Janti Prasad v. Vimla Devi Rani — 1969 DIGILAW 328 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - The above First Appeal From Order and Civil Revision raise the same question of law and have come before us on a reference by a learned Single Judge. The point involved is as to how the suit in each case should be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction. 2. First Appeal From Order arises out of suit No. 371 of 1962 instituted in the Court of Munsif, Bulandshahr. In this suit the plaintiff claimed that defendant should be restrained from constructing any brick kiln in the plot specified at the foot of the plaint. This relief was sought on the allegation that the plaintiff's certain bhumidhari plots over which there stood a grove would be affected by the running of the brick kiln. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 100-, 30 times of the annual land revenue of Rs. 6.68P. payable for the bhumidhari land in dispute. He further valued the suit at Rs. 200/- for the purposes of court fee in terms of Section 7 (1V-B) (b) of the Court Fees Act. 3. This suit was contested by the defendant, inter alia, on the ground that it has been improperly valued. It was asserted in the written statement that the property affected was garden and that the market value of the garden and not the value of the land should be the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. The Munsif on the pleadings of the parties framed necessary issues including the one about the under valuation of the suit. He decided the issue about valuation in favour of the plaintiff. He also decided other issues in plaintiff's favour. Consequently he decreed the plaintiff's suit for injunction as prayed. 4. An appeal was preferred against this decision of the Munsif. The lower appellate court took up the question of valuation first and came to the conclusion that the suit was under valued. According to the learned Civil Judge the land did not include the trees and the grove. The grove and the land should have been separately valued. He concluded that the valuation of the suit if so valued would exceed Rs. According to the learned Civil Judge the land did not include the trees and the grove. The grove and the land should have been separately valued. He concluded that the valuation of the suit if so valued would exceed Rs. 5,000/, Having arrived at this conclusion the learned Civil Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court with a direction to readmit it to its original number and then return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. First Appeal From Order No. 277 of 1964 has been filed against the above decision of the Civil Judge. 5. Civil Revision arises out of Suit No. 155 of 1965 instituted in the Court of Munsif Hawaii, Meerut. This is a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from running a brick kiln within a mile from the plaintiff's orchards specified in the plaint on the allegation that the running of the brick kiln would be harmful and-injurious to the plaint-life and would cause substantial injury to the orchard. The plaintiff mentioned the orchards in schedules 'A' to 'C' of his plaint. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction at Rs. 1,000/- alleging it to be the value of the right affected and paid court fees at one-fifth of this valuation. 6. The suit was contested inter alia on the ground that the suit was under-valued and the court fee paid was insufficient. The Munsif framed preliminary issues on the question of valuation and sufficiency of the court fees. It appears that when these issues were taken up for consideration the plaintiff sought permission to amend the plaint by valuing the suit on the basis of the annual land revenue payable for the land in dispute. This was refused. The learned Munsif thereafter decided the question of valuation fog the purposes of jurisdiction and came to the conclusion that the suit was undervalued and according to him the proper value would be more than Rs. 5,000/-. He held that the market value of the grove should be the value of the land and the market value of the trees. Accordingly he ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper court. 7. Against the decision of the Munsif an appeal was preferred. 5,000/-. He held that the market value of the grove should be the value of the land and the market value of the trees. Accordingly he ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper court. 7. Against the decision of the Munsif an appeal was preferred. In appeal the II Civil Judge, Meerut, discussed the relevant provisions of the Suits Valuation Act and came to the conclusion that the suit should have been valued at 30 times of the land revenue paid in respect of the land in dispute. If so valued the learned Civil. Judge was of the opinion that the value of the suit would not be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court of Munsif. So he allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Munsif returning the plaint. He directed the Munsif to allow the plaintiff to value the suit on the basis of the land revenue as observed in his judgment Against this decision of the II Civil Judge, Meerut, Civil Revision 1374 of 1966 was filed in this Court. 8. When the above First Appeal From Order and the Civil Revision came for decision before a learned Single Judge Both these cases were referred to a larger Bench. This is how these cases have come up before us for decision. From the facts of the two cases it is clear that the point involved is the same as to how the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction should be valued in these cases. It is not disputed before us that in view of the reliefs claimed the two suits fall under Section 7 (IV-B) for the purposes of the payment of the court fees. It is also not disputed that the two cases are governed by Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act which reads as follows: 4. Valuation of relief in certain suits relating to land-Suits mentioned in paragraphs IV (a) , IV-A, IV-B, V, V-A, V-B, VI, V1-A, VIII and X (d) of Section 7 and Articles 17, 18 and 19 of Schedule II of the. Valuation of relief in certain suits relating to land-Suits mentioned in paragraphs IV (a) , IV-A, IV-B, V, V-A, V-B, VI, V1-A, VIII and X (d) of Section 7 and Articles 17, 18 and 19 of Schedule II of the. Court Fees Act, 1870, as in force for the time being in the Uttar Pradesh, shall be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved in or affected by, or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, or of the amount involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, and such value shall in the case of land be deemed to be the value as determinable in accordance with the rules framed under Section 3. In view of the above section, before deciding the question of valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction we have to decide as to what is the property involved in or affected by the relief sought. It appears that in both the suits before the courts below it was the admitted case of the parties that the properties involved in or affected by the relief sought were the orchards in one case and bhumidhari land along with the trees standing thereon in the other case. Before us, however, it was argued on behalf of the defendants in the two cases that the property affected by the relief sought would be the brick kilns of the defendants also. The value of the kilns, if valued properly, would be more than Rs. 5,000/-. It was also contended on their behalf that in any case the value of the land and trees should be separately valued. If so valued the valuation would exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. On the other hand the plaintiffs of the two respective suits maintained that the valuation in the two cases should have been at 30 times the land revenue payable in respect of the orchard plots or bhumidhari plots in the two suits. 