Judgment The three appellants before me were convicted by the Sessions Judge, Mysore, of an offence punishable under section 411 of the Penal Code. There were three charges against them. The first was a charge of trespass punishable under section 457, the second was a charge of murder, and the third was a charge of robbery punishable under section 392 of the Penal Code. The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused of all these three offences, but convicted them of an offence of receiving stolen property, punishable under section 411 of the Penal Code although there was no specific charge with respect to that matter. But, as rightly submitted by Mr. Public Prosecutor, if it was otherwise possible to do so, it was not beyond the competence of the Sessions Judge, when there was a charge of robbery which is an aggravated form of theft, to convict the accused, it the charge of robbery is not proved, of the offence punishable under section 411 of the Penal Code. But, Mr. Keshava. Iyengar, appearing for the appellants, makes a submission that no such conviction or an offence under section 411 of the Penal Code was possible in this case, and in order to understand this contention, it would be necessary to state the material facts. A certain Janakamma, an old lady of 80 years, was found. dead inside her house on the morning of 19th May, 1968, and when accused-1 who was her servant, was asked by the neighbours to get into the house through a ladder and open the door, he did so, and it was discovered that not only she was dead, but that there was an injury on her head. The sequel was the trial in the Court of Session on the three charges to which I have referred. The principal evidence on which the prosecution depended in support of the charges, was the recovery of jewellery, according to the prosecution, on the information furnished by the accused. M.Os. 21 and 22 were, according to the prosecution, recovered on the information furnished by accused-1 from the open backyard of his house. M.Os. 19 and 20 were the articles recovered from the backyard of the house of accused-2 on information furnished by him. M.Os. 17 and 18 were the articles recovered from the cattleshed of accused-3 from a place where they had been buried underground. M.Os. 19 and 20 were the articles recovered from the backyard of the house of accused-2 on information furnished by him. M.Os. 17 and 18 were the articles recovered from the cattleshed of accused-3 from a place where they had been buried underground. Exhibits P-7, P-8 and P-9 are the mahazars which were respectively prepared with respect to those recoveries. The articles so recovered, according to the prosecution evidence, consisted of gold or silver articles. But, the Sessions Judge was of the opinion that since the places from which they were so recovered were accessible to the members of the public it was not possible to convict on a charge of murder, or an offence of robbery or trespass merely on the basis of such recovery. So having concluded that the accused should be acquitted in respect of the three charges brought against them he however considered it proper to say that they could be convicted of an offence of receiving stolen property punishable under section 411 of the Penal Code and this is what he stated in that context: “No doubt it is true that the places from where the articles were discovered in pursuance of the information furnished by the accused were accessible to others or to put it differently that they were not enclosed places……….The only other question which remains to he considered is what is the offence proved against all or any of the accused. Even on this point, the decision referred to by me herein above will solve the problem. In that case their Lordships of the Madras High Court came to the conclusion that the only offence proved against the accused was an offence punishable under section 379, Indian Penal Code taking into consideration the relatively short interval between the murder and the production of the jewels by the accused. In the instant case “since there is a long interval between the commission of the offence and the production of the jewels by the accused, I am inclined to hold that the only offence that had been satisfactorily established against the accused by the prosecution is an offence punishable under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, I find the accused guilty for an offence punishable under section 411, Indian Penal Code.” Mr. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, I find the accused guilty for an offence punishable under section 411, Indian Penal Code.” Mr. Iyengar, is, in my opinion right in making the criticism that there was no discussion by the Sessions Judge about the existence or otherwise of the ingredients which should be established by the prosecution before it could be said that an offence punishable under section 411 of the Penal Code is established. That offence is committed only on receipt or retention of any stolen property with the knowledge or belief that it was stolen property. As explained by the Supreme Court in Trimbak v. State of Madhya Pradesh1 an offence of receiving stolen property is proved only when it is established (1) that the stolen property was in the possession of the accused (2) that some person other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got possession of it and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the property was stolen property. The Sessions Judge did not find the existence of any one of these ingredients. There was not even a discussion of that aspect of the matter by him. He proceeded entirely on the unsupportable supposition that the property belonging to the person who was murdered if it is recovered from the accused on information furnishedby him, must be presumed to be stolen property and that such recovery would by itself justify a conviction under section 411 of the Penal Code. The finding recorded by the Sessions Judge that the places from which the properties were recovered were axcessible to the members of the public, is completely destructive of the supposition that the accused were in possession of the properties so recovered. Moreover, the Sessions Judge did not record a finding that there was any dishonest receipt or retention of that property by any one of the accused, or that they had knowledge or belief that the property so recovered was stolen property. The Supreme Court made the elucidation in Trimbak's case1 that the information furnished by the accused on the basis of which the recovery was made, does not necessarily mean that he was in possession of the property, if the recovery was made from public places such as those from which the properties were recovered in the case before me. The Supreme Court made the elucidation in Trimbak's case1 that the information furnished by the accused on the basis of which the recovery was made, does not necessarily mean that he was in possession of the property, if the recovery was made from public places such as those from which the properties were recovered in the case before me. As explained by the Supreme Court the possibility of the accused having knowledge of someone having kept the property in those public places cannot be eliminated in that situation. These infirmities in the judgment of the Sessions Judge ensure the success of this appeal and so, I allow it, set aside the convictions of the appellants and the senttences imposed upon them. I acquit them of the offence of which they were convicted by the Sessions Judge. S.V.S. ----- Appeal allowed; Conviction set aside.