Om Swaroop v. State — 1969 DIGILAW 338 (ALL)

ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This bunch of three connected criminal revisions bristles with questions of law. The facts in each of these revisions are substantially similar and they may be conveniently disposed of together. They are directed against the orders of the III Temp. Civil and Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, affirming the conviction of the Applicants u/s 5/8 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, (hereinafter called the Act) and the sentence of a fine of Rs. 500/- each imposed on them by the SDM Bindki, district Fatehpur. The question of law which is posed is whether the complaint filed by the Marketing Inspector in each case was competent and the conviction of the Applicants pursuant to the same was valid in law? 2. Om Swarup Applicant in one of the revisions is alleged to have installed a rice huller in his flour mill on 9-11-1964 in village Bardara. This was detected by the Marketing Inspector Sri Raj Pal Singh who found that the Applicant had no permit or license for the same. The Applicant was thus charged with having contravened the provisions of Section 5/6 read with Section 8 of the Act and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 13. Since the case can be decided purely on questions of law it is not necessary to refer to other facts relating to incidental matters such as the recovery of the various articles and other formalities duly observed in this connection. It would suffice to mention that the complaint in each case was actually filed by a Marketing Inspector who claimed to have been authorised by the licensing officer in this regard by a General Circular. 3. The Applicant in each case pleaded not guilty and stated that he had no rice mill and that he was never found hulling the rice. 4. The prosecution evidence was believed by the courts below and the defence version was rejected and the cases ended in the conviction of the Applicants. There were, however, certain legal objections which were raised on behalf of the Applicants in the courts below and which alone have been canvassed before me in this Court. 5. 4. The prosecution evidence was believed by the courts below and the defence version was rejected and the cases ended in the conviction of the Applicants. There were, however, certain legal objections which were raised on behalf of the Applicants in the courts below and which alone have been canvassed before me in this Court. 5. Sri V.B. Singh, the learned Counsel for the Applicants, contended that it was a necessary requirement of law that the complaint for an offence under the Act must be made "by the licensing officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing officer in this behalf." It was urged that since the complaint in the instant case had not been filed by the licensing officer but by the Marketing Inspector and there was nothing to show that he had been duly authorised "in this behalf", there was no complaint in the eye of law and all subsequent proceedings were vitiated. In order to appreciate this contention the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act may be noticed. 6. Section 8 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 forbids any person or authority from establishing any new rice mill after the commencement of the Act except under and in accordance with the permit granted u/s 5. Section 5 provides for the grant of permits in respect of new or defunct rice mills. For the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any rice mill is working in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder and whether the aforesaid provisions are not being violated a machinery is provided u/s 9 of the Act. As already stated, it was during the inspection made by the Inspector in the instant cases that it came to light that the Applicant in each case had been running the rice mill without the necessary permit. As already stated, it was during the inspection made by the Inspector in the instant cases that it came to light that the Applicant in each case had been running the rice mill without the necessary permit. Section 9 of the Act reads as fallows: Power of inspection-For the purpose of ascertaining the position or examining the working of any rice mill or for any other purpose mentioned in this Act or the rules made thereunder, the licensing officer or any person authorised by the Central Government in this behalf shall have the right- (a) to enter and inspect any rice mill; (b) to order the production of any document, book, register or record in the possession or power of any person having control of or employed in connection with, any rice mill; and (c) to examine any person having the control of or employed in connection with, any rice mill. It will be noticed that the power of inspection is initially vested in the 'licensing officer' but it may also be delegated to a person 'authorised by the Central Government in this behalf.' The 'Licensing officers' are appointed u/s 4 of the Act which provides: Appointment of licensing officers. The Central Government may, by notified order- (a) appoint such persons, being gazetted officers of Government, as it thinks fit to be licensing officers for the purpose of this Act and (b) define the limits within which a licensing officer shall exercise the powers conferred on licensing officers by or under this Act. 7. One of the questions which falls for decision in this case is as to whether the Marketing Inspector concerned who filed the complaint could be treated as a person authorised by the Central Government in this behalf. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that the authorisation of such person has to be necessarily by the Central Government and it can not be done by the 'licensing officer.' It is not disputed that the licensing officers appointed u/s 4 of the Act are the Regional Food Controllers in respect of various regions, each comprising a number of districts. According to the notification No. S-4069/XXIX-AS-44-1957 Regional Food Controllers have been appointed licensing officers under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. According to the notification No. S-4069/XXIX-AS-44-1957 Regional Food Controllers have been appointed licensing officers under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. Still, however, the question arises as to whether these licensing officers could in their turn delegate the power of inspection to the Marketing Inspectors or such delegation could be made by the Central Government alone. 8. In this connection Sri Rishi Ram Agarwal placed before me two notifications issued by the Government. The first notification is dated 22-4-1959 and purports to have been issued by the Central Government u/s 19 of the Act. It is in the following terms: Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food) Notification. New Delhi, 22-4-1959. Order-G.S.R. 512-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (21 of 1958), the Central Government hereby directs that the powers exercisable by it Under Sections 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15 and 18 of the said Act shall be exercisable also by Government of a State or the Administrator of a Union Territory, as the case may be. (No. 209(2)/291/58. PV II) B.P. Bagchi, Joint Secretary. The other notification to which he drew my attention was a notification dated 21-9-1959, purporting to have been issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh u/s 9 of the Act and it is in the following terms: Government of Uttar Pradesh Food and Civil Supplies (A) Department. No. 5183/XXIX.AS.44/1957 Dated Lucknow, 21-9-1959. Notification/Miscellaneous. Whereas the powers conferred on the Central Government Under Sections 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15 and 18 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 1958 (21 of 1958) have been delegated to the State Government vide Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food), GSR No. 512 dated 22-4-1959; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers so delegated in respect of Section 9 of the said Act, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to authorise all the Deputy Regional Food Controllers, Regional Marketing Officers, Additional Regional Marketing Officers, District Supply Officers, Area Rationing Officers, Deputy Regional Marketing Officers, Assistant Regional Food Controllers, Senior Marketing Inspectors, Marketing Inspectors and the Provincial Marketing Officer (Foodgrains) to enter and inspect any rice mill within their respective jurisdictions for the purposes mentioned in the aforesaid section. By order, B.S. Seth IAS, Sachiv. By order, B.S. Seth IAS, Sachiv. The learned Government Advocate has chiefly relied on the provisions of Section 19 of the Act in order to justify the delegation of powers which was made in favour of the Marketing Inspectors. Section 19 of the Act runs as under: Delegation of powers. The Central Government may, by notified order, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by- (a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government, as may be specified in the direction. 9. It has already been noticed that u/s 9 of the Act the Central Government has the power to authorise any person to enter and inspect any rice mill and perform other actions enumerated in the Act. Section 19(b) of the Act provides that any power exercisable by the Central Government shall in relation to such matters be exercisable also by such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to it as maybe specified by the Central Government in the notification. The effect of reading Section 9 with Section 19(b) appears to be that the authority to enter and inspect etc. u/s 9 though initially vested in the Central Government can also by virtue of an appropriate notification be exercised by an officer subordinate to a State Government. I have already referred to the notification by which the Regional Food Controllers have been appointed licensing officers, they are admittedly subordinate to the State Government. Therefore, it is open to these subordinate officers to delegate the power of inspection contemplated by Section 9 but that would depend upon the terms of the notification by the Central Government u/s 19 of the Act. A perusal of the notification dated 22-4-1959, makes it clear that the Central Government itself made delegation of its powers to the State Government alone and not to such officer or authority subordinate to State Government as provided by Section 19(b) of the Act. A perusal of the notification dated 22-4-1959, makes it clear that the Central Government itself made delegation of its powers to the State Government alone and not to such officer or authority subordinate to State Government as provided by Section 19(b) of the