B. J. DIVAN, Y. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) WE find that when Ambalal Kalidas was in the witness box after the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused a note was made that there was no reexamination and certain questions were put to the witness by the learned trial Judge. In those questions put to him by the Court questions based on the statement of Ambalal recorded by the police in the course of the investigation were put to him by the learned trial Judge. With respect to the learned trial Judge he was in error when he used the statement of the witness for the purpose of putting these questions to the witness. Sec. 162 Criminal Procedure Code clearly mentions that any statement or any record thereof whether in a police diary or otherwise or any part of such statement or record cannot be used for any purpose except as provided in the proviso under sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code; and that proviso lays down that when a witness is called for the prosecution the statement recorded in the course of the investigation can be used by the accused for the purpose of contradicting him and with the permission of the Court by the prosecution to contradict such witness; but this proviso is the exception to the main body of sec. 162 (1) and the words any purpose occurring in sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code clearly indicate that it cannot be used for any other purpose. We may point out that in Emperor v. Kassamalli Mirzalli 44 Bom. L. R. 27 a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was concerned with the provisions of sec. 63 of the City of Bombay Police Act as it then stood; and those provisions were identical with sec. 162 Criminal Procedure Code. The said sec. 63 was in these words :-NO statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Act shall if taken down in writing be signed by the person making it nor shall such writing be used as evidence. ( 3 ) THEN there was a proviso and the wording of that proviso was similar to the wording of the proviso to sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code as it stood prior to the amendment of 1956. ( 3 ) THEN there was a proviso and the wording of that proviso was similar to the wording of the proviso to sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code as it stood prior to the amendment of 1956. Beaumont C. J. has observed at page 40 of the report as follows:-SO that the right to cross examine a prosecution witness on his statements made to the police is a privilege conferred on the defence. IN this case certain witnesses were called by the prosecution who did not corroborate the complainant and her husband on certain material points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So that to that extent they did not help the prosecution and in those circumstances naturally counsel for the defence did not cross examine them on their police statements. But the learned Judge himself called for the police statements and put to some of the witnesses questions founded on those statements That was a clear breach of the provisions of sec. 63. ( 4 ) WE are in agreement with these observations of Beaumont C. J. and in our opinion the language of sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code does not permit any trial Court to use the statement made before the police in the manner in which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has used the police statement in the instant case. It is noteworthy that all the contridictions from Ambalals police statement have been brought on the record in questions put to him by the Court and even when the Police Officer P. S. I. Shah was in the witness box the learned trial Judge has tried to ascertain from the Investigating Officer as to whether this particular statement about Ambalal Kalidas stating to the police that he had seen accused No. 1 stabbing Ishverbhai was made before the police or not. In our opinion the learned trial Judge has committed a breach of the specific provisions of sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code and that too inspite of the position as clearly explained by Beaumont C. J. in the case referred to above. In our opinion the learned trial Judge has committed a breach of the specific provisions of sec. 162 (1) Criminal Procedure Code and that too inspite of the position as clearly explained by Beaumont C. J. in the case referred to above. In the instant case we will disregard everything that has been elicited from Ambalal Kalidas or from the Investigating Officer by the learned trial Judge on the basis of the statement of Ambalal recorded by the police in the course of the investigation. .