ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This revision raises an important question of law as to whether on the facts of this case it can be held that there was no compliance of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter called the Act) and whether the proceedings were vitiated on that account. 2. The Applicant was convicted u/s 7/16 of the Act and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for four months. In appeal the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Sessions Judge, Kanpur. Hence this revision. The prosecution case was that on 6-10-1966 the Applicant was found selling and also exposing for sale buffalo milk in his dairy in Mohalla Ajitganj, P.S. Bakarganj, Distt. Kanpur, by the Food Inspector Sri M.L. Bhatti. He took a sample of the milk from the Applicant on payment of price and sealed it in three equal parts according to the rules. He complied with all other formalities and informed the Applicant that the sample would be sent to the Public Analyst for examination. The case was examined by the Public Analyst and found to be deficient in fat contents by about 2.2% and in non-fatty solids content also by the same percentage. The Applicant was accordingly prosecuted u/s 7/16 of the Act. 3. The Applicant pleaded not guilty--his defence was that he was falsely implicated on account of enmity. 4. The courts below after considering the evidence on record found that the Applicant had sold adulterated milk to the Food Inspector and as such, he was guilty of the offence charged. He was, therefore, convicted and sentenced as stated above. 5. There is only one submission which has been made before me by the learned Counsel for the Applicant. It has been contended that in this case there was no compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 10(7) of the Act and consequently the conviction of the Applicant was vitiated. It cannot be doubted that the provisions of the aforesaid section are mandatory. It has been contended that in this case there was no compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 10(7) of the Act and consequently the conviction of the Applicant was vitiated. It cannot be doubted that the provisions of the aforesaid section are mandatory. The old Section 10(7) was in these terms: Where the food inspector takes any action Under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), Sub-section (2), Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (6), he shall, as far as possible, call not less than two persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take their signatures. The section as amended by Section 6 of Act 49 of 1964 runs as follows: Where the food inspector takes any action Under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), Sub-section (2), Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (6), he shall, call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. Thus, the words "as far as possible" which formerly occurred in the section were deleted by the Legislature and the compliance of the provisions of the sub-section was made obligatory. Prior to the amendment there was a good deal of controversy on the point as to whether the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 were mandatory or not and whether noncompliance of the same could be treated as merely an irregularity or whether it was an illegality which vitiated the proceedings. The whole controversy on the point must be deemed to have been set at rest by the amendment of the section. The provisions contained in this sub-section are now mandatory. As indicated earlier, the words "as far as possible" which were the source of controversy have been omitted. Under the amended Sub-section it is incumbent on the Food Inspector taking action Under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1), Sub-section (2), Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (6) of Section 10 to call at least one person to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. 6. In the instant case the Food Inspector Sri M.L. Bhatti (PW 1) called another person namely Mohammad Hanif (PW 2) to witness the taking of the sample. 6. In the instant case the Food Inspector Sri M.L. Bhatti (PW 1) called another person namely Mohammad Hanif (PW 2) to witness the taking of the sample. Mohammad Hanif was a sanitary Inspector and he deposed that the sample was taken in his presence when the Applicant was found selling or exposing for sale buffalo milk at his dairy, that the price was paid and the Applicant was told that the sample would be sent for analysis and that the Applicant had sold 200 grams of milk from the can. A memo was prepared on the spot and it was signed by the Food Inspector and Mohammad. Hanif. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that Mohammad Hanif was not an independent witness and therefore, there was substantially no compliance of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act. In my opinion this contention cannot prevail. In the first place, it has not been clearly brought out in the present case that Mohammad Hanif (PW2) was under the influence of the Food Inspector. According to his designation Mohammad Hanif was "Safai Naik" (Sanitary Inspector). There is nothing to demonstrate any affinity of the Sanitary Inspector with or his subordination to the Food Inspector. Prima facie the two belong to different departments. It was elicited in the cross-examination of Mohammad Hanif that he had lived with the Food Inspector for three or four months. That circumstance by itself does not establish any official relationship with the Food Inspector. The circumstance of residing together can be true of many persons otherwise wholly unconnected with each other in their official capacities. Thus, there is no material in the present case to warrant the conclusion that the witness taken by the Food Inspector at the time of the obtaining of the sample was not an independent witness or was under his influence. Even assuming for a moment that Mohammad Hanif (PW2) was subordinate to the Food Inspector, I am unable to accede to the view that his testimony is liable to be discarded on that ground alone, if it otherwise inspires confidence. 7. This raises another legal question for consideration regarding the interpretation of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act. Even assuming for a moment that Mohammad Hanif (PW2) was subordinate to the Food Inspector, I am unable to accede to the view that his testimony is liable to be discarded on that ground alone, if it otherwise inspires confidence. 