Judgment Santhosh, J.-The Criminal Appeal and the Criminal Revision Petitions arise out of one proceeding i.e., C. C. No. 1404 of 1964 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Belgaum Cantonment. The Superintendent, of Central Excise, Belgaum filed a complaint against accused 1, N.T. Alvi and accused 2, K. Rajagopal under section 135 (a) and (b) of the Customs Act, 1962. Both the accused were further charged of having committed an offence under section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) (a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The accused were also charged with having contravened Rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India Amendment Rules of 1963 (Gold Control Rules). The Prosecution case, briefly stated is as follows: On 30th September, 1964 at about 11 A.M. accused 1 was found sleeping in a sleeper coach in the Poona-Bangalore Mail, by the two Officers of the Customs Department, P.W. 3, Kami, Sub-Inspector, Central Excise, and P.W. 4, Narahari, Inspector, Central Excise. Accused 1 (N.T. Alvi) was having a blue rexin hand bag under his head and pretending to be asleep. The suspicion of the Customs Offcers was aroused and they questioned accused 1. He did not give satisfactory explanation. Customs Officers made accused 1 get down from the train and detained him in the Belgaum Railway Station. As accused 1 informed that his railway ticket was with one Rajagopal, the Customs Officer suspected that Rajagopal was also an associate of accused 1. As train moved, P.W. 4 Naraharai got into the train and when the train had gone a little farther he apprehended second accused at Khanapur Railway Station. Accused 2 (Rajagopal) was brought to Belgaum Railway Station by P.W. 4, Narahari. The accused 1 and 2 were produced before P.W. 1 Shri Venkatachala Ayyar, Deputy Superintendant of Police, Central Excise at Belgaum who was sent for and in the presence of Panchas, the blue rexin bag (M.O. 1), which was with accused 1, was searched. Inside the said rexin bag there was a white pant and in one of the specially made pockets of the pant, they discovered 12 pellets of gold with foreign markings. The gold weighed 120 tolas and it was estimated to cost about Rs. 18,000. This gold was seized a under panchanama, Exhibit 2. Inside the said rexin bag there was a white pant and in one of the specially made pockets of the pant, they discovered 12 pellets of gold with foreign markings. The gold weighed 120 tolas and it was estimated to cost about Rs. 18,000. This gold was seized a under panchanama, Exhibit 2. Thereafter P.W. 1 recorded the statements of accused 1 and 2, which have been marked as Exhibits 3 and 5 respectively. In Exhibit 3 accused 1 stated that his uncle, N.T. Abdulla Kutty Hajee, a jewellery merchant of Manjeri had sent him with accused 2 to Bombay to gain some experience in gold business. He also stated that his uncle had given currency notes to accused 2 to purchase foreign marking gold from Bombay. After making purchase at Bombay he was returning with accused 2 in the train. When they were reaching near Belgaum Railway Station, accused 2 removed his white drill pant containing the packet of foreign gold, folded the same and after putting it inside his rexin blue hand bag gave the same to him for safe custody and went into the latrine of the said compartment to attend calls of nature; he took their hand bag and kept it under his head and slept. The Customs Officers woke him up and took him and the rexin bag for examination at Belgaum Railway Station. When the bag was opened 12 pieces, often tolas each, of gold with foreign markings were found inside the pant. Ho also stated that the gold recovered from the pant found inside the rexin hand bag did not belong to him, but belonged to accused 2 Rajagopal. Accused 2, Rajagopal in his statement (Exhibit-8) stated that the uncle of accused 1, N. T. Abdulla Kutti Haji had given him currency notes and sent him to Bombay along with accused 1 to purchase gold. He also stated that N.T. Abdulla Kutti Haji had asked accused 1 to accompany him to Bombay and told him to show one Sankaran Kutty and introduced him to accused 1. He also stated that he purchased foreign marked gold from Sankaran Kutty and had put the gold in the specially made pocket of his white pant. He also stated that N.T. Abdulla Kutti Haji had asked accused 1 to accompany him to Bombay and told him to show one Sankaran Kutty and introduced him to accused 1. He also stated that he purchased foreign marked gold from Sankaran Kutty and had put the gold in the specially made pocket of his white pant. In the morning of 30th he removed white pant before going to the latrines, folded it, kept it inside the rexin bag and gave the rexin bag to N.T. Alvi, (accused 1), telling him to keep it under his head and sleep. One of the Central Excise Officers woke accused 1 and opened and examined the rexin hand bag. Thereafter the other officer traced him and asked him to get down at Khanapur Railway Station. He also stated that he had no permit from the Reserve Bank either to purchase the above foreign marked gold or to carry it with him. After completing the investigation the Superintendent of Customs filed the complaint against the two accused as stated earlier. After the trial, the learned Magistrate found both the accused guilty of the three charges. He sentenced both the accused for an offence under section 135 (b) of the Customs Act, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and further to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. He also convicted and sentenced both the accused under section 23 (1) (A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and further to pay a fine of Rs. 500 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. Both the accused were also convicted under Rule 126 (p) (2) (ii) of the Defence of India Rules and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and further to pay a fine of Rs. 500 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. Both the accused filed appeals against the conviction and sentences before the Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. The learned Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the second accused and dismissed his appeal. 