9. If so valued the valuation would exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. On the other hand the plaintiffs of the two respective suits maintained that the valuation in the two cases should have been at 30 times the land revenue payable in respect of the orchard plots or bhumidhari plots in the two suits. 9. At one stage the argument advanced on behalf of the defendants that the property affected in the two cases would be the brick kilns of the defendants appealed to us but on a perusal of the plaints we are of opinion that in the two cases before us it is not possible to accept the contention of the defendants in this respect. It is possible in a case for restraining the defendants from running their brick kiln to consider the valuation of the brick kiln when it is admitted in the plaint that the brick kiln has been constructed, but in the present case from the allegation in the plaint it is clear that the suit was instituted on the allegation that the defendants should be restrained from setting up any brick kiln within the radius of a certain distance from the plaintiff's property. In such a case it is not possible to say that any existing property of the defendants is involved or affected. It may be that by the relief sought the right of the defendants to establish the brick kiln might be affected. But this right is incapable of valuation. In order to determine the question of valuation it is primarily the allegations in the plaint that determine the question of jurisdiction. However, on the allegations in the plaint it is open to the defendants to point out the incorrectness of the mode of valuation or to show that the allegations made in the plaint for the purposes of valuation are incorrectly made. From the pleadings of the parties it is clear that the parties before the courts below accepted that the property involved in or affected by the relief sought was the plaintiff's property. Having regard to the plaint allegations no other property can be said to be involved in or affected by the relief sought. So we have to take into account only the plaintiff's properties which are involved in the two suits. Having regard to the plaint allegations no other property can be said to be involved in or affected by the relief sought. So we have to take into account only the plaintiff's properties which are involved in the two suits. Thus the short point for determination is as to how the properties in the two suits should be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction. The properties in the two suits are grove plots. These grove plots on the passing of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act have become bhumidhar land of the plaintiff vide Section 18 (1) (b) and (e) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 18 reads as follows :- 18. Settlement of certain land with intermediaries or cultivators as bhumidhar. - (1) subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands- (a) * * * (b) held as a grove by, or in the personal cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh, (c) * * * (d) * * * (e) held by a grove holder, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed by the State Government with -such intermediary, lessee, tenant, grantee or grove-holder, as the case may be, who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession as a bhumidhar thereof. "Land" has been defined in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming. 10. From the above two sections of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it is clear that grove plots are included in the definition of land in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re-forms Act. Grove land becomes bhumidhari land because the tenureholder holds it as a grove. Ordinarily land and tree are two distinct and separate concepts. But the Legislature appears to have integrated these two concepts in the legal concept of grove-land and bhumidhari land. Now the bhumidhari land of the plaintiffs is assessed to land revenue. As the property in dispute is land assessed to land revenue its valuation is to be determined in accordance with Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act and the rules framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. Now the bhumidhari land of the plaintiffs is assessed to land revenue. As the property in dispute is land assessed to land revenue its valuation is to be determined in accordance with Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act and the rules framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. Therefore in the two cases before us in order to determine the correct valuation we have to look to the rules framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. The relevant rule is rule 3. The relevant portion of this rule reads as follows :- 3. Suits for possession of land, buildings and gardens.-In suits for the possession of land, the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction shall be determined as follows : (a) * * * (b) where the land forms as entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government or forms part of such estate and such part is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue, and such revenue is not permanently settled-thirty times the annual revenue so payable : (c) * * * (d) * * * (e) where there are also buildings or a garden on the land the aggregate of the value of the land as determined in accordance with these rules plus the market value of such buildings or garden situated thereon. A perusal of rule 3 would show that the two cases should have been valued in terms of rule 3, sub-clause (b) for the land in the two suits are not situate in a permanently settled district. The valuation should be calculated at thirty times of the land revenue payable on the land in dispute. It was contended before us that it is not only the land but also the price of the trees which should be considered in determining the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on rule 3, sub-clause (e) of the rules framed under the Suits Valuation Act. We are unable to accept this contention. Grove cannot be equated with a garden mentioned in this sub-clause. The question whether the grove is included in the expression garden in Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act as amended in Uttar Pradesh came for decision before a Division Bench of this Court. We are unable to accept this contention. Grove cannot be equated with a garden mentioned in this sub-clause. The question whether the grove is included in the expression garden in Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act as amended in Uttar Pradesh came for decision before a Division Bench of this Court. In the case of Damodar Dass v. Shanti Swaroop, 1969 ALJ 593. Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act is almost in the same language as rule 3 framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. It was held in this Division Bench case that the word "garden" cannot be held to include a grove standing on a plot of agricultural land. The Division Bench has given reasons in detail for coming to that conclusion. It is not necessary to repeat those reasons in the instant case. Suffice it to say that we entirely agree with the reasons given in the above case. In view of the above decision it has to be held that garden does not include grove. So rule 3 (e) of the Suits Valuation Rules does not apply to these cases. The only provision applicable is rule 3 (b) as discussed above. Thus the valuation in the two suits for the purposes of jurisdiction should be calculated in accordance with rule 3, sub-clause (b) framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act which is similar to Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act and the valuation should be fixed at 30 times the annual land revenue in respect of the land in dispute. 11. It is now necessary to notice some of the cases bearing on the subject. In the case of the Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Ramesh Chandra, 1944 ALJ 70 the words "involved in or affected by the relief sought" was the subject-matter of interpretation. It was held that "the words 'involved in or affected by the relief sought' in the proviso to Section 7 (IV-B) of the Court Fees Act must be strictly construed and they clearly exclude all properties which are not involved in or affected by the relief sought. It was held that "the words 'involved in or affected by the relief sought' in the proviso to Section 7 (IV-B) of the Court Fees Act must be strictly construed and they clearly exclude all properties which are not involved in or affected by the relief sought. Where the plaintiff as an adopted son was seeking in respect or certain properties it could not be said that he was bound to include the value of other properties also, which he could claim on the basis of adoption for purposes of court fees which he had admittedly inherited from the adoptive father and which was not the subject-matter of dispute between the parties." We respectfully agree with this exposition of law. 12. In the case of Shanti Prasad v. Mahabir Singh, A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 402 the plaintiff brought a suit in the court of the Munsif whose pecuniary jurisdiction extended upto Rs. 5,000/- for possession of the land mentioned in Schedule 'A' of the plaint and a house mentioned in Schedule 'B'. The valuation for purposes of jurisdiction put by the plaintiff was below Rs. 5,000/-. The plaintiff had not included in the valuation the value of the buildings and the gardens existing on the land as he did not claim any interest in or relief in respect of them. In this case it was held that "it was necessary for the plaintiff to have valued the land and the building and the garden for the purposes of jurisdiction." Reliance was placed on rule 3, sub-clause (e) of the Suits Valuation Rules. The reasoning in support of this conclusion is given at page 404 of the Report : "If, however the suit of the plaintiff succeeds he is found entitled to the relief he has claimed the defendants must either remove the buildings and do away with the garden in question or leave them as they are to be taken by the plaintiff along with the land. In the circumstances we are of opinion that these buildings and garden must be held to be affected by the relief sought ........" We respectfully agree with this rationalisation. The buildings and garden were necessarily involved in or affected by the relief sought or the title to them would be affected by the relief sought if they were allowed to pass to the plaintiff in the event of his success. The buildings and garden were necessarily involved in or affected by the relief sought or the title to them would be affected by the relief sought if they were allowed to pass to the plaintiff in the event of his success. This case is distinguishable from the cases before us. In the present cases the properties in dispute are neither building nor garden but grove land. We have already tried to show that the legal concept of land in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act inextricably unites the two concepts of space and matter. Moreover, Rule 3 (e) mentions garden but not trees. Trees cannot accordingly be valued separately from the land. 13. In the case of Vaish College Society, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, 1969 ALJ 248 Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act and Section 7 (IV-B) (b) of the Court Fees Act came for interpretation by this Court. A Division Bench consisting of one of us (S. N. Dwivedi, J. and R.B. Misra, J.) discussed the case on the subject and said :- "There is a certain indeterminacy in the words "involved" and "affected". It is not possible to give them such an exhaustive meaning as will fit in with the changing patterns of cases. Each case should be decided on its own facts. These words will not cover a case where a property is remotely involved in or affected by the relief sought. The true nature and character of the allegations in the plaint should be examined in order to determine whether any property is involved in or affected by the relief sought." Apart from the cases already discussed some other cases were also cited at the Bar. They have been referred to in the case of Damodar Dass and others v. Shanti Swaroop and others. It is not necessary to notice all these cases which have already been noticed in the above case. Suffice it to say that we have already expressed our respectful agreement with the views expressed in that decision. 14. In the light of the above discussion we find that the decision of the II Civil Judge, Meerut dated 11th August, 1966 is correct and calls for no interference but the decision of Addl. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr dated 16th May, 1964 is erroneous in law and has to be set aside. 14. In the light of the above discussion we find that the decision of the II Civil Judge, Meerut dated 11th August, 1966 is correct and calls for no interference but the decision of Addl. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr dated 16th May, 1964 is erroneous in law and has to be set aside. The plaintiff in this case has correctly valued the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and the Munsif was right in entertaining the suit. 15. In the result we allow the First Appeal From Order No. 277 of 1964, set aside the order of the Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, and remand the case to him with a direction to readmit the appeal to its original number and decide it on merits in accordance with law. The appellant is entitled to the cost of this appeal. 16. We hereby dismiss the Civil Revision No. 1374 of 1966 with costs.