Judgment Sadanandaswamy, J.- The complainant is one B.V. Nagvekar. He is the owner of premises Bearing No. 14/2 situated at the K. Sadasiva Rao Road and Hampanakatta Road junction in Mangalore. The third respondent Mrs. Mary D’Souza is a tenant of the premises No. 14/2 (a) (b) in the ground-floor carrying on business in Ice cream and cool drinks. The complainant obtained an order of eviction of the tenant of the upstairs portion of premises No. 14/2 to facilitate the construction of a new building by demolishing the existing old building. The Municipality is said to have issued a licence to the complainant to construct a new building consisting of four floors on the said promises. The third respondent instituted O.S. No. 248 of 1966 on the file of the Munsiff, Mangalore, for an injunction restraining the complainant from demolishing the building. On 17th August, 1966, the first respondent, the Municipal Commissioner, Mangalore City Municipality, issued a notice to the complainant with copies to the third respondent and another tenant directing the complainant to demolish the building within 15 days of the notice. By another notice dated 23rd December, 1966, the first respondent directed demolition of the building within three days. The third respondent challenged the legality of the order of first respondent in Writ Petition No. 2726 of 1966, filed in this Court on 27th December, 1966. The said Writ Petition was dismissed on 18th December, 1967. But since the counsel for the respondent in that writ petition, the first respondent herein, agreed, this Court directed in the course of the order that the first respondent shall not enforce the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 until 1st February, 1968. The third respondent did not vacate the premises by the 1st February, 1968. She instituted O.S. No. 34 of 1968 on the file of the Maunsiff, Mangalore, on 5th January, 1968 against the first respondent and filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code for an order of temporary injunction restraining the first respondent from enforcing the notices dated 17th August, 1966 and 23rd December, 1966 and obtained an ex parte order of temporary injunction which was ultimately vacated on 16th July, 1968. On 27th February, 1968, respondent 3 approached the Municipal Councillors of the Mangalore City Municipality to move a resolution to withdraw the notices issued by first respondent for demolition of the building. On 27th February, 1968, respondent 3 approached the Municipal Councillors of the Mangalore City Municipality to move a resolution to withdraw the notices issued by first respondent for demolition of the building. Respondent 2, the then president of the Mangalore City Municipality, admitted the resolution which was referred to the Standing Committee by the Municipal Council by its proceedings dated 27th February, 1968. On 13th July, 1968 another petition was presented to the second respondent asking him to suspend the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 issued by the first respondent. On the said petitions, the second respondent passed an order on 27th July, 1968 suspending that notice. The learned Munsiff posted the case for pronouncement of orders on temporary injunction to 16th July, 1968 and it is alleged that the second respondent issued the order on 14th July, 1968 with the mala fide intention of helping the third respondent anticipating the order of dismissal of the applications by the Court. On 12th August, 1968, there was a resolution moving the Standing Committee to vacate the order of the second respondent suspending the order of first respondent dated 23rd December, 1966, and the same was passed and the order was vacated. On 14th August, 1968, the complainant received another notice from the first respondent informing him that since he had failed to demolish the building, the same would be demolished by the Municipality on 16th August, 1968. Copy of the notice was also served on the third respondent. On 16th August, 1968, the Municipal Engineer came to the spot along with his subordinates and was proceeding with the work of demolishing, when the second respondent appeared on the scene and passed an order on the spot suspending the order of fust respondent dated 14th August, 1968. Later on the same day the first respondent also issued the order staying execution of the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 till 20th August, 1968. On 17th August, 1968, the third respondent instituted another suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mangalore, O.S. No. 68 of 1968, for a permanent injunction restraining the Municipal Council from demolishing the building in pursuance to the notice dated 23rd December; 1966 and obtained an order of temporary injunction till 26th August, 1968. On 17th August, 1968, the second respondent passed another order suspending the order of first respondent dated 14th August, 1968 until further orders. On 17th August, 1968, the second respondent passed another order suspending the order of first respondent dated 14th August, 1968 until further orders. The third respondent filed an appeal in the Court of the Principal Civil Judge, Mangalore, against the order made by the learned Munsiff, rejecting the application for temporary injunction. The learned Civil Judge issued the order of temporary injunction till 10th September 1968. It is contended that the third respondent failed to carry out the undertaking which she had given to this Court and the second and third respondents have adopted dubious means to obtain orders from the subordinate Courts in prosecution of a scheme to flout the orders of this Court. The third respondent, it is alleged, has acted deliberately and intentionally contrary to the undertaking given to this Court and that the second respondent who is aware of the order of this Court, has been openly abetting her. It is further alleged that the second respondent by hi:; repeated orders suspending the order of demolition, made by the first respondent, has interfered with the persons obeying the orders of the Court and that he has taken the law into his own hands to nullify the decisions rendered by the judiciary. On the abovesaid allegations, the complainant has prayed for action being taken against; (1) the first respondent for having failed to carry out the order of this Court dated 18th December, 1966; (2) the second respondent for having aided and abetted the dis-obedience of the orders of this Court by the third respondent; (3) the third respondent for having failed to carry out the undertaking which she had given to this Court on 18th December, 1967. Sri K.J. Shetty, the learned Counsel for the complainant, fairly conceded that the first respondent had not done anything objectionable and confined his complaint to respondents 2 and 3. Since the matter involved questions of importance, notice was