Judgment Shivdayal, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the people Act, 1951, as it stood before the amendment of 1966, (hereinafter called "the Act"), from a decision of the Election Tribunal, Raipur. 2. After the general elections of 1962 the Kasdol Legislative Assembly constituency was called upon to elect a person for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The appellant (hereinafter also called "the petitioner") was a candidate set up by the Praja Socialist Party; Shri D.P. Mishra, respondent No. 1, (hereinafter called "the respondent") was the Congress candidate; and one Purushottamdas was an independent candidate. Kanhaiyalal Mishra (respondent No.2) had also filed his nomination paper as a Congress candidate, but he withdrew his candidature when the respondent's nomination paper was accepted. Poll was taken on May 4, 1963. The appellant got 4611 votes; the respondent 11528 votes; and Purushottamdas 850. The respondent was declared elected. 3. By an election petition, the appellant challenged the election of the respondent on various charges of corrupt practice, which may be classified into four heads: (1) Bribery; (2) publication of false statements, (3) hiring or procuring of vehicles for conveyance of electors, and (4) incurring or authorising election expenses in excess of the prescribed' limit. The election petition was initially dealt with by Shri S.R. Vyas, District Judge, Raipur, who constituted the Election Tribunal under section 86 of the Act. From his decision on a preliminary point, the case went up to the Supreme Court and then came back to Raipur for trial on merits. Shri B.K. Choudhari was then specially appointed Election Tribunal for the trial of this election petition. The respondent contested the election petition. The learned Tribunal, by its order dated December 28, 1966, decided all the issues against the election petitioner and dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by that order, the election petitioner preferred this appeal on July 1, 1967. 4. The respondent raised two preliminary objections: (1) That the appeal was barred by time; and (2) that the appeal became infructuous as, in the meantime, the Assembly, to which the respondent had been returned, had been dissolved and fresh general elections had taken place in February 1967. Both these preliminary objections were rejected by our order dated May 4, 1968 [ 1970 JLJ 342 ]. 5. Both these preliminary objections were rejected by our order dated May 4, 1968 [ 1970 JLJ 342 ]. 5. By the same order of May 4, 1968, certain preliminary points raised by the appellant were also disposed of. It was held that the cross-examination of the respondent had been abruptly closed by the Tribunal; that the appellants applications for leave to amend the election petition had been wrongly rejected by the tribunal and that the tribunal wrongly refused to admit in evidence three documents. We permitted one witness to be examined by the appellant to prove that the respondent had paid to the Congress Part) Rs.200/- as application fee and Rs.500/- as deposit for being given, a Congress ticket, which expenses were not included in the respondent's return of election expenses. By consent of the parties and as necessited by the amendment of the election petition, we amended certain issues and framed a few additional issues. The appellant then examined Ramnarayan Purohit (P.W. 93) After that the respondent was recalled. He was further examined-in-chief and then further cross examined. The respondent was given a fresh opportunity to produce such further evidence as he chose to. He filed a list of the following witnesses:- (1) Chakrapani Shukla, resident of Baloda Bazar, District Raipur, (2) Permanand Bbai Patel, Jabalpur, (3) One Munim of parmanand Bhai Patel, Jabalpur, and (4) Laxmi Shankar Bhatt, Jabalpur. But eventually he abandoned them all, and did not examine any. 6. Then, on August 29, 1968, the appellant made an application for production of three more documents: (i) A document purporting to be in the handwriting of and signed by Jaideo Satpati, about the expenditure of Rs.516/- not shown in the return of election expenses of the respondent. (ii) A document purporting to be in the hand writing of and signed by Maheshdutt Dube of Sagar, addressed to the respondent about procuring motor vehicles from Jabalpur and Sagar ;and showing the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and also expenses of petrol. (iii) A telegram dated May 4, 1963, sent from Jabalpur by "Bidiwala" (telegraphic address) to Parmanand Bhai Patel C/o Chakrapani Shukla, in order to prove the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and of Chakrapani Shukla, and also to prove that motor vehicles were procured by the respondent. (iii) A telegram dated May 4, 1963, sent from Jabalpur by "Bidiwala" (telegraphic address) to Parmanand Bhai Patel C/o Chakrapani Shukla, in order to prove the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and of Chakrapani Shukla, and also to prove that motor vehicles were procured by the respondent. Since this application was for production of additional evidence, by our order dated August 31, 1968, the application was kept in abeyance for being considered at the hearing of the appeal. If we allowed these documents to be produced, the appellant would have been further required to produce oral evidence to prove them. However, at the hearing of the appeal that application was not pressed and was impliedly abandoned. 7. In Jagjit Singh Vs. Kartar Singh [AIR 1956 SC 773], it is held:- "The jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an election appeal under section 116-A of the Act is very wide. It is open to the High Court' to re-appreciate the evidence and consider the propriety, correctness or legality of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order under appeal Naturally, as a Court of appeal, the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal, which are based merely on appreciation of oral evidence. But this is not to say that the High Court cannot so interfere, if it comes to the conclusion that impugned finding is erroneous and deserves to be reversed." Let it be mentioned at the outset that Shri Kanhaiyalal Mishra, learned Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh, who argued before us the respondent's case, frankly told us that he would support the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, but would not adopt the reasons stated in its order. And, in fact he did not refer to any part of the Tribunal's order in the course of his arguments. BRIBERY 8. The appellant's