ORDER Hari Swarup, J. - The question arising in this case is whether a citizen is entitled to the protection of his right to privacy or, to put it more precisely, whether a citizen is entitled to approach the Court for the protection of the rights declared by Article 17 of the International Covenants of Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 21st Session on 16-12-1966, which runs as follows: (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 2. The question has arisen as a history-sheet-has been opened in respect of the Petitioners in exercise of the powers given in Regulation 228 of the UP Police Regulations and by reason of which the Petitioner is being put to surveillance as contemplated by Regulations 236 and onwards of the UP Police Regulations. The particular Regulation which for all practical purposes defines "surveillance" is Regulation 236 which reads: Without prejudice to the right of Superintendents of Police to put into practice any legal measures, such as shadowing in cities by which they find they can keep in touch with suspects in particular localities or special circumstances surveillance may for most practical purposes be defined as consisting of one or more of the following measures: (a) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to the houses of suspects; (b) domiciliary visits at night; (c) through periodical enquiries by officers not below the rank of sub-inspector into repute, habits, associations, income, expenses and occupation; (d) the reporting by constables and chaukidars of movements and absences from home; (e) the verification of movements and absences by means of inquiry slips; (f) the collection and record on a history sheet of all information bearing on conduct. 3. In the case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP 1963 ALJ 711, the Supreme Court held that the domiciliary visits at night contemplated by Clause (b) of Regulation 236 of the UP Police Regulations constituted infringement of the citizens' fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution. 3. In the case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP 1963 ALJ 711, the Supreme Court held that the domiciliary visits at night contemplated by Clause (b) of Regulation 236 of the UP Police Regulations constituted infringement of the citizens' fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution. So far as the surveillance contemplated by Clauses (c), (d) and (e) is concerned, the Supreme Court observed: "As already pointed out the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore, the attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual, which is merely a manner in which privacy is Invaded, is not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by part III". It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the surveillance contemplated by Clauses (c), (d) and (e) involves a procedure by which privacy of a citizen is invaded and infringed. 4. The learned Counsel for the opp. parties challenges the right of the Petitioners to maintain the petition as according to him no legal right of the Petitioners is being affected by the opening of the history sheet or the carrying on of the surveillance against them. 5. The rights of the Petitioners which are being affected by the impugned action are the rights to personal liberty and privacy and amount to attack on their honour and reputation. The right to privacy is the right to be left alone to live one's own life with the minimum degree of interference and in its expanded form is understood to include a right against (a) interference with his private life, family and home life; (b) attacks on his honour and reputation; (c) being placed in a false light; (d) the disclosure of irrelevant and embarrassing facts relating to his private life; (e) spying, prying, watching and besetting and (f) interference with his correspondence. The right to privacy in society certainly cannot be absolute and has got to be with limitations but nothing can justify measures which may be inconsistent with the physical, mental and intellectual or moral dignity of the human person which the preamble of the Constitution assures to the individual and if any act unauthorised by law is done which affects his dignity as a man, the same may be liable to be questioned in a court of law. 6. 6. The principles which have descended down the ages declaring the basic rights of man which are the 'ultimate essentials of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization' based on accepted theories of freedom are the important features of the rule of law which the constitution promises to the people of the land. What, therefore, to be seen is whether the right to privacy, honour and reputation is a right which goes to the very root of ordered liberty and concept of civilization. The observation of Frantfurther, J. in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 238 US 25 which was approved in Kharak Singh's case (supra) was, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police...is basic to a free society. It is, therefore, implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty'...." 