ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a revision against the conviction of the Applicant for an offence u/s 78 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and sentence to pay a fine of Rs. 300/-. 2. The prosecution case was that the Applicant was at the relevant time the proprietor of Sita Ram Press situated in Mohalla Pasarhatla within police circle City Kotwali, Mirzapur. On 22-12-1964, the Applicant was found in his press in possession of blocks, Ex. 1 to 8 which could be used to print on tobacco packets false trade marks deceptively similar with "Gada Chhap" trade mark belonging to Yatendra Nath Shukla and Company, Kanpur. The Applicant admitted recovery of the blocks from his Press. His defence, however, was that he had no knowledge that the blocks resembled any other original trade mark and that the same could be used for making false trade marks. He claimed that the blocks were left with him by a client, who used to get the printing done at his press in the ordinary course of business. 3. Prosecution examined P.N. Malviya (PW 1), the proprietor of M/s. Yatendra Nath Shukla and Co. Kanpur who deposed that "Gada Chhap" was his registered trade mark for tobacco. He further deposed that Exs. 1 to 8 did not belong to his Company, though they were deceptively similar to his own blocks. Ramnath Malviya (PW2), Amarnath Dubey (PW 3) and Sub Inspector Iqbal Narain Singh (PW 4) were examined to prove the recovery of the blocks. The Applicant also examined himself as a defence witness and made a statement containing the pleas to which I have already referred. 4. The courts below disbelieved the version of the defence and believed the prosecution evidence and convicted the Applicant. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Applicant. The decision of this case depends on answers to two questions, namely whether the block printed by the Applicant was deceptively similar to the original trade mark belonging to M/s. Yatendra Nath Shukla and Company and whether recovery of blocks Exs. 1 to 8 from the possession of the Applicant in the circumstances of the case made out a offence u/s 78 of the Act. 1 to 8 from the possession of the Applicant in the circumstances of the case made out a offence u/s 78 of the Act. So far as the first point is concerned, there is a finding of fact recorded by the courts below that the general get up of the two labels was similar and the unwary purchaser who had never seen the real Gada Chhap packet was very likely to be deceived by the counterfeit Gada Chhap. In other words, it was found by the courts below that the blocks in question were deceptively similar to the blocks of the Registered Trade Mark of M/s. Yatendra Nath Shukla and Company. I do not find anything wrong in this finding. I have compared the two trade marks myself and I think the courts below applied the right tests in arriving at a finding as to whether the trade mark in question was deceptively similar or not. There is no doubt that the two trade marks were substantially similar excepting for the addition of two more small Gadas in the trade mark in question. There was general affinity and resemblance of a nature, which was very likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser. 6. The other question, however, which has been greatly stressed by the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that mere possession of such blocks by the Applicant, who was a printer was not enough to make out the essential ingredients of an offence u/s 78 of the Act. It was submitted that the aforesaid section postulated that the possession of the block etc. must be "for the purpose of falsifying or of being used for falsifying a trade mark". According to this interpretation mens rea or guilty intention must be established in the sense that the possession of the blocks by a printer must be for the purpose of falsifying or of using the blocks for falsifying a trade mark. There is no doubt that guilty intention is a necessary ingredient of the offence but the question is as to how that intention has to be ascertained. 7. The language of Section 78(c) makes it clear that it is not always essential that the falsifying of the trade mark must be done by the printer himself. Clause (c) significantly case the expression "of being used for falsifying a trade mark". 7. The language of Section 78(c) makes it clear that it is not always essential that the falsifying of the trade mark must be done by the printer himself. Clause (c) significantly case the expression "of being used for falsifying a trade mark". Thus, if sufficient identity between the genuine and spurious trade mark has/been established, a presumption can legitimately be raised in appropriate case that the spurious trade mark was for the purpose of being used for falsifying a genuine trade mark. It obviously possessed the potentiality of being used for that illegal purpose. The accused in such a case is certainly not precluded from showing that there was no intention that the incriminating 'block' be used for the purpose of falsifying trade mark. This will depend, inter alia, on whether the printer had the knowledge of the original trade mark. That is a fact which is within his special knowledge and cannot be proved by the prosecution. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (a) to the section can be usefully referred to in this connection. It says that when a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of Droving that intention is upon him. When certain blocks are recovered from the possession of a printer which are identical or almost identical with the genuine trade mark, the burden of proving that the said printer had no knowledge of the existence of the original trade mark or again that the circumstances were such that the incriminating blocks could not have been intended to be used for the purpose of falsifying a trade mark would lie on him. If he succeeds in discharging that burden, he cannot be convicted, but otherwise a presumption would be drawn against him on the existence of the above mentioned circumstances. The view also gets support from another indication which is to be found in the operative part of Section 78 of the Act which is reproduced below: 78. Penalty for applying false trade marks, trade descriptions, etc. The view also gets support from another indication which is to be found in the operative part of Section 78 of the Act which is reproduced below: 78. Penalty for applying false trade marks, trade descriptions, etc. Any person who-- (a) falsifies any trade mark; or (b) falsely applies to goods any trade mark; or (c) makes, disposes of, or has in his possession any die, block, machine plate or other instrument for the purpose of falsifying, or of being used for falsifying, a trade mark, or (d) applies any false trade description to goods; or (e) applies to any goods to which an indication of the country or place in which they were made or produced or the name and address of the manufacturer or person for whom the goods are manufactured is required to be applied u/s 117, a false indication of such country, place, name or address; or (f) tampers with, alters or effaces an indication or origin which has been applied to any goods to which it is required to be applied u/s 117; or (g) causes any of the things above-mentioned under this section to be done; shall, unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.... Therefore, the prosecution having discharged the initial burden of proving the identical character of the two trade marks, the onus would shift to the person from whose possession the incriminating blocks etc. are recovered, of proving the existence of circumstances which would negative the possibility of an "intent to defraud." 8. Thus, I am not impressed with the argument that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden in the present case of proving affirmatively want of knowledge on the part of the Applicant as to the existence of the original trade mark or the intention of the Applicant of falsifying the trade marks or of their being used for such falsifying. I may mention that the language of Section 78(c) contemplates a possibility of the trade mark in question being used for falsifying a trade mark not necessarily the printer himself but also by other persons. I may mention that the language of Section 78(c) contemplates a possibility of the trade mark in question being used for falsifying a trade mark not necessarily the printer himself but also by other persons. I am convinced on the facts and the evidence led by the prosecution that it has been proved beyond doubt that the Applicant committed an offence u/s 78 of the Trade and Marchandise Marks Act. 9. The result is that this revision fails and is dismissed.