case is that one Dr. Ausaf Hussain of Sagar made an offer of Rs.50,000/- to him at Raipur, as an inducement to withdraw from the election. The appellant, as P.W. 5, states that on the morning of the April 6,1963, Ausaf Hussain went to his residence at about 5-30 and asked him brothers, Chandra Prakash Sharma, and Vyasnarain Sharma who were studying in his office, to wake him up. The appellant, as P.W. 5, states that on the morning of the April 6,1963, Ausaf Hussain went to his residence at about 5-30 and asked him brothers, Chandra Prakash Sharma, and Vyasnarain Sharma who were studying in his office, to wake him up. When he came into his office and the boys were outside Ausaf Hussain first told him that he and the respondent are both brahmins, but the respondent alone could establish a Brahmin Raj. (After discussing evidence in paragraphs 9 to 17, his Lordship proceeded-) 18. Besides, the attending circumstances do not support the allegation that that person approached the petitioner with the respondent's consent. On the appellant's own showing, he was a stranger not only to the petitioner but also to the place generally. Further, he had no notable status. It is almost impossible to believe that the respondent would fix his choice on such a person for such a huge sum as Rs.50,000. It was not as if the respondent could not find any other person at Raipur for the job. It was not as if he was a person who could exert his influence upon the appellant. Thus, it must be held that the petitioner could not prove that Ausaf Hussain was an agent of the respondent, nor could he prove that Ausaf Hussain offered the bribe to or approached the petitioner. The question of consent of the respondent does not then arise. It seems that some irresponsible person, of his own accord, or at the instance of some other supporter of the respondent, may have approached the petitioner and may have recklessly and irresponsibly thrown out a feeler to assess the strength of the petitioner. No one saw the cash which he supposedly carried in his beg. 19. For these reasons it must be held as not proved that Dr. Ausaf Hussain offered a bribe to the petitioner with the consent of the respondent. 20. The appellant's request that Dr. Ausaf Hussain should be named under section 99 of the Act must also be consequently rejected at once. Offer of bribe by a person who is not an agent of a candidate is not a corrupt practice within section 123 (1) of the Act unless it is committed with the consent of the candidate. VEHICLES : - 21. Ausaf Hussain should be named under section 99 of the Act must also be consequently rejected at once. Offer of bribe by a person who is not an agent of a candidate is not a corrupt practice within section 123 (1) of the Act unless it is committed with the consent of the candidate. VEHICLES : - 21. The appellant's contention is that the respondent and with his consent, his agents and workers, hired or procured on payment or otherwise, motor vehicles for conveying the electors to polling stations in the constituency and thus committed the corrupt practice as defined in section 123(5) of the Act. He gave the following particulars:- Vehicles Polling Station Voters Jeep MPR 2401 Sarkhon No. 3 Voters of village Pandariya Jeep No. MPR 5191 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Nandi Jeep No. BYJ 3902 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Hardi MPL 272 Barely No. 28 Voters of village Nargha and Darri Jeep No. MPR 5166 Siriadih No. 15 Voters of village Lata MPJ (I) 1636 Sinodha No. 14 Voters of village Deorikala 10 Bullock-Carts Sel. No. 24 Voters of village Bhusada, Chandidih and Bhanwarid MPR 183 Jeep MPL 1541 Amodi No. 25 Voters of Nawapara Jeep No. MPL 220 Jeep APX 1593 Baloda No. 10 Voters of Semara and Baloda BYJ 4749 Kadgi No. 12 Voters of village Sarwani, Lakhmmisati MPL 1839 Amarua 47 voters of village Chandan MPR 207 (Truck) PAKRID No. 48 Voters of village Charoda MPL 977 Pisid No. 33 Voters of village Charched MHN 1170 Motia No. 26 Voters of Madowa, Turkindid and Kotiodih 22. The basic ingredients of the corrupt practice under subsection (5) of section 123 of the Act, are (1) that any vehicle was hired or procured for the conveyance of voters; and (2) that such hiring or procurement was by the candidate himself or by his agent or any other person with his or his election agent's consent. Thus, the main ingredient consists of hiring or procuring of the vehicle. An election petition must furnish the names of the persons who hired or procured and such other particulars as the petitioner can possibly do It is necessary to prove that the hiring or procurement was for the specific purpose, that is for conveying the: electors to or from any polling station. An election petition must furnish the names of the persons who hired or procured and such other particulars as the petitioner can possibly do It is necessary to prove that the hiring or procurement was for the specific purpose, that is for conveying the: electors to or from any polling station. The actual user of the vehicle hired or procured for carrying electors, is not an ingredient of the corrupt practice under that sub-section. Evidence of such user is, therefore, not quite essential, except in so far as it has a considerable bearing on the question of the purpose of hiring or procurement. 23. Mere reproduction of the words of a section does not constitute a pleading. The election petitioner is bound to set out in his petition the facta probanda that is, the facts on which be relies, though not facta probantia, that is the evidence or the facts by means of which they are to be proved. In the particulars supplied by the petitioner (para 6 (b) of the petition) names of the "agents and workers" of the respondent, who hired or procured vehicles, were not specified. The particulars were, therefore, not sufficient to meet the requirement of the law. That being the position, the respondent ought to have moved the tribunal to strike out paragraph 6 (a) and (b). But this was not done. The tribunal framed issue No.7 and the parties went to trial. The particulars being insufficient, the Tribunal ought to have adopted the following course: The petition could not be dismissed in limine. The Tribunal was bound to decide whether the petition was defective for want of particulars and if it so held, it should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. In the event of non-compliance with that order, the Tribunal could strike out the charge as being vague. It is an accepted rule that full particulars of a corrupt practice must be insisted upon as of paramount importance in the