JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - The Petitioner Hari Chand was a Pradhan of Gaon Sabba Wazidpur Kutubpur, Tahsil Firozabad in the district of Agra. Complaints were received against him of derelection of duty on his part of serious nature such as forgery of the record of the Gaon Sabha, connivance at the encroachment by some persons over the land of the Gaon Sabha (his failure to prosecute diligently the proceedings against one Roshan Lal for certain encroachments upon the land of the Gaon Sabha) and finally of having misappropriated the funds of the Gaon Sabha and to have misused his position and power as a Pradhan off the Sabha. A preliminary enquiry was held in the charges and a formal charge-sheet was served upon him on 17-10-1967. He was required to render his explanation and also to lead such evidence in defence as he desired. After considering the material on the record, Sri S.L.S. Kumaiyan, SDM, Firozabad passed an order dated 17-5-1968 finding him guilty of the charges and issued to him a notice to show cause within ten days as to why he should not be removed from the office of the Pradhan. After considering the explanation filed by the Petitioner Sri B.P. Verma who in the meantime had come to occupy the post of SDO/SDM, Firozabad passed an order dated 18-11-1968 removing him from the office of the Pradhan. The Petitioner then appealed and his appeal was rejected by Sri S.N. Gangulee, ADM (E), Agra by his order dated 21-4-1969. The Petitioner has now filed the present writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution and has prayed for certiorari quashing the order of the SDO removing him from the office of the Pradhan as also the order passed by the ADM dismissing his appeal. 2. Two grounds have been urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of the writ petition. The first ground is that Sub-clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 under which the proceedings were taken against the Petitioner, does not authorise an action against a Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha because that provision applies only to an office-bearer of the Gaon Sabha and according to the learned Counsel, the Pradhan is not an office-bearer. His second ground is that the impugned order removing the Petitioner from the office of the Pradhan has been passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice. 3. As regards the first contention it has simply to be stated to be rejected. The Gaon Sabha is established u/s 3 of the Panchayat Raj Act for a village or a group of villages. Its membership consists of every person whose name is, for the time being, included in the electoral roll for the Gaon Sabha. According to Section 4, every Gaon Sabha is to be a body corporate. Like any other body corporate, its affairs are to be managed by its office-bearers while its ministerial work is done through salaried staff. Section 11-A of the Act provides that there shall be a Pradhan and an Up Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha. Section 5-B prescribes the qualification of a Pradhan and is in the following terms: 5-B. Qualification for holding office of Pradhan: A member of a Gaon Sabha shall not be qualified to be choosen as Pradhan unless he is not less than 30 years of age. Section 12-K talks about the tenure of the office of Pradhan and Up Pradhan and reads as under: 12-K. Tenure of office of Pradhan and Up Pradhan: Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 11-B or 11-C the Pradhan and Up Pradhan shall continue in office until their respective successors are elected. From the provisions extracted above, it is quite plain that the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha is its office holder and he has been termed as such. u/s 11, one of the duties of the Pradhan is to call and hold two general meetings each year and also to call and hold an extraordinary meeting on the written requisition of the prescribed authority or by not less than 1/5th of the members of the Sabha. It is difficult to imagine as to who else can be an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha if the Pradhan is not its office bearer. The learned Counsel has not brought to our notice any statutory provision or any decided case to support this extraordinary proposition of his. We find absolutely no force in this contention of the learned Counsel and the same is rejected. 4. The learned Counsel has not brought to our notice any statutory provision or any decided case to support this extraordinary proposition of his. We find absolutely no force in this contention of the learned Counsel and the same is rejected. 4. It was then contended that even if the Pradhan is an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha he can be removed only u/s 14 of the Act which deals specifically with that matter. Section 14 provides that the Gaon Sabha may at a meeting specially convened for the purpose remove the Pradhan by a majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting. His argument is that there being a specific provision for the removal of the Pradhan, his removal can only take place under that section and the application of Section 95(1)(g) of the Act should, therefore, be restricted only to the office bearers other than the Pradhan. There is a clear fallacy in this argument. From the scheme of the Act, it appears that the Pradhan can be removed in two ways. He can either be removed u/s 14 by the Gaon Sabha itself if the Pradhan for any reason loses the confidence of the Sabha or can be removed by the State Government u/s 95(1)(g) for any of the reasons mentioned therein. Section 95 occurs in Ch. VII which deals with the external control exercised by the State Government over the affairs of a Gaon Sabha. In the exercise of that control, the State Government has been invested with the power Under Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 to suspend or remove an office bearer of the Gaon Sabha if he is found guilty of any of the defaults enumerated in Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (v). He can also be removed Under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 if he does not possess the qualification specified in Section 5-B. In other words, a Pradhan can be removed as a result of the internal action by the Gaon Sabha itself or as a result of the external control exercised by the State Government. There is no conflict between the two provisions nor are the two provisions mutually exclusive. There is no conflict between the two provisions nor are the two provisions mutually exclusive. In the present case the SDO exercising the powers of the State Government u/s 95(1)(g), delegated to him u/s 96 A of the Act, has taken the impugned action against the Petitioner for which there was ample justification. 5. The second contention of the learned Counsel that principles of natural justice have not been complied with, is equally devoid of all force. It may be stated at the out set that no particular procedure is prescribed for an action contemplated by Section 95(1)(g) but in taking such an action the principles of natural justice have to be observed. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that certain witnesses were examined behind the back of the Petitioner and the Petitioner was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine them. His second complaint is that the Petitioner was afforded no opportunity to lead evidence in defence. To support these contentions he invited our attentions to the order of the SDO dated 18-11-1968 which, according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is a very brief order and does not disclose that an adequate opportunity was allowed to the Petitioner. This complaint of the Petitioner is wholly unjustified inasmuch as the order dated 18-11-1968 is the final order of punishment while the order dealing with the charges levelled against the Petitioner was passed earlier by the SDM, Firozabad on 17-5-1968. That is an elaborate order which shows very clearly as to how the enquiry was conducted. From that order it appears that one of the charges against the Petitioner was that he had charged for abadi land a sum of Rs. 100/- each from three persons viz. Diman Singh, Kanchan Singh and Mohan Singh but had issued to them receipts for Rs. 40/-, Rs. 50/- and Rs. 50/- respectively, thus saving for himself a sum of Rs. 160/-. The statement of these three persons were recorded by the Suprevisor Kanungo who had sent his report to the SDO along with the statements of those witnesses. In the charge-sheet served upon the Petitioner, this fact was disclosed to him and he was specifically asked if he wanted to cross-examine any of the witnesses. In the charge-sheet he was also asked to produce such oral and documentary evidence as he desired. In the charge-sheet served upon the Petitioner, this fact was disclosed to him and he was specifically asked if he wanted to cross-examine any of the witnesses. In the charge-sheet he was also asked to produce such oral and documentary evidence as he desired. The Petitioner submitted two written representations but made no request for the production of any of the witnesses examined by the Suprevisor Kanungo for cross-examination. It farther appears that after the Petitioner had submitted his written reply on 21-11-1967, a notice dated 5-1-1968 was issued to him to produce evidence in defence on 20-1-1968. That notice was served on the Petitioner on 12-1-1968 but he produced no evidence on the appointed date. In fact he was absent when the case was called out. He, however, later-on appeared and made an application for the inspection of the record. This was allowed. It is not the Petitioner's allegation that the statements of the three witnesses were not on the record; but even after inspecting the record he made no application for recalling any of the witnesses for cross-examination. In the circumstances, it was clearly his duty to have asked for the production of any of the witnesses he wanted to cross-examine and because of his own failure to adopt the proper course, he cannot complain of the violation of the principle of natural justice. Form a perusal of the materials before us it is plain that the Petitioner was aware of the charges levelled against him as also the material that was collected during the enquiry. He was allowed ample opportunity to meet the charges and to produce evidence in rebuttal but beyond filing the written objections, the Petitioner did not take any steps to produce any evidence. The case of the Petitioner is clearly covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ved Singh Pradhan Vs. Assistant Sub-Divisional Officer and Others, AIR 1965 All 370 , where, in answer to a similar contention, the Bench has held that where the Pradhan himself did not ask for an opportunity to cross examine the witness against him and to produce evidence in defence it was not open to him to contend that he was not given an adequate opportunity or that there was any violation of the principle of natural justice. 6. The Supreme Court as early as in 1957 in New Prakash Transport Co. 6. The Supreme Court as early as in 1957 in New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 232 observed: Rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and rules prescribed by the legislature under which they have to act and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. and after reviewing the facts of that case, the Supreme Court went on to hold: the reading out of the contents of the police report by the Chairman at the hearing of the appeal was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice as there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of it to be furnished to any of the parties. 7. It may be stated as a proposition well settled that in cases involving the removal of a person from his office or post, action should be taken strictly in accordance with the prescribed rules if there be any. If a formal enquiry is prescribed by the rules the enquiry should be conducted in accordance with those rules and if the rules require that witnesses should be examined in the presence of the other party, that should be done but where no particular procedure is prescribed as is the case u/s 95(1)(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act, it would be enough compliance with the principle of natural justice if the charges, are fully communicated to the person concerned, the result of the enquiry, if any, is made known to him and the material which is sought to be used against him, is disclosed to him and he is afforded adequate opportunity to meet the charges and to lead evidence is rebuttal. The principle underlying the doctrine of the observance of the principle of natural justice is that justice must not only be done but manifestly seem to be done. But this principle does not mean that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that in fact it should be done. This is fully illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in New Prakash Transport Co. But this principle does not mean that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that in fact it should be done. This is fully illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. (Supra) where the Supreme Court had no hesitation in reversing the decision of the Nagpur High Court holding that no duty lay upon the Tribunal to abjourn the proceedings suo motu merely to make it appear that justice was being done. In Ceylone University v. Fernando (1960) 1 All. ER 631 (PC) the Privy Council held that the failure of the inquiry commission to tender unasked an essential witness for cross examination by the Plaintiff did not amount to a violation of the principle of natural justice. Reference may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam and Another Vs. Gauhati Municipal Board, AIR 1967 SC 1398 where the Supreme Court said that a personal hearing was not always a concomitant of the principle of natural justice. 8. This being the legal position the two Supreme Court cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner viz. Phulbari Tea Estate Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111 and Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1914 are clearly distinguishable. Both these cases were under the Industrial Disputes Act which requires an enquiry to be held in accordance with certain prescribed rules and on the facts obtaining in those cases, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the relevant rules had not been properly complied with. 9. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the two orders impugned in the present writ petition suffer from no such infirmity as is attributed to them. 10. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.