JUDGMENT Pathak, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner, Messrs Chitra Cinema, Varanasi, challenges the validity of an award dated April 10, 1969 made by the Labour Court (II) Kanpur. 2. The first contention of the petitioner is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it. It is submitted that the Labour Court, under Section 4-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, has been conferred power to adjudicate upon industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the First Schedule to the Act, and that as the dispute, referred to the Labour. Court for adjudication concerns the revision of the rate of wages that is not a matter which falls within the First Schedule, Wages, it is pointed out, is specified as item no. I in the Second Schedule, and therefore a dispute in respect oil wages falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 4-B of the Act. The contention is without substance. Section 4-A provides that the State Government may constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the First Schedule and "for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act." The power to refer a dispute for adjudication is conferred on the State Government by Section 4-K. That section provides that a dispute relating to one of the matters contained in the First Schedule. may be referred for adjudication to a Labour Court and a dispute in respect of a matter covered either by the First Schedule or the Second Schedule may be referred for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. Then follows a proviso which appears to its to be material to this case. It declares that if the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen, the State Government may make the reference to a Labour Court. It is clear, therefore, that the State Government has been specifically empowered to refer a dispute in respect of a matter mentioned in the Second Schedule to a Labour Court provided the dispute is not likely to effect more than 100 workmen. As pointed out already, the entry "wages" is mentioned as item no. 1 in the Second Schedule. It is clear, therefore, that the State Government has been specifically empowered to refer a dispute in respect of a matter mentioned in the Second Schedule to a Labour Court provided the dispute is not likely to effect more than 100 workmen. As pointed out already, the entry "wages" is mentioned as item no. 1 in the Second Schedule. It is also clear that the dispute here is in respect of two workmen only. Plainly, therefore, the State Government was empowered under the proviso to Section 4-K to refer the dispute to a Labour Court. It cannot be disputed that when the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication, the adjudication of that dispute was a function assigned to the Labour Court under the Act. It was a function assigned to the Labour Court under Section 4-K of the Act, and, therefore, falls squarely within the terms of Section 4-A. The petitioner points out that in the order of reference nothing has been said about Section 4-A. That, it seems to us, was hardly necessary. Section 4-A itself contemplates that the function to be assigned to the Labour Court must be under the Act, and when the function is assigned to the Labour Court under Section 4-K it is Section 4-K to which reference alone need be made. It is also not possible to accept the submission that the function contemplated under Section 4-A cannot be the function of adjudication. The function may be assigned under any provision of the Act and there is nothing in the language of Section 4-A to limit the meaning of the word ,'function" used therein. Moreover, when we expressly find that the proviso to Section 4-K provides for a reference by the State Government to a Labour Court in respect of matters falling outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the Labour Court, it is plain that while the proviso to Section 4-K empowers the State Government to make such a reference Section 4-A vests jurisdiction in the Labour Court to entertain such a reference and dispose it of. If the contention of the petitioner was accepted, it would mean that while the State Government has been empowered by the Act to make such a reference to a Labour Court, there is no provision in the Act conferring jurisdiction in the Labour Court to entertain and dispose of such a reference. If the contention of the petitioner was accepted, it would mean that while the State Government has been empowered by the Act to make such a reference to a Labour Court, there is no provision in the Act conferring jurisdiction in the Labour Court to entertain and dispose of such a reference. A harmonious reading of Sections 4-A and 4-K provides against this impossible situation. The first contention of the petitioner is rejected. 3. The next contention is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to make an award revising the wages and all that it could do waste lay down guide lines to be followed by the employer. We may refer to the terms of the reference which read : "Should the employers be required to revise the rates of wages of the work men, detailed in the Annexure? If so, from which date and with what other details? " On a plain reading of these terms it is clear that the Labour Court was required to draw up a scheme of the revision of rate of wages, in case it held that the wages should be revised, and to require the employers to adopt that scheme. That is.what the Labour Court did. Accordingly, the second contention is also rejected. 4. It is finally pointed out that the two workmen concerned in the reference were part-time employees and they were paid consolidated wages which included dearness allowance. It is urged that the Labour Court erred in law on the face of the record in granting them dearness allowance, apart from wages. Now, the finding of the Labour Court that these workmen were entitled to dearness allowance proceeds on the assumption that they were not allowed any dearness allowance so far. In paragraph 10 of the award the Labour Court refers to an admission on the part of the petitioner to this effect. The petitioner submits that no such admission was 'made by it. That does not appear to be correct. In paragraph 9 of the petitioner's written statement filed before the Labour Court it was expressly stated that "D. F. A." was intended to be given to whole time employees and that part-time employees could not claim that benefit. The petitioner submits that no such admission was 'made by it. That does not appear to be correct. In paragraph 9 of the petitioner's written statement filed before the Labour Court it was expressly stated that "D. F. A." was intended to be given to whole time employees and that part-time employees could not claim that benefit. In coming to the finding that dearness allowance was not paid so far to the two employees the Labour Court, we think, did not commit any patent illegality in the award made by it. 5. No other contention was raised before us. The petition is rejected.