trial of an election petition. But, if the parties go to trial inspite of the absence of full particulars and evidence is led by them on the plea raised in the petition, the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction. But, if the parties go to trial inspite of the absence of full particulars and evidence is led by them on the plea raised in the petition, the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction. In that situation, the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the plea even in the absence of particulars. The appellate Court would be justified in setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that material prejudice has resulted by reason of the absence of full particulars. But the appellate Court will give due weight to the omission on the part of the respondent to raise and press his objection about the absence of particulars before going to trial. See Balwansingh Vs. Laxminarain [22 ELR 273]. In Bhikaji Keshao Joshi Vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [ (1955) 2 SCR 428 (411)], it was observed:- "There can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of full particulars is one that has got to be complied with, sufficient fullness and clarification so as to enable the opposite party fairly to meet them and that they must be such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and roving inquisition." That case was distinguished in Bhagwan Datta Vs. Ram Ratanji [ AIR 1960 SC 200 ] where it was urged that in the absence of adequate particulars the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to admit evidence on the plea or to give a finding thereon. Their Lordships said:- "There can be no doubt that the requirement of full particulars is of paramount importance in cases of this kind as in cases of the ordinary Courts based on allegations of fraud or undue influence. But unlike the one in the above decision of this Court relied upon, in which the questions that arose was as to the validity of an order dismissing the entire election petition on the preliminary ground of absence of particulars, the question in this case is different. This is a case where notwithstanding the absence of particulars, the evidence was allowed to be given and taken. The question in such a case would not be one of absence of jurisdiction but as to whether there has been any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars. It is in that light that the validity of the objection raised by the appellant in this behalf before us has to be judged. The question in such a case would not be one of absence of jurisdiction but as to whether there has been any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars. It is in that light that the validity of the objection raised by the appellant in this behalf before us has to be judged. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize the nature of the evidence on which this finding had been arrived at and to see whether the appellant had a fair opportunity of meeting it." In the present case, an issue was framed and the parties went to trial. The petitioner led oral and documentary evidence in respect of each polling station. We shall, therefore, decide the issue on merits despite want of full particulars. [After discussing evidence on this point in paragraph 24 his Lordship proceeded]. 25. Their Lordship's decision in Sheopal Singh Vs. Harishchandra [ AIR 1960 SC 1217 ], is not opposite to this case. There it was held that where a candidate after getting knowledge of the act of a corrupt practice on a polling day does not prohibit the repetition of similar acts on the following polling days, it is a reasonable inference to draw that all the acts were not haphazard but by design and that the candidate must have consented to them. 26. It was argued that it was an error to infer consent from the mere fact that the appellant had knowledge of the acts. It was further argued that consent to an act implied that it was given before it was done, but knowledge of an act could only mean that it was after the act was done. Therefore, knowledge cannot in itself be equated with consent. Their Lordships said: "There would have been force in this argument, if all that was established was a stray act or even a number of them 'committed on one day. But here the acts were numerous and extended over a number of days............From the above facts it is not an unreasonable inference to draw that all the above acts were committed not haphazard but by design and that applicant must have consented to them." In the present case, no material was placed before us to reach that conclusion. But here the acts were numerous and extended over a number of days............From the above facts it is not an unreasonable inference to draw that all the above acts were committed not haphazard but by design and that applicant must have consented to them." In the present case, no material was placed before us to reach that conclusion. As regards the polling stations in group (d), Shri Munshi conceded that there is no evidence to show who hired or procured vehicles for conveying the electors to those polling stations. 27. A great deal of stress was laid by Shri Munshi on the purchase of a large quantity of petrol by the respondent on the May 3, 1963; when the poll was to be taken on the 4th May. It was argued that this large quantity of petrol could only be meant for consumption in motor vehicle which had been hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. From the return of the respondent's election expenses and from the woks of account of Nawalchand Nathmal of Bhalapara, it was clear that on the 3rd May, that is, the day proceeding the poll, 600 letres of petrol for Rs.534 besides some motor oil and brake oil, were purchased by the respondent (per voucher No. 54, filed with the return). On the respondents own showing, he had only one motor vehicle (a jeep). It could not possibly consume 600 litres of petrol within two days. The appellant, therefore, persuaded to hold that this petrol must have been used in motor vehicles which were hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. Undoubtedly; this creates a very strong suspicion because from the Bhatapara petrol pump, this was the largest quantity of petrol purchased on any particular day by the respondent. But this suspicion is not enough to hold definitely that vehicles were hired or procured for the purpose of conveying electors to the polling stations. 