JUDGMENT : K.S. Hegde, J. This appeal by special leave arises from the decision of the High Court of Allahabad which dismissed the plaintiff's suit for possession of House No. 42/145, Pirpur Square, Narhi Ward, Lucknow, after reversing the judgments of the Courts below granting the decree prayed for by the appellant. 2. The appellant purchased the house in question sometime before she instituted the suit from which this appeal arises. Thereafter she applied to the Rent Control Area Rationing Officer, Lucknow under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control and Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act III of 1947) for permission to sue for possession of the house purchased by her as she bonafide needed that house for her own residence. In that application she also stated that she was willing to make available for allotment to the respondent the house in which she was living. That house also is situated in the Mohalla in which the suit house is situated. The Controller granted the permission prayed for but directed the appellant not to sue for a period of three months so that it may be convenient for the respondent to shift to the house occupied by the appellant. The respondent unsuccessfully went up in appeal as well as in revision as against the permission granted. 3. The permission in question was granted on December 9, 1962. Thereafter the appellant through her advocate caused a letter written to the respondent on January 18, 1963, offering him the alternative accommodation mentioned in her petition for permission. In that letter it was further written 'kindly inform me in writing the date and time of you agree to the exchange and when you would shift to the rented house of my client so that it may be made available to you." The respondent did not choose to reply that letter. On February 23, 1963, the appellant's advocate again wrote to the respondent asking him to vacate the suit house. On May 18, 1964, the respondent applied to the Controller to allot to him the house which was in the occupation of the appellant and her husband. We may say at this stage that the house had been leased in favour of the appellant's husband. The appellant had also conveyed to the respondent her husband's consent for making available that house for his residence. We may say at this stage that the house had been leased in favour of the appellant's husband. The appellant had also conveyed to the respondent her husband's consent for making available that house for his residence. On June 29, 1964, the appellant and her husband informed the Controller that they had no objection for alloting the house under their occupation to the respondent. It is not known as to what had happened to the application for allotment made by the respondent. That fact must be within the knowledge of the respondent but he has not chosen to disclose the same to the court. 4. Both the trial Court as well as the appellate Court concurrently came to the conclusion that the appellant bonafide requires the house for her own use. The High Court has accepted that finding, yet it reversed the decree granted by the courts below on the ground that the permission granted by the Controller was a conditional one and the condition imposed by the Controller has not been satisfied by the appellant. 5. It is not necessary in this case to go into the question whether while granting permission under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the Controller or the appellate authority or the revisional authority can impose any condition, as in our opinion, the permission granted was not subject to any condition. In her application for permission, the appellant voluntarily offered to make available for allotment the house in which she and her husband were living. She did so merely as an act of grace. The Controller accepted that offer. She had done all that she could have done to implement the offer made by her. She had obtained the consent of her husband and communicated the same to the respondent. When the respondent applied for allotment she as well as her husband consented to the allotment of the house to the respondent. She could not have done anything more. It was for the respondent to apply for the allotment. In fact he did apply for allotment but possibly he did not pursue that application. It was not for the appellant to see that the house was allotted to the respondent. No such condition was imposed on her by the Controller while granting permission to sue. It was for the respondent to apply for the allotment. In fact he did apply for allotment but possibly he did not pursue that application. It was not for the appellant to see that the house was allotted to the respondent. No such condition was imposed on her by the Controller while granting permission to sue. Therefore in our view the High Court was wrong in interfering with the judgments of the Courts below. 6. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in all the courts. Appeal allowed.