ORDER S.N. Katju, J. - This is an application in revision which is directed against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Etawah by which he affirmed the order of Sri B. Lal, a Magistrate of Etawah discharging the opposite party Sumer Chand Vatsa u/s 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The complainant Prithvi Singh lodged a complaint against Sumer Chand Vatsa, S.O., Kotwali, Etawah Under Sections 220, 330 and 354 of the IPC. It was alleged that on 26-10-63 the complainant was standing in front of the door of his house at about 8 a.m. when Sumer Chand Vatsa along with some police officers and constables and one Ghan Shyam Singh, a nephew of Tej Singh who led a rival group in the town of Etawah, came and arrested the complainant without any justification and started beating him with shoes and fists. "The women of the complainant's house protested but they were also rebuked and were pushed aside. Thus the modesty of the women was out raged". The complainant was then, according to him, taken to the Kotwali and was beaten on the way with shoes, fists and kicks. He was again beaten in the Kotwali and tortured "so he might confess his guilt under the Gambling Act" and he was forced to sign some papers. He was later released on bail which was granted by the City Magistrate in the evening. It was contended on behalf of Sumer Chand Vatsa that the entire case of the complainant was false and that he was arrested for gambling and during the course of the arrest he had received some injuries. The injuries of the complainant were examined by the Civil Surgeon of Etawah and he found some contusions and abrasions on the body of the complainant. 3. The learned Magistrate considered the evidence produced on behalf of the complainant and also took into consideration the Evidence led for the defence and came to the conclusion that there was "no sufficient ground for committing the accused to the Court of Session." He, therefore, discharged the opposite party Sumer Chand Vatsa. As mentioned above, the order of the learned Magistrate was affirmed on revision by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Etawah. 4. As mentioned above, the order of the learned Magistrate was affirmed on revision by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Etawah. 4. It was contended on behalf of the complainant that the Magistrate had exceeded his powers u/s 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in refusing to commit the opposite party to the Court of Session. It was contended that the Magistrate had only to see whether a prima facie case against the opposite party existed and it was beyond his powers to decide the case after taking into consideration the entire evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution as also on behalf of the defence. 5. Learned Counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in K.P. Raghavan v. M.H. Abb 1967 AWR 456 SC. It was observed that the test of judging the justification of an order of discharge by a Magistrate u/s 209 Code of Criminal Procedure has not been altered as a result of the enactment of Section 209A. It was observed that a Magistrate-- ...has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the court of session; but in arriving at that conclusion, it is not the function of an enquiring Magistrate to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution and defence evidence and to discharge the accused merely because in his view the defence evidence was better than the prosecution evidence. It was held by the Supreme Court in respect of the functions of a Magistrate in Tara Singh Vs. The State, AIR 1951 SC 441 that all that he had to consider was whether u/s 209(1) there were sufficient grounds for committing the Appellant for trial and not whether, on an appreciation of the whole evidence and other material in the case including witnesses for the defence, the charge against him was proved. It was observed in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia and Another Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 97 that The Magistrate holding the inquiry, therefore has to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit and unless he is so satisfied, he is not to commit.... 6. Where a Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the prosecution case was inherently importable he will be justified in refusing to commit. 6. Where a Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the prosecution case was inherently importable he will be justified in refusing to commit. If the Magistrate feels that a different view other than the one which may be taken by him about the guilt of an accused person could be taken then under these circumstances he will be justified in committing the case to a court of session. When the state of evidence indicate a prima facie case against an accused person then it is not for the Magistrate to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence and come to a decision in the case. That should be left to the Court of session. But where the Magistrate is not satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused then in such a case he will be justified in refusing to commit. In coming to a conclusion whether a prima facie case against the accused has been established or not, the Magistrate has to take into consideration, to some extent, the evidence that has been produced by the prosecution as also by the defence. If the evidence is such which is not decisive in favour of the accused and a different view of the prosecution evidence is possible then in that case the Magistrate has to commit. It cannot be denied that there is a shadowy border land between the limits of a Magistrate's power u/s 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure within which he is empowered to act and beyond which he could not go while he has to take into consideration the prosecution and the defence evidence in satisfying himself whether a prima facie case against the accused person has been established or not and it is only where the prosecution and the defence evidence is not decisive in favour of the accused, then in such a case the Magistrate has to commit the case so a court of session. Thus to some extent the matter is left to the discretion of the Magistrate concerned and the circumstances of the case and the evidence produced before the Magistrate has to be looked into for considering the question whether the Magistrate has exceeded his powers u/s 209 of the Code or not. 7. In the present case, only the charges Under Sections 220 and 330 IPC, are triable by the court of session. 7. In the present case, only the charges Under Sections 220 and 330 IPC, are triable by the court of session. Section 220 IPC relates to illegal confinement by a person in authority. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party that the complainant was arrested on a charge of gambling for which there was a warrant of arrest against the complainant and therefore, there was no substance in the aforesaid charge. Section 330 IPC, relates to extorting confession or information. It was alleged that the complainant was beaten in the Kotwali and tortured so that he might confess his guilt under the Gambling Act. The charge u/s 354 IPC obviously relates to the assault which was said to have been made on the complainant's mother by the opposite party. Such an offence was triable by a Magistrate. The Magistrate therefore had to consider whether a prima facie case against the opposite party Under Sections 220 and 330 of the IPC had been made out against the opposite party. He considered the prosecution evidence and came to the conclusion that no prima facie case existed against the opposite party. Much of the evidence that was produced on behalf of the complainant related to his being beaten in front of his house and the assault made on his mother and the beating which was inflicted on him while he was taken to the police station. There was some evidence with regard to the beating which was alleged to have been given to the complainant at the police station. With regard to the prosecution evidence regarding the beating inflicted on the complainant it could not be said with certainty that such evidence was worthy of credence and a view against the opposite party was not possible on that evidence. But that related to a charge that was triable by a Magistrate. It may be that the evidence with regard to the charges Under Sections 220 and 330 IPC against the opposite party was not decisive and another court could have possibly taken a view against the opposite party. 8. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party that the complainant had been charged on several occasions earlier for offences under the Gambling Act. It was further stated that there were two rival groups in the town, one of which was led by the complainant and the other by Tej Singh. 8. It was contended on behalf of the opposite party that the complainant had been charged on several occasions earlier for offences under the Gambling Act. It was further stated that there were two rival groups in the town, one of which was led by the complainant and the other by Tej Singh. The complainant alleged that it was at the instigation of Tej Singh that the opposite party inflicted the beating on the complainant. It has come in evidence that the opposite party had not taken any action earlier against the complainant before the incident in question. Under these circumstances it is somewhat difficult to say that the Magistrate had exceeded his powers u/s 209 Code of Criminal Procedure in going into the evidence more deeply than he should have gone into. Even assuming that he exceeded his powers u/s 209 Code of Criminal Procedure and the evidence in favour of the opposite party was not decisive and the Magistrate should have committed the case to the court of session, I am not inclined to reopen the matter after a lapse of six years. 9. I am therefore not prepared to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The application in revision is dismissed.