28. In Josh Bhai Chunnibhai Patel Vs. Anwar Beg A. Mirza [Civil Appeal No. 799 of 1968, decided on the 19th September 1968], the Supreme Court has held that section 123 (5) requires these things:- (1) Hiring or procuring of a vehicle, (2) by a candidate or his agent, etc. and (3) for the free conveyance of an elector. 28. In Josh Bhai Chunnibhai Patel Vs. Anwar Beg A. Mirza [Civil Appeal No. 799 of 1968, decided on the 19th September 1968], the Supreme Court has held that section 123 (5) requires these things:- (1) Hiring or procuring of a vehicle, (2) by a candidate or his agent, etc. and (3) for the free conveyance of an elector. In addition to proving the hiring or procuring and the carriage of electors to and from the polling station, it must further be proved that the electors used the vehicle of free of cost themselves. Their Lordships observed: "In the instant case, the vehicles were procured, but there was no proof that there was flee conveyance of the ladles in these vehicles. It is not impossible of proof because the owner of the car or the driver or the ladies could have been examined to show that the ladies have travelled free in the vehicles. Since this is not proved, toe ingredients of the section have not been established." (See Supreme Court Notes of October 15, 1968, page 384). In the present case there is no such evidence- 29. Accordingly, it must be held as follows:- (1) It is not proved that the respondent or respondent No. 2 hired or procured any vehicles for the purpose of conveying electors to any polling station, nor it is proved that either of them actually conveyed and voter of Pisid Polling Station, or any other polling station. (2) It is proved that voters were conveyed in vehicles No. BYJ 4749 to the Polling Station Katanji, but it is not proved that if was Bhuwan Bhaskar Singh who had brought them. (3) It is proved that Wasudeo Chandrakar and 2 male voters and 7 females and some children were seen together in a jeep between village Lata Siriadih Polling station, which jeep was proceeding towards the Polling Station, but it is not proved that the vehicle in which they were seen together was hired or procured by Wasudeo Chandrakar; nor is it proved that he had brought the voters from the village with the consent of the respondent. (4) It is proved that voters were conveyed to polling station Amodi from Village Nawapara in vehicles No. MPR 183 and MPL 1541, but it is not proved that it was Rohini Kumar Bajpai who had brought them or that he had any connection with either of them. (5) It is proved that 59 voters were conveyed in a truck No. MPR 207 to Pikrid Polling Station but it is proved that Munnalal Shukla or Jaideo Satpati had conveyed these electors or that they either hired or procured it. (6) The petitioner could not prove that any vehicle was hired or procured with the respondent's consent for the purpose of conveying electors. 30. Therefore, the contention must be rejected. FALSE STATEMENT 31. The appellant's next contention is that three false statements (these will hereinafter be called Annexures 1, 2 and 3 as they were called all along during the course of the hearing) in relation to his personal conduct and• character were published with the respondent's consent in the Mahakoshal and they were calculated to prejudice his election prospects. The Mahakoshal a Hindi Daily was published from Raipur and circulated in the constituency during the election period. Shyamacharan Shukla, an active supporter, worker and agent of the respondent, was its owner, printer, publisher and editor. The offending statements were published in the issues dated 12th April, 26th April and 4th May, 1963. The appellant attaches much significance to these dates in pointing out the motive and the background with which each of them was published. 32. Annexure-1 - In the issue of the 12th April, the following statement appeared in the Mahakoshal:- "On the last date for withdrawal, the P.S.P. candidate clearly stated that unless he was paid Rs.15,000/- for contesting the election, he would withdraw his candidature. According to knowledgeable sources, the PSP candidate fictitiously gave out that he had already received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/- so that if the PSP would not pay him Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw after taking Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of Mishra..................Thakur Niranjan Singh, the convenor of the P.S.P. election campaign, is somewhat dull He could not appreciate the vakil's bid of bargen and eventually Thakur Saheb 'accepted the goods' (agreed to pay) and gave him full authority to spend so that the needful be done". This statement will hereinafter be called “Annexure 1”. This statement will hereinafter be called “Annexure 1”. The petitioner is an Advocate and was the only P.S.P. candidate. The words "P.S.P. candidate" and "Vakil" in the above passage admittedly refer to him. According to the petitioner, the above statement was published for the purpose of conveying that the petitioner had been promised or had been paid Rs.15.000/- for contesting as a PSP candidate and that the petitioner had bargained for it, by threatening to withdraw his candidature and further that he would stoop so low as to accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate in order to withdraw from the contest. 33. The petitioner says that this statement was published about him. He was the only P.S.P. candidate and the only Vakil (Advocate) contesting from the Kasdol constituency. He says that these allegations were false. It was false that he threatened to withdraw his candidature, if he was not paid Rs.15,000/- or that he would accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of the rival candidate. It was false that he fictitiously gave out that he had received offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. It was also false that Thakur Niranjansingh either gave him or offered to give him Rs.15,000/- and authorised him to spend it. In short, every part of the statement ascribed to him was false. He says that he did not meet Thakur Niranjansingh during the entire election period, that is, between the date of the notification and the taking of poll. 34. Niranjansingh (P.W. 43) supports the petitioner and says that he did not meet the latter on any days between the 3rd April and the 4th May, and that there was no such talk between him and the petitioner as was reported in the news item (Annexure I). 