( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the Union of India, representing the South Eastern and Eastern Railways. The appeal is directed against a concurrent decree of the two courts below, decreeing the plaintiff-respondent's suit for recovery of compensation for non-delivery of its consignment, booked at Sambalpur for delivery at Howrah. ( 2 ) THE only point, which has been urged in support of this appeal, is the point of limitation and Mr. Basu has contended, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 91) Boota Mal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716 , that the instant suit would be barred by limitation and, upon that view, the concurrent decrees of the two courts below should be set aside and the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. ( 3 ) WE have considered the matter in the light of the facts before us and, in our view, the point of limitation should not succeed in the instant case. The suit was one for recovery of compensation for non-delivery. To the suit, therefore, Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply. Under the said Article, the starting point of limitation would be the point of time, when the goods ought to have been delivered and, in the absence of any specific mention of the time of delivery, the goods are to be delivered within a reasonable time. What would be reasonable time in a particular case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. The onus, again, on this point would be on the Railways. This has, indeed, been laid down in the authority ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 ), relied on by Mr. Basu himself. ( 4 ) IN the instant case, the plea of limitation was, no doubt, taken in the written statement but that was in the bald form that the suit was barred by limitation. Thereafter, it appears, the plaint was amended to furnish particulars as to how, according to the plaintiff, the suit would escape the bar of limitation. To the amended plaint, the defendant was given the opportunity of filing an additional written statement, but no additional written statement was actually filed. At the time of raising of issues also, the plea of limitation was not pressed or pressed into issue. To the amended plaint, the defendant was given the opportunity of filing an additional written statement, but no additional written statement was actually filed. At the time of raising of issues also, the plea of limitation was not pressed or pressed into issue. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Judge, however, appears to have considered the plea of limitation on the general issue, which was framed as Issue No. 2 in these terms : "is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for damages as prayed?" and, on certain consideration, particularly, in view of a subsequent correspondence between the parties, which he interpreted as holding out hopes of delivery to the plaintiff of the goods in question, he held that the suit was not barred by limitation. He, of course, in his judgment, appears to have inter-mixed or mixed up Arts. 30 and 31 of the Indian Limitation Act but his eventual conclusion was that, even under Art. 31, because of the said correspondence, the suit would not be barred by limitation. ( 6 ) ON appeal by the Union of India, the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the decision of the learned Munsif, clarifying the position as to the applicability of Article 31 and agreeing with the learned Munsif on his view that, because of the above correspondence, the suit would not be hit by the bar of limitation under Article 31. ( 7 ) IN this Court, Mr. Basu has made his point in support of his claim of limitation, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in Boota Mal's case (supra ). That decision has ruled that the subsequent correspondence between the parties would not be relevant for purposes of Art. 31 unless they throw some light on the question of reasonable time for delivery. But, in that particular case, there was no difficulty in finding out what was reasonable time for delivery for purposes of the said case, as it was a case of part-delivery and Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that, in such a case, the reasonable time may well be held to have expired when the part-delivery was made. But, in that particular case, there was no difficulty in finding out what was reasonable time for delivery for purposes of the said case, as it was a case of part-delivery and Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that, in such a case, the reasonable time may well be held to have expired when the part-delivery was made. In the said case, Their Lordships further pointed out that the suit there had not been filed even within one year from the date of service of the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on which date the plaintiff may well have been aware of the repudiation of his claim as, on that footing, he stated his cause of action for the suit in the said notice. In the instant case, on the question of reasonable time, there appears to be no dependable material on record as the plaintiff's statement on the point in the plaint was denied by the Union of India in its written statement. The point, therefore, was at large, when the parties went to trial and, as the onus on this question was on the defendant Railways, unless that onus was discharged, they could not claim that limitation had started under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. Unfortunately for the Railways, no evidence at all was adduced by them possibly because they had no defence on the merits in the instant case. ( 8 ) INDEED, the records do not show whether the goods in question were at all dispatched from Sambalpur and when such dispatch if any, was made. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold the Railways discharged the onus of proving the reasonable time, requisite for purposes of Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act, as required under the authority of the Supreme Court decision, cited by Mr. Basu himself, and, in that view, the starting point of limitation under the said Article does not appear to have been proved or established in the instant case for application of the bar of limitation. ( 9 ) IN the above connection, our attention was also drawn to the decision of this Court reported in (2) Gulab Chand Dhanraj v. Union of India, 69 Calwn 591. ( 9 ) IN the above connection, our attention was also drawn to the decision of this Court reported in (2) Gulab Chand Dhanraj v. Union of India, 69 Calwn 591. But that case also would be distinguishable inasmuch as, in the said case, there was clear evidence that the goods were carried by a particular train, which reached the place of destination at a particular time and, from that point of time, the period of limitation under Article 31 had, admittedly, expired. The said decision would, accordingly, the distinguishable and the fact that, in the said case cited, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed on the ground of limitation on the authority of the above Supreme Court decision, would not really affect the instant case. ( 10 ) IN the above view, we are not inclined to interfere with the concurrent decrees of the two courts below in favour of the plaintiff and we dismiss this appeal. There will, however, be no order for costs in this Court. Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.