Act. Therefore, the licensing officers i.e. the Regional Food Controllers who were officers subordinate to the State Government could not exercise the power of authorising other persons such as Marketing Inspectors to act u/s 9 of the Act for the purpose of entering and inspecting any rice mill etc. In other words, the delegation by the Central Government having been made only to the State Government by virtue of the notification u/s 19 of the Act, the State Government in its turn could not redelegate that power to the licensing officers or Regional Food Controllers of authorising other persons to perform the functions contemplated by Section 9 of the Act. The result therefore is that the Marketing Inspector Sri Ranjit Singh who is alleged to have inspected the rice mill of the Applicant was not competent to make such inspection and ask for the license from him. In fact, the latter would have been well within his rights to resist such inspection and refuse to produce the license before him. 10. This, however, does not dispose of finally the question as to whether the prosecution and conviction of the Applicant were vitiated on that account. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that even if the report of the Inspector based on his inspection were excluded from consideration, there was nevertheless no bar to the complaint being filed by the Marketing Inspector and the conviction could not be held to be illegal until the complaint was shown to have not been filed by the competent authority in this regard. There appears to fee force in this contention. In my opinion the twin findings of fact essential for conviction of the Applicant under the Act were that he was running a rice mill at the time when the prosecution was launched and that he did not possess the necessary license or permit for that purpose. If these facts are established and the complaint has been brought by the competent authority, the conviction of the accused will not be vitiated. If these facts are established and the complaint has been brought by the competent authority, the conviction of the accused will not be vitiated. As I have already observed, the only effect of the want of authority in the Inspector would be to entitle the Applicant to resist and prevent his entry into his premises; it can have no bearing on the merits of the case. If a complaint is brought by the competent authority and it is found that an accused person was running the mill without necessary permit or license, he cannot escape conviction. In the instant case the concurrent findings of the courts below are that the Applicant was running the rice mill at the relevant time and he never claimed to possess any license in this regard nor did he produce any such license. An inspection u/s 9 of the Act is not a condition precedent to the taking of cognizance of offence u/s 15 of the Act. Hence, it was open to the courts to rely on the evidence of the prosecution and believe it for recording a finding that the Applicant did run the rice mill without a license. Thus, the Applicant cannot take shelter under the plea that the act of inspection by the Marketing Inspector was unlawful and so the prosecution was vitiated. 11. The other question, however, which has been canvassed is as to whether the delegation made in favour of Marketing Inspectors in general of the power of filing complaints was valid or not. Section 15 of the Act runs as follows: Cognizance of offences. No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by the licensing officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing officer in this behalf. An analysis of Section 15 of the Act leads to the conclusion that the cognizance of an offence punishable under the Act can be taken only on a report in writing "made by the licensing officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing officer in this behalf". The complaint in each of the three cases before me was filed by the Marketing Inspector. The complaint in each of the three cases before me was filed by the Marketing Inspector. It has been argued by the learned Government Advocate that the licensing officer i.e. the Regional Food Controller had issued a General Circular whereby all the Marketing Inspectors of the region were authorised to make a report in writing of the facts constituting an offence under the Act, as required by Section 15. I have already indicated that the Regional Food Controllers of the respective regions have been appointed as licensing officers as provided u/s 4 of the Act. If such licensing officers can be proved to have duly authorised any other person such as the Marketing Inspector in the instant case for making a report in writing, the complaint would be in accordance with law. 12. According to the prosecution all the Marketing Inspectors had been authorised by the Regional Food Controllers by a General Circular, copies of which were filed by the Marketing Inspector Sri Ranjit Singh who was examined as a court witness. He referred to those documents in his deposition as Exs. C-1 and C-2. The prosecution relied on his evidence to prove that every Marketing Inspector enjoys the delegated power of filing a complaint u/s 15 of the Act. The said power is stated to have been delegated by the Regional Food Controller by means of a General Circular dated 7-8-1963, which may be reproduced below: Office of the Regional Food Controller, Kanpur Region. No. 3550/2/LG Dt. Kanpur 7-8-1963. I.T.R. Barkor, Regional Food Controller having been appointed as licensing officer under Notification No. S. 4069/XXIX AS-44 1957 dated 5-8-1959 authorise the following u/s 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 1958 to report the facts constituting the offence under the said Act to the court having jurisdiction. 