35. The statement (Annexure I) may conveniently be divided into four parts:- (1) The petitioner, on the last date for withdrawal made a statement threatening to withdraw if he was not paid Rs.15,000/-. (2) The petitioner had made a false statement that he had received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. (3) If the P.S.P. would not give the petitioner Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw, after accepting Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate. (4) Eventually, Thakur Niranjan Singh agreed to pay and also authorised the petitioner to spend it. (2) The petitioner had made a false statement that he had received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. (3) If the P.S.P. would not give the petitioner Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw, after accepting Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate. (4) Eventually, Thakur Niranjan Singh agreed to pay and also authorised the petitioner to spend it. The authorship of the first two parts is ascribed to the petitioner, while that of the fourth to the writer of the news item. The authorship of the third part is ambiguous. It may be construed as a statement by .the petitioner; it may also be interpreted as an expression of opinion of the news reporter. It is proved by the evidence of the petitioner that he never made the statements the authorship of which is attributed to him. The petitioner could only swear to prove a negative fact and this he did. We do not find anything in his statement for which he should not be believed. No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of any of these statements. As will be seen white dealing with another point arising in connection with this alleged corrupt practice the Mahakoshal actively supported the respondent's candidature and carried on intensive propaganda for him. So also Shyamacharan Shukla was an active supporter of the respondent. The respondent did not produce any correspondent who was the author of the news item to prove the fourth part of the statement, which obviously emanated: from him, and also to prove that the first two statements were actually made by the petitioner. In fact, truth was not pleaded in defence. The respondent admitted that there was no other Vakil or P.S.P. candidate at the election concerned. (Deposition date 9-8-1968) It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure I) related to the petitioner's personal conduct and character und that it was false. 36. It was an argument before us that Annexure I cannot be said to be a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4) of the Act, but it is a mere-expression of opinion. It is not possible to accept this argument is respect of the first part of the statement the very opening words of the news item "HUA YE KI" (it so happened) incontestably express what actually happened, that is to say, that the petitioner actually made that statement. It is not possible to accept this argument is respect of the first part of the statement the very opening words of the news item "HUA YE KI" (it so happened) incontestably express what actually happened, that is to say, that the petitioner actually made that statement. The making of a statement is a fact and the publication of that fact is a statement of fact which, if found to be false, is within the mischief of the section. The second part is also a statement of fact inasmuch as it tells the reader that a fictitious statement had been made by the petitioner to "knowledgeable sources". The fourth part of the statement is again a statement of fact, that Niranjan Sing accepted the "goods" (meaning that he agreed to make payment to the petitioner and authorised him to spend it). 37. Subsection (4) requires: (1) there was publication of any statement of fact by a candidate or with his consent; (2) the statement is false; (3) the candidate believes it to be false of does not believe it to be true; (4) it relates to the personal character or conduct or another candidate; and (5) the statement is reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the other candidate's election. Sheopal Singh v. Ramratan [1964 (1) SCR 175]. The third element refers to the belief of the candidate publishing the statement, or, who is in the eye of law responsible for it and not the belief of the person who actually made the false statement This proposition has been succinctly laid down and fully explained by their Lordships in Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Sharma [ AIR 1967 SC 808 ], thus:- “The responsibility of the candidate for the publication arises if he publishes the thing himself. He is equally responsible for the publication if it is published by his agent. Thirdly, he is also responsible where the thing is published by any other person but with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. In all the three cases, the responsibility is of the candidate and it is ordinarily the candidate's belief that matters for this purpose. If the candidate either believes the statement to be false or does not believe it to be true, he would be responsible under section 123 (4)............... In all the three cases, the responsibility is of the candidate and it is ordinarily the candidate's belief that matters for this purpose. If the candidate either believes the statement to be false or does not believe it to be true, he would be responsible under section 123 (4)............... It is the candidate's belief that matter and not the belief of the person who actually made it with the consent of the candidate". Dr. Jagjeet Singh Vs. Gyani Kartar Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 773 ]. When the first part of Annexure 1 was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he said:- "I cannot say whether the statement is true or not. I would prefer to say that it is not true." With regard to the second and the fourth parts of Annexure 1, the respondent's answer is:- "I have absolutely no knowledge about its correctness or otherwise." An argument was constructed by the learned Advocate General that when a person says that he has no knowledge cannot be said that he either believes it to be false or does not believe it to be true. According to him, if a person does not believe a thing to be true, the alternatives are:- (1) He believes it to be false; or (2) he does not believe it to be true; or (3) be neither knows whether it is true or false. But in our opinion, the third also means that he does not believe it to be true, because, otherwise, he cannot say that he does not know whether it is true or false. To put; it differently if one does not believe thing to be false, he either believes it to be true or does not believe it to be true. The expressions used in section 123 (4) of the Act are: "believes to be false" and "does not believe to be true". These are also the expressions used, for instance, in sections 171 (g), 191 and 199 of the Penal Code. These expressions are different from "knowing or believing to be false" as employed in sections 197 and 203, Penal Code, or "knowing to be false" in sections 196, 198, 200 and 209. 