7. The rule of law which is writ large on the pages of our Constitution can be enforced only when the basic human rights are fully recognized and respected. The right to privacy declared in the International Covenants on Human Rights is nothing but putting into words a basic human right which always existed and was ever accepted as such by all the States parties to the declaration. It was positively recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by General Assembly of the United Nations on 10-12-1948. Article 12 of that declaration was in the same terms as Article 17 of the declaration of human rights made in 1966 except that in Article 17 the word "unlawful" has been added before the words "interference" and "attack" in the language employed in Article 12 of 1948 declaration. In the case of Cimara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco 387 US 1967 523) speaking about the Fourth Amendment it was stated: "This gave concrete expression to the right of the people which was basic to a free society". The rights declared in Article 17 of 1966 Declaration of Human rights being the basic human rights will be deemed to have always existed and will be deemed to have always received the sanction and the protection of the law of the land. 8. In the case of Minister Public Et. Dr. Jud. v. Dame Joffre Gazetee du Palis April 24-26, 1968 Madame Jofre had made very frequent telephone calls even at inconvenient times on Dr. 8. In the case of Minister Public Et. Dr. Jud. v. Dame Joffre Gazetee du Palis April 24-26, 1968 Madame Jofre had made very frequent telephone calls even at inconvenient times on Dr. Jud who had refused to continue to give her medical aid. The Court of Law of Paris took the view that "the acts of violence contemplated by Article 311 contemplated not only acts which offended against the sense of sight but also those which offended against the sense of hearing of a person. The act of putting unnecessary, unwanted or offending questions to a person can, therefore, itself be treated as violating his right to privacy even though the person may not be liable to penal action for not answering such questions. Though the act will not be a violation of the personal liberty of a man as guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution it will in the surveillance contemplated by Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Reg. 236, amount to invasion of his privacy. In the case of Katz v. United States 389 US pp. 247-374 the Supreme Court of the United States of America had observed that "the Government's ever-dropping activities without a warrant violated the privacy" of the person. 9. The enforcibility of the basic right to privacy, honour and reputation was specifically recognised by the signatory States when there was introduced in Article 12 of the 1948 Declaration and in Article 17 of the International Covenants of Human Rights of 1966 the clause giving to everyone a right to the protection of law against interference or attacks on his right to privacy, honour and reputation declared in the first part of the Article. The Declaration recognises the right of the citizen to the protection of law against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy or unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. The right declared Under Article 17 is in the nature of what is called a "self executing" right. It was held by this Court in the case of Ram Swarup v. Ram Narain 1962 AWR 317 , "Liberty and honour of a citizen in an independent country are his most priceless possessions. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of the executive officers to rob a citizen of these valuable assets in disregard of the provisions of law can be taken notice of by Courts in their writ jurisdiction." 10. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of the executive officers to rob a citizen of these valuable assets in disregard of the provisions of law can be taken notice of by Courts in their writ jurisdiction." 10. According to Wade and Phillips (Constitutional Law Sixth Edition, page 70) "the Principle of the rule of law has since the end of the second World War been a matter of universal discussion and endeavour and formulate the basic elements of the rule. So far from the principle being confined to the common law jurisdictions, the rule of law is now considered as a basic idea which can serve to unite lawyers of many differing systems, all of which aim at protecting the individual from arbitrary government. In this way the rule has come to be identified with the concept of the rights of man". The acceptance of the rule of law as a feature of the positive law of the land has become an international obligation and the same has been accepted by all States which are parties to the Declaration of Human Rights. While enforcing the Rule of Law, the 'Equality before the law' has to be maintained. The equality before the law certainly does not mean that the powers of the private citizen are the same as the powers of the public officials. But "what the rule of law requires is that powers should be defined by law and that any abuse of power or other wrongful act by public officers should be subject to control by the courts in the same way as any wrongful act committed by a private citizen".-(Wade and Phillips (supra) p. 66). The right to privacy, honour and reputation can be interfered with by public officials only under authority of law. It has been held in Kharak Singh's case (supra) by the Supreme Court that the UP Police Regulations "contained in Ch. XX had no statutory basis but were merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the police officers". Any interference by the police with the life of citizen, therefore, u/Ch. XX of the UP Police Regulations cannot be deemed to be under authority of law. 11. XX had no statutory basis but were merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the police officers". Any interference by the police with the life of citizen, therefore, u/Ch. XX of the UP Police Regulations cannot be deemed to be under authority of law. 11. The Petitioners have complained that domiciliary visits at nights are being made by the police officials and that they have been directed to report their movements in the police station and give information regarding their destination and time of return and that the same has damaged their reputation and honour in society and has placed restrictions on their rights of free movement. Although the allegations have been denied in the counter-affidavit it has been admitted that a history sheet has been opened in respect of the Petitioners. If that is so there can be no reason not to believe 'the Petitioners' entire statement. 