issued to the learned Advocate-General who was also heard. The first point to be considered is whether the third respondent gave an undertaking to this Court on 18th December, 1967 that she would vacate the premises in her possession by 1st February, 1968 as alleged by the complainant. Since the matter involved questions of importance, notice was issued to the learned Advocate-General who was also heard. The first point to be considered is whether the third respondent gave an undertaking to this Court on 18th December, 1967 that she would vacate the premises in her possession by 1st February, 1968 as alleged by the complainant. According to the complainant, at the conclusion of the pronouncement of the order, Sri Mohandas Hegde, the learned Counsel for the third respondent, the petitioner in the writ petition, requested the Court to grant time till the end of January, 1968 to his client to vacate the premises and thereupon. Sri K.R. Karanth, the learned Counsel for the first respondent agreed for granting of the said time to vacate the premises and accordingly, the Court was pleased to direct that the first respondent shall not enforce the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 until 1st February, 1968. According to the third respondent, no such request was made by her learned Counsel. According to her, her learned Counsel merely, pointed to the Court that his client was carrying on business in the premises sought to be demolished. Thereupon, the Court suggested to the learned Counsel for the first respondent that his client should not execute the demolition order till 1st February, 1968 and that Sri K.R. Karanth, the learned Counsel for the first respondent, had no objection for the Court making such an order, and thereupon the last paragraph of the order was dictated by the Court. The concluding paragraph of the order in writ petition No. 2726 of 1966 relied on by the complainant reads as follows: “Since all the grounds urged by the petitioner fail, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. Sri Karanth the learned Counsel for the respondent was agreeable to our making an order that the respondent shall not enforce his notice dated 23rd December, 1966 until 1st February, 1968. We make an order accordingly. Sri Karanth the learned Counsel for the respondent was agreeable to our making an order that the respondent shall not enforce his notice dated 23rd December, 1966 until 1st February, 1968. We make an order accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own cost.” The complainant and the third respondent relied upon the affidavits of the Advocates Sri K.R. Karanth dated 16th June, 1968 and Sri Mohandas Hegde dated 23rd June, 1968 filed in the Court of the Munsiff, Mangalore, in O.S. No. 34 of 1968 respectively in support of their respective contentions, as to what transpired in this Court before the abovesaid order was made in the writ petition. In Virabhadra Rao v. Sakalchand1 it has been held that a statement in a judgment or order as to what had taken place in Court is conclusive and cannot be allowed to be controverted by an affidavit or otherwise and a party who is aggrieved by what he considers a wrong statement in a judgment should apply to the very same Judge by way of review, except in cases where there is an enquiry into an accusation of misconduct against a judicial officer in relation to a particular case, or where there is in reality no controversy at all between the parties and it is apparent from the affidavits of the Advocates on both sides that the judge fell into an accidental error. The reasons for this salutory rules are stated thus: “……….One is that to depart from it and to allow such statements when they are deliberately made in judgments to be challenged would be to draw the presiding officers of Courts into the controversy between the parties, a process which must inevitably and in the long run lead to embarassment, if not demoralisation all round. Especially when the parties are rich and obstinate, vakils appearing for them would be subjected to a degree of pressure to swear to affidavits which is not to be encouraged. Especially when the parties are rich and obstinate, vakils appearing for them would be subjected to a degree of pressure to swear to affidavits which is not to be encouraged. Confidence in the impartiality of the officers presiding in the Courts of Justice is the very foundation of our judicial system and indeed of any civilized system and if such officers are dragged into the battle of allegations and counter allegatioas that is appropriate only to the role of litigants, their detachment and the confidence which such detachment inspires will be seriously impaired.” We are in respectful agreement with the above said observation. We have therefore to see whether by reading the other passed in the writ petition as set out above, we can come to the conclusion that the third respondent or her Advocate Sri Hegde gave an undertaking to the Court that she would vacate the permises by the 1st February, 1968. For this purpose it is not permissible to look into the affidavits of the Advocates who appeared for the parties in the writ petition. Nor can we look into the statements of the parties as to what happened in Court at the time of the passing of the order in the writ petition. By reading the order set out above, it is clear that Sri Karanth, the learned Counsel for the first respondent, was agreeable to postpone the enforcement of the demnlition order contained in the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 until 1st February, 1968, and that the Court made the order accordingly. We cannot gather from the order that any request was made by Sri Hegde on behalf of the third respondent, for time to vacate the premises nor can we gather that any undertaking was given on behalf of the third respondent that she would vacate the premises by 1st February, 1968. In Redwing Limited v. Redwing Forest Products, Limited2 it has been held that a party cannot be committed for contempt on the grounds that upon one of two possible constructions a breach of the undertaking had been committed, and for the purpose of relief of this character, the undertaking must be clear and the breach must be clear beyond all question. The learned Counsel for the complainant relied on the decisions in Lajuklata v. Nrishingha3, Suretennessa Bibi and the unreported decision of the Madras High Court in K. Narasimhulu Chetty v. R.V. Subramaniam and others5 wherein it has been held that breach of the undertaking given to the Court amounts to contempt of Court. But in all these cases, there was a specific undertaking given to the Court and there was no dispute that such an A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 182. undertaking was given to the Court. He next relied on the decision in Bajrangal Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd.1 In