Venkataraman, J.-This is an appeal against the order dated and January, 1965 of the learned Subordinate Judge, Madurai, dismissing the application E.A. No. 12 of 1964 in E.P. No. 15 of 1958 in O.S. No. 96 of 1943 which the appellant filed calling upon respondents 1 to 4 in the petition and in the appeal to re-deposit the amount of Rs.18,289-24 which they had drawn out. The facts have been fully stated in the judgment under appeal and it is enough to mention the following facts One Rayaloo Iyer and Company had a mortgage over five items of properties, dated 14th September, 1921. It obtained a decree in O.S. No 75 of 1934 which was duly confirmed in appeal. In execution it brought item I of the hypotheca to sale on 15th January, 1956 for Rs. 24,000. The decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 was fully satisfied and there remained a surplus amount of Rs. 19,595-8-10. In the said suit the predecessor-in-title of the respondents 1 to 4 herein was impleaded as the third defendant because he held a subsequent mortgage, dated 9th January, 1926 over those five items and another item. He filed his own suit O. S. No. 9 of 1938 to enforce the mortgage and obtained the usual preliminary and final decrees Respondents 1 to 4 had filed an execution petition in enforcement of their mortgage decree in O.S. Mo. 91 of 1938; and it was during the pendency of that execution petition, the earlier sale in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 took place. The Court ordered even in O.S No. 75 of 1934 that the subsequent mortgagee, the third defendant therein would be entitled to the surplus sale proceeds after satisfaction of the first mortgagee’s claim. In pursuance of this direction, the respondents filed E.A. No. 282 of 1956 in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 for payment to them of the sum of Rs. 19,595-8-10 representing the substituted security for item 1 in their capacity as second mortgagee decree-holders. That petition was dismissed on 22nd July, 1956 on the ground that they should work out their rights in execution of their mortgage decree in O.S. No. 91 of 1938. On 27th July, 1956 they filed an application in E.A. No. 645 of 1956 in E.P. No 349 of 1955 in O.S. No. 91 of 1938 to send for the sum of Rs. On 27th July, 1956 they filed an application in E.A. No. 645 of 1956 in E.P. No 349 of 1955 in O.S. No. 91 of 1938 to send for the sum of Rs. 19595-8-10 from O.S. No. 75 of 1934 being their substituted security. The petition was ordered on 6th October, 1956 (the dated 6th September, 1958 appearing in the printed copy of judgment under appeal is a mistake for 6th October, 1956). The learned Judge overruled some objections taken by the judgment-debtors mortgagors about the E.P. being time barred and finally on 18th April, 1958, ordered the issue of a cheque in favour of the respondents for the sum of Rs. 18,289.24. Before the cheque was issued, the appellant herein got the said amount attached in his own E.P. No. 15 of 1958 in O.S. No. 96 of 1943. The attachment made on the footing that the money belonged to the judgment-debtors. The appellant is a simple money decree-holder. The attachment was on 12th July, 1958. The actual money which was sent for to the credit of O.S. No 91 of 1938 waspaid to the respondents 1 to 4 as ordered by the learned Subordinate Judge Thereafter, the appellant filed E.A. No. 12 of 1964 out of which this appeal arises for directing the respondents 1 to 4 to re-deposit the said amount. The said application has been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge and it is against that order the present appeal has been filed. The main reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge for dismissing the application of the appellant is that the respondents 1 to 4 are entitled to the amount in question as substituted security in place of their rights as second mortgagees and that their claim will obviously have preference over that of a simple money decree holder like the appellant. The main reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge for dismissing the application of the appellant is that the respondents 1 to 4 are entitled to the amount in question as substituted security in place of their rights as second mortgagees and that their claim will obviously have preference over that of a simple money decree holder like the appellant. This reasoning obviously in sound and is borne out by the provisions of section 73 (1), provision (c), Civil Procedure Code which runs in these terms: “Where any immovable Property is sold in execution of a decree ordering its sale for the discharge of an incumbrance thereon, the proceeds of sale shall he applied first, in defraying the expenses of the sale; secondly, in discharging the amount due under the decree; thirdly, in discharging the interest and principal monies due on subsequent incumbrance (if any); and fourthly, ratably among the holders of decrees for the payment of any money against the judgment-debtor, who have, prior to the sale of the property, applied to the Court which passed the decree ordering such sale for execution of decrees. and have not obtained satisfaction thereof.” It will be noted that the sale in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 took place in discharge of the incumbrance therein and after satisfying the expenses of the sale and the amount due under that decree there remained a surplus and under the third clause of the proviso (c), the respondents 1 to 4 being the subsequent encumbrancers (second mortgagee) would be entitled to the amount; and only if there was some money left after satisfying their claim, the fourth clause of the proviso (c) providing for ratable istribution for the simple money decree-holders of the judgment-debtor would come into play. The appellant will come only under the fourth clause. Hence the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. Having regard to the wording of section 73 which after all only embodies the substantive law that a mortgage will take priority over a simple money creditor. Otherwise, the whole object of a mortgage would be defeated. The doctrine is pointed out by a Bench of this Court in Shanmugham Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar1, that where the hypotheca is sold, the security will fasten itself on the sale proceeds which come by way of substituted security. Otherwise, the whole object of a mortgage would be defeated. The doctrine is pointed out by a Bench of this Court in Shanmugham Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar1, that where the hypotheca is sold, the security will fasten itself on the sale proceeds which come by way of substituted security. The learned Counsel for the applicant has no effective answer to this contention. He argued the appeal on the footing that the attachment of the amount by his client took place on 12th July, 1958, and that the money was sent for to the credi, of O.S. No. 91 of 1938 only on 6th October, 1958 and that since the attachment was prior to the order dated 6th October, 1959, that order cannot be availed by the respondents 1 to 4. But it has been pointed out to us that 6th October, 1948 is a mistake for 6th October, 1956; and we have satisfied ourselves on that point. That is also another reason why the argument of the appellant has to fail. The learned Counsel for the appellant urged that there were special circumstances in this case. We are unable to find any special circumstances, particularly to overcome the effect of section 74 (1), proviso (c). In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs-one set. V.M.K. --------------- Appeal dismissed.