JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This writ petition which is directed against the judgment of the Dy. Director Consolidation, Lucknow, (in camp at Faizabad), is pressed on the sole ground that the revision application from which it arises not having been transferred by the District Dy. Director of Consolidation Faizabad to the Dy. Director Consolidation who decided it could not have been heard and disposed of by him and that his judgment is void for that reason. Reliance is placed upon Rule 65(1-A) of the Rules framed under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as Rules) in support of a submission by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. That rule reads: The officer before whom appeals, revisions or references under the provisions of the Act or these rules are instituted may transfer any case instituted or pending before him to any other officer empowered to hear and decide such case, or recall any case pending before any other officer from the file of that officer to his own file. (2) The Director of Consolidation may withdraw any case from the file of any Settlement Officer (Consolidation) for disposal. (Italicised by us) The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the officer hearing a revision application gets jurisdiction to hear it by the authority of the order of transfer of the case to his file by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation. In support of his contention he places reliance upon Saheb Lal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation UP and Ors. 1966 AWR 636 Balbhadra and Anr. v. Assistant Director of Consolidation 1967 AWR 86 , Brij Bahadur Lal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1968 RD 210 decided by B.N. Nigam, J., Shanker v. Dy. Director of Consolidation UP 1967 RD 50 decided by R.N. Sharma, J., Baqar and Chheda v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1967 AWR 566 and Bhai Lal v. District Dy. Director of Consolidation UP and Ors. 1967 RD 275 decided by L.P. Nigam, J. Reliance is also placed upon the unreported decision of Sahgal, J., in writ petition No. 220 of 1967 Narpat and Anr. v. Parag and others, decided on 17-7-1968. 2. Admittedly and clearly there is no provision in the Act dealing with the power of transfer. 3. Director of Consolidation UP and Ors. 1967 RD 275 decided by L.P. Nigam, J. Reliance is also placed upon the unreported decision of Sahgal, J., in writ petition No. 220 of 1967 Narpat and Anr. v. Parag and others, decided on 17-7-1968. 2. Admittedly and clearly there is no provision in the Act dealing with the power of transfer. 3. The short answer to the submission of the learned Counsel is that inasmuch as Rule 65(1-A) speaks of the case being transferred to an "officer empowered to hear such case", it clearly follows that the officer to whom the case is transferred has already got jurisdiction to hear and decide the case and that Rule 65(1-A) does not deal with conferment of jurisdiction at all. 4. With great respect to the learned single Judges who decided the case mentioned above this aspect of the matter and the clear language of Rule 65(1-A) has been lost sight of by them. 5. An order of transfer passed Under Rule 65(1-A) transferring a case to another Dy. Director far from conferring jurisdiction on the transferee Dy. Director actually proceeds on the legal footing that the transferee Dy. Director has already got jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Rule 65(1-A) has been framed for purposes of administrative convenience and to enable case being transferred from one officer to another. It is in the nature of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 22 of the Bengal Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act or Sections 526 and 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Without this rule no officer would have had the power to transfer a case from one officer competent to hear it to another officer equally competent to hear and decide it. 6. The question relating to the functions of the officers appointed under the Act and their jurisdiction is dealt with by the Act. Section 3(4-A) of the Act defines Dy. Director of Consolidation which reads: "Deputy Director of Consolidation" means a person appointed as such by the State Government to exercise such powers and perform such duties of the Director of Consolidation as may be delegated to him by the State Government and shall include a District Dy. Director of Consolidation and Assistant Director of Consolidation. 7. This rule shows that a District Dy. Director of Consolidation is only a Dy. Director of Consolidation. Director of Consolidation and Assistant Director of Consolidation. 7. This rule shows that a District Dy. Director of Consolidation is only a Dy. Director of Consolidation. He has no higher jurisdiction than that of a Dy. Director of Consolidation simpliciter. It is a different matter that he may have some administrative powers. All Dy. Directors of Consolidation including the Distt. Directors of Consolidation can exercise only such powers and perform such duties as may be delegated to them by the State Government. This provision or any other provision in the Act or the Rules does not provide that the Dy. Directors of Consolidation shall have such power or discharge such functions as the District Dy. Director of Consolidation may delegate to them. Section 44 of the Act deals with the delegation of power by the State Government and reads: Delegation--The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette and subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification: (i) delegate to any officer or authority any of the powers conferred upon it by this Act; (ii) confer powers of the Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director Consolidation, the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Consolidation Officer under this Act or the rules made thereunder, to any officer or authority. Admittedly the State Government has conferred on all the Deputy Directors of Consolidation in U.P. jurisdiction to hear and decide revision applications made under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act. Section 48 provides that a revision application shall be made to the Director of Consolidation and he may suo motu also exercise the power of revision. Rule 111 of the Rules, however, permits the presentation of a revision application to an officer appointed by the Director of Consolidation. That provision reads: Section 54--An application u/s 48 of the Act shall be drawn up and presented by the Applicant or his pleader to the Director or to such other Officer as he may appoint in his behalf. It shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree or the order in respect of which the application is made and by the copy of the judgment, if any, upon which the decree or the order is founded. It shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree or the order in respect of which the application is made and by the copy of the judgment, if any, upon which the decree or the order is founded. Copies of decrees or orders or judgments of other subordinate authorities shall not be required to be filed unless, for special reasons, filing of these documents is also considered necessary by the Director. These provisions read along with the various notifications issued by the State Government from time to time and the order of the Director clearly show that a revision application can be made to a Deputy Director of Consolidation and that all Deputy Directors of Consolidation in Uttar Pradesh have jurisdiction to hear a revision application made u/s 48 of the Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of a Deputy Director of Consolidation to hear a revision application is not conferred by an order passed Under Rule 65(1-A) but by the provisions of the Act mentioned above and the notifications of the State Government. 