500 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. Both the accused filed appeals against the conviction and sentences before the Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. The learned Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the second accused and dismissed his appeal. The learned Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the first accused on the ground that he was in temporary possession of the said gold and was also not charged with abetment. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that no case had been made out against accused 1. He, therefore, acquitted him of all three charges. Criminal Appeal No. 271of 1965 is filed by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Bilgaum against the order of acquittal of accused 1 passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Criminal Revision Petition 211 of 1965 is filed by the 2nd accused wherein he questions the correctness and legality, of the order confirming his conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Criminal Revision Petition 225 of 1965 is filed by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Belgaum, questioning the correctness of the order of the Sessions Judge in regard to the disposal of the seized gold pellets (M.O. 3), Criminal Revision Petition 272 of 1965 is filed by the first accused wherein he questions the correctness of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in not refunding the security amount of Rs. 3,000 deposited by him (accused 1) at the time he was released on bail in the Sessions Court. Taking Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 1965 filed by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Sri Keshava Iyengar, learned Central Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that the learned Sessions Judge erred in acquitting accused 1 on the ground that he was only in temporary possession of the said gold pellets. He argues that law does not makes any distinction between temporary and permanent possession. Carriers of smuggled gold are usually in temporary possession, as the said smuggled gold is passed through such carriers from one person to another. He contends that if temporary possession of smuggled gold is not an offence, then it will defeat the very purpose for which the Customs Act was passed. Carriers of smuggled gold are usually in temporary possession, as the said smuggled gold is passed through such carriers from one person to another. He contends that if temporary possession of smuggled gold is not an offence, then it will defeat the very purpose for which the Customs Act was passed. He also contends that the language of section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 is very wide, which states that whoever knowingly acquires possession of or is in any way concerned with smuggled gold would be guilty and will come within the mischief of section 135 of the customs Act. Mr. Keshava Iyengar also submits that the view of the Sessions Judge that since there was no charge of abetment against accused 1, he cannot be found guilty, is erroneous. The language of section 135 is very wide and there is no need to frame a separate charge of abetment against accused 1. He strongly relied on Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. Sitaram Agarwal1 is support of his said contention. He also cited before us two decisions of this Court, reported in State of Mysore v. Budaku Joti Svant2 Sri Keshava Iyengar argues that the acquittal of accused 1 is erroneous and there are compelling reasons to set aside the same. Sri S.V. Subrahmaniam, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first accused, argues that possession has not been traced to first accused in this case. He also contends that accused 1 had no knowledge that the rexin bag contained the pellets of gold. Sri Subrahmaniam also contends that Exhibit 3, the statement said to have been given by accused 1 is hit by section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act as it is not a voluntary statement. He also argues that Exhibit 3 is also hit by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Sri Subrahmanyam also contends that P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 have not been cited in the complaint as witnesses. Their version that accued 1 was found sleeping with the head, in the train is not true and is a later improvement made by the prosecution. He also argues that all the charges against accused 1 have not been made out by the prosecution. Mr. Subrahmaniam submits that there are no compelling reasons to set aside the acquittal of accused 1. He also argues that all the charges against accused 1 have not been made out by the prosecution. Mr. Subrahmaniam submits that there are no compelling reasons to set aside the acquittal of accused 1. Lastly Sri Subrahmaniam submits that in, case the Court is against him on the various points urged by him, as accused 1 is only a young boy of 19 years of age and had no direct part in the purchase of contraband gold, it is a fit and proper case to release accused 1 under the Probations of Offenders Act. Taking the first contention of Mr. Subrahmaniam that the prosecution has not proved that accused 1 was in possession of the rexin bag (M.O. 1) as already pointed out, his argument is that P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 were not cited in the complaint as witnesses and their version that accused 1 was sleeping with the blue rexin hand bag underneath his head is only a subsequent development in the case. It is no doubt true that P.W. 3 and 4 have not been cited as witnesses in the complaint. P.W. 3 E. 1. Inspector Kami has stated that he and P.W. 4 Narahari,‘on 30th September, 1964, boarded the Poona-Bangalore Mail train at Belgaum Railway Station. He noticed accused 1 sleeping in berth No. 60 with the blue rexin bag underneath his head. As his suspicion was aroused, he questioned accused 1 as to what he had in the rexin hand bag.; accused 1 first hesitated and thereafter told him that there were gold pellets about 120 tolas inside the bag. As he (P.W. 3) had no power of search and seizure, he reported this to his superior officers and detained accused 1 at the Belgaum Railway station waiting room. It may to pointed out that in the cross examination of these witnesses, the defence itself suggested that P.W. 3 questioned accused 1 in the train ‘and subsequently detained him with the hand bag. The suggestion made by the defence was that P.W. 1 had asked accused 1 to hand over the bag to him. It is therefore clear that P.W. 3 had met accused 1 in the train and subsequently detained him with the rexin bag. The suggestion made by the defence was that P.W. 1 had asked accused 1 to hand over the bag to him. It is therefore clear that P.W. 3 had met accused 1 in the train and subsequently detained him with the rexin bag. P.W. 4, Inspector Narahari has also given evidence corroborating generally the evidence of P.W. 3 Kami, it may also be mentioned that accused 1 in his statement Exhibit 3 has himself admitted that he was sleeping in the train with the rexin hand bag: keeping it underneath his head; The Central Excise Officers questioned him and he handed over the bag to the Officers. We may also point out that in the statement of accused 2 Exhibit 5 recorded on the very day, i.e. 30th September, 1964, he had stated that he had given the rexin bag with the gold pellets inside the bag, to accused 1 to keep it under his head and sleep when he went into the bath-room. He further specifically stated at that time one of the Central Excise Officers asked accused 1 to open the bag and examined the rexin bag lying under the head of accused 1. From what has been stated above, there is no doubt that A-1 was found sleeping with rexin bag underneath his head by P.W. 3 Kami on the morning of 30th September, 1964, in the train. Thereafter he questioning him and detained accused 1 with the hand bag which resulted in the recovery of the said gold pellets in question. Sri Subrahmaniam has next contended that accused 1 had no knowledge that the rexin bag contained the 12 pellots of foreign marked gold. It is not possible for us to accept the said contention. It may be pointed out that the evidence discloses that accused 1 had been sent by his uncle to accompany accused 2 to Bombay to get introduced to Sankaran Rutty who sold the foreign marked gold to accused 2 Evidence also discloses that the uncle of accused 1 had paid Rs. 15,600 for the purchase of the said gold. Both accused 1 and accused 2 stayed with Sankaran Kutti at Bombay. After purchasing the said gold they both set out inthe train occupying adjoining sleeper berths tearing Nos. 60 and 61. 15,600 for the purchase of the said gold. Both accused 1 and accused 2 stayed with Sankaran Kutti at Bombay. After purchasing the said gold they both set out inthe train occupying adjoining sleeper berths tearing Nos. 60 and 61. The statement of accused 1 (Exhibit 3), clearly indicates that that he had been asked to accompany accused 2 to Bombay to purchase Foreign gold at Bombay. He had specificaly stated that his uncle had given currency notes to accused 2 to purchase foreign marked gold from Bombay. His statement also clearly discloses that he knew that accused 2 had purchased foreign marked gold from Sankaran Kutti in Bombay. Further the statement of accused 1 shows that he know that accused 2 was keeping the gold in his white drill pant in a specially made pocket. Accused 1 has also stated that before reaching Belgaum Railway Station his friend Rajagopal accused 2 removed the white drill pant, containing the pocket of foreign gold, folded the same and thereafter putting it inside the blue rexin bag gave it to him accused 1 for safe custody and went inside the latrine. He also states that he took the hand bag and kept it underneath his head and was sleeping. From this it is very clear that accused 1 had knowledge that the rexin bag which was given to him for safe custody contained the 12 pieces of foreign gold. Sri Keshava Iyengar has strenuously contended that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in thinking that if a person is found in temporary possession of foreign gold he will not be guilty of offences under section 135 of the Customs Act. As contended by Sri Keshava Iyengar the words of section 135 of the Customs Act are of very wide import. The said section does not contemplate any permanent possession of contraband gold by the person. Section 135 (a) states that any person in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attemp at evasion of any duty chargeable thereon with respect to such goods would be guilty of an offence. Sub section (6) of section 135 of the Customs Act, states that any person who is any way concerned in carrying, removing depositing, harbouring or keeping, concealing selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with the contraband goods liable for confiscation, would be guilty of offence. Sub section (6) of section 135 of the Customs Act, states that any person who is any way concerned in carrying, removing depositing, harbouring or keeping, concealing selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with the contraband goods liable for confiscation, would be guilty of offence. It is clear that the learned Sessions judge did not advert to the wording of section 135 of the Customs Act. His finding that as the accused-1 was only in temporary possession of the gold, he was not guilty under section 135 of the Customs Act, is clearly erroneous. As Sri Keshava Iyengar pointed out, the section does not make any distinction between any temporary or peramanent possession. Though a person may not be in possession, any person knowingly concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, etc., the smuggled gold would come within the mischief of section 135 of the Customs Act. In Assistant Collector of Customs Calcutta v. Sitaram1 in paragraph 14 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered section 167 (81) of the Sea Customs Act, wherein the words used are similar to those of the new Customs Act, 1962. Their Lordships observed as follows: — “The words ‘in any way concerned in any manner dealing with prohibited goods’ are of very wide import. It is neither desirable nor necessary to define all manners of connection with the prohibited goods which might come within the meaning of the words ‘in any way concerned in any manner dealing with such goods’.” Their Lordships have further pointed out that both the words ‘concerned’ and ‘deal’ have a wide connotation. The words ‘concerned in ‘mean ‘interested in, involved in mixed up with’ while the words ‘deal with’ mean ‘to have something to do with, to concern oneself, to treat, to make arrangement, to negotiate with respect to something. ‘In that particular case, the accused had made arrangement¡ to purchase some smuggled gold, when he was about to purchase the gold, the customs authorities came and interrupted the purchase, their Lordships held, even though the accused had not purchased the gold and had not even got into possesion of the same, he would still come within the mischief of the section as he was concerned with those goods. Again in Soni Vallabadas Liladhar v. The Assistant Collector of Customs,1 their Lordships have pointed out that in order to establish an offence in relation to smuggled gold, under section 167 (81) it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove by positive evidence that the intention of the accused was to defraud the Government of the duty payable on the gold or to evade the prohibition or restriction on the import thereon for the time being in force. Once it is proved that the gold is smuggled gold, it follows that it was brought into the country without payment of duty or in violation if the prohibition or restriction in force and whosoever brought it and whosoever dealt with it thereafter knowing it to be smuggled in the manner provided in the section must be held to have the intention of evading the payment of duty or violating the prohibition or restriction. It may be pointed out that the words uses in clause (a) of section 135 of the Customs Act, are very wide and they are as follows: “if any person is in relation to any goods in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion of attempt at evasion of any duty chargeable thereon or of any prohibition for the time being imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force with respect to such goods.” Sri Subramaniam has next contended that Exhibit 3, the statement made by accused-1, is hit by section 24 of the evidence Act. He argues that Exhibit 3 is not a voluntary statement. Accused 1 was admittedly arrested by the customs officials and the statement has been made while he was in custody. Pressure must undoubtedly have been put on accused-1 to make this statement. He contends that the very language of Exhibit 3 and the various corrections made therein show that it was not a voluntary statement made by accused 1. He has also pointed out some contradictions between Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 the statement made by accused 2. He therefore argues that it is not safe to rely on Exhibit 3 and use it against accused 1. It may be pointed out that the concurrent findings of both the Courts below is that Exhibit 3 is a voluntary statement. He has also pointed out some contradictions between Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 the statement made by accused 2. He therefore argues that it is not safe to rely on Exhibit 3 and use it against accused 1. It may be pointed out that the concurrent findings of both the Courts below is that Exhibit 3 is a voluntary statement. The trial Court had the advantage of seeing the witnesses in the box and it has come to the conclusion that Exhibit 3 was rot got from accused 1 as a result of threat or duress. The lower appellate Court has agreed with this finding of the trial Court. Both the Courts have pointed out that absolutely no suggestion has been made to P.W. 1 the Deputy Superintendent, who took the statement from accused-1 that he got the statement of accused 1 either under threat or compulsion, and there is no material before the Court to come to the conclusion that Exhibit 3 is not a voluntary statement, but has been taken by holding out any threat or inducement to accused 1. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. The State of Rajasthan2 Subba Rao, J., as he then was, has considered the scope of section 24 of the Evidence Act and has laid down that there must be a prima facie opinion based on the evidence and circumstances to make the Court come to the conclusion that there was threat, inducement or promise held out to the accused, His Lordship has also pointed out that the mere existence of the threat, inducement or promise is not enough, but in the opinion of the Court the said threat, inducement or promise should be sufficient to cause a reasonable belief in the mind of the accused that by confessing he would get an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. We have already pointed out that in this case, there is no material on record to show that any threat, inducement or promise was held out to accused 1 when he made the statement Ex-3; nor is there any material to show that accused 1 had reasonable belief in his mind that he would get, by confessing, an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. We are therefore of opinion that Exhibit 3 is not hit by section 24 of the Evidence Act. Sri Subramaniam has next contended that Exhibit 3 is hit by article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. The basis for this contention again is that accused 1 was in custody and the statement, Exhibit 3, must have been got from him under compulsion. We have already held that there is no material before Court to come to the conclusion that the statement of accused 1was got by any inducement or threat. Article 20 (3) of the Constitution would come into play only when a person accused of an offence is compelled to be a witness against himself. In this case, as there is no material what soever to come to the conclusion that accused 1. was compelled to make a statement, article 20 (3) will have no application. Sri Keshava Iyengar has contended that respondent Alvi, when he made the statement, Exhibit 3 was not in the position of an accused. He argues that no First Information Report or Complaint had been filed against him at that time. The Customs authorities were conducting only a departmental enquiry against him. It is unnecessary to go into this question, as we have already pointed that once it is proved that there was no compulsion for making the statement, article 20 (3) of the Constitution is not attracted. Though Sri Subramaniam, in the beginning contended that Exhibit 3 is also bit by section 25 of the Evidence Act, he did not press his contention in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the full Bench decision of the Madras High Court. This point has been considered and an authoriative ruling has been given by the Supreme Court in Badaku Joti Svant" v. State of Mysore1 wherein their Lordships have held that a statement recorded by the Central Excise and Customs Officer is not hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Madias High Court in a full Bench decision in The Collector of Customs Madras v. Kotumal Bhirumal Pihlajoni2 has considered the question whether under the new Customs Act of 1962, a statement recorded by a customs and Central Excise Officer is hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Madias High Court in a full Bench decision in The Collector of Customs Madras v. Kotumal Bhirumal Pihlajoni2 has considered the question whether under the new Customs Act of 1962, a statement recorded by a customs and Central Excise Officer is hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships have ruled that any such statement recorded by the Customs Officer is not hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. We have already pointed out that the words of section 135 of the Customs Act are of very wide import and the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that because accused 1 was in temporary possession of the gold, he would not come within the mischief of section 135, is clearly erroneous and deserves to be set aside. At this stage, we may point out that so far as the second charge framed against the accused is concerned, i.e., charge with regard to section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) (a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, Sri Kashava Iyengar, learned Central Government Pleader, conceded that no offence under the section has been made out as there is no evidence in the case to show that the accused brought any gold into India. In view of this, there is no need to set aside the acquittal of accused 1 by the learned Sessions Judge of the charge under section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) ( a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Sri Subramaniam has contended that the third charge that the 1st accused has voilated rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules has not been made out. He argues that it is clear from the evidence that accused 2 was the owner of this gold and accused-1 was only having custody of this gold far a short period on behalf of accused-2 who was the owner. He also contends that rule 126-1 (5) of the said Rules apply to the facts of this case If at all, as per sub- rule (5) of Rule 126-1, a person has got to make a declaration within 30 days’ time. In this case, even according to the prosecution, the 30 days time from the period when accused-2 acquired the said gold had not