1. Dy. Regional Food Controller 2. Regional Marketing Officer 3. Asstt. Regional Food Controller 4. Dy. Regional Marketing Officers 5. Senior Marketing Inspectors 6. Marketing Inspectors Sd. (T.R. Barkor) Regional Food Controller Kanpur Region. No. 3550 of date Copy forwarded for information and necessary action to: 1. R.M.O. Kanpur 2. Dy. R.F.C. Kanpur 3. A.R.F.C. (C) and (F) Kanpur 4. Dy. R.M.Os. of the Region 5. S.M.Is/M.Is. of the Region. Asstt. Regional Food Controller 4. Dy. Regional Marketing Officers 5. Senior Marketing Inspectors 6. Marketing Inspectors Sd. (T.R. Barkor) Regional Food Controller Kanpur Region. No. 3550 of date Copy forwarded for information and necessary action to: 1. R.M.O. Kanpur 2. Dy. R.F.C. Kanpur 3. A.R.F.C. (C) and (F) Kanpur 4. Dy. R.M.Os. of the Region 5. S.M.Is/M.Is. of the Region. The above Circular was seriously assailed by the learned Counsel for the Applicant on three grounds firstly that the general delegation in favour of Marketing Inspectors could not have been validly made in law, secondly, that the delegation must be with reference to the facts of each individual case and in favour of a particular officer and thirdly, that even the so called letter of authority has not been proved in accordance with law. I am not impressed by the infirmities pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Applicant in such delegation of power. In my opinion on a proper construction of the language of Section 15 of the Act a general authorisation in favour of an officer or a class of officers regarding the filing of a complaint about offences punishable under the Act would be in accordance with law. The learned Counsel relied on a number of authorities in support of his contention. Before dealing with these cases I would like to emphasise the distinction between two distinct classes of cases, on the one hand those in which the law requires the sanction or consent in writing of a particular individual or authority before a prosecution can be commenced and on the other hand those in which merely the power or authority competent to file the complaint is nominated by the statute. In other words, there may be cases in which the law may prescribe that a particular individual or authority alone would be competent to file or present a complaint. On the other hand, there may be cases in which the sanction or consent in writing of an individual or authority may be a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution. In my opinion there is a fundamental difference between these two classes of cases and the considerations applicable to one cannot be imported into the other. On the other hand, there may be cases in which the sanction or consent in writing of an individual or authority may be a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution. In my opinion there is a fundamental difference between these two classes of cases and the considerations applicable to one cannot be imported into the other. The fallacy in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Applicant is to adopt the considerations applicable to cases requiring sanction or consent in writing to the cases where merely the authority competent to file the complaint is named. 13. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Orissa High Court in K.G. Anjaneyalu Vs. Chairman, Puri Municipality, AIR 1963 Ori 158 . In that case it was observed by R.L. Narasimhan, C.J. that the words 'in this behalf in Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act seemed to require that the authorisation of the person to initiate the prosecution must be with special reference to the particular case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act that was placed before the Municipality. I have already observed that the decision based on such provisions as Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would be governed by entirely different considerations. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act runs as follows: No prosecution for an offence shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the State Government or local authority or person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority. It is clear that the consent in writing by the authorities mentioned in that section was essential for launching the prosecution. The only alternative was that the authority itself may institute the prosecution or some person authorised by it in this behalf. It is obvious that the underlying purpose of such provision was that the relevant authority must apply its mind to the desirability or propriety of commencing a prosecution. In other words, it should be able to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances of a particular case and then decide as to whether the prosecution should be instituted. In a case like this naturally a general authorisation or an authorisation made before the individual case actually arose would be meaningless and would not serve the purpose of the Legislature in enacting such provision. In a case like this naturally a general authorisation or an authorisation made before the individual case actually arose would be meaningless and would not serve the purpose of the Legislature in enacting such provision. So far as 1963 Ori 158 case is concerned, it is also distinguishable on another ground. It was observed in paragraph 6 of the Reports that the resolution generally authorising the Puri Municipality to file a complaint appeared to have been passed in pursuance of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Municipalities Act. The power to initiate prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not a power assigned to the Municipal Council under the provisions of the Orissa Municipal Act. 14. The next case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Applicant was again a decision of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa Vs. Bisram Patel, AIR 1965 Ori 159 . That was a case in which prosecution was started on a report made by the Inspector of Supplies u/s 13(1) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. The prosecution had relied on a notification issued by the Government of Orissa authorising, among others, the Inspector of Supplies to report to the Courts within the area noted against them in writing in respect of the offences punishable under the said Act. Thus, there was only a general authorisation relying on which the Inspector concerned had made a report. It was ruled that the person making a report must be so authorised in respect of the particular offence. The phrase 'in this behalf occurring in Section 15 of the Act was construed as inconsistent with the general authorisation with respect to all the offences punishable under the Act. With great respect to the learned Judge who decided the case I am unable to agree with the ratio of that decision. It does not contain any reasons for the dictum and it merely refers back to the case of K.G. Anjanevalu v. Chairman, Puri Municipality (Supra). 15. The learned Counsel also referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in Gour Chandra Rout and Another Vs. The Public Prosecutor, Cuttack, AIR 1963 SC 1198 . It does not contain any reasons for the dictum and it merely refers back to the case of K.G. Anjanevalu v. Chairman, Puri Municipality (Supra). 15. The learned Counsel also referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in Gour Chandra Rout and Another Vs. The Public Prosecutor, Cuttack, AIR 1963 SC 1198 . This was a case which arose out of defamation alleged to have been made in respect of the Governor of Orissa and the provisions of Section 198-B(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were being construed. The procedure prescribed by the aforesaid section in substance is that when the offence of defamation is alleged to have been committed against a Governor etc. in the discharge of his public functions a complaint in writing must be made by the Public Prosecutor but such complaint cannot be made except with the previous sanction "of any Secretary to the Government authorised by him (the Governor) in this behalf." The view expressed by the Supreme Court was that it was necessary that the initiative in this regard must be taken by the Governor defamed in the year 1958 when the alleged defamation occurred and in case he was personally indifferent to the filing of the complaint, the sanction accorded by the Secretary to the Home Department purporting to be based on a genera authorisation by a predecessor Governor in the year 1956 did not meet the requirements of law. The reasoning in support of the proposition laid down in that case was that the person who was directly aggrieved by the defamatory statement made in a case might not consider it proper to vindicate his position or in public interest to institute prosecution. Therefore, a general authorisation of the kind contained in the notification in favour of the Secretary to the Government of Orissa in the Home Department was held to be insufficient. As I indicated at the very outset of my judgment, the cases requiring the sanction or consent in writing of the authority concerned stand on an entirely different footing. Therefore, in my opinion the learned Counsel for the Applicant cannot derive any strength from the authorities which he has cited in support of his proposition. 16. As I indicated at the very outset of my judgment, the cases requiring the sanction or consent in writing of the authority concerned stand on an entirely different footing. Therefore, in my opinion the learned Counsel for the Applicant cannot derive any strength from the authorities which he has cited in support of his proposition. 16. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate referred me to a number of authorities which are directly in point and in which the question was as to whether the complaint was filed by the person prescribed by a certain statute or another person authorised by him in this behalf. The leading case on the point seems to be a Full Bench decision of six Judges of this Court in M.J. Powell v. The Municipal Board of Mussoorie ILR 22 All 123. In that case the complaint had been filed by the Secretary of the Municipal Board authorised by a general resolution purporting to be u/s 69 of Act No. XV of 1883 which provided that "a Court shall not take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act, or the rules made under this Act, except on the complaint of the Municipal Board or some person authorised by the Board in this behalf." Their Lordships repelled