of the plaint. In the lower Court, except defendants 1 and 16, the other defendants remained ex parte. The first defendant, the main contesting defendant, pleaded that Sabia’s father Mohammed Nooruddin spent a great deal of time in the Isles, which term appears to refer to Borneo, Sarawak and other Islands in Indonesia. There he married under Mohammedan Law, a local lady Masma and had a son Yousuff by her. This Yousuff is alive. The first defendant contended that under the Mohammedan Law, it was Yousuff who would succeed Sabia on her death and not her paternal uncle Mohammed Ali. This Yousuff is her consanguine brother and therefore should succeed to the properties and not Mohammed Ali. The first defendant also pleaded that in any event, his possession was adverse for over the statutory period to the plaintiff, and he has acquired prescriptive title. On the above pleadings he contended that the suit was to be dismissed. The sixteenth defendant claimed that he was an unnecessary party to the suit. The learned District Judge, after an elaborate trial, found that there was no satisfactory evidence to prove the existence of Yousuff, the alleged consanguine brother of Sabia, and that therefore it would follow that Mohammed Ali as heir, was entitled to succeed her along with her husband. The sixteenth defendant claimed that he was an unnecessary party to the suit. The learned District Judge, after an elaborate trial, found that there was no satisfactory evidence to prove the existence of Yousuff, the alleged consanguine brother of Sabia, and that therefore it would follow that Mohammed Ali as heir, was entitled to succeed her along with her husband. We find on a full consideration of the evidence that this finding is correct. Learned Counsel for the respondents was also not able to displace this finding in the course of his argument. But the learned District Judge found that, notwithstanding the conveyance by Mohammed Ali of his share of the suit properties to Noor Mohammed on 5th January, 1932 by a sale-deed the original of Exhibit B-36, the possession of the first defendant must be considered as adverse for over the statutory period and that therefore the first defendant acquired title to the suit properties. The plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed with costs of defendants 25 to 31, the legal representatives of the first defendant who died pendente lite. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-appellants before us contended that, in view of the finding of the lower Court that Yousuff’s position as the consanguine brother of Sabia has not been established, it would follow that Mohammed Ali became her co-heir along with her husband the first defendant, each entitled to a specified undivided share in the suit properties. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the legal principle which has particular relevance to Mohammedan Law, that the possession of a co-heir or co-sharer must be presumed to be that of the other co-sharer and the onus lies on the co-sharer who claims to have perfected title by adverse possession to establish his claim. The learned District Judge, in paragraph 26 of the judgment, has referred to a notice Exhibit B-37 which Mohammed Ali sent to the first defendant immediately after the sale on 5th January, 1932, informing him of his sale to Noor Mohammed. To this notice, the first defendant sent a reply notice Exhibit B-38 to Mohammed Ali. But this was returned unserved. At. or about the same time, the first defendant sent a notice Exhibit B-40 dated 24th January, 1932, to Noor Mohammed and the postal acknowledgment Exhibit B-41 shows that Noor Mohammed received it. To this notice, the first defendant sent a reply notice Exhibit B-38 to Mohammed Ali. But this was returned unserved. At. or about the same time, the first defendant sent a notice Exhibit B-40 dated 24th January, 1932, to Noor Mohammed and the postal acknowledgment Exhibit B-41 shows that Noor Mohammed received it. The learned District Judge found that the notice which the first defendant thus gave both to Mohammed Ali and Noor Mohammed amounts to unequivocal repudiation of the co-sharers’ title firstly of Mohammed Ali and after him of Noor Mohammed. According to the learned District Judge, the possession of the first defendant after such repudiation must be treated as adverse to the plaintiffs. He also referred to the fact that the first defendant was able to prove that patta for the lands had been transferred to him and kist receipts and house-tax receipts are all in his favour tending to show that his possession for over that statutory period was on the whole properties and was open hostile and adverse to the plaintiffs. In view of the fact that the above finding is the sole finding now under attack in this appeal, the scope of the appeal is very much narrowed down. The issue is a short one; whether the transactions covered by the exchange of the notices above-mentioned in 1931 between the first defendant on the one hand and Mohammed Ali and Noor Mohammed on the other closely following the sale of one half share by Mohammed Ali to Noor Mohammed amount to a clear and unequivocal notice by the first defendant to the plaintiffs that he is claiming title adverse to them over the whole properties and which would enable the commencement of adverse possession in favour of the first defendant, from the date of the above said notices. (After discussing the evidence the Court proceeded). There are ample grounds to hold from a perusal of the