that case, the question was whether the undertaking given by a party in a compromise petition can be construed as an undertaking given to the Court. The other clauses of the compromise petition began with the expression “Agreed”, but clause (8) read “Ordered that the defendants do execute the said lease within a period of two months from the date hereof.” It was held that the other clauses merely recorded the agreement between the parties whereas (8) was an undertaking given to the Court. Hence, these decisions are of no assistance to the complainant. Since there is no undertaking given by the third respondent to vacate the premises by 1st February, 1968, it cannot be said that she was committed any breach of an undertaking given to the Court. It is next contended on behalf of the complainant that since this Court has upheld the validity of the notice issued by the first respondent on 23rd December 1966 in the writ petition, the order of this court as set down above amounts to a direction issued by this Court to the first respondent to stay demolition only until 1st February, 1968, and that the conduct of the third respondent in filing a suit and obtaining an order of injunction beyond that period amounts to contempt. It was also urged that since the validity of the order of the first respondent has been upheld the order of the 1st respondent is merged in the order of this Court amounts to a direction to demolish the building after 1st February, 1968. It was also urged that since the validity of the order of the first respondent has been upheld the order of the 1st respondent is merged in the order of this Court amounts to a direction to demolish the building after 1st February, 1968. It is true that 1 his Court over-ruled the contentions of the third respondent and held that there was no ground made out by the third respondent in the writ petition for quashing the notice dated 23rd December, 1966 issued by the first respondent. But it is difficult to understand how the mere upholding of the validity of the order of first respondent by this Court, can be said to be equivalent to an order by this Court directing the demolition of the premises in terms of the order passed by the first respondent. This Court was concerned with the question whether the notice issued by the first respondent was valid and whether the third respondent was entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the validity of the notice was upheld by this Court, the order of the first respondent continued to be the order of the first respondent only and did not convert itself into an order of this Court. The prayer in the writ petition was not for a direction by this Court to demolish the building and hence no question of a direction by this Court to demolish the building arose. Hence, the order of this Court restraining the first respondent from enforcing his notice till 1st February, 1968 amounts only to a direction not to enforce he notice before that date. It does not amount to a direction to enforce the notice after that date. Hence the interpretation sought to be put on the order by the complainant is to be rejected. He relied on the decision in N. Senapathi v.Sri Ambal Mills2, Sessions Judge, Meerut and the unreported decision of the Madras High Court in A. Ananthalakshmi Ammal v. V.R, Viramani and others4. But in each of these cases, there was an order of the Court the breach of which was committed by the parties concerned. He relied on the decision in N. Senapathi v.Sri Ambal Mills2, Sessions Judge, Meerut and the unreported decision of the Madras High Court in A. Ananthalakshmi Ammal v. V.R, Viramani and others4. But in each of these cases, there was an order of the Court the breach of which was committed by the parties concerned. Since we are of the opinion that there was no direction by this Court to demolish the building after 1st February, 1968, it cannot be said that the third respondent committed contempt of this Court by trying to prevent the demolition of the building since she was resisting only the order of the first respondent and not the order of this Court. The third respondent filed O.S. No. 68 of 1966 on 4th July, 1966 for an injunction against the complainant. The first respondent's notices dated 17th August, 1966, and 23rd December, 1966 were issued thereafter. Thereupon she filed the writ petition on 27th December, 1966, which was dismissed on 18th December, 1967. The third respondent filed the second suit, O. S. No. 34 of 1968, in the Court of the Munsiff, Mangalore, in January, 1968 and obtained an order of temporary injunction against the first respondent on 6th January, 1968 which was vacated on 16th July, 1968. The suit itself was withdrawn by the third respondent in June A I.R. 1955 All. 161. 1969. She filed the third suit O.S. No. 58 of 1968, in the Court of the Civil Judge Mangalore on 17th August, 1968 and obtained an order of temporary injunction on the same day against the first respondent. This injunction continued till 12th February, 1969 on which date the suit was dismissed. She filed the 4th suit, O.S. No. 115 of 1969 on 3rd March, 1969, and again obtained an order of temporary injunction. This suit ended in a compromise, since the Municipal Council passed a resolution on 30th April, 1969 setting aside the orders of the first respondent directing the demolition of the premises in the occupation of the third respondent. By filing the second, third and fourth suits and obtaining orders of temporary injunction, it is contended that the third respondent is guilty of an abuse of the process of the Court. By filing the second, third and fourth suits and obtaining orders of temporary injunction, it is contended that the third respondent is guilty of an abuse of the process of the Court. It is also contended that she has concealed the result of the previous proceedings in the subsequent suits and thereby practised deceit on the Court in order to obtain favourable orders from the Court. The second suit O.S. No. 34 of 1968 was filed against the Manglore Municipality represented by the Commissioner. The prayer in that suit was for a declaration that the two notices dated 17th August, 1966 and 23rd December, 1966 issued by first respondent directing the demolition of the portion of the premises mentioned in the said notices bearing No. 14/2 under section 213(2) of the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964, is null and void, ineffective and inoperative and opposed to natural justice and consequently for an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the said order. The suit was filed and an ad interim temporary injunction order was obtained on 6th January, 1968. In the plaint, the pendency of the first suit O.S. No. 248 of 1966 is mentioned as well as the order of the Court in that suit directing that the status quo should be maintained and also of granting permission to the third