BHANDARI, C.J.—These ten cases are references under sec. 113 of the Civil Procedure Code. The first nine references have been made by the Judge, Debt Relief Court, Bilara in cases in which various debtors had filed separate applications under sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act., 1957 (hereinafter called the Act). In ail these cases various co-operative societies registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1953, were shown as creditors. It was argued before the learned judge on behalf of these Societies that the Act does not apply to the liability in respect of any sum due to any society registered or deemed to have been registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1953 and as such the Debt Relief Court was not empowered to pass any order in respect of their debt under the provisions of the Act They also relied on sec. 146(2) of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 which lays down that nothing contained in the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957, shall apply to the loans advanced by the Co-operative Societies under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act. On behalf of the debtors, it was contended that both these provisions were ultra vires the Constitution as they denied the debtor equality before the law. The learned Judge, therefore, made these references under sec. 113 Civil Procedure Code after formulating three questions. The first two questions formulated are as follows: (1) Whether sec. 4(b) of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act 1953 is hit by Article 14 of the Indian Constitution it being discriminatory? (2) Whether sec. 146 sub-sec. (2) of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act 1965 is also a discriminatory one and as such it is also hit by Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. The third question also purports to contain what is contained in the first two questions and it need not be mentioned. 3. Similar questions also arose before the Debt Relief Court, Pali in a case and the said court has also made a reference under sec. 113 Civil Procedure Code and that reference is tenth case noted above. 4. Notices of these references were given to the parties and in the last reference No. 67 of 196|6 notice was also given to the Advocate-General, Rajasthan. 5. 113 Civil Procedure Code and that reference is tenth case noted above. 4. Notices of these references were given to the parties and in the last reference No. 67 of 196|6 notice was also given to the Advocate-General, Rajasthan. 5. A preliminary point has been raised by the Additional Advocate-General that these references are not maintainable as they do not arise out of any proceedings in a suit or appeal He has argued that the power of a court to state a case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court is subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, and the conditions and limitations are prescribed by order 46, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which runs as follows: "Where, before or on the hearing of a suit or an appeal in which the decree is not subject to appeal, or where, in the execution of any such decree, any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, on which the Court trying the suit or appeal, or executing the decree, entertains reasonable doubt, the Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained refer such statement with its own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court." 6. It is argued that the Debt Relief Court was neither hearing a suit, nor an appeal, nor did any question in execution of any decree arise before it and as such the Debt Relief Court was not competent to make a reference u/s. 113 C. P. C. to this Court. Learned counsel has cited a judgment of the Nagpur High Court in District Judge, Hoshangabad vs. Seth Shri Kishandas (1) in support of his argument. 7. In that case, there is some discussion on the question whether a Debt Relief Court is a Civil Court or not and the view taken is that it is a Special Tribunal created ad-hoc for the special purposes of the C. P. and Barar Relief of Indebtedness Act But the decision in that case is based on the view that proceedings in the Debt Relief Courts are not suits and the provisions of O. 46. r. 1 are not attracted. r. 1 are not attracted. Looking to the provisions of the Act we are of the view that the Debt Relief Courts in Rajasthan are established under sec. 3 of the Act and they are courts. Sec. 3 of the Act runs as follows: "Sec. 3—Establishment of Debt Relief Courts—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950 (Rajasthan Ordinance VII of 1950), the State Government may establish Debt Relief Courts with such jurisdiction as it my determine and may appoint persons possessing the prescribed qualifications to be Judges of such courts." 8. This section clearly shows that the State Government is to establish Debt Relief Courts. The other provisions of the Act show that these Courts have to determine civil disputes between the parties and grant relief. The opening part of sec. 3 mentions that Debt Relief Courts are to be established by the State Government notwithstanding anything contained in the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950. That Ordinance refers to the establishment of regular Civil Courts. These words were not necessary if the Debt Relief Courts were not courts and were mere Tribunals. In view of the aforesaid provision we are definitely of the opinion that the Debt Relief Courts are courts and as they decide civil matters they are Civil Courts. 9. It is, however, contended that sec. 113 Civil Procedure Code can be applied only to a court to which the Civil Procedure Code applies. Reference in this connection has been made to Raja Setrucharlu Ramabhadra Raju Bahadur vs. Maharaja of Jeypore (2). The Civil Procedure Code applies to all the Courts of Civil Judicature. The preamble to the Code itself shows that the Code was enacted for the purposes of consolidating and amending the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature. Sec. 141 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down that the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code in regard to suits is to be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. 