the contention of the Applicant that the words "authorized by the Board in this behalf" did not include a general authority to prosecute in regard to offences under the Act or rules generally such as that given in the resolution but were confined to a specific authority to be given by the Municipal Board in relation to the specific offence for which the accused was to be prosecuted. In my opinion that provision was pari materia with the provisions of Section 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act. While commenting on the object and scope of Section 69 it was observed in the Full Bench decision that the section was enacted with a twofold purpose. In the first place, it was to exclude prosecutions at the instance of irresponsible persons and secondly, it was to relieve the Municipal Board of the necessity of itself dealing with each individual case of prosecution for an offence and to enable it to assign that particular task to some other person or person?. 17. In the first place, it was to exclude prosecutions at the instance of irresponsible persons and secondly, it was to relieve the Municipal Board of the necessity of itself dealing with each individual case of prosecution for an offence and to enable it to assign that particular task to some other person or person?. 17. I respectfully adopt the observations made in M.J. Powell's case and in my opinion the object of Section 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act appears to have been twofold. In the first place, it provides a safeguard against a facile prosecution at the instance of irresponsible persons, or those having an ulterior object. Secondly and the more important object appear to be to relieve the licensing officer or the Central Government of himself or itself scrutinising every individual case for the purpose of filing a complaint. In other words, it is only a kind of procedural provision enacted for the purpose of practical convenience in the absence of which the section would become unworkable. It would be imposing a prodigiously onerous duty on the Central Government or the licensing officers of examining each individual case before a complaint is filed. The object is not that the aforesaid authority or officers should apply their mind to the facts of each case and for the purpose of deciding some matter of policy or whether it would be expedient or in public interest to launch a particular prosecution. That purpose cannot be said to exist until there is a provision in a statute with regard to sanction or consent in writing of a particular authority or individual for starting a prosecution. 18. The Full Bench decision in the case of M.J. Powell (supra) was followed by a division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Subbayyan v. State AIR 1968 Ker 330 . In that case the prosecution had relied on a general notification u/s 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act whereby a general authorisation in favour of Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions for the offences under the Act was made. It was held that no illegality was committed if an authorisation to institute prosecution u/s 20(1) of the Act was given by the authorities empowered thereunder generally in favour of persons holding a particular office. It was held that no illegality was committed if an authorisation to institute prosecution u/s 20(1) of the Act was given by the authorities empowered thereunder generally in favour of persons holding a particular office. It was observed that the general authority in all cases or in a class of cases is a familiar form of authorisation to an agent or officer. In that case a reference was made to the observations of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, AIR 1961 SC 1 which ruled that u/s 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the written consent to institute a prosecution need not be in favour of a named person. 19. The same view was expressed by Jagjit Singh, J. in Nawal Kishore Tara Chand Vs. State, AIR 1969 Delhi 198 where 1963 Ori 158 and 1963 SC 1198 were distinguished and a complaint filed by a Municipal Prosecutor authorised through a general resolution of the Municipal Corporation to institute and conduct all prosecutions under the Act was held to be valid. 20. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the State on a division Bench decision of the Mysore t.igh Court in State of Mysore v. Danjaya (AIR 1963 Mys 157 wherein after referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in 1961 SC 1 it was held that the Food Inspector was competent to institute prosecution u/s 20(1) on the basis of a general resolution of the Municipal Council authorising all the Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions for the offences Under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 21. Therefore, the consensus of judicial opinion appears to favour the view that where a statute merely prescribes the authority competent for the purpose of filing a complaint or instituting a prosecution, a general authorisation in favour of an officer or a class of officers in respect of offences punishable under the statute would be valid. Applying that principle to the facts of the present case, the General Circular of the Regional Food Controller relied upon by the prosecution, if proved according to law, would be a valid authorisation entitling the Marketing Inspector concerned to file a complaint. Applying that principle to the facts of the present case, the General Circular of the Regional Food Controller relied upon by the prosecution, if proved according to law, would be a valid authorisation entitling the Marketing Inspector concerned to file a complaint. The same conclusion can also be drawn by a reference to Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central Act X of 1897) which runs as follows: Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, may be made either by name or by virtue of office. If this section is read with Section 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, it would be clear that a general authorisation in favour of Marketing Inspectors or other class of officers enumerated therein is not invalid. 