38. The next contention advanced for the respondent is that the statement (Annexure I) cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. These expressions are different from "knowing or believing to be false" as employed in sections 197 and 203, Penal Code, or "knowing to be false" in sections 196, 198, 200 and 209. 38. The next contention advanced for the respondent is that the statement (Annexure I) cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. The learned Advocate General construed the statement as to carry an effect on the electors which would raise the prestige of the petitioner either for his cleverness or honesty. The reader would think that there is nothing wrong in a candidate asking his party to finance him and the reader will also be favourably impressed by the petitioner demanding only Rs.15,000 in preference to Rs.50,000 offered him as a bribe. On this interpretation, it was argued that the statement is not within the mischief of section 123 (4), as its effect would be wholesome and would only advocate the petitioners' prospects. We are unable to accept this logic. It is first of all to he remembered that the test if not to evolve a possible or ingenious interpretation. A news item is not a matter for research of contemplation. That meaning must be attached which the news item will convey immediately and plainly at the first glance. We are clearly of the opinion that the effect which the news item (Annexure I) will at once create on the mind of the reader is that the petitioner extorted money from his party under the threat of withdrawing from the candidature. Secondly, the demand of Rs.15,000 was also exorbitant and, therefore, extortious because the permissible limit of election expenses under the law was Rs.7000. Thirdly, the expression "LATIFA SUNAYA" stamps the petitioner as a person who fabricates stories. All this was bound to, or atleast reasonably calculated to lower the petitioner in the estimation of the electorate and thus prejudice his election prospects. 39. Shri Munshi laid a great deal of stress on the context in which the statement (Annexure I) was published (1) In the issue of the 8th April, the Mahakoshal published a report entitled as a report by "Sanjay" with the caption "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI": (Sanjay figures in the Mahabharat as one invested with the superhuman power of seeing all that was happening at the battle field and relating It to Dhritrashtra. Thus, it means a farsighted person). In that article the respondent was compared favourably with Raja Bhoj and the petitioner with Gangu Teli. The latter was shown to be a dwarf like an oil-man in contrast to the former who was styled a King. Although the aim of this article was to belittle the petitioner, it was little realised that it would offend and annoy the Teli voters, whose number was fairly large, and, further they would cast their votes, on the ground of brotherhood; in favour of the petitioner who had been stamped a Teli. (ii) The petitioner's statement about Dr. Ausaf Hussain's offer had appeared in three news-papers Nav Bharat, Nai Duniya and Yugdharma on the 10th April. To neutralise the effect created by these two, this offending statement (Annexure I) was published in the Mahakoshal of the 12th April, imputing to the petitioner that he was out to grab Rs.15,000/- by extending a threat to his party, and conveying to the electorate that the story of the offer of Rs.50,000/- was a myth. And this was quickly followed by a statement (Ex. P-76) issued by the respondent, which was published in the Mahakoshal of the 13th April. Shri Munshi argued that although this statement ostensibly expressed dis-appropriation of the article 'KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI", in reality its aim was to pacify the Teli community. In this statement (Ex. P-76) it was suggested that in the legend, it was "Raja Gangeya Deo Telangan" who had fought with Raja Bhoj, and then it became a saying "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGEYA TELANGAN", as time passed, the saying depreciated into "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI." The article then goes on to say that in the Sanskrit "Tel" means "Sneh" (affection) so that the Teli community is 'very affectionate.' 40. This background and Shri Munshi's argument we shall bear in mind when we shall deal with the question whether the statement (Annexure I) was published by the respondent or with his consent, which question remains to be seen. Since the question is common to all the three annexures, it will be convenient to deal with it at one place. 41. Annexure 2 - The second 0ffending statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal, issue dated the 26th April. Since the question is common to all the three annexures, it will be convenient to deal with it at one place. 41. Annexure 2 - The second 0ffending statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal, issue dated the 26th April. It is a news item with the caption: "NEHRUJI MAHATMA GANDHI KE HATYARE KAMAL NARAYAN PAGLA GAYA". (Nehruji murderer of Mahatma Gandhi? Kamal Narayan has gone mad). The news is that on the 23rd April, "the official candidate of the P.S.P. "while delivering a speech at Bar village from a cloth shop, uttered: "RASHTRA PITA BAPU KA HATYARA NEHRU HAI" (Nehru is the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation). 42. The petiti0ner, as P.W. 5, stated that he was always in his sense and it was wrong to say that he has lost his mental equilibrium. It was also wrong to say that he had gone to Bar village on the 23rd April or that he called a meeting or that he began delivering a speech from any cloth shop and "it is also false that I said there that Nehru was the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation." The petitioner's statement on oath must be believed as it was not rebutted, nor was the news item pleaded, nor did the respondent make any endeavour to produce the news correspondent. It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure II) is false. The impugned news item is a representation of what the. petitioner reportedly uttered at a meeting. When it was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he stated:- "I have absolutely no idea whether the fact published in Annexure II is true or false. I was not present at that meeting." This means that the respondent did not believe it to be true. (Reasons already stated in connection with Annexure I). 