12. The learned Counsel for the State contended that as there is no law or statutory power under which the history-sheet might be opened or the action violating the citizens right to privacy may be legally taken, the court should ignore the actions complained of by the Petitioners because they can refuse to comply with the orders with liability of penalty and further that the court should not take notice of what is contained in Ch. XX or what is contemplated by Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulations 236. Once, however, it is admitted that, a 'history sheet' has been opened it is presumed that the consequential directions contained in the Police Regulations will be given effect to by the officials concerned. If under the garb of Police Regulations which do not have the authority or sanction of law the Police officials continue surveillance which may violate the rights of the Petitioners, it would be a matter not possible to be ignored. As the right to privacy is not a fundamental right under the Constitution it may be open to the State to frame under an authority of law regulations for surveillance of the suspected persons but unless that is done no person on behalf of the State can act on the basis of such directions as are contained in Police Regulations which do not have the force of law and thereby infringe the rights of a citizen. 13. 13. The learned Counsel for the State also contended that as there was a suspicion against the Petitioners of their harbouring dacoits it is not appropriate in this case to issue a writ. But from the facts alleged in the affidavits it is apparent that the only suspicion which had arisen against the Petitioners was in the year 1962 and at that time some cases were started against three of the Petitioners, namely, Dharam Vir Singh, Sheo Singh and Sahab Singh. Dharam Vir Singh and Sheo Singh were on 30-4-1962 discharged in the case which was instituted against them for the offences Under Sections 216 and 216-A of the IPC and Sahab Singh was on 31-1-1962 acquitted of the charge u/s 396 IPC No allegation has been made in the counter-affidavit on any other circumstance against the Petitioners which might have given cause to the opposite party No. 1 to continue the history sheet till the date of the petition. The circumstances, therefore, cannot justify the denial of relief to the Petitioners. The continuance of the history-sheet hangs over the head of the Petitioners like the sword of Democles keeping them constantly under a compulse which affects their general reputation and honour as alleged by them in the petition and also makes their movements subject to enquiry and surveillance infringing their right to privacy. 14. The actions contemplated under the Police Regulations can be divided into two parts-one consisting of those by which directions are given to a citizen to do certain acts such as reporting their presence or answering the questions and the second consists of what the police does itself either secretly or openly within the knowledge of the suspected person or his neighbours. No objection can be taken to a police officer's doing surveillance secretly or confidentially against a suspected person. It was held by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh's case (Supra) that secret picketing of the house or the approaches to the house cannot be complained of for the reasons that the same are secret. If the surveillance remains secret it can neither affect the privacy of the citizen nor his honour and reputation. But the actions contemplated by Sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 do not require the surveillance to be done in a secret manner and the same if carried on openly must necessarily affect the man's privacy, reputation and honour. If the surveillance remains secret it can neither affect the privacy of the citizen nor his honour and reputation. But the actions contemplated by Sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 do not require the surveillance to be done in a secret manner and the same if carried on openly must necessarily affect the man's privacy, reputation and honour. The measures contained in Clauses (c), (d) and (e) are not contemplated by the Regulations to be taken secretly and hence they cannot be protected on the principle that the police in exercise of its normal duties has the right to carry on secret surveillance against suspects. Once the surveillance becomes open it becomes liable to be questioned by the person against whom it is taken. 15. The contention of the learned Counsel for the State that as the Police Regulations having no statutory basis cannot be taken note of by the Courts for issuing a mandamus too has no force as in similar circumstances in the case of Kharak Singh (Supra) while deciding the petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution the Supreme Court had struck down Regulation 236(b) which authorised domiciliary visits and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent in that case not to continue domiciliary visits. 16. In the result this petition is allowed. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued to the opposite party No. 1 not to take any measure against the Petitioners Under Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 of Ch. XX of the UP Police Regulations. In the circumstances of the case no order is made as to costs.