JUDGMENT R. B. Misra, J. - These two consolidated appeals against a common judgment of the Civil Judge, Bijnor, dated 9th March, 1962, arise out of restitution proceedings under Section 144, C. P. C. The facts leading up to these appeals lie in a narrow compass and are as follows : 2. Ami Chand and his brother filed Suit No. 445 of 1952 against the appellant Gopinath on 24th September, 1952 for declaration that plots Nos. 73 (area 16 bighas 7 biswas) and 76 (area 27 bighas) were their Bhumidhari plots, as, also for an injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with their possession. Shanti Prasad also filed Suit No. 387 of 1962 against Gopinath on. 26th August, 1952 in respect of plot No. 67 (area 87 bighas) for declaration of his Sirdari rights as also for an injunction restraining the appellant (Gopi Nath) from interfering with his possession. The plots in dispute are agricultural plots and constitute a substantial area. There was a dispute between the parties in respect of these plots which culminated in proceedings under Section 145, C. P. C. and the plots in dispute, along with crops, were attached on 10th October, 1951. 'I he proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were ultimately decided in favour of the appellant on 6th September, 1952, and the property, which was kept in the custody of a Supurdar, was released in appellant's favour. The appellant took formal delivery of possession on 12th October, 1952. It appears that in Suit No. 387 an interim injunction order was obtained on 24th September, 1952, while in Suit No. 445 of 1952, the interim injunction order was granted on 6th October, 1952. The two interim injunction orders were ultimately confirmed, after hearing both the parties, on 16th October, 1952. Both the suits were ultimately dismissed on 22nd March, 1960 with a definite finding that the plaintiffs in either case were not in possession on the date of the suit, and this is why both the suits were held to be barred by Section 42, Specific Relief Act. 3. The judgment and decree in both the suits were confirmed even by the first and the second appellate Courts. 4. 3. The judgment and decree in both the suits were confirmed even by the first and the second appellate Courts. 4. According to the finding of fact recorded by the learned Munsif, the plaintiffs were not in possession on the date of suit; the possession was with the appellant, but he was dispossessed on account of the injunction order passed by the learned Munsif, during the pendency of the suit, as mentioned above. As the interim order of injunction was passed by the Court, it would be deemed to have been vacated after the disposal of the suit in favour of the appellant. Accordingly, he was entitled to get restitution over the plots in dispute. On these allegations he applied for restitution, which was objected to by the respondents on various grounds. The objection in the main in both the cases was that Section 144, C. P. C. had no application to the facts of the cases, and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any restitution. 5. The learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession on the date of the suit but subsequently lie was dispossessed on account of the injunction order. It was on account of the injunction order that the respondents came in possession. 6. The Advocate-General, appearing for the appellant, raised a number of contentions. He urged that if there had been no injunction order the appellant would have remained in possession in pursuance of the order of the Criminal Court in the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. The appellant was found to be in possession on the (late of the preliminary order in the 145, Cr. P. C. proceedings. On the conclusion of the proceedings the appellant was accordingly allowed to remain in possession: the property was ordered to be released in his favour and indeed he obtained formal possession from the Supurdar on 12th October, 1952. He could not however retain possession on account of the interim injunction order which was confirmed on 16th October, 1952. No doubt the injunction order slid not in so many words direct Gopi Nath to deliver possession to the respondents, all the same, the order dated 16th October, 1952, read as a whole, only indicates that the appellant had to give up his possession. No doubt the injunction order slid not in so many words direct Gopi Nath to deliver possession to the respondents, all the same, the order dated 16th October, 1952, read as a whole, only indicates that the appellant had to give up his possession. In order to appreciate this point, it would be necessary to refer to the injunction orders in some detail. If the appellant had to part with his possession on account of the injunction orders. he would certainly be entitled to restitution and the respondents were under the obligation to return the property after the dismissal of the suit. 7. In one case the interim order was passed on 24th September, 1952, while in the other it was passed on the 6th of October, 1952, but the two interim orders were confirmed in both the cases on 16th October, 1952, more or less, in the following words : "The parties have argued their cases at great length. The object of the present suit is to establish that the land over which the defendant seeks to establish his title under the lease in his favour is quite different from the land in dispute. There is thus a bona fide contention between the parties. The present suit was filed on........ Thus it appears that after getting an order of the Criminal Court under the proceedings of Section 145, Cr. P. C. the defendant hurriedly took possession over the plots in dispute after the institution of the suit on ......... as alleged in their affidavit, through police. One thing, however, is clear from this that on the date of this suit the defendant was out of possession. This is also clear from the Qabuliat filed by the defendant that only a portion of certain plots of a forest land was given to him. I have carefully gone through the judgment of the Criminal Court under Section 145, Cr. P. C. This is in the nature of enquiry subject to the present suit. In case a temporary injunction is issued against the defendant, no irreparable loss can be suffered by him because he can be compensated by damages 4nd mesne profits. If the injunction is refused, it would amount to put the defendant in possession over the land over which he had no right, if it is ultimately decided that the land' in dispute was not given to him. If the injunction is refused, it would amount to put the defendant in possession over the land over which he had no right, if it is ultimately decided that the land' in dispute was not given to him. Under the circumstances it is desirable that a temporary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining him from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit during the pendency of this suit. I, therefore, order the defendant not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff (luring the pendency of the suit." It would be noticed that though the operative portion of the order only prohibits the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit, the body of the order leaves no room for doubt that if the defendant did not give up his possession, he could do so only on pain of penalty. On the basis of the observation of the learned Munsif that, "Thus it appears that after getting an order of the Criminal Court under the proceedings of Section 145, Cr. P. C. the defendant hurriedly took possession over the plots in dispute after the institution of this suit on 10th October, 1952, as alleged in their affidavit, through police. One thing however is clear from this that from the (late of this suit the defendant was out of possession", Shri N. S. Singhal, appearing for the respondents, contended that the learned Munsif has found as a fact that the appellant was out of possession on the date of the suit, and he hurriedly tried to take possession in pursuance of the order under Section 145, Cr. P. C. According to him, this finding of fact could not be challenged at the second appellate stage, and if this finding of fact recorded by the learned Munsif while confirming the injunction order (as confirmed also by the appellate Court) is allowed to stand, Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure can have no application. 8.. In my opinion the learned Munsif was labouring under a misapprehension in assuming that the appellant got possession only in pursuance of the order under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Section 145, Cr. P. C. is intended only to provide a speedy remedy for prevention of a breach of the peace arising out of disputes relating to immovable property by maintaining one party in possession. P. C. Section 145, Cr. P. C. is intended only to provide a speedy remedy for prevention of a breach of the peace arising out of disputes relating to immovable property by maintaining one party in possession. The object of the section is to entitle the Magistrate to intervene and pass a temporary object in regard to the possession of the disputed property, having effect only until the actual right of the parties is determined by a competent Civil Court. The Magistrate had ordered the property to remain in possession of the appellant on the footing that he was in possession of the plots on the date of the preliminary order, and the attached property that was kept in the custody of the Supurdar was ordered to be handed over to the appellant. The possession of we appellant was not on account of the release order but because the criminal Court had found the appellant to have been in possession. Having obtained possession thus under the orders of the Criminal Court, the appellant would not have normally given up possession but for the injunction order. In my judgment, therefore, there is no doubt that the position in regard to possession changed in this case only on account of the. injunction order. In face of the injunction order the appellant could not keep his possession, and if he had done so, he would have been hauled up for contempt proceedings. 9. We have now to consider whether this order of injunction was subsequently reversed. If the order of injunction has been reversed, in that case the benefit that had accrued to the other side on account of that injunction order must also be given back to the appellant. All interim orders automatically come to an end after the dismissal of a suit. Therefore the interim injunction orders as confirmed on 16th October, 1952) would also be deemed to have been vacated on the dismissal of the respondents' suits. All interim orders automatically come to an end after the dismissal of a suit. Therefore the interim injunction orders as confirmed on 16th October, 1952) would also be deemed to have been vacated on the dismissal of the respondents' suits. This brings us to the question whether such a vacation would bring the case within the four corners of Section 144, C. P. C. The relevant wordings of Section 144, C. P. C. are : "Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in appeal, revision or otherwise, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made, as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order...." Under Section 583 of the old Code, restitution could have been allowed only where a decree was reversed in appeal. But that is not the position now under Section 144, C. P. C. Section 144, C. P. C. is attracted not only to a case of "reversal of a decree by an appellate Court but also when it is.varied or reversed even by the first Court itself. In the present case the reversal of the order is not by the appellate Court but by the first Court itself. The learned Munsif had passed and confirmed the injunction order and the respondents entered into possession after the passing of the injunction order. On the dismissal of the suits, that injunction order stood vacated, There was thus a reversal of the injunction order by the same Court as a consequence of the dismissal of the suits, and Section 144, C. P. C. is clearly attracted. 