43. According to the objected statement the petitioner uttered those words factually. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that it is a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4). 44. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that to call Nebruji the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi would be an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact; it is figurative language meaning that Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, did not pursue and translate into action the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. 44. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that to call Nebruji the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi would be an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact; it is figurative language meaning that Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, did not pursue and translate into action the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Further, this opinion will relate to the speaker's political conduct. The argument would have deserved some consideration if Mahatma Gandhi's assessination had not been a fact, which is unforgettable. The reader's mind will immediately connect the statement with it and it will register the plain and apparent meaning and its natural impact. 45. But what we are really concerned with is not what the petitioner uttered (according to the news item) but whether the statement (Annexure II) published by the Mahakoshal representing to its readers that the petitioner uttered those words, is a statement of fact or not. According to the news item, the petitioner went to the village and there started his speech with that utterance. Thus, all this is a statement of fact, which we have found to be false. Further, there can be no doubt that the objected statement relates to the personal conduct and character of the petitioner, depicting it as base and mean. In Inderlal Vs. Lal Singh [ AIR 1962 SC 1156 ], Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court, explained the distinction in these words:- "In order that the ejections should be free it is necessary that the electorate should be educated on political issues in a fearless manner and so the Legislature thought that full and ample scope should be left for free and fearless criticism by candidates against the public and political character of their opponents. But the position with regard to the private or personal character of the candidate is very different. Circulation of false statements about the private or personal character of the candidate during the period proceeding elections is likely to work against the freedom of election itself in as much as the effect created by false statements cannot be met by denials in proper time and so the constituency has to re protected against the circulation of such false statements which are likely to affect the voting of the electors. That is why it is for the protection of the constituency against acts which would be fatal to the freedom of election that the statute provides for the inclusion of the circulation of false statements concerning the private character of a candidate amongst corrupt practices. Dissemination of false statements about the personal character of a candidate thus constitutes a corrupt practice.................................In discussing the distinction between the private character and the public character sometimes reference is made to the man 'beneath the politician' and it is said that if a statement of fact affects the man beneath the politician, it touches private character and if it affects the politician, it does not touch his private character." The same distinction was expressed in Guruji Shrihari Vs. Vitthalrao [CA 1178 of 1967 decided on the 19th November 1968, (SC)] thus:- "When false allegation of fact pierces the politician and touches the person of the candidate, then section 123 (4) is contravened". 46. It was not contended before us that the impugned statement (Annexure II) was not calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. 47. Shri Munshi pointed out that the setting in which this statement appeared in the Mahakoshal was this: (1) An appeal of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to vote for the respondent was widely and profusely circulated through cards and also through the Mahakoshal Pandit Nehru's photograph was also printed with his appeal. Being a very respected and beloved leader of the country, his appeal was bound to have great influence on the electorate in favour of the respondent. 48. To counteract that influence, Gopinath Sharma, a petitioner's sympathiser, published on the 23rd April a leaflet (Ex. P-135) in which was reproduced the respondents letter dated September 9, 1951, addressed to Seth Govindas, President, Mahakoshal provincial Congress Committee, by which letter the respondent resigned an offices which he held and also the primary membership of the Congress. The following passages are emphasised by Shri Munshi:- "The immediate cause for submitting the resignation is the act of the Prime Minister to turn out Shri Purushottamdas Tandon and to himself become the President and thus an absolute dictator. After the occurrence of this immediate cause, my continuation in the Congress will mean betraying the country. The removal of Rajrishi Tandon is.........murder of democracy. This sin has been committed with the help of Nehruji because of his lust for winning the election. After the occurrence of this immediate cause, my continuation in the Congress will mean betraying the country. The removal of Rajrishi Tandon is.........murder of democracy. This sin has been committed with the help of Nehruji because of his lust for winning the election. This is the limit of degeneration of the Congress. The 8th September 1951 will be regarded as an inauspicious day in the history of India. I regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence a curse for India......". At the top of this letter its publisher (Gopinath Sharma) asks “How will Mishraji who calls Pandit Nehru a dictator and the murderer of democracy, strengthen his hands". Then he writes that the letter is being published to inform the general public to what extent the Congress candidate, Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, hates the Prime Minister of the country Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At the bottom of the letter the publisher asks the respondent four questions: (1) By re-entering the Congress are you not betraying the country? (2) Has your re-entry in the Congress and the grant of Congress ticket to you stopped the murder of democracy within the Congress (3) According to your letter the Congress had reached the limit of degeneration in 1961, at what level it is now, (4) when you regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence as a curse for India, why are you seeking votes in his name ?" 