Judgment :- 1. This is yet another instance where action purported to have been taken under the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) 0.1966 and the Kerala Paddy and Rice Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) 0.1966 has resulted in unnecessary inconvenience and has created a source of insecurity because of the hasty manner in which the officers empowered with extraordinary powers took action ignoring principle of natural justice. 2. The petitioner and his sons got divided by a registered partition deed dated 19 71961. Up to and inclusive of the Makarom crop in the year 1142, the amounts of paddy which the petitioner had to measure under the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) 0.1966 (hereinafter referred to as the levy order) was based on the extent of the land that the petitioner obtained under the said partition deed namely 5.70 acres and that alone. According to counsel for the petitioner, this is the correct method to be adopted for the purpose of determining the quantum of paddy which can be demanded from the petitioner under the above-said order. But for the Kanni crop of the year 1143, Ext. P1 notice dated 218 1967 was issued to the petitioner on the 28th of that month demanding from him 34.20 quintals of paddy on the basis that he is in possession of and is cultivating 12.94 acres the total of the extent that has been partitioned under the partition deed dated 19 71961 already referred to. He objected by Ex. P2. But this objection was rejected by order Ext. P3 dated 4101967 by the Taluk Supply Officer. He appealed as evidenced by Ext. P4 on 27101967 and also made an application for stay Ex. P5. While this matter was thus pending in appeal and before orders were passed either in appeal or on the stay petition 36.40 quintals of paddy were seized on the 11th November 1967. This is the version of the respondents on whose behalf a counter-affidavit has been filed. The petitioner would have it that the amount of paddy seized on 11 111967 is the entire stock of the paddy that was available with the petitioner and amounted to 59 quintals of paddy. This is the version of the respondents on whose behalf a counter-affidavit has been filed. The petitioner would have it that the amount of paddy seized on 11 111967 is the entire stock of the paddy that was available with the petitioner and amounted to 59 quintals of paddy. The questions to be determined in this case are whether there has been a correct and true determination of the amount of the paddy the petitioner had to measure under the Levy Order and whether the action for seizure of paddy under the Declaration and Requisitioning Order is justified. 3. The question arising under the levy order is fairly easy to resolve. A glance at the orders Exts. P3 and P7, P7 being the order on the appeal taken by the petitioner (Ex. P4) passed after the writ application was filed, indicates that matters which are not relevant weighed with the authorities incoming to the conclusion that the levy should be on the basis of the total extent of the paddy lands covered by the partition deed dated 19 71961. It is mentioned that the petitioner and his sons were living under the same roof, and they had a common mess and a common kitchen and had stock of paddy in the same place and that the petitioner cultivated the paddy lands allotted to his sons under the partition deed. These matters are not material for deciding the question of the quantum of paddy to be measured by the petitioner. It is not suggested that the partition deed is a sham document. In fact there is no reason to create a document which was not intended to take effect. On the other hand, it appears it was very much intended to take effect and the object was.it appears, to avoid liabilities such as which can arise under the Levy Order. It is not suggested that such an object is illegal. It is well settled that all legal steps can be taken to avoid the incidents of tax. This principle must apply to cases of liabilities arising under provision such as those in the Levy Order. The partition deed must therefore stand. The question therefore is whether the petitioner can be said to have disposing power over the share of the paddy collected from the shares of the sons who obtained it under the partition deed. This principle must apply to cases of liabilities arising under provision such as those in the Levy Order. The partition deed must therefore stand. The question therefore is whether the petitioner can be said to have disposing power over the share of the paddy collected from the shares of the sons who obtained it under the partition deed. This court in its Full Bench ruling in State of Kerala & others v. Annam alias Thankamma and others reported in 1968 KLT. 390 held that it is not sufficient that the cultivation was done by any particular person who is one of the sharers under the partition deed. But that person even if he cultivated, harvested and collected the entire paddy from the various sharers must also have the disposing power of that paddy which he collected from the sharers belonging to other persons. It is not possible to postulate that such is the case when each member in the partition deed is entitled to the paddy that was obtained from his share. It follows that the petitioner can only be liable for the quantum of paddy measurable by him with respect to 5.70 acres of paddy land which he obtained under the partition deed dated 19 71961. I therefore quash Exts. P3 and P7 orders and direct that fresh orders be passed by the Taluk Supply Officer in accordance with the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this court fixing the quantum of paddy measurable by the petitioner under the Levy Order. 4. When I pass on to the action taken under Declaration and Requisitioning 0.1966, the position is not so easy. If the petitioner did not file the returns enjoined under the Act, certain consequences can follow. Even here the question will arise whether the failure to file such returns should be visited with the dire consequences of the entire paddy belonging to himself and his sons who as I said are independent shareholders who have absolute right to the property and income therefrom, should all be requisitioned. This of course is not a matter for this court to consider and or decide. But it is certainly a matter that the authorities will have to consider and consider seriously, before action is taken. This of course is not a matter for this court to consider and or decide. But it is certainly a matter that the authorities will have to consider and consider seriously, before action is taken. In the circumstances in which action under this Order was taken it appears to me that there has been undue haste to say the least. What is more, no reasonable opportunity which would satisfy the requirements of natural justice had been afforded to the petitioner. I may recapitulate the facts. He had appealed from the order Ext. P3 by the end of October 1967. He had asked for stay of proceedings being taken under the Levy Order. It is said that there was an inspection of the place of the petitioner on the 11th of November 1967. On the same day it is said that a notice had been issued (vide Para.7 of the counter-affidavit). It is not said in the counter-affidavit what is the date of that notice. It is also not asserted in this paragraph that this was served on the petitioner. I find on going through the file there is an order passed by the Taluk Supply officer on the 11th November 1967 determining that three quintals more in addition to what is payable by the petitioner under the Levy Orders must be measured by him. This order states that the inspection was on the 11th November 1967, that is the date on which this order was passed. It is further said now that there was a refusal to accept this order (referred to as a notice in the counter-affidavit) and therefore this was affixed. 5. The affixture was followed by the seizure of the quantum in dispute. The records before me do not enable me to decide what exactly was the quantum seized. But the immediate fact remains that admittedly 36.40 quintals were taken away. This has resulted in miscarriage of justice because a reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner to state his case. 6. I must therefore direct that even in regard to the liability of the petitioner under the Declaration and Requisitioning Order there must be a fresh enquiry. But the immediate fact remains that admittedly 36.40 quintals were taken away. This has resulted in miscarriage of justice because a reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the petitioner to state his case. 6. I must therefore direct that even in regard to the liability of the petitioner under the Declaration and Requisitioning Order there must be a fresh enquiry. So a fresh notice, I say notice and not an order will be issued to the petitioner to show cause why an order should not be made in terms of the order dated 1111 1967 which had already been passed and a reasonable opportunity given to the petitioner to state his case and the facts and circumstances stated by the petitioner will be duly considered and an appropriate fresh order passed under the Declaration and Requisitioning Order. 7. After these orders are passed if it is found that no action should be taken under the Declaration and Requisitioning Order, the excess amounts of paddy seized in addition to what is payable by the petitioner with reference to 5.70 acres of land will be given back to the petitioner. It necessarily follows particularly in the light of the subsequent events as evidenced by Exts. P9 and P11 that the identical paddy seized from the petitioner is incapable of being returned to the petitioner by the respondents. It therefore goes without saying that substitute paddy similar in kind and quality will be returned to the petitioner. This of course is subject to the orders that can be passed under (he Declaration and Requisitioning Order. If there are justifiable grounds under the circumstances for any order being passed in regard to the quantum seized that quantum may also be retained by the respondents. I make it clear that the liability, in any event, should not exceed what has been fixed by order dated 11-1-11967 and in no case the liability of the petitioner to surrender paddy should be greater than that fixed by order dated 11-1-11967. 8. This Original Petition is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.