respondent to put up wooden protection and to effect such other repairs as may be necessary to the building. There is also the allegation that she had filed W.P. No. 2726 of 1966 and that it was dismissed. Her contention in that plaint is that the said two notices issued by the first respondent are illegal, that they are opposed to principles of natural justice, that an opportunity was not given to the third respondent to Show cause why the building should be demolished before issue of such notices. She has stated that whole dismissing the writ petition on a technical ground, the Court directed the Municipality not to enforce its order till 1st February, 1968 “thus giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to go to the Civil Court.” This allegation, it is contended by the complainant, amounts to misrepresentation of the effect of the order in the writ petition. She has also stated in the plaint that the writ petition was dismissed mainly on the ground that the third respondent cannot be allowed to raise the plea of natural justice at the hearing of the writ petition since that question was not raised specifically in the petition though the Court opined that the notice issued by the Commissioner was opposed to principles of natural justice. This allegation, it is further alleged, is contrary to what this Court held in the writ petition and amounts to a misrepresentation. During the course of the arguments, as could be seen from the perusal of the order in the writ petition, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner, the third respondent herein that the principles of natural justice required that the third respondent should have been given an opportunity of being heard before the decision to demolish the building was taken by the first respondent, and the notice was invalid since no such opportunity was given to the third respondent. The learned Counsel for the respondent, the first respondent herein, did not dispute the correctness of the principles laid down in the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner in the writ petition. But he contended that no such plea had been taken in the affdavit filed in support of the writ petition. That contention was upheld and it was observed that if the petitioner is allowed to raise the new ground urged, it will go outside the grounds of the statement for relief and that it cannot be permitted. Further, the Court considered the allegations made by the third respondent in the plaint in O.S. No. 248 of 1966 wherein she has stated that the building and its walls are unsafe and are in a precarious condition. The said allegation was made by the third respondent on 4th July, 1966 and the first respondent issued the notice on 17th August, 1966. Relying on this statement of the third respondent in her plaint, it was held that what was stated in the notice of the first respondent dated 17th August, 1966 is substantially correct and therefore, there was no substance in the ground taken by the third respondent that the principles of natural justice had been offended. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to pass the final order in the writ petition in the terms already set out above. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to pass the final order in the writ petition in the terms already set out above. Since there was an observation in the abovesaid order that the third respondent was precluded from raising the ground as to the principles of natural justice not being followed, as it was not taken in her affidavit in support of the writ petition, it gives room for doubt whether or not the third respondent was under the bona fide belief that such a ground could be taken in a suit to be filed subsequently. Hence, it cannot be said that she was wilfully making any misrepresentation while making the abovesaid allegation in the plaint. The third suit O.S. No. 68 of 1968 was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge on 17th August, 1968. This suit was for a permanent injunction against the Mangalore City Municipality represented by its Commissioner and the President, Mangalore City Municipal Council, restraining them from demolishing any portion of Door No. 14-2 except the portion referred to in the notices dated 17th August 1966 and 23rd December, 1966 issued by the Municipal Commissioner, “while in the guise of carrying out demolition of the alleged dangerous portion.” The allegation in the plaint is that she had filed the Writ Petition No. 2726 of 1966 in the High Court and that the same was dismissed on a technical ground in view of the restructed jurisdiction regarding the writ petitions and that therefore she filed O.S. No. 34 of 1968 and that the said suit is pending in the Munsiff's Court. She has further alleged that though the notices issued by the first respondent relate to a portion only of the building Door No. 14-2,under the guise of that notice, the first respondent has directed the demolition of the entire structure Door No. 14-2 which is about 50 feet, long and 25 feet wide with several rooms in the upstairs occupied by the plaintiff and others with a view to help the complainant. She has also stated that she had already given the protection to the building by putting up wooden support on the western side as directed by the Court in O.S. No. 248 of 1966, that the execution of the order of demolition was suspended by the first respondent only till 20th August, 1968, that the order cannot be used for the demolition of the whole building and that she is compelled to file this suit which she did on 17th March 1968. She valued the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 10,000. It is cor tended on behalf of the complainant that the temporary injunction order which she had obtained on 6th January 1968 was vacated by the Munsiff's Court on 16th July, 1968 and that therefore with the mala fide intention of getting another order of injunction in her favour, she filed this suit in the Court of the Civil Judge and for that purpose she valued the suit at a higher value. The question is whether she was justified in filing the suit. It is to be observed that both the notices dated 17th August 1966 and 23rd December 1966 seem to refer to the demolition of the dangerous portion of the building Door No. 14/2 only. This suit is filed on the apprehension that by making use of the said two notices the first respondent may pull down the entire old building. A perusal of the plaint schedule in O.S. No. 248 of 1966 shows that the third respondent was a tenant in respect of Door Nos. 14/2 as well as 14/2-A and 14/2-B all of which are parts of the same building. The written statement filed in O.S. No. 68 of 1968 by the first defendant, the first respondent herein, the Municipal Commissioner, shows that his contention was that a portion of the building bearing Door No. 14/3 had been demolished already even prior