22. This brings me to the last point submitted on behalf of the Applicant. I have already quoted the Circular referred to by Sri Ranjit Singh, Food Inspector and the documents Exs. C-1 and C-II. It has been strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the Applicant that the so called Circular has not been proved in accordance with law and therefore, it was not admissible in evidence. The Inspector deposed that he had brought before the Court and filed a copy of the original letter of authority prepared by a uniform process of lithography. He, however, admitted that the original of the lithography copy had not been prepared in his presence and he had not seen the signature of the Regional Food Controller on the original letter of authority. Reliance was placed in this connection on a decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh v. Universal Company AIR 1950 Alld. 696. In that case a document Exhibit 26 being a typed letter was filed as notification made u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act. The contents of the original letter were not proved; only the signature on the document was proved. It was observed by Ghulam Hasan, J. as under: Such evidence as has been adduced by the Plaintiff company falls short of proving the contents of the original and mere proof, of the signature of Mr. The contents of the original letter were not proved; only the signature on the document was proved. It was observed by Ghulam Hasan, J. as under: Such evidence as has been adduced by the Plaintiff company falls short of proving the contents of the original and mere proof, of the signature of Mr. Bhairon Prasad cannot, in my opinion, amount to proof of the contents of the original. There is nothing to show that Exhibit 26 was the result of an uniform process namely typing with the aid of carbon paper and there is certainly no evidence to show that it was compared with the original. After all Exhibit 26 is no more than a secondary evidence of the contents and in order to show that it is an exact copy of the original, it is necessary to prove that either it was prepared by an uniform process or it was compared with the original by some witness, who can give evidence to that effect. Learned Counsel for the State also referred to Explanation 2 to Section 62 of the Evidence Act and contended that the Circular in question having been prepared by a uniform process of lithography every copy thereof should be deemed to be primary evidence of the contents of the rest. In my opinion Explanation 2 is helpful to him only to the extent that the successive copies prepared by lithography could not be discarded on the ground of being copies of copies. Still Explanation 2 as well as the statutory illustration make it clear that while each of such documents is primary evidence of the contents of the rest, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original. For instance, if it is desired to prove the publication of a liable in a newspaper, any copy of the issue in which the libel appeared would be primary evidence of the publication in all the other copies of that issue. But if it were necessary to prove the original libel from which the article was set up, the printed paper would not be primary, but only secondary evidence of the manuscript and admissible only under the conditions which tender the reception of secondary evidence admissible (Norton p. 242). But if it were necessary to prove the original libel from which the article was set up, the printed paper would not be primary, but only secondary evidence of the manuscript and admissible only under the conditions which tender the reception of secondary evidence admissible (Norton p. 242). Hence, in my opinion it was necessary to produce the original Circular alleged to have been issued by the Regional Food Controller in Court and prove its contents by appropriate evidence. That procedure having not been followed, I am of the opinion that the Circular containing the delegation of power by the Regional Food Controller i.e. authorising the Marketing Inspectors in general to institute prosecutions u/s 15 of the Act; was not proved in accordance with law. 23. In these circumstances I am constrained to allow these revisions and set aside the conviction and sentence of the Applicant in each of these revisions but I consider it expedient for the ends of justice that the cases should be remanded to the court below with the direction that they may be decided afresh in the light of the observations made by me and on the evidence already on record but after giving opportunity to the prosecution to prove the Circular in question issued by the Regional Food Controller.