ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The Petitioner was a member of the Municipal Board, Kairana, district Muzaffarnagar. Two of his brothers Rameshwar Dayal and Ram Gopal applied for allotment of plot No. 8658 and plot No. 8661, measuring 5 bighas on lease for three years. The Land Management Committee on 22-6-1966 allowed the application and allotted these two plots to the Applicants. One Hirdey Ram on 274-9-1967 made a complaint to the Collector, Muzaffarnagar against this allotment stating that it was illegal. It was also prayed that the Petitioner be suspended and removed from the membership of the Board. On 8-1-1968 the Commissioner, Meerut Division issued a notice to the Petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be removed from the membership of the Board, for having taken part in the meeting at which these allotments were made to his own brothers. The Petitioner submitted an explanation stating that the case did not fall within the purview of Section 82 and Section 40(1)(c) of the Municipalities Act. No action could, therefore, be taken. By the impugned order dated 4-6-1968, the Commissioner has held that the Land Management Committee consisted of the members of the Municipal Board, Kairana. The Chairman of the Land Management Committee was the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Kairana. The Petitioner became a member of the Land Management Committee by virtue of his holding the office of a member of the Municipal Board. He attended the meeting at which the allotments were made in favour of his brothers. It was held that the Petitioner ought to have taken prior permission of the Prescribed Authority u/s 82 UP Municipalities Act, before attending the meeting at which this matter was decided. He held that since no such previous permission was taken, the Petitioner was guilty u/s 40(1)(c) of the Municipalities Act. He was, therefore, removed from membership. 2. The Petitioner challenges this order. Sub-section (2) of Section 40 confers a right of appeal on a member removed by an order of the Prescribed Authority Under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1). The remedy of appeal to the State Government was efficacious and speedy. The Petitioner had an alternative remedy. It is settled that if a litigant has an equally efficacious and alternative remedy he should avail of it, rather than rush to the High Court. The remedy of appeal to the State Government was efficacious and speedy. The Petitioner had an alternative remedy. It is settled that if a litigant has an equally efficacious and alternative remedy he should avail of it, rather than rush to the High Court. The Petitioner has offered no explanation why he did not exercise the right of appeal. In my opinion, this is not a fit case for interference and the petition deserves to be thrown down on this ground. 3. In order, however, to complete the judgment I may indicate my opinion on the merits of the case. Section 82 of the Municipalities Act contemplates that a member who acquires any share or interest in any contract or employment with the Board can do so only with the prior permission in writing of the Prescribed Authority. Clause (c) of Section 40(1) deals with a case where a member within the meaning of Section 82 knowingly acquires or continues to hold directly or indirectly or by a partner any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature of any contract by or on behalf of the Board. The allotment of the plots was a contract by the Board. The land in dispute was u/s 117-A of the UP ZA and LR Act vested in the Municipal Board, Kairana by the State Government. The Land Management Committee consisted exclusively of the members of the Municipal Board. The land was vested in the Municipal Board by the State Government and the members of the Municipal Board constituted the Committee which made the allotments. So the contract of lease so made would be a contract by or on behalf of the Board within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 40(1) of the Act. 4. The other ingredient of Clause (c) is that the member acquires or holds directly or indirectly any share or interest whether pecuniary or of any other nature in the contract. The lease was expressly in favour of the Petitioner's two brothers. Simply because the brothers were lessees it cannot be said that the Petitioner acquires or holds any pecuniary interest in the contract, but the clause does not confine itself to pecuniary interest. It says whether pecuniary or of any other nature. The provision is, of a very wide amplitude. It includes any kind of interest. Simply because the brothers were lessees it cannot be said that the Petitioner acquires or holds any pecuniary interest in the contract, but the clause does not confine itself to pecuniary interest. It says whether pecuniary or of any other nature. The provision is, of a very wide amplitude. It includes any kind of interest. The requisite interest of course must be material and not merely notional. I am unable to say that interest of a person in helping in the acquisition of land on lease by his own brothers is not within the meaning of the clause, "share or interest whether pecuniary or of any other nature." It is admitted that the Petitioner did not take the prior permission of the Prescribed Authority before the alleged allotments were made. He attended the meeting in which the allotments were made. He did not exclude himself from the meeting. In my opinion, the Commissioner, was justified in holding the Petitioner guilty Under Clause (c) of Section 40(1) of the Municipalities Act. 5. It was also urged that the Land Management Commissioner made the allotments in accordance with the provisions of the UP ZA and LR Act and its Rules and not in accordance with any provision of the Municipalities Act. That, in my opinion, is immaterial. These proceedings did not challenge the validity of the allotments. The allotments stand and remain in operation The Respondents are gunning for the Petitioner in so far his membership of the Municipal Board is concerned. For removal of a member, the requirement is not that the contract was valid or invalid, but whether the conduct of the member was contrary to Clause (c). 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon Emperor v. Narbada Prasad AIR 1930 Alld. 38 where the Bench held that expression "interest in a contract" in Section 34, District Boards Act meant a financial interest with profit or hope of profit. The case is not relevant. Here the phrase is "interest whether pecuniary or of any other nature." 7. Similarly, the case of K.F. Nariman Vs. Municipal Corporation of Bombay, AIR 1923 Bom 305 is unhelpful. The case is not relevant. Here the phrase is "interest whether pecuniary or of any other nature." 7. Similarly, the case of K.F. Nariman Vs. Municipal Corporation of Bombay, AIR 1923 Bom 305 is unhelpful. There the Court expounded the significance of the term "interest" and held that in the context of the provisions of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, the term would not include a mere sentimental interest, such as a father may have in the prosperity of his son. It must be a pecuniary or at least a material interest. That does not solve the Petitioner's difficulty. His interest was material enough. 8. The petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs.