Judgment Ahmed Ali Khan, J.- This appeal is directed by the State against the order of acquittal passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No., 74 of 1967, on the file of his Court.; That order was made on 14th February, 1968, by the lower appellate Court, setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Second Magistrate, Bangalore in C.C. No., 1689 of 1966 on the file of his Court., The respondents before us, who are twelve in number, were the accused Before the trial Court., They were prosecuted for the offence punishable under rule 126 (1) read with rule 126 (2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and Notification L.M.A. 37 H.B.E., dated 11th April, 1966 issued by the Government of Mysore. It was the prosecution case that the respondents, who were the employees of the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (which will be hereinafter referred to as HAL), went on strike on the 12th April, 1966, in contravention of Notification No. S.O. 4164 dated 11th April, 1966 issued by the Government of Mysore under the power vested in the same under rule 126 (1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962., It is said that there was a dispute with regard to payment of profit sharing bonus between the management and the employees. The respondents who are members and office-bearers of the Hindustan Aeronautics Employees Association went on token strike on 12th April, 1966, in contravention of the Notification of the Government of Mysore mentioned above, i.e., Notification dated 11th April, 1966 declaring any such strike as illegal. On the material on record, the trying Magistrate held the respondents guilty of the offence with which they had been charged., He, therefore, convicted and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default to under go imprisonment of simple nature for a term of one month. In appeal, the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore set aside the conviction ordered by the trial Magistrate and acquitted the respondents. It is against the said order that this appeal has been preferred before us on behalf of the State. It was contended by Sri Byra Reddy, the learned Public Prosecutor, that the evidence adduced in the case fully established that the respondents had contravened the order made by the State Government in its Notification. It is against the said order that this appeal has been preferred before us on behalf of the State. It was contended by Sri Byra Reddy, the learned Public Prosecutor, that the evidence adduced in the case fully established that the respondents had contravened the order made by the State Government in its Notification. The second contention was that the appellate Judge was in error in holding that the State Government was not competent to issue the prohibitory order.. He submitted that the Notification dated 9th December, 1964, was issued under section 40 (1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962 which empowers the State Government to issue a Prohibitory Order under rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules. The third contention was that the appellate Judge has fallen into an error in holding that sub- rule (2) of rule 126- AA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 was applicable to the Notification issued by the State Government., He urged that the provision of that sub- rule is confined only to sub- rule (1) of rule 126- AA. With regard to the first contention, Mr. Byra Reddy argued on behalf of the State that the stand taken by the accused-respondents in their statements, under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, was that they did not know anything about the Prohibitory Order promulgated and published by the State Government and each of them has pleaded that he did not obstruct anybody. The questions put to the witnesses in their cross-examination on behalf of the accused-respondents also go to point out the same. He submitted that it has been satisfactorily established by the evidence-documentary as well as oral-produced on behalf of the prosecution, that the accused went on strike and did not attend to their work on 12th April, 1966. His grievance was that the lower appellate Judge has erred in arriving at a conclusion on misappreciation of the evidence let in the case. He took us through the evidence in the case. After perusal of the same, we are of the opinion that the lower appellate Judge was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the offences charged have not been established against the accused-respondents. He took us through the evidence in the case. After perusal of the same, we are of the opinion that the lower appellate Judge was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the offences charged have not been established against the accused-respondents. Exhibit P-1 is the document in which the Hindustan Aeronautics) Employees Association has requested all the employees to attend the meeting referred to therein, which was to be held on date, antecedent to the token strike. It reads- “HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Bangalore-17. Area Meetings on 1-4-66 5-4-1966 at 6-00 p.m. at Konenagrahara 9-4-1966 at 6-00 p.m. at New Township (Marathhalli). MUSTER STRONG. Friends, As you are aware the Special General Body meeting of our Association held on 26th March, 1966 has given a call for ‘token strike’ on 12th April, 1966 in case of our demand for Profit sharing Bonus is not conceded on or before 10th April, 1966 and to organise Hunger Strike for indefinite period and to take Strike Ballot. To explain the present position and to mobilise the employees for Token Strike, Area Meetings will be held on Tuesday the 5th April, 1966 at 6-00 P.M. at Konenagrahara and on Saturday, the 9th April, 1966, at 6 P.M. at New Township Quarters (G. GB and GBJ Quarters) near Welfare Centre. All the employees are requested to attend the meeting without fail. H.A.E.A. Zindabad. K.S. Krishnamurthy, F. Louis, General Secretary. President.” Exhibit P-2 is a document in which an appeal is made to the employees to cooperate in making the token strike on 12th April¡, 1966 a complete success. It is clear from the document that by narrating the previous incidents, appeal was made to the Employees Association for a ‘token strike’ on 12th April, 1966, so that it should be a cent per cent success and to serve as an eye-opener to the authorities and the Government. It is in the evidence of P.W. 2, who was the Deputy Security Officer of the HAL at the relevant period, that in spite of the prohibitory order, on 12th April, 1966 all the employees of the HAL” had struck work excepting a few labourers of essential departments. In his cross-examination he has stated that before the close of the first shift at 4-15 p.m., he came to know about the prohibitory order. In his cross-examination he has stated that before the close of the first shift at 4-15 p.m., he came to know about the prohibitory order. P.W. 6 the Accounts Manager of HAL has sworn to the fact that the accused-respondents did not attend the factory on that day viz., 12th April, 1966. Nor they sent any leave letter. There is absolutely no reason for not accepting the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 6. Nothing has¡ been elicited from those witnesses in their cross-examination as to why their evidence should not be believed. We are not persuaded either on behalf of the respondents, as to why we should not place reliance on the evidence given by these witnesses. Further Exhibits P-1 and P-2 lend support to their evidence. It is further supported by the evidence of P.W. 5 Somasekbarappa, who is an employee in the Telephone Exchange in HAL factory. He has deposed to the effect that the members of the Hindustan Aeronautic Employees Association had given him the pass Exhibit P-5 on 11th April, 1966 to attend to his work on 12th April, 1966. On the basis of the pass so given, he had gone to work on 12th April, 1966. In their statements under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, the accused have not denied that there was a strike on 12th April, 1966., In this background, if we consider the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 6, coupled with Exhibits P-1 and P-2, we see absolutely no reason for not accepting the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The complaint Exhibitl4 in the case has been given at the earliest point of time. Therefore there was no time for any concoction. The evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution, in our opinion, is satisfactory and it establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused-respondents went on strike on 12th April, 1966, and consequently they are guilty of the offences charged. The second contention advanced by Mr. Bvra Reddy on behalf of the State was that the notification dated 9th December, 1964, was issued under section 40 (1) ofthe Defence of India Act, 1962, which empowers the State Government to issue prohibitory orders under rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 He therefore, urged that the learned Sessions Judge was in error in holding that the State government was not empowered to issue the prohibitory order. We are of the opinion that the contention advanced on behalf of the State has force in it The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that although rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules. 1962 empowered the Central Government or the State Government to make an order prohibiting strike or lock-out in connection with any industrial make an order applying general or special order has to makes an order applying general of any specified order or to class undertaking so that the Central Government or the State Government thereafter may prohibit the strike or lock-out, and that in the absence of any such order made by the Central Government the State Government has no competence to make publication of Notification under rule 126 (1) of the Defence of India Rules. 1962., Section 40 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, provides that,- “40. Power to delegate.- The Central Government may, by order, direct that any power or duty which by this Act or by any rule made under this Act is conferred or imposed upon the Central Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged, also,- (a) by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) whether or not the power or duty relates to a matter with respect to which a State Legislature has power to make laws, by any State Government or by any officer, or authority subordinate to such Government, or (c) by any other authority. The remaining portion of the section is not relevant for our purpose. Exhibit P-3 is the Notification published by the State Government in the Government Gazette on 11-4-1966. It reads.- “LABOUR AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION SECRETARIAT. Notification. Bangalore, Dated 11th April, 1966. S.O. 4164 - Whereas the Government of Mysore is of the opinion that it is necessary and expedient to make provision for prohibiting the strike in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Bangalore-17 for securing the Defence of India and Civil Defence and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community: Now, Therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- rule (1) of Rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules. 1962 read with Notification No. F. 10/17/64-IR. 1962 read with Notification No. F. 10/17/64-IR. 1, dated the 19th December, 1964, of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour and Employment, the Government of Mysore hereby makes the following order, viz.: - ORDER. No person engaged in the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Bangalore-17 shall go on strike in connection with any Industrial Dispute. This Order shall be in force for a period of three months from 11th April, 1966. No. LNA. 351, LLE. 65). By Order and in the name of the Governor of Mysore. Sd. N.S. Ramachandra, Secretary to Government, 9-4-1966 at 6-00 p.m. at New Township Labour and Municipal Admn. Department.” It is seen that in the preamble to this Notification it has been expressly stated that the Government of Mysore has published the Notification in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- rule (1) of rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules i.e delegated to it by the Notification dated 19th December, 1964. It is also clear that the Notification was made by the order of the Governor. Mr. Byra Reddy has produced a copy of the Notification of the Central Government, The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contends that since the copy of the Notification of the Central Government has not been produced in the lower Court it cannot be produced in this Court on behalf of the State. Being a Notification in the Gazette of the Central Government, judicial notice can be taken of it. Mr. Reddy is right in his contention that there is no legal obstacle in the way of this Court taking judicial notice of the same. Being a Notification in the Gazette of the Central Government, judicial notice can be taken of it. Mr. Reddy is right in his contention that there is no legal obstacle in the way of this Court taking judicial notice of the same. It must be held that such a notification is a part of the law itself and therefore judicial notice of the Notification can be taken under section 57 of the Evidence Act., That was the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. F.N. Bulsara1 It was observed at page 329 of the Report that “…An order made by the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this section and therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the Legislature itself.” In the case referred to above, section 139 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 which authorised the Provincial Government to exempt any intoxicant or class of intoxicants from the operation of the Act by a general or special order, was under consideration., It was further observed that the Notification (issued by the Provincial Government) being made in exercise of the power given by the Act itself, has undoubtedly the force of law and must be read along with the Act., It is clear from the preamble of the Notification published by the State Government that the power to issue the Notification had been delegated by the Central Government to the Government of Mysore under the Notification of the Central Government referred to therein. That being so, a notification by the Centra] Government as contemplated in sub- rule (1) of rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules was not necessary for the simple reason that that power had been delegated by the Central Government to the State Government. Since the Notification by the State Government was issued under section 40 (1) of the Act in exercise of the powers delegated to it by the Central Government, the State Government was competent to pass the prohibitory order under sub- rule (1) of rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules., With regard to the third contention, it has been urged on behalf of the State that sub- rule (2) of rule 126- AA does not apply to all Notifications. It was submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in holding that non-publication in compliance with’ sub- rule (2)of rule 126- AA invalidated the Notifications. It was submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in holding that non-publication in compliance with sub- rule (2) of rule 126- AA invalidated the Notification issued by the Government of Mysore. In para 11 of his judgment the learned Sessions Judge has stated. — “…Anyway, clause (2) of Rule 126-AA states that such a notification has got to be published in such manner as the Government making the order considers best calculated. But there is nothing on record to show what are the modes of publication that the Government thought best in the circumstances for publishing that notification. Simply publication of the notification in the Government Gazette or affixing cyclostyled copies of the same in the important places in the Factory by themselves cannot mean that the Government thought that that was the best manner of publication. We are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge went wrong in resorting to the provision of sub- rule (2) of rule 126- AA. The provision of that sub- rule is confined, to rule (1) of 126-AA only and this has been made clear in the sub-clause itself, which reads: “(2) The Central Government or the State Government may, by general or special order, direct that any person or persons engaged in any employment to which this rule applies shall not depart out of such area or areas as may be specified in such order. Any order issued under this sub- rule shall be published in such manner as the Government making the order considers best calculated to bring it to the notice of the persons effected by the order.” (italics ours). It is thus clear that the provision of sub- rule (2) of rule 126-AA is confined to that rule only and it cannot be made applicable to the notification made under sub- rule (1) of rule 126 of the Defence of India Rules. It is not disputed before us that the prohibitory order made by the Mysore Government is published in the ‘Mysore Gazette’. That being so, it may validly be presumed that it was duly published and that the publication was made in the ‘Gazette’ in compliance with the provision of rule 141 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. It is not disputed before us that the prohibitory order made by the Mysore Government is published in the ‘Mysore Gazette’. That being so, it may validly be presumed that it was duly published and that the publication was made in the ‘Gazette’ in compliance with the provision of rule 141 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. In a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Mahadeo Prasad Jayaswal v. Emperor,1 it was observed: “It is a well-known practice of the Central and Provincial Governments to publish their Acts and Notifications in their Official Gazettes. Therefore when an order passed by the Central or the Provincial Government is published by it in the Official Gazette it may be presumed that the Government while publishing the order was aware of the provisions of rule 119 (1) and the publication was made in compliance with all its provisions including the provision as to the determination of the most suitable form of publication. XX X”. It must be mentioned here that sub- rule (1) of Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, and the provision contained in sub- rule (1) of rule 141 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, are substantially the same. We are in respectful agreement with the observation made by their Lordships in the Full Bench decision, quoted above. The learned Sessions Judge has not taken into consideration the provision of rule 141 (1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 at all. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in holding that no presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act arose. The illustrations appended to section 114 of the Evidence Act are not exhaustive. The presumption to be drawn under that section is one on facts and whether a presumption should be drawn will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, as observed by Fazl Ali, C.J. in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court quoted above. What emerges from the above discussion is that the provision of sub- rule (20) of rule 126-AA cannot be made applicable to all notifications. Its applicability is confined to sub- rule (1) of rule 126-AA only. The next question for consideration is of sentence. There cannot be any doubt that to prescribe a sentence is purely within the discretion of the trial Court. Its applicability is confined to sub- rule (1) of rule 126-AA only. The next question for consideration is of sentence. There cannot be any doubt that to prescribe a sentence is purely within the discretion of the trial Court. But in this case, the accused-respondents are alleged to have committed the offence in 1966, and we are now in 1970. At this distance of time, we are of the opinion that there is some force in the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents that the sentence of fine of Rs. 200 imposed on the respondents is rather harsh. Further, the circumstance that the accused-respondents rightly or wrongly had the benefit of an order of acquittal also goes in support of the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it will meet the ends of justice if the sentence of fine is reduced to Rs. 25 each, and in default the accused-respondents will undergo simple imprisonment for a week.) We order accordingly. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge is set aside, and that of the Magistrate is restored as per the above modifications. S.V.S. ----- Ordered accordingly.