10. The wording of Section 144, C. P. C. is wide enough to allow restitution irrespective of the manner in which the decree or order has been reversed. The tentative finding about possession recorded by the learned Munsif while passing the order of injunction has been set at nought by the same Court while disposing of the case, when it recorded a clear and categorical finding, that the respondents were not in possession on the date of the suit. The tentative finding about possession recorded by the learned Munsif while passing the order of injunction has been set at nought by the same Court while disposing of the case, when it recorded a clear and categorical finding, that the respondents were not in possession on the date of the suit. Thus it is evident that the respondents entered into possession only in pursuance of an order of the learned Aiunsif, which was subsequently found by the learned Munsif himself to be incorrect. Refusing restitution in such a case would virtually amount to allowing the appellant to suffer at the hands of the Court. The doctrine of restitution is based on equitable principles. The law places an obligation on a party receiving the benefit of an erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what it had lost, and it is the duty of the Court to enforce it unless it is shown that the restitution would clearly be contrary to the real justice in the case. In the present case the respondents entered in possession in pursuance of an order of the Court, which was subsequently found to be incorrect, and it is obligatory on their part to make restitution to the appellant. 11. The learned judge disallowed restitution on three grounds. Firstly, according to him, there was no reversal of the injunction order. In my opinion the learned judge was not justified in holding so. As shown above, the order of injunction stood vacated with the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court. The learned judge seems to have been labouring under a mistaken notion that reversal could be made only by an appellate Court, which, as already shown above, is not correct. I 12. The second ground given by the learned judge is that if the appellant felt aggrieved by the order of injunction, it was open to him to obtain compensation under the provisions of Section 95, C. P. C. and there was no question of any restitution. I am afraid, this ground also cannot be substantiated. Once it is established that the respondents had entered into possession only in pursuance of an injunction order which was later on reversed or vacated, the appellant was certainly entitled to restitution and also to damages for the period the respondents had remained in possession as a consequence of the erroneous order of the Court. 13. Once it is established that the respondents had entered into possession only in pursuance of an injunction order which was later on reversed or vacated, the appellant was certainly entitled to restitution and also to damages for the period the respondents had remained in possession as a consequence of the erroneous order of the Court. 13. The third ground given by the learned Judge is that the injunction order did not direct the appellant to deliver possession to the respondents; it my prohibited him from interfering with the possession of the respondents. This aspect 'of the matter has been dealt with by me earlier, and it has been held that the order of injunction as confirmed on 16th October, 1952, read as a whole, indicates by necessary implication that the applicant was to deliver possession to the respondents. The order read as a whole clearly amounts to a mandatory injunction and not merely a prohibitory injunction. No sensible man, in face of that injunction order read as a whole, could have ventured to retain possession. 14. The Advocate-General next contended that in any case, even assuming for the sake of arguments that Section 144 in terms did not apply, it was at any rate on account of the injunction order that the appellant had to give up possession. This plea seems to have been raised even before the lower appellate Court but was repelled on the ground that such a plea had not been taken by the appellant in his restitution application. Paragraph 4 of the restitution application is material in this connection. It reads thus : "Yee ki uprokt wad men hukm -imtenayee dauran muqadma jaree hone ke paschat Babu Ram wa pratipakchhi se us hukm ke aadhar per wivadit bhoomi per qabza kar liya our prarthi uprokt hukm se bedakhal ho gaya." The assertion in both the cases is in similar terms. The allegation, therefore, is that in both the cases the other side entered into possession either in pursuance of or on the basis of the injunction order. 15. The learned Advocate-General contended that Section 144, C. P. C. would be applicable not only in a case where possession had been taken by a party in pursuance of an order but it can be invoked even in a case where possession had been taken under the colour of the order. 15. The learned Advocate-General contended that Section 144, C. P. C. would be applicable not only in a case where possession had been taken by a party in pursuance of an order but it can be invoked even in a case where possession had been taken under the colour of the order. For this reliance was placed upon Robert Hercules Skinner v. Lt. James R. K. Skinner, A.I.R. 1943 Alld. 202, , Arya Pratinidhi Sabha v. Chhotey Lal, A.I.R. 1937 Alld. 728 and Jacob Syriac Nidhiri v. Nagendra Prabhu Krishna Prabhu, A.I.R. 1951 Travancor Cochin 226. They all support the appellant's contention. 16. The allegations made in paragraph 4 of the restitution application are wide enough to include the allegation that the appellant had to give up possession under the colour of the injunction order. A large number of cases. were cited for the appellant in support of the contention that even if Section 144, C. P. C. does not apply, restitution can be allowed under Section 151, C. P. C., and Jai Berham v. Kedarnath, A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 269 is the leading case on the point. The proposition of law laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council was : "It is the duty of the Court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to 'place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor in deed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." To the same effect are Amba Lal v. Ram Gopal. A.I.R. 1933 Alld. 218, Shital Prasad v. Mt. Tapesra Kwniin, A.I.R. 1953 Addl. 573 and Salehon Shah v. Zawar Hussain, A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 343. 