8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to point out any section in the Act or to a rule which provides that; unless a revision application is transferred to a Deputy Director of Consolidation by a District Deputy Director of Consolidation the former shall have no jurisdiction to hear it. In AIR 1945 9 (Federal Court) the question was whether an assessment order passed by an officer in whose territorial jurisdiction the Assessee did not live was bad. The Federal Court observed: It however seems to us open to serious doubt whether the Appellant is entitled to raise this question at all and whether it is really a matter for decision by the Court. Clause (3) of Section 64 provides that any question as to the place of assessment shall be determined by the Commissioner or by the Central Board of Revenue. Proviso 3 to the clause enacts that if the place of assessment is called in question by the Assessee, the income tax Officer shall, if not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, refer the matter for determination under this Sub-section before assessment is made. These provisions clearly indicate that the matter is more one of administrative convenience than of jurisdiction and that in any event it is not one for adjudication... (Italicised by us. In Pannalal Binjraj Vs. These provisions clearly indicate that the matter is more one of administrative convenience than of jurisdiction and that in any event it is not one for adjudication... (Italicised by us. In Pannalal Binjraj Vs. Union of india (UOI), AIR 1957 SC 397 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were considering the provision relating to the transfer of cases under the Indian Income Tax Act 1952. The Court observed: This aspect was further emphasized by the Federal Court in AIR 1945 9 (Federal Court) , where Spens C.J. observed: ...These provisions clearly indicate that the matter is more one of administrative convenience than of jurisdiction and that in any event it is not one for adjudication by the Court. 9. The State Government maintains a pool of Deputy Director of Consolidation at Lucknow having jurisdiction to decide cases throughout Uttar Pradesh, so that one or more of them may be sent to the district from which there is a call for officers to dispose of pending case. Sri H.M. Singh who decided the revision application giving rise to the petition is one of those Deputy Directors. In view of the large number of cases in the district of Fyzabad he was sent to that district. The revision application giving rise to this petition was sent to his file but there was no written order of transfer of the case to him. In our opinion his jurisdiction to decide the revision application giving rise to the petition was not affected by the absence of an order of transfer. We find support for our view from Jhakar Abir and Others Vs. Province of Bihar, AIR 1945 Patna 98 (Full Bench). In this case a criminal court tried a person for an offence punishable by law. There was no order transferring that case to that court. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court while dealing with the matter concluded: Where a Court has jurisdiction to try an offence it is immaterial whether it has taken cognizance of the offence without being empowered to do so or whether the case has been transferred to it by another Court which was not empowered to make the order of transfer. Again in Posan Singh and Others Vs. Again in Posan Singh and Others Vs. Inderdeo Singh and Others, AIR 1952 Patna 328 the learned Judges of the Patna High Court were called upon to decide the question whether the decree passed in a suit by the Additional Munsif who was not the instituting court was bad in the absence of there being an order transferring that case to him. The learned Judges of the Patna High Court concluded: To sum up, the Additional Munsif, Third Court, had inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. All that was necessary was that certain procedure should have been followed in order to remove the case from the file of the Additional Munsif, Second Court, to his file. The failure to obtain this order was a defect of procedure which has been cured by waiver. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that if this view is taken then any Deputy Director of Consolidation in Lucknow pool can rush to any district head quarters and seize upon any case and decide it himself thereby causing perfect chaos. 11. The imaginary argument cannot be seriously taken. In the first place a Deputy Director of Consolidation is a responsible officer and he cannot be expected to act in a mad manner. Besides, he cannot leave Lucknow for a district head quarters to decide cases there without there being an order of the Director. Rule 110 reads: The Director of Consolidation shall exercise powers of supervision and superintendence over the staff employed in the Consolidation organization of the State and may for that purpose issue such direction as may be necessary. The supervisory control of the Director extends to all Deputy Directors of Consolidation. Their travelling allowance and daily allowance is payable to them only after the bill is passed. They would put this in jeopardy and would also be liable to disciplinary action for acting so indiscreetly. Therefore, the fear entertained by Sri Hargur Charan Srivastava, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is more fantastic than real. 12. We would like to point out that the circumstance that the case was sent to the file of Sri Singh shows that it was transferred by the District Director of Consolidation. The law does not require any written order. In this view of the matter also there is no substance in the petition. 13. 12. We would like to point out that the circumstance that the case was sent to the file of Sri Singh shows that it was transferred by the District Director of Consolidation. The law does not require any written order. In this view of the matter also there is no substance in the petition. 13. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that there was no want of jurisdiction on the part of the Deputy Director of Consolidation who decided the revision application giving rise to the petition. We find no merits in the petition and dismiss it.