elapsed. He, therefore, argues that the charge under rule 126-P (2) (ii) is not made out against accused-1. In this case, even according to the prosecution, the 30 days time from the period when accused-2 acquired the said gold had not elapsed. He, therefore, argues that the charge under rule 126-P (2) (ii) is not made out against accused-1. We are of opinion that there is no merit in this contention. Sub- rule (5) of Rule 126-1 of the Rules will have no application to accused-1. The said sub- rule (5) applies only to persons who have made declaration as to possession of gold under Rule 126-1 (1) and to persons who have acquired gold either by succession, intestate or testamentary, or in accordance with a permit granted by the Administrator. Hence, sub- rule (5) of rule 126-1 will have no application to the facts of the case. It is nobody's case that accused-1 acquired the gold by any of the modes mentioned in sub- rule (5) of rule 126-1 of the rules. In the result, we set aside the acquittal of accused-1 of the first charge under section 135 of the customs Act and the third charge under rule 126-P (2) (ii) of Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963. We convict accused-1 of the charge under section 135 of the Customs Act and of violating rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963. Sri Subramaniam has finally contended that since accused-1 is only a body of 19 years and did not him self actively take any part in the purchase of smuggled gold, it is not a case for sentencing him to imprisonment, but a fit case to apply the provisions of the probation of offenders Act. He contends that the interests of justice require that either under section 4 or under section 5 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, accused-1 may be released on admonition or he may be bound over for good conduct. Before applying the provisions of either section 4 or section-5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the Court must be satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him with admonition or on probation of good conduct. It is therefore necessary in the instant case to consider the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence. It is therefore necessary in the instant case to consider the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence. It may be pointed out that smuggling of gold is an anti-social act affecting the very economy of the country. We are therefore of opinion that it is not desirable to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to a person who is involved in smuggling gold. It may be mentioned that accused-1 was sent by his uncle with accused-2 to be introduced to one K.C. Sankuni at Bombay who sells smuggled gold. If accused-1 is released on probation of good conduct, in our opinion, it is likely to encourage him to indulge in further smuggling activities. Hence, considering the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence, we are of opinion that it is not desirable to apply to accused-1, the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. We, therefore, convict accused-1 under section 135 of the Customs Act and sentence him to six months’ Rigorous Imperisonment and to a fine of Rs. 1,000, in default, to Rigorous Imprisonment for three months. We also convict accused-1 of violating rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963, and sentence him to six months’ Rigorous Imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 500 in default, to Rigorous Imprisonment for two months. We direct that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment should run concurrently. Criminal Revision Petition No. 211 of 1965 is filed by accused-2, wherein he challenges the correctness and legality of the convictions and sentences imposed on him by the learned Sessions Judge. Sri Mandagi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petition (accused-2), has not challenged before us the correctness of the 2nd accused's conviction under section 135 of the Customs Act. Sri Mandagi has admitted that accused-2 was in possession of smuggled gold on 30th September, 1964. Sri Mandagi only questions the correctness of the conviction of accused-2 of the third charge, i.e., of violating rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules. Sri Keshava Iyengar has not pressed the second charge against him under section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) (a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The contention of Sri Mandagi is that the provisions of the Gold Control Act do not apply to smuggled gold. Sri Keshava Iyengar has not pressed the second charge against him under section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) (a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The contention of Sri Mandagi is that the provisions of the Gold Control Act do not apply to smuggled gold. He argues that under the Defence of India Rules, a person in possession of smuggled gold is not bound to make any declaration under said Act or the Rides. He contends that the provisions of the Defence of India Rules are not in derogation of the Customs Act , His argument, is once a person is convicted under section 135 of the Customs Act., he cannot be convicted again on the same facts for an offence under Rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India Rules. It is not possible for us to accept the said contention of Sri Mandagi. The definition of ‘gold ‘in rules 126” A (c) is as follows: ‘Gold ‘means gold, including alloy, whether virgin, melted, remelted, wrought or unwrought, in any shape or form of