7. This raises another legal question for consideration regarding the interpretation of Sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act. The terms of the aforesaid provision clearly indicate that it is not necessary for the Food Inspector to take an "independent" witness in the sense that he must be a public witness or a respectable witness of the locality. There is nothing inherently wrong in a Government Official or a public servant which may disqualify him for being taken as witness as required by Sub-section (7) of Section 10. The language of the section is in marked contrast with that of Section 103 Sub-section (1) Code of Criminal Procedure which makes it incumbent upon the officer making a search to call upon two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate to attend and witness the search. Even with regard to the stringent provisions of Section 103(1) of the Code the view of the Supreme Court is that failure to take two respectable inhabitants of the locality would not by itself invalidate the search. It was observed by Sinha, J. (as he then was) in Sunder Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411 : Hence at the highest the irregularly in the search and the recovery in so far as the terms of Section 103 had not been fully complied with would not affect the legality of the proceedings. It only affected the weight of evidence which is a matter for Courts of fact and this Court would not ordinarily go behind the findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the courts below. Their Lordships dismissed the appeal and refused to set aside the conviction on the ground of irregularities of the nature mentioned above. It was observed that the courts below had not committed to notice those special features of the case and had come to the conclusion that these circumstances did not affect the veracity of the witnesses examined in support of the prosecution case. It was observed that the courts below had not committed to notice those special features of the case and had come to the conclusion that these circumstances did not affect the veracity of the witnesses examined in support of the prosecution case. Thus, it appears that ultimately the result depends on the reliability of the witnesses and the intrinsic quality of their evidence and not merely on their antecedents in the sense that they happen to be government officials or public servants. 8. I have no hesitation in applying the same principles to the interpretation of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. What is to be seen is whether the witnesses are "above-board." A contrary view was taken by the Punjab High Court in State v. Sadhu Singh AIR 1962 Pun. 548. Dealing with the question Shamsher Bahadur, J. remarked: When the law enjoins that the sample be taken in the presence of two persons it clearly contemplates that the evidence relating to the taking of sample must be above board and the witness in whose presence the sample is taken be independent and disinterested so as to inspire confidence. In the present case, we however, find that both the witnesses associated with the taking of the sample were under the influence of the Food Inspector. To my mind that was a decision based on the particular facts of the case which were materially different from those of the case before me. The ratio of that decision does not suggest that in that case there was any serious violation of Section 10(7) so as to vitiate the proceedings. The emphasis of that decision seems to have been more on the fact that the persons taken as witnesses must not be under the influence of the Food Inspector. This is an aspect which has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The same view was followed in a later decision of the Punjab High Court in Rameshwar Radhey Lal v. State AIR 1967 Pun. 132. This is an aspect which has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The same view was followed in a later decision of the Punjab High Court in Rameshwar Radhey Lal v. State AIR 1967 Pun. 132. It may be pointed out that even the Punjab High Court in an earlier decision had held that the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would not materially affect the case wherein it was admitted by the accused in his statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure that such samples were taken from him. See Leela Ram v. State 1964 (2) Cri LJ 449. The case of Sadhu Singh (Supra) was distinguished by Dua, J. who expressed a contrary view in Tilo Ram Karam Chad Vs. State, AIR 1967 Delhi 71 . In that case it was contended that the persons who were taken as witnesses at the time of obtaining the sample could not be described as independent persons. The contention was repelled and it was observed that Section 10(7) could not be construed to mean that persons who were called should never belong to the Department meant for preventing food adulteration. On the facts and circumstances of the case it was held that Section 10(7) had not been violated so as to vitiate the trial. The same view was expressed by the Orissa High Court in Bupdeo Santholia Vs. Cuttack Municipality, AIR 1968 Ori 12 . Misra, J. dissented from 1962 P&H 548 and followed the case reported in Patna Municipal Corporation Vs. Dularchand Sao, AIR 1964 Patna 565 . It was observed after comparing the language of Section 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act with that of Section 103(1) Code of Criminal Procedure that in the former provision the witness need not be respectable and independent. It would be sufficient if in presence of two witnesses the sample was taken. It need hardly be observed that it is always open to a Court to believe or disbelieve those two witnesses. Every witness appearing before the court must be reliable before conviction can be based upon his testimony. For that no statutory provision is necessary. It is open to a Court of fact to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses examined in support of the Food Inspector, if they are unreliable. Every witness appearing before the court must be reliable before conviction can be based upon his testimony. For that no statutory provision is necessary. It is open to a Court of fact to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses examined in support of the Food Inspector, if they are unreliable. If however they are otherwise reliable, their evidence cannot be discarded merely because they are servants of the Municipality or are employees of the Department. A Government servant or departmental employee is not precluded from being taken as a witness u/s 10(7) of the Act. 9. I have carefully scrutinised the evidence of the two prosecution witnesses examined in the present case and I am satisfied that it is worthy of credence. No contradiction or other intrinsic infirmity has been pointed out in their depositions so as to destroy their probative value. Moreover, the accused in his statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure admitted the taking of the sample. 10. Thus, in my opinion, there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 10 Sub-section (7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the conviction of the Applicant is not vitiated by any illegality or impropriety. I, therefore, dismiss this revision and maintain the conviction and sentence of the Applicant as recorded by the courts below. The Applicant is on bail. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out his sentence. His bail bonds are cancelled. The stay order dated 23-11-1968 is vacated.