17. Shri N. S. Singhal, appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that on the own admission of the appellant the respondents were in possession, otherwise they would not have applied for restitution; and the respondents possession would he the possession of trespasser without any right. Such a possession would give rise to a fresh cause of action for which the remedy is a separate suit. Such a possession would give rise to a fresh cause of action for which the remedy is a separate suit. In not filing such a suit within the period of limitation the appellant has lost all his rights and what he could get directly he cannot seek it indirectly. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Privy Council reported in Narayan Jivangouda Patil v. Puttabai, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 5. . That too was a case for declaration and possession wherein a temporary injunction granted was subsequently confirmed by the decree of the Court which prohibited the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff in any manner. The precise question that arose in that case was whether in such a case the injunction order would be deemed to have prevented a party from filing a suit, and it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that there was nothing in the order to show that any party was restrained from filing a suit. The question with which we are faced in the present case was not directly involved in that case. In the present case it has been clearly found that the possession of the respondents was in pursuance or on account of the injunction order passed 1.y the Court, which was subsequently vacated, so the respondents are under an obligation to return the benefit that had accrued to them under that order. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon T. S. Swaminatha Odayar v. The Official Receiver of West Tanjore, 1957 S.C. Journal 501. But the facts of that case being different from the facts of the present case, it is not of much assistance on the question involved in the present case. 18. Shri Singhal then contended that, there was no finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the respondents came in possession in pursuance of the injunction order, and in the absence of such a finding restitution cannot be allowed. According to him, the finding is rather to the contrary, namely, that there was nothing in the order of injunction to direct the appellant to give up possession. The learned counsel urged that indirectly the finding is that the possession could not have been delivered by the appellant to the respondents in pursuance of the order of injunction. According to him, the finding is rather to the contrary, namely, that there was nothing in the order of injunction to direct the appellant to give up possession. The learned counsel urged that indirectly the finding is that the possession could not have been delivered by the appellant to the respondents in pursuance of the order of injunction. I have already dealt with this aspect of the matter in the earlier part of the judgment and held to the contrary. Section 144, C. P. C. would be attracted even if possession had not been taken by the respondents through the process of the Court. It was quite sufficient for attracting the provisions of Section 144, if the position had changed on account of the order of injunction. As indicated above the learned judge was wrong in assuming that possession in this case was not taken by the respondents through the process of the Court or that the order of injunction did not direct the appellant to hand over possession to the respondents. 19. Shri Singhal lastly argued that in any case the restitution, if at all, could be allowed only against the plaintiffs of the two suits and not against the various others (subsequent transferees) who were no parties to those suits. i find great difficulty in accepting this argument as well. If those various other persons are persons claiming through the plaintiffs, they have also to give up possession in the same way as the plaintiffs, because in a restitution proceeding under Section 144, C. P. C. the Court has to put the parties in the same position a, they were at the time of the institution of the suit. The matter can also he looked at from another aspect. Evidently those other persons were either ushered in by the plaintiffs or they were independent persons If they were persons brought in by the plaintiffs, they would be bound by the order passed against the plaintiffs in the same way as the plaintiffs themselves. If on the other hand they are independent persons and they were in possession, they were made parties to the restitution proceeding and in appeal up to this Court. If on the other hand they are independent persons and they were in possession, they were made parties to the restitution proceeding and in appeal up to this Court. At no stage of the proceeding they contested the matter that restitution should not be allowed as against them: and the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to plead jus tertil, i.e. they cannot be allowed to plead the cause of others. In this view of the matter also the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold good. , 20. For the reasons given above the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot be upheld. In the result both the appeals (Nos. 1945 and 1946 of 1962) are allowed, the judgments and decrees of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the Court of first instance are restored. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs,