Order The order made by the Magistrate was clearly without power, and I, therefore, set it aside for the reasons which may briefly be stated: The proceedings which culminated in the order, against which this revision petition was directed, commenced with a preliminary order made on 16th March, 1968 under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As can be seen from the affidavit produced by the first party in whose favour the Magistrate made his final order, the first party was asserting a right of way over a ‘passage’ as it is called, on site number 162. According to the members of the first party that passage was on government land and not upon municipal land, and it is alleged that the members of the second party were making a claim that it was part of a municipal land which had been granted to them. So, it is clear from the statement produced by the first party that the controversy surrounded the right to the use of the passage which was part of a Government land and that no part of the controversy surrounded the other parts of site No. 162 which according to the second party had been granted by the municipal council to them. So, it should have been plain to the Magistrate that no proceeding could commence in respect of a dispute concerning the right of use of immovable property-and that that was the dispute in the present case is indisputable or could ever form the subject-matter of a proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but could only form the subject-matter of an investigation under section 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the Magistrate nevertheless by his preliminary order directed the attachment of the entire site bearing No. 162 on which according to the first part there was the disputed passage. He proceeded to enquire into the question whether the first party members were in possession of that disputed passage or whether the members of the second party were, and the conclusion he reached was that the members of the first party were in possession of the passage at the relevant point of time and made a direction that that passage should be handed over to the first party and that the remaining portion of the site should be restored to the possession of the second party. There is more than one infirmity in the order made by the Magistrate. The first is that in the statement produced by the first party, he did not delineate the particular passage the right to use which was asserted. The width of the passage and its length were not specified. Nor did the preliminary order state the dimensions of the passage. Even in the final order made by the Magistrate, those particulars were not stated and there was an obscure and unworkable direction that an undefined and unidentifiable passage should be handed over to the first party. The second infirmity in the order of the Magistrate is that although the first party merely asserted its right to the use of the passage which according to the first party was on a property belonging to Government, the Magistrate thought that the passage belonged to the first party and was in the exclusive possession of the first party and so he made a direction for the delivery of possession of that passsage to the first party. It does not appear to have been noticed by the Magistrate that that direction was an impossible direction, since, admittedly the land is Government land and it was therefore not possible for the Magistrate to direct delivery of possession of Government land to a private party. On the pleadings before the Magistrate, it was clear that the proper statutory provision under which he should have made the enquiry was section 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is an essential distinction between section 145 and section 147. The former concerns disputes concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof and what he has to enquire, when the dispute with respect to those matters is likely to cause a breach of the peace, is what concerns possession of the property which was the subject-matter of the dispute at the relevant point of time and the final direction that he may make is that the person in possession shall retain possession until legally evicted, and he may also make a direction for restoration of possession to the party forcibly and wrongly dispossessed. But section 147 concerns itself with disputes about rights to the use of immovable property unlike the right to be in possession of the immovable property about which section 145 speaks and in a proceeding arising under that section, what the Magistrate should do is to declare whether a right to use any land or water exists and in whom, and he may make an order prohibiting any interference in the exercise of such right. That being the true position, the only order that could have been made by the Magistrate was to prohibit interference with the right of the first party to use the passage to which the affidavit referred. He could not on that pleading direct restoration of the passage to the first party. What was overlooked by the Magistrate was that even the first party did not assert that they had the right to be in exclusive possession of the passage. On the contrary the restricted claim made by the first party was that there was a right to use the passage, and so the Magistrate should have investigated the question whether there was any such right, and if he found there was what he could do was to prohibit any interference with the exercise of such a right. So, the order made by the Magistrate being beyond his competence, I set it aside. I, however, abstain from expressing any opinion on the question whether as-contended by the second party the land is the municipal land or whether as contended by the first party the land is Government land. That question has to be decided if and when it arises before the proper forum. S.V.S. ----- Petition allowed.