a purity of not less than nine carats and includes any gold coin (whether legal tender or not), ornament and any other article of gold. Sub- rule ( g) of Rule 126-A defines ‘primary gold’ as gold in any unfinished form and includes all ingots, bars, blocks, slabs, bukkets, shots, pellets, rods and wires. It may be pointed out that this definition of ‘gold ‘in the Defence of India Rules, does not exclude smuggled gold. We also do not agree with Sri Mandagi that the Rules do not apply to a person in possesssion of smuggled gold. If that is so the very purpose of gold control will be defeated. Rule 126-H (2) ( d) of the Rules, in our opinion, applies to the case of accused-2, which says that no person other than a dealer licensed under this Part shall buy or otherwise acquire or agree to buy or otherwise acquire, gold, not being ornament, except ( i) by succession, intestate or testamentary, or (ii) in accordance with a permit granted by the Administrator or in accordance with such authorisation as the Administrator may, by general or special order, make in this behalf. It is clear that accused-2 either purchased or acquired gold. It is clear that accused-2 either purchased or acquired gold. He did not acquire the gold by succession, intestate or testamentary, or in accordance with a permit granted by the Administrator. Hence his buying or acquiring smuggled gold would come within clause (d) of sub- rule (2) of rule 126-H of the Rules. Rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Rules makes it an offence for any person to have either in possession or under his control any quantity of gold in contravention of any provision of this Part. There is no doubt whatsoever that accused-2 was in possession or had under his control a quantity of smuggled gold which he acquired in contravention of the provisions of that part. We have already pointed out that he has contravened rule 126-H (2) (d) of the Rules. It is also clear that before a person comes into possession of gold, the mist acquire it. We have therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that accused-2 is guilty of violating rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963. Hence, no case has been made out for interference in revision with the conviction of accused-2 of the offence under section 133 of the Customs Act and of violating rule 126-P (2) (ii) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963. We, therefore confirm the convictions and sentences passed on him by the learned Sessions Judge with regard to the two offences mentioned above. With regard to the charge under section 8 (1) read with section 23 (1) ( ii) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, for the reasons mentioned above, we set aside the conviction and sentence passed on accused-2 in respect of the said charge. We direct that the fine in respect of this charge, if paid, will be refunded to him. We will now take up Criminal Revision Petition No. 225 of 1965 filed by the Superintendent of Central Excise questioning the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge directing the return of the 12 pellets of gold to the Government. The contention of Sri Keshava Iyengar is that the learned Sessions Judge erred in ordering the confiscation of M.O. 3, the 13 gold pellets, to Government. He argues that under Session 136 (1) of the Customs Act, when any goods are confiscated under the Act, such goods shall thereupon vest in the Central Government. The contention of Sri Keshava Iyengar is that the learned Sessions Judge erred in ordering the confiscation of M.O. 3, the 13 gold pellets, to Government. He argues that under Session 136 (1) of the Customs Act, when any goods are confiscated under the Act, such goods shall thereupon vest in the Central Government. It may also be pointed out that the learned Magistrate in his order had directed that M.O. 3 may be confiscated to the Central Government. The confiscation order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not correct and the same is modified and we direct that the article, M.O. 3 (12 pellets of gold) be confisceated to the Central Government. Criminal Revision Petition No. 272 of 1965 is filed by the first accused. In this revision petition, the first accused questions the correctness of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge not granting him the refund of Rs. 3,000 deposited by him as security, when he was released on bail pending the appeal, filed by him in the Sessions Court. Sri Mandagi contends that the learned Sessions Judge was bound to return this amount as the accused had not violated any conditions of the bond. He argues that only if the accused violates any condition of the bond, the Court is entitled to forfeit this amount and not otherwise. We may point out that the learned Sessions Judge has not refused to refund to the said amount. All that he has states is that all the records of the case have been submitted to the High Court and as such, it is not possible for him to pass any orders in the matter. It is not possible to say that the order of the learned Sessions Judge is either wrong or illegal. In the vary nature of things, it was not possible for the learned Sessions Judge to direct the refund of the security amount without having the necessary papers before him. It is open to the petitioner to apply to the Sessions Judge, after the records of the case are received by him from the High Court. We have no doubt that the learned Sessions Judge will pass orders in accordance with law. With these observations, we dismiss Criminal Revision Petition 272 of 1965. Orders accordingly.