ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - The Petitioners Ram Prakash Agnihotri and Rama Kant were living in a tenanted house at Fatehgarh, the landlord being Jagannath Prasad, opposite party No. 4. On 1-9-1964 the landlord obtained permission from the RC and EO Fatehgarh, opposite party No. 3, u/s 3(1) of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to file a suit for the ejectment of the Petitioners. A revision application filed by the Petitioners against the order of the RC and EO was dismissed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, by his order dated 10-2-1965. Thereupon the Petitioners made an application dated 25-2-1965 to the State Government u/s 7-F of the Act and the State Government passed the following order on 27-2-1965, staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner: Operation of the permission u/s 3 of the Act granted by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad to the opposite party landlord to file a suit for the Petitioner's ejectment from the house in question is stayed pending consideration of the case by the State Government. Parties may please be informed immediately. A copy of this order was forwarded to the Commissioner and was also served upon the landlord through the RC and EO, Farrukhabad on 4-3-1965. The landlord, however, inspite of the service upon him of the interim stay order of the State Government, instituted a suit on 9-3-1965, for the Petitioner's ejectment in the court of the City Munsif, Farrukhabad. The RC and EO made a report to the State Government saying that the landlord had already instituted, the suit in pursuance of the permission granted by the rent control authorities without mentioning the fact that the suit was instituted after the order staying the operation of the order of the Commissioner had been served upon the landlord. On the receipt of this report from the RC and EO, the State Government passed an order on 10-11-1965 dismissing the Petitioner's application u/s 7-F on the ground that the suit having already been instituted, the proceedings before the State Government had become infructuous. On the receipt of this report from the RC and EO, the State Government passed an order on 10-11-1965 dismissing the Petitioner's application u/s 7-F on the ground that the suit having already been instituted, the proceedings before the State Government had become infructuous. The Petitioner thereupon filed the present petition which was admitted by this Court on 10-3-1966 and on the application of the Petitioners for interim relief, it was ordered on 5-7-1966 that while the suit may go on, the decree shall not be executed during the pendency of the writ petition. 2. The Petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Government dated 10-11-1965, as also for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government to decide the Petitioner's application u/s 7-F of the Act on merits on the ground that the suit having been filed in contravention of the stay order issued by the State Government, the State Government was not right in the view that the proceedings u/s 7-F had become in-fructuous. 3. After having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that the contention of the Petitioner must be upheld. 4. According to the scheme of the Act, the permission to file a suit for the ejectment of a tenant is to be granted by the DM Under Sub-section (1) of Section 3. That permission, however, is not final and is subject to the order passed by the Commissioner in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction Under Sub-section (3) of Section 3. The order of the Commissioner in term is subject to the order passed by the State Government u/s 7-F of the Act. u/s 7-F the State Government has been vested with a power of wide amplitude including the power to revoke the order of the Commissioner granting the permission. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Paras Nath 1968 AWR 713 the State Government can exercise the power to revoke the permission granted by the Commissioner only before the suit itself is instituted. After the institution of the suit the revocation of the permission by the State Government u/s 7-F shall have no affect upon the suit. After the institution of the suit the revocation of the permission by the State Government u/s 7-F shall have no affect upon the suit. It follows therefore that for the effective exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 7-F the State Government must act before the suit is instituted and in case it cannot do so, it may stay the order of the Commissioner granting the permission during the proceedings u/s 7-F so as to prevent them from becoming in-fructuous. Such a power of granting interim relief, in my opinion, is ancillary to the jurisdiction vested in the State Government u/s 7-F, even though there is no specific provision in the Act authorising the State Government to grant such an interim relief. His Lordship then referred to case law enunciated in M. K. Mohammed Kunhi Vs. Income Tax Officer, Cannanore, and Another, (1966) 59 ITR 171 ; Income Tax Officer Vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, (1969) 71 ITR 815 ; Swarnambika Motor Service v. Vahita Motor Service 1956 (2) MLJ S N 12 and Themmalapuram Bus Transport Ltd. Vs. The Regional Transport Officer, Malabar and Another, AIR 1957 Ker 142 and concluded: It was held in these cases that the power to stay was a necessary corollary to the power to entertain an appeal or revision. The contention of the learned Counsel for the opp. parties that the stay order granted by the State Government was unauthorised because of the absence of any specific provision in that regard in the Act has, therefore, no force and is rejected. 5. The next question that arises is as to what is the effect of the interim stay order passed by the State Government. In the case of Bhagwan Dass the Supreme Court observed at p. 718: If the State Government revokes the permission granted before the institution of the suit, then there would be no valid permission to sue. In my opinion the same result would follow when the permission to sue is suspended by the State Government during the pendency of the proceedings u/s 7-F, so that the suit shall be deemed to have been filed without the permission contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. 6. In my opinion the same result would follow when the permission to sue is suspended by the State Government during the pendency of the proceedings u/s 7-F, so that the suit shall be deemed to have been filed without the permission contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. 6. Sri J.N. Agarwala, learned Counsel for the Respondents, argues that even if the suit had been filed in contravention of the stay order, it would render the proceedings u/s 7-F infructuous and in support of this contention he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Mohammad Ismail v. Nanhey Lal 1969 AWR 281. In that case the Supreme Court held that once a suit had been validly instituted on the permission granted by the Commissioner, the subsequent order passed by the State Government u/s 7-F revoking the permission would not affect the validity of the suit. There cannot be two opinions about that proposition of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, because the permission to file a suit granted by the DM u/s 3(1) is subject only to the order passed by the Commissioner u/s 3(3) and is not subject to the orders passed by the State. Government u/s 7-F. Consequently, a suit instituted during the pendency of a revision before the Commissioner would bean invalid suit if the permission is revoked by the Commissioner, but such a result would not follow when the State revokes the permission granted by the Commissioner. However, that position holds good only if a valid suit is instituted before the State Government passes an order u/s 7-F. It has already been shown above that the suit in the present case was not a validly instituted suit because it was filed when the permission granted by the Commissioner had been suspended by the State Government by way of an interim order which it had the jurisdiction to pass. In the case before the Supreme Court Mohammad Ismail v. Nanhey Lal (supra) no interim stay order had been passed by the State Government before the institution of the suit. 7. In the case before the Supreme Court Mohammad Ismail v. Nanhey Lal (supra) no interim stay order had been passed by the State Government before the institution of the suit. 7. It was next contended by Sri Agarwala that even though the State Government had suspended the operation of the order of the Commissioner, it had not suspended the order of the RC and EO, who had granted the permission exercising the power of the DM and therefore the suit could be filed In pursuance of the permission granted by the RC and EO. This argument is plainly wrong. The order of the DM u/s 3(1) has been specifically made subject to the order of the Commissioner Under Sub-section (3) and Under Sub-section (4) of Section 3, it is the order of the Commissioner which if final. It is, therefore, the order of the Commissioner that prevails and supersedes the order of the DM. It is the Commissioner who finally determines whether or not permission is to be granted. In the circumstances it was not necessary for the State Government to have separately stayed the operation of the order of the RC and EO because the same shall be deemed to have been merged in or superceded by the order of the Commissioner. 8. It was next contended by Sri Agarwala that as the civil court before whom the civil suit is pending has not been impleaded as a party and no relief has been claimed by the Petitioner against the institution of the suit, this petition is infructuous. I do not agree. It having been held that the suit was not validly instituted for want of requisite permission under the Act, it would be open to the Petitioner to resist the suit before the civil court on that ground. It was therefore, not necessary for the Petitioner to have asked for any relief from this Court in respect of the suit. 9. For the reasons stated above, it is abundantly clear that the State Government committed a manifest error in rejecting the Petitioner's application u/s 7-F of the Act on the ground that the same had become infructous as a result of the institution of the suit. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the reliefs claimed in this petition. 10. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the reliefs claimed in this petition. 10. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. The order of the State Government dated 10-11-1965 is quashed and the State Government is directed to restore the Petitioner's application u/s 7-F to its original number and to dispose it of on merits in accordance with the law.