to the date of his notice dated 17th August, 1966 and that the remaining portion of the said building was in a dangerous condition, that the notice in question was for the demolition of the said remaining portion of the building and that the third respondent, the plaintiff in that case, was estopped from contending that the notices directed demolition only a portion of the building. In fact, two issues were realised in this regard in the suit, namely, issues 1 and 2 and the finding of the learned Civil Judge was that the notices dated 17th August, 1966 and 23rd December, 1966 direct the demolition of the entire existing building described by the third respondent as 14/2, 14/2-A and 14/2-B. On issue No. 2, it was held that the said two demolition notices were issued for the demolition of the entire existing building described by the third respondent as 14/2, 14/2-A, 14/2-B and that the entire existing building des cribed as 14/2, 14/2-A and 14/2-B. is in a dangerous and ruinous condition and that the Commissioner directed the demolition of the entire existing building described as 14/2, 14-/2 A and 14/2-B. We do not wish to express any opinion on the question whether those findings are right or wrong. What we are now concerned with is whether this suit was a frivolous or vexatious suit or whether it can be said that the third respondent was justified in firing this suit. But as noticed above, the two notices seem to refer only to the dangerous portion of Door No. 14/2. It cannot therefore be said that the third respondent was not justified in apprehending that the entire building would be demolished even though the notices, according to her related to a portion of the entire building only. Since the second suit was in respect of Door No. 14/2 and this suit relates to the other portions of the building, it cannot be said that the subject matter of the two suits is identical. Consequently, it cannot be said that the third respondent was not justified in filing this suit, even though, the suit was ultimately dismissed on 12th February, 1969. The fourth suit filed by her is O.S. No. 115 of 1969, in the Court of the Munsif, Mangalore on 3rd March, 1969. It is contended that since the third suit filed by her was dismissed on 12th February, 1969, she has filed this suit with the sole object of continuing in possession of the premises in her occupation though she was not entitled to resist the demolition in pursuance of the notices issued by the first respondent. The reliefs in this suit are three. The reliefs in this suit are three. The first is for declaration that the western cross-wall of Door No. 14/2 had been removed and in its place a shop door with wooden doors fitted with brick masonary had been substituted; that the building Door No. 14/2 or any portion thereof is not in a ruinous and dangerous condition, and that the demolition of the same is not necessary under section 213(2) of the Mysore Municipalities Act. The second relief was for a declaration that the Public Works Supervisor of the City Municipal Council, the defendant in the suit, has not inspected the premises and that his alleged report of inspection dated 9th August, 1966 and the demolition notice dated 17th August, 1966 issued in pursuance of the said report is void and invalid. The third prayer is for a declaration that the attempt to pull down the whole building by the Municipal Commissioner is not bonafide and his attempt to drive out the third respondent is with the mala fide intention of helping the present complainant. She has referred to the previous suits filed by her in the plaint and has stated that the reliefs prayed in the suit are different from the reliefs sought in the earlier second and third suits. She has also referred to the writ petition and has stated that this Court has not given a finding that the building is in a dangerous or dilapidated condition, nor has it considered the facts which transpired after 4th July, 1966 and before issue of notice on 17th August, 1966, nor the question whether if danger is averted the first respondent can still demolish the building in pursuance to his earlier notice. She has stated that in the course of the proceedings in O.S. No. 248 of 1966 he third respondent was permitted to replace the portion of western wall of Door No. 14/2 as well as the roofing on the western side of Door No. 14/2. and that she has carried out the said repairs even by the end of July. [966. and that she has carried out the said repairs even by the end of July. [966. It is also the case of the third respondent that the second suit O.S. 34 of 1968 had been filed without issuing the statutory notice to the Municipality required under the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, that therefore she withdrew the suit in June, 1969 and that the fourth suit O.S. No. 115 of 1969 was filed after issuing the required statutory notice to the Municipality. It is relevant to note that this suit was sub-sequently compromised on 26th May, 1969 and the defendants conceded the first and second reliefs asked for by the third respondent. It is to be noticed that she has referred to the dismissal of her writ petition in all the three suits filed by her after the disposal of the writ petition. In the second suit she has referred to the pendency of the first suit and in the third suit she has referred to the first two suits already filed by her and in the 4th suit she has referred to the earlier suits already filed by her. Hence, it cannot be said that she has tried to conceal the fact that she had filed the writ petition and the earlier suits in the subsequent suits filed by her It is contended on behalf of the complainant that knowing full well that her contentions had been negatived in the writ petition both with regard to the validity of the notice and the condition of the building in her possession, she still persisted in approaching the lower Courts for the same reliefs which she had asked for in the writ petition and which had been negatived. From the a legations in the various plaints, it is to be observed that she has put her own interpretation on the effect of the order in the writ petition. It may be that she understood the order in the way in which she has sought to make out in the subsequent suits. But that cannot be said to amount to contempt. As stated above, she has not tried to conceal the fact in the subsequent suits as to the institution of the previous proceedings. Under these circumstances, we have to see whether site is guilty of contempt of Court. But that cannot be said to amount to contempt. As stated above, she has not tried to conceal the fact in the subsequent suits as to the institution of the previous proceedings. Under these circumstances, we have to see whether site is guilty of contempt of Court. The learned Counsel for the complainant relied on the decision in In re Shamdasani,1 wherein it has been