above evidence that the assertion made by the first defendant denying the title of Mohammed Ali in 1932 when the notices were exchanged, was not an unequivocal assertion of hostile title in himself to the whole property. First of all, he did not claim in that notice title to the entire properties. He conceded that he had only a share, the other share belonging to another heir of Sabia, whether it be Yousuff or Mohammed Ali. First of all, he did not claim in that notice title to the entire properties. He conceded that he had only a share, the other share belonging to another heir of Sabia, whether it be Yousuff or Mohammed Ali. Secondly, even his denial of Mohammed Ali’s title was equivocal. It is clear from the admission of the first defendant that Mohammed Ali except to file an affidavit for being added as a party, did not file any written statement in the suit and did not do anything to make out his title. Obviously the plaintiffs were not interested in setting up any title in Mohammed Ali. The first defendant says that they had opposed Mohammed Ali being added as a party. Though the first defendant in his deposition stated that he too filed a counter opposing the impleading of Mohammed Ali, he was unable to file a copy of the counter. It is, therefore, legitimate to infer that at the appellate stage, for the purpose of gaining his own ends in the appeal, the first defendant actively supported the claim of Mohammed Ali in order to get a decision in favour of himself and Mohammed Ali and non-suiting the plaintiffs. Such a decision was given by the appellate Court. During the stage of the further second appeal also, it would appear the first defendant did not object to the right which the appellate Court recognised in Mohammed Ali to a share. When questioned on this point, the first defendant stated that he did not remember whether he raised any objection in the High Court in regard to this. Therefore, at the second appellate stage, the first defendant must be presumed to have supported the position of Mohammed Ali as a co-heir in preference to Yousuff. It was only during the pendency of the second appeal in the High Court, on finding that Mohammed Ali had made a conveyance to Noor Mohammed, Noor Mohammed being the son of Sabura Animal, the party who opposed the first defendant in the prior litigation, that the first defendant decided to reverse his stand by refuting both Mohammed Ali, and Noor Mohammed’s title. This would clearly show that at the relevant period when the notice was issued, both before and after the notice the first defendant was taking conflicting positions for the purpose of securing a tactical advantage in the litigation between himself and Sabura Animal. Therefore the denial of the title of Mohammed Ali and of Noor Mohammed by the first defendant in the notices sent at that period, cannot be construed as an unequivocal declaration of a title in himself to the exclusion of the co-sharers. The learned District Judge has dismissed this conflict in the attitude of the first defendant by a laconic observation: “ What exactly the 1st defendant meant by this hide and seek is not clear.” But the lower Court has failed to notice that a party who sets up a hostile title to the exclusion of co-heirs must be definite and unequivocal in his assertions. But when the assertions are in the nature of “ hide and seek,” that is to say, mutually contradictory and merely intended for the purpose of taking a tactical advantage out of a litigious situation, it cannot be considered as an assertion of a hostile tide adequate for the purpose of becoming the starting point in the acquisition of title by adverse possession against co-sharers. We will refer briefly at this stage to the law on the point, as explained in the decisions cited at the Bar. In Lakshmi Reddy v. Lakshmi Reddy1, the Supreme Court observed at page 202 thus: “ There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostitle title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. Whether that line of cases is right or wrong we need not pause to consider. Whether that line of cases is right or wrong we need not pause to consider. It is sufficient to notice that the Privy Council in N. Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal2, quotes with approval, a passage from Cutlev v. Deed Taylerson3, which indicates that such a situation may well lead to an inference of ouster if other circumstances concur (See also Govinda Rao v. Rajabai 4 ), It may be further mentioned that it is well settled that the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.” This Court in Md. Kaliba Rowther v. Md. Abdullah Rowther5, observed thus: “ It is only when acts are clearly proved on the part of the co-sharer in possession which would be inconsistent with any other co-sharer being entitled to any possession or interest in any part of the property, it can be said that any question of ouster of the co-sharers not in possession can arise. In the absence of such ouster there will be no room for adverse possession or prescription in favour of the cosharer in possession.” As to the alienees from a co-sharer especially when the co-sharer is Mohammadan, this is what the Bench observed: “ Neither on principle nor on authority can an alienee from a co-sharer more especially when he is a Mohammedan, be regarded as standing on a special footing differently from the position of his alienor. It is clear that what the co-sharer conveyed to his alienee is his right, title and interest in his share which will take