10. It may be said that there is a special provision in sec. 16 directing the Debt Relief Court to follow the same procedure as followed by a Court of original civil jurisdiction and that this gives an indication that the Debt Relief Court is not a court of original civil jurisdiction and is merely a Tribunal. 10. It may be said that there is a special provision in sec. 16 directing the Debt Relief Court to follow the same procedure as followed by a Court of original civil jurisdiction and that this gives an indication that the Debt Relief Court is not a court of original civil jurisdiction and is merely a Tribunal. This is the basis of the reasoning of the Nagpur High Court in holding the Debt Relief Court a Tribunal and not a court of civil jurisdiction. In our humble opinion, if the other provision of the Act unmistakably point out that a Debt Relief Court is a Court of civil jurisdiction, the mere presence of sec.16 in the Act would not make such a court not a Court of civil jurisdiction. The Madras High Court in Thummalapalli Viswanadham vs. Sokalachand Chunnilal(3) applied sec. 141 Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings under Madras Agriculturist Relief Act without there being any provision for the applicability of that section to the proceedings under that Act. We may also point out that the Privy Council in Raja Setrucharlu Ramabhadra Raju Bahadur vs. Maharaja of Jeypore (2), which was a case in which a British Indian Court had ordered the sale of property situate in the scheduled districts to which the Code did not at all apply, held that the provisions of sec, 17 of the Code of the Civil Procedure would not be attracted. In our view, the Debt Relief Court is a Court of Civil Judicature to which the Civil Procedure Code applies and on that account it cannot be said that sec. 113 of the Civil Procedure Code would not apply because it is not a court. 11. The real difficulty, however, is that sec. 113 Civil Procedure Code lays down that it will apply subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. Certain conditions and limitations have been prescribed under O. 46, r. 1 and we have to examine whether the conditions and limitations mentioned in this rule are fulfilled in this case. It is argued on behalf of the debtors in these cases that the Debt Relief Court should be taken to be hearing a suit when they are hearing an application under sec. It is argued on behalf of the debtors in these cases that the Debt Relief Court should be taken to be hearing a suit when they are hearing an application under sec. 6 of the Act and, therefore, a reference is permissible by such a Court The provisions of Civil Procedure Code clearly show that a suit originates by filing a plaint and not otherwise. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta vs. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd.(4 that under sec. 3 of the Limitation Act the word suit ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint and that a claim against a company in liquidation not made by a proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint cannot be considered to be a suit instituted within that section. 12. The Limitation Act is in pari materia with the Civil Procedure Code and the same meaning must be given to a suit instituted in the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, in our view because of O. 46, r. 1 Civil Procedure Code no reference could have been made by the Debt Relief Courts of Bilara and Pali to this Court under sec. 113 Civil Procedure Code. 13. But the matter does not end here. Art. 228 of the Constitution imposes a duty on this Court that if this Court is satisfied that a case pending in a Court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it may withdraw the case and may either dispose of the case itself, or determine the said question of law and return the case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn. We are satisfied that this case involves a substantial question as to the applicability of Art.14 to the Act. But Art.228 is attracted only when such question arises before a court subordinate to the High Court, We have, therefore, to examine the point whether the Debt Relief Court is subordinate to this Court or not. We are satisfied that this case involves a substantial question as to the applicability of Art.14 to the Act. But Art.228 is attracted only when such question arises before a court subordinate to the High Court, We have, therefore, to examine the point whether the Debt Relief Court is subordinate to this Court or not. It has been argued before us that the Debt Relief Court under the Act is neither subject to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of this Court and as such it is not subordinate to this Court. A revision application, however, lies to the District Court under sec. 17 of the Act and the District Court is empowered to revise the order of a Debt Relief Court. It is conceded that a District Court is subordinate to the High Court, but it is urged that simply because of this fact that a revision application lies to the District Court,, which is subordinate to the High Court, the Debt Relief Court cannot be treated as subordinate to the High Court. This argument is not acceptable to us. We may refer to sec. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code which runs as follows: "Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court." 14. Thus, under sec. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code, every Civil Court of the grade inferior to that of a District Court is subordinate to the High Court no matter whether any revision application lies directly to the High Court or not. In the matter of subordination of Courts, to the High Court, Art.228 of the Constitution must be interpreted in the same light. The principle laid down in sec. 3 Civil Procedure Code is based on common sense and this common sense interpretation must be adopted while interpreting Art.228 of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that a Debt Relief Court is inferior to a District Court and District Court while performing its duty under sec. 17 of the Act cannot be treated as persona designate, but it is court which is subordinate to the High Court. There can be no doubt that a Debt Relief Court is inferior to a District Court and District Court while performing its duty under sec. 17 of the Act cannot be treated as persona designate, but it is court which is subordinate to the High Court. Further, the District Court has been enumerated as one of the Courts subordinate to the High Court in the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950 under which the Court of District Judge is established. In this view of the matter, we do not find any difficulty in treating the Debt Relief Court as subordinate to the High Court. 15. In the circumstances of these cases, we withdraw all these matters from the Debt Relief Courts where they are pending and proceed to decide the question of law regarding the applicability of Art.14 of the Constitution to the provisions of the Act. 16. The Act has been enacted to provide for the relief to the agriculturists in the State of Rajasthan from indebtedness as the preamble mentions. In the objects and reasons for introducing the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Bill (No. 13 of 1957), {he following has been mentioned: The problem of agricultural indebtedness in the State has assumed considerable magnitude. Because of sheer necessity agriculturists are compelled to pay exorbitant rates of interest. Not only this but the interest which accrues on loans is from time to time added to the principal amount and the burden on the debtor goes on increasing, resulting in his inability to pay his debts in full. There exist scattered pieces of legislation applicable to different areas of the State. The provisions thereof are however defective and wanting in many respects. With a view to dealing adequately with problem in question Government considers it desirable to have a uniform law enacted for the whole of the State with all the requirements of the day embodied therein. The Bill is designed to achieve this object." 17. Thus, the object for which the Act has been enacted is to grant relief to the agriculturists who may have become victims at the hands of the unscrupulous money-lenders charging exorbitant rates of either simple or compound interest. The Bill is designed to achieve this object." 17. Thus, the object for which the Act has been enacted is to grant relief to the agriculturists who may have become victims at the hands of the unscrupulous money-lenders charging exorbitant rates of either simple or compound interest. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gamini Krishnayya vs. Guraza Seshachalam(5), any beneficial measure of this kind should, as far as permissible, be interpreted in such a way as to carry out the main object which the Legislature had in view. 18. The scheme of the Act is that by filing an application under sec. 6 a debtor may get a discharge of the debt of a creditor under sec. 8(2) or get the debt determined under sec." 10 and in the process of determination get the debt reduced in case the conditions provided under sec. 10 are satisfied. The creditor is also empowered to make an application under sec. 6 of the Act. The debt has been defined in sec. 2(c) as including all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, but under sec. 4 it has been laid down that the Act will not affect the claim in respect of several matters mentioned in that section. Sec. 4(b) mentions that the Act will not affect the claim due in respect of any liability in respect of any sum due to any society registered or deemed to be registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act IV of 1953 ). In this case, we are concerned only to determine whether sec. 4(b) is ultra vires and should be struck down inasmuch as it is discriminatory to exclude from the purview of the Act the claim of a co-operative society. 19. Art. 14 of the Constitution affords equality before law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India and it lays down as a fundamental right that the State shall not deny to any person such equality before law or equal protection of laws. The Legislature has excluded the Co-operative Societies from being affected by the operation of the Act. We have to determine whether in doing so, the Legislature has discriminated in a manner not warranted by Art.14 which prohibits an arbitrary discrimination. 20. The Legislature has excluded the Co-operative Societies from being affected by the operation of the Act. We have to determine whether in doing so, the Legislature has discriminated in a manner not warranted by Art.14 which prohibits an arbitrary discrimination. 20. Under the Act, law has classified the persons against whom an agriculturist can seek protection and also those against whom he cannot seek protection, and a registered co-operative society is one against whom it has been laid down that a debtor cannot claim protection. We have to examine whether there is sufficient justification for this. 21. The Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1953, which has been replaced by the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (Act No. 13 of 1965), makes elaborate provisions for the management of the cooperative societies for the investment of its funds. Sec. 65 makes restrictions on giving loans. It runs as follows: "Sec.65. Restriction on loans.—(1) A co-operative society shall not make a loan to any person other than a member: Provided that with the general or special sanction of the Registrar, a co-operative Society may make loans to another co-operative society. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), a co-operative society may make a loan to depositor on the security of his deposit. (3) The Government may, by general or special order, prohibit or restrict the lending of money on the security of movable property or on mortgage of immovable property by any society or class of societies. (4) The lending policy of a financing bank shall be approved by the Government." 22. There are also restrictions placed on a registered co-operative society under sec. 66 when the loan is given to a non-member. The other provisions of that Act also show that the formation and working of the co-operative societies is for the promotion of common economic need among the members so as to bring prosperity in agriculture and industry. It is expected that a registered co-operative society would not advance loan to its members or even non-members on exorbitant rates of interest and would not try to exploit its debtors. The registered co-operative societies stand by a class in themselves and when their claims against their debtors are excluded from the operation of the Act, it cannot be said that the Legislature has acted with unjustifiable discrimination in excluding them from the operation of the Act. 23. The registered co-operative societies stand by a class in themselves and when their claims against their debtors are excluded from the operation of the Act, it cannot be said that the Legislature has acted with unjustifiable discrimination in excluding them from the operation of the Act. 23. In Lachhman Dass vs. State of Punjab (6), it has been held that special procedure for the recovery of dues from customers of State Bank was not a contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Manna Lal vs. Collector of Jhalawar (7). The same view may be taken with respect to the debts of the co-operative societies. In our view, taking all these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be said that the Legislature while excluding the co-operative societies from the purview of the operation of the provisions of the Act acted in a manner which may be called discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. 24. In Nathudan vs. State of Rajasthan(8), Jagat Narayan J. has taken the view that sec. 4( j) of the Act which excluded any sum of money due to Government by way of or towards payment of loan was hit by Art, 14 of the Constitution. In this case, we are not called upon to make any pronouncement with- reference to sec. 4(j). We may, however, mention, with respect, that the only reasoning given in that judgment for holding that sec. 4(j) was hit by Article 14 is that the following observations of the Supreme Court made in Mukan Chand vs. Inder Singh (9) while considering the provisions relating to the exclusion of the State debt from the purview of the Rajasthan Jagirdars Debt Reduction Act were equally applicable to sec. 4(j) of the Act: "We think that the High Court was right in holding that the impugned part of sec. 2(e) infringes Art.14 of the Constitution. It is now well-settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In our opinion, Condition No 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The Jagirdars capacity to pay debts had been reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the Act was to ameliorate his condition. The fact that the debts are owed to a government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of sec. 2(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Further, no intelligible principle underlines the exempted categories of debts." 25. In our humble opinion, the provisions of the Rajasthan Jagirdars Debt Reduction Act and the object and reason for the enactment of that Act are entirely different. In the Supreme Court case, their Lordships examined the scheme of that Act. Their Lordships took notice of the preamble of that Act which stated in plain terms that object of the Act was to scale down the debts of Jagirdars whose lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. Sec. 3 of that Act provided for the reduction of secured debts in accordance with the formula given in Schdl. I at the time of passing of the decree and their apportionment where necessary between jagir and non-jagir property. Sec. 4 provided for the reduction of secured debts. Sec. 5 directed a court to pass a fresh decree after the reduction of a secured debt. Clause (1) of sec. 7 provided for the execution of the decree against the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable in respect of jagir lands of the judgment-debtor. Their Lordships pointed out the object sought to be achieved by that Act was to reduce the debts secured on jagir lands which have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, and that on that account the jagirdars capacity to pay debts has been reduced and the object of that Act was to ameliorate their condition. Taking this view of the object of that Act, it was held that there was no reasonable classification for sustaining impugned part of sec. 2(e). Taking this view of the object of that Act, it was held that there was no reasonable classification for sustaining impugned part of sec. 2(e). The Rajasthan Jagirdars Debt Reduction Act had a different purpose and the main consideration in enacting that Act was that as there was reduction in the assets of the jagirdars by force of law, his debts must be reduced. Under these circumstances, there could be no distinction between the debt of a State or that of any other person. It cannot, therefore, be said that the considerations which prevailed for holding that there was discrimination in enacting the portion of sec. 2(e) of that Act are the same while enacting sec. 4(b) of the Act. In our opinion, sec. 4(b) of the Act is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 26. Having decided this point of law, we remand the cases for decision to the respective courts from which they have been withdrawn.