held that where successive frivolus and vexatious applications for transfer are resorted to as a means of preventing the ends of justice being attained, the High Court ought to exercise its inherent power under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that in certain cases the conduct of this sort may amount to contempt of Court. The learned Advocate-General has brought to our notice the decisions in In the matter of Taylor2, R.V. Weisz and another,3 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 86 and 92 of 1967. In In the matter of Taylor2, the plaintiff who had been refused a warrant for detention of the defendant by a Civil Court started criminal proceedings on the same subject matter and by means of allegations to which the Civil Court attached no credit, obtained a warrant from the criminal Court. There was no concealmen or deception on the part of the plaintiff The lower Court held that the whole proceeding was an abuse of the process of justice and that the contemners in initiating their criminal proceeding; were influenced by the intention of defying the Court for having refused them the civil warrant of arrest they applied for, and that they are guilty of contempt of Court. It was held in appeal by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that though the appellant by his abovesaid conduct runs several risks of a serious character he is not restricted by law to a single form of remedy, and that he may pursue all the legal remedies appropriate to his grieveance and his conduct does not necessarily involve any punishable contempt of the civil Court, whatever may be its other consequences. In R.V. Weisy3, one W. instructed his solicitor ‘M’ to take proceedings to recover money which he alleged he had won on bets made by him with a firm of bookmakers. In R.V. Weisy3, one W. instructed his solicitor ‘M’ to take proceedings to recover money which he alleged he had won on bets made by him with a firm of bookmakers. But M. with the knowledge of W. framed the suit as one for recovery of balance amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them, though, in fact, there had never been an account stated between the parties. It was alleged that the fictitious allegation was made merely to conceal from the Court that the action was prohibited by the Gaming Act, and therefore, was a contempt of Court. It was held that M was guilty of contempt since it was an action so as to canceal its true nature, when in truth, it is one prohibited by statute. While holding that W was not guilty of contempt since he did not know the terms of the action brought by M on his behalf, it has been observed by Lord Goddard, C.J., as follows: “That he insisted on an action being brought which was an abuse of the process of the Court is clear, and as it is admitted that he knew that betting bebts could not be recovered by action it follows that he knew that the action for which he gave instructions was an abuse. It has never yet been held, however, that merely to bring, or cause to be brought, an action which is an abuse can be treated as a contempt, even though it may have been brought for the purpose of pressure or what may be called “showing up”. If it were held that to bring an action prohibited by the Gaming Acts was punishable, it would mean that the Court was treating as criminal something for which Parliament had not provided a penalty. As a general rule stopping the action in limine and awarding costs against the plaintiff must be regarded as the appropriate sanction There may be exceptions, and, to give one instance, if a person who brought an action which was struck out as an abuse again brought exactly the same action, the Court might deal with him for contempt, but that would be because his conduct in bringing the second action amounted to a defiance of the Court. It is necessary to emphasise that the contempt in the present case lies, not in bringing an action forbidden by the Gaming Acts, but in bringing it as a feigned issue so as to conceal its true nature from the Court. For this we cannot hold Mr, Weisz responsible. He instructed his solicitor to bring an action for the bets. Had the writ been endorsed for money due to the plaintiff on bet won by him the action would have been struck out, but it would not have amounted to contempt” In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 8, at page 16, it is stated: “Abusing the process of the Court is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bonafide and is frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive, the ordinary remedy in such case being to apply to strike out a pleading or stay the proceedings, or to prevent further proceedings being taken without leave. Beyond this the Court has jurisdiction to punish abuse of process by committal or attachment as a contempt. Where the Court, by exercising its statutory powers its powers under Rules of Court, or its inherent juridiction to stay frivolous or vexatious proceedings, can give an adequate remedy, it will not order a committal. On the other hand, where the irregularity amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it is contempt of Court and punishable accordingly.” This statement of the law by Halsbury was cited with approval in the decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 86 and 92 of 1967. The facts of that case are as follows: The probate proceedings in respect of the will of one Arsiwala was pending in the High Court of Bombay. On 10th October, 1963, Mistry, one of the near relations of the deceased, filed a complaint in the Court of the Additional Chief presidency Magistrate, Bombay, against one Karkariya alleging that in the house occupied by Arsiwala at the time of his death, there was a ‘ wooden box. which contained currency notes of the value of Rupees five lakhs and this box was found missing from the room of Arsiwala when inventory was taken. The complaint was summarily dismissed with the observation that apart from the alleged word of Arsiwala who was dead, there was no other evidence about the existence of the box. which contained currency notes of the value of Rupees five lakhs and this box was found missing from the room of Arsiwala when inventory was taken. The complaint was summarily dismissed with the observation that apart from the alleged word of Arsiwala who was dead, there was no other evidence about the existence of the box. On 16th March, 1964, Mistry filed another complaint before the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court Esplanade, Bombay, alleging that Arsiwala was possessed of Rs. 8 lakhs in currency notes which he had kept in a box in his residence, but that when an inventory was made in Probate proceedings on 20th July, 1963, the box containing currency notes was not found in the room, that it was suspected that it was removed by Karkaria, that he had reason to believe that the said