with it also the right to sue for partition and recover separate possession of such share. If the co-sharer who was the alienor is not barred by time because for over 12 years he took no action either to share possession of the property or income therefrom or sue for partition there is no principle why his alienee should be placed on a different footing. In the absence of the defendant establishing ouster of the plaintiff, the defendant’s plea that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be accepted.” We wish to note in particular the observation that the assertion of a co-sharer in possession for a hostile title should be such as would be inconsistent with any other co-sharer being entitled to possession. In the absence of the defendant establishing ouster of the plaintiff, the defendant’s plea that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be accepted.” We wish to note in particular the observation that the assertion of a co-sharer in possession for a hostile title should be such as would be inconsistent with any other co-sharer being entitled to possession. It would thus be clear that the co-sharer in possession may not admit title of a particular co-sharer, because in his view the real co-sharer is somebody else, and not the co-sharer who puts forward his title. In such circumstances, the co-sharer claiming adverse title must be considered as not having put forward his title to the whole property, excluding the title of any other co-sharer; he should be considered as only expressing his doubt about the title of a particular co-sharer who claims such title but he has not gone further and set up title exclusively in himself to the whole property. In the present case, in the prior notices of 1932 the first defendant did not set up title exclusively in himself. He conceded the title of Yousuf but without conceding the title of Mohammed Ali. At one time in the litigation at the same period as the notice, he conceded the title of Mohammed Ali for his own tactical advantage, at another time he disowned it, when he, found that Mohammed Ali took advantage of his concession to make a conveyance of his share to the party who was opposed to the first defendant in the prior litigation. In Salhun v. Malku1, the Lahore High Court observed: “ Where one of the co-heirs enters into possession claiming to do so in the character of a sole and exclusive heir, he cannot be deemed to be in adverse possession, because, such a statement is vague and does not contain any assertion of hostile title which in law would amount to ouster. Nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to ouster can make such claimant’s possession adverse.” Natesan, J., in Ameer Bibi v. Chinnammal2, after reviewing the authorities observed: “ The nature of possession by one co-owner to become adverse and bar the rights of the other co-owners must be such that one can infer from it an intention by such person in possession to keep out the others in assertion of an exclusive and hostile title in himself to the property.” This is consistent, if we may say so with our view stated above that the coowner’s assertion of a hostile title must be one exclusively for himself in the property. It will not suffice if he claims for himself only a co-owner’s right, and for the time being expresses his doubt as to who is the person properly entitled to the rights in the remaining share or shares in the property. In such circumstances the coowners who is really entitled to the remaining share or shares even though he may be able to establish his title only in subsequent proceedings of rival claimants to the title can claim relief of partition as against the co-sharer who had disputed his title earlier but who at the same time had not asserted title in himself exclusively to the whole of the property. The latter case does not claim a title by adverse possession, because of such assertion alone. There are alienations made by both the plaintiffs and the first defendant to various persons who claim to have obtained possession of the property. But those alienations, as found by the lower Court, are all within 12 years prior to suit. They cannot be used as adequate evidence for proving ouster or adverse possession for over 12 years by the first defendant. This position is not disputed by the appellant at the time of the hearing of the appeal before us. The properties alienated by the respective parties will be allotted to their shares as far as possible in the final decree proceedings. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the appeal has to be allowed. The decree of the lower Court is set aside. The plaintiffs will be given a decree for partition and separate possession as prayed for. The properties alienated by the respective parties will be allotted to their shares as far as possible in the final decree proceedings. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the appeal has to be allowed. The decree of the lower Court is set aside. The plaintiffs will be given a decree for partition and separate possession as prayed for. The legal representatives of the first defendant will be directed to render accounts to the plaintiffs of the income from the property, which will be determined in the enquiry for mesne profits to be separately conducted for the purpose. The appellants will be entitled to the costs of this appeal from the contesting respondents. Costs in the lower Court will come out of the estate. The appeal as against respondent 30 abates. V.K. ------ Appeal allowed.