amount in currency notes and the shares belonging to Arsiwala had been concealed in the house of a Karkaria and that the latter had misappropriated Mistry's share of the property and had applied the entire property of Arsiwala to him own use. He asked for issue of a search warrant. The Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, directed investigation of the complaint by the police. The house of Karkaria was searched on 2nd April, 1964, but no box with currency notes or shares was found. On 29th May, 1964, Mistry withdrew the complaint. Subsequently, the dispute between the parties was settled out of Court, Mistry having withdrawn all the allegations in the criminal proceedings and Karkaria withdrew the application for proceeding against Mistry under section 282 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code which he had filed in August, 1964. On 28th July, 1969, Karkaria filed an application against Mistry in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court for sanction to prosecute Mistry under sections 182 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. On 4th February 1966, Karkaria moved a petition in the High Court of Bombay under the Contempt of Courts Act on the allegation that after his first complaint dated 10th March, 1963, was dismissed, Mistry, without disclosing that fact and on substantially the same allegations, had filed another complaint on 26th March, 1964, before another Magistrate and had obtained an order for investigation by the police and had thereby abused the process of Court. It was the case of Karkaria that the averments in the two complaints filed by Mistry were false and that he had filed a previous complaint which was dismissed, instituted a fresh complaint on the same subject matter and on the same facts on which the first complaint had been dismissed, that the second complaint was neither bona fide nor made in good faith, but was made with a view to compel him to come to terms in the probate proceedings and that also by placing reliance upon the letter dated 15th January, 1963, which was a fabricated, letter, Mistry had committed contempt of Court. The High Court held after enquiry that Mistry was well aware that the said letter was a forgery and Mistry had abused the process of Court when he filed the second complaint on 28th March, 1964, and held that he was guilty of contempt of Court. The Supreme Court obeserved that Mistry did appear to have made some inconsistent statements and his failure to disclose in the second complaint the fact that his previous complaint was dismissed showed that he was not honest with the Court. It observed that he cannot be held to be guilty of contempt of Court, reying on the observations made by the Judicial Committee in McLeod v. St. Aybyn1 to the effect that “committal for contempt of Court is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice,” and those of Lord Chief Justice Russel in The Queen v. Gray2 that jurisdiction for contempt of Court must be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. It further observed that it may not be possible from the various proceedings to affirm that the complaint filed by Mistry was false and the fact that he may not be able to produce evidence to sustain the charge in a Court by reliable evidence does not establish the falsity of the charge. The Court observed that even if the proceedings taken by Mistry could be characterised as frivolous, the High Court could, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, issue an order against entertainment of proceedings filed or to be filed by Mistry in respect of the alleged criminal misappropriation of the estate of Arsiwala. The Court observed that even if the proceedings taken by Mistry could be characterised as frivolous, the High Court could, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, issue an order against entertainment of proceedings filed or to be filed by Mistry in respect of the alleged criminal misappropriation of the estate of Arsiwala. The Court accepted the undertaking given on behalf of Mistry that he will not commence any fresh proceeding in any criminal Court in respect of the complaints already filed by him and discharged the order for commitment of contempt passed by the High Court. The definition of Contempt of Court which is given in Oswald's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 6 in the following words, has been approved by the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. Garbaksh Singh3. “To speak generally, contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the lav into disrespect or disregard, or to interefere with or prejudice parties litigating or their witnesses during the litigation.” Sri V. Krishnamurthy, the learned Counsel for the third respondent, relied on the observation in Nand Kishore v.Delhi Corporation4 that resort to contempt proceedings for the purpose of securing execution of the Court's orders for the benefit of a private litigant is not to be encouraged. He contended that the third respondent’, suit O.S. 248 of 1966 had been decreed against the complainant on 2nd September, 1968 and that the complaint petition had been filed on 13th September, 1968. We are in agreement with the observations made by the learned Judges in Nand Kishore v.Delhi Corporation4. We are of the opinion that in this case, subsequent suits and proceedings instituted by the third Respondent may or may not amount to abuse of the process of the Court, but it cannot be said that she is guilty of contempt of Court. It might have been necessary to take an undertaking from the third respondent that she would not resort to further proceedings, and to issue a warning to her, but since the matter has been compromised between the third respondent and the Municipality we consider it unnecessary to take any such action. The allegation against the second respondent is that he should be committed for contempt of Court for having aided and abetted the disobedience of the orders of this Court by the third respondent. The allegation against the second respondent is that he should be committed for contempt of Court for having aided and abetted the disobedience of the orders of this Court by the third respondent. Since we have held that the third respondent has not committed any contempt of Court, the question of second respondent aiding and abetting in the performance of such a contempt will not arise. The other acts attributed to the second respondent are that he colluded with the third respondent and admitted the resolution of the suspension of the order of demolition and referred the same to the Standing Committee of Municipal. Council and on a petition presented to him, passed an order on 28th July, 1968 suspending the execution of (he order of demolition. As we have already held that there is no order of this Court directing the demolition of the building, what the second respondent did was related to the order of the first respondent only. Therefore, such acts cannot be said to constitute any contempt of Court. There remains one other matter to be dealt with, namely, the Criminal petition No. 81 of 1969 filed in the above Contempt of Court case by the first respondent — the Municipal Commissioner, on 15th January, 1969 during the pendency of this proceeding. It is stated in the affidavit of the 1st respondent that the second respondent has intimated to him and to his counsel that he should withdraw his defence in this case and also engage another counsel mentioned by him and that a copy of the resolution passed by the Mangalore City Municipal Council has been sent to him. The resolution of the Municipal Council reads as follows: “Resolved that the entrustment of the case by the Commissioner to Sri.K.R. Karanth flouting the order of the President is revoked. President's note for entrusting the case to Sri. B.P. Holla is approved. Sri. B.P. Holla, Advocate, Bangalore or any other Advocate that may be nominated by the President, to be engaged by the Commissioner forthwith to defend the contempt of Court proceedings in consultation with the President. Affidavit already filed by the Commissioner in the Contempt of Court proceedings is without any authority or approval of the council. The Commissioner to (inform) the Courts through the Counsel that the danger alleged in the notice of demolition F2 18994/1966 has been averted. Necessary expediture is sanctioned. Affidavit already filed by the Commissioner in the Contempt of Court proceedings is without any authority or approval of the council. The Commissioner to (inform) the Courts through the Counsel that the danger alleged in the notice of demolition F2 18994/1966 has been averted. Necessary expediture is sanctioned. Passed unanimously. Sd. K Vishwanath Kamath President.” This resolution was passed on 31st December, 1968. The preamble to the resolution recites as to what happened earlier to the passing of the said resolution. The notice of summons was served on the first respondent — the Municipal Commissioner, on 1st October, 1968 and he entered appearance through Sri. K.R. Karanth on 10th October, 1968. It is stated in the preamble that since the office was busy in connection with the Municipal Elections held on 8th October, 1968, the entrustment of the case was made to Sri K.R. Karanth, in anticipation of the Council's sanction for defending the first respondent. The Municipal Council has in its resolution dated 29th October, 1968 approved the entrustment of the case against the second respondent — the President of the Municipal Council, the Sri S.G. Sundaraswamy, Advocate, Bangalore, for defending the President. The Council was therefore, requested to approve the entrustment of the case of contempt of Court No. 46 of 1968 to Sri. K.R. Karanth, Advocate, Bangalore and to sanction the expenditure in this regard. It is in those circumstances, that the said resolution dated 31st December, 1968 has been passed. It is obvious that the Municipal Commissioner, 1st Respondent, had entrusted the case on his behalf to Sri. Karanth in anticipation of the Council's sanction and requested the Municipal Council to approve the entrustment of the case. The Municipal Council seems to have been of the opinion that the case should have been entrusted to another Advocate nominated by the President of the Municipal Council, the second respondent. It was also of the opinion that it should be brought to the notice of the Court that there is no necessity to demolish the building in the occupation of the third respondent. It is relevant to note that subsequently, on 30th April, 1969, the Municipal Council passed the resolution setting aside the demolition orders passed by the first respondent relating to the premises in question. It is relevant to note that subsequently, on 30th April, 1969, the Municipal Council passed the resolution setting aside the demolition orders passed by the first respondent relating to the premises in question. It is stated that the said resolution of 31st December, 1968 has thereafter been suspended by the Divisional Commissioner on 14th January, 1969. In his letter to the second respondent dated 4th January, 1969, the first respondent has stated that he has been impleaded in the contempt proceedings in his “individual and official capacity as the Commissioner of Mangalore City Municipal Council”. We are not concerned with the question whether the Municipal Council was or was not within its rights in directing the first respondent to engage another counsel and to bring certain facts to the notice of the Court. From the circumstances it is apparent that the first respondent asked for the Municipal Council's approval of the action taken by him in entrusting the case to be conducted on his behalf to Sri K.R. Karanth. When such a request was made, the Municipal Council felt that it was within its powers whether to approve of the action taken by the first respondent or not. It did not approve of the action taken by the first respondent and expressed such disapproval in the resolution. We do not think that the abovesaid action taken by the second respondent amounts to contempt of this Court. Sri K.R. Karanth, the learned Counsel for the first respondent, relied on the decision in Vijai Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad1 wherein it was held that the act and conduct of the two contemners directly interefered with the course of judicial proceeding in as much as they did not merely amount to a threat to the petitioner to withdraw his suit, but were actually meant to non-suit him by expelling him from the Congress Organisation and thus removing the very bed-rock on which stood the edifice of the petitioner's claim, and that they were therefore guilty of contempt of Court. The other decision relied on by him is Pratap Singh v.Grubaksh Singh2 wherein it was held that the action taken by the contemners had the clear and unmistakable tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it, and that therefore they were guilty of contempt of Court, following the observation in Oswald's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 87, namely, “any conduct by which the course of Justice is perverted either by a party or a stranger is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts.” But the action taken by the second respondent in this case cannot be said to be one which is intended to coerce the first respondent in any way in the conduct of the litigation. As a matter of fact, the complaint has not attributed any act of contempt of Court against the first respondent except stating that he has failed to carry out the order of the High Court dated 18th December, 1966. We, therefore, discharge the notices issued to the respondents and crop the proceedings. S.V.S. ----- Notices discharged proceedings dropped.