49. Another leaflet (Ex. P-157) was published by one Triveni Shankar, another sympathiser of the petitioner. To this leaflet, a letter of Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, dated January 16, 1952, addressed to the President, Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee, was reproduced. Another leaflet (Ex. P-157) was published by one Triveni Shankar, another sympathiser of the petitioner. To this leaflet, a letter of Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, dated January 16, 1952, addressed to the President, Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee, was reproduced. In that letter, Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla wrote, inter and, that after leaving the Congress, the respondent delivered strong speeches against the Congress, in Delhi and several towns of Uttar Pradesh, from the Jan Sangh platform; that the respondent tried to create a new political body, named 'Lok Congress': and made an effort to set up candidates who would contest election against the Congress candidates from all the 232 Constituencies of Madhya Pradesh; and that when he did not succeed and foresaw", dark future, he tried to re-enter the Congress but that had become impossible Pandit Shukla referred to his letter which he had earlier given to the respondent and said that apprehending that it would be exploited, this letter was written to explain the occasion on which and the circumstances in which he had given that letter to the respondent. 50. In the said leaflet (Ex. P-157), the publisher says that Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla's aforesaid letter was published by Seth Govinddas and he asks whether the respondent, Shymacharan Shukla. Pandit Shankarlal Tiwari, or Pandit Shyam Sunder Mushran will contradict in writing the view expressed by the late Ravi Shankerji about Pandit Mishra. Mr. Munshi's contention is that the effect on the electorate of these leaflets Exs.P-157 and P-155 which were published on the and 23rd April respectively, was going to be tramendously prejudicial to the respondent's election prospects. Having regard to the degree of esteem and love which the people had for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, nothing could counteract that effect unless some statement involving the name of Pandit Nehru and causing hurt to the feelings of the voters, was attributed to the petitioner and published to the electorate And, nothing worse could be imagined about pandit Nehru than that he was the murderer of Bapu. It is with this hack ground and in this setting that the statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal. 51. At the end of the trial before the Tribunal, the petitioner produced Shyamlal (P.W. 91), who stated that the respondent himself was the author of the news item (annexure II). It is with this hack ground and in this setting that the statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal. 51. At the end of the trial before the Tribunal, the petitioner produced Shyamlal (P.W. 91), who stated that the respondent himself was the author of the news item (annexure II). Shri Munshi relied on this direct evidence and also the attending circumstances to show that the respondent himself was the author of Annexure II, or, at any rate, it was published with his consent. This point we shall consider at its appropriate place. The learned Advocate General vehemently criticized the evidence of Shyamlal and stamped it as concocted. Judgment Shivdayal, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the people Act, 1951, as it stood before the amendment of 1966, (hereinafter called "the Act"), from a decision of the Election Tribunal, Raipur. 2. After the general elections of 1962 the Kasdol Legislative Assembly constituency was called upon to elect a person for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The appellant (hereinafter also called "the petitioner") was a candidate set up by the Praja Socialist Party; Shri D.P. Mishra, respondent No. 1, (hereinafter called "the respondent") was the Congress candidate; and one Purushottamdas was an independent candidate. Kanhaiyalal Mishra (respondent No.2) had also filed his nomination paper as a Congress candidate, but he withdrew his candidature when the respondent's nomination paper was accepted. Poll was taken on May 4, 1963. The appellant got 4611 votes; the respondent 11528 votes; and Purushottamdas 850. The respondent was declared elected. 3. By an election petition, the appellant challenged the election of the respondent on various charges of corrupt practice, which may be classified into four heads: (1) Bribery; (2) publication of false statements, (3) hiring or procuring of vehicles for conveyance of electors, and (4) incurring or authorising election expenses in excess of the prescribed' limit. The election petition was initially dealt with by Shri S.R. Vyas, District Judge, Raipur, who constituted the Election Tribunal under section 86 of the Act. From his decision on a preliminary point, the case went up to the Supreme Court and then came back to Raipur for trial on merits. Shri B.K. Choudhari was then specially appointed Election Tribunal for the trial of this election petition. The respondent contested the election petition. From his decision on a preliminary point, the case went up to the Supreme Court and then came back to Raipur for trial on merits. Shri B.K. Choudhari was then specially appointed Election Tribunal for the trial of this election petition. The respondent contested the election petition. The learned Tribunal, by its order dated December 28, 1966, decided all the issues against the election petitioner and dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by that order, the election petitioner preferred this appeal on July 1, 1967. 4. The respondent raised two preliminary objections: (1) That the appeal was barred by time; and (2) that the appeal became infructuous as, in the meantime, the Assembly, to which the respondent had been returned, had been dissolved and fresh general elections had taken place in February 1967. Both these preliminary objections were rejected by our order dated May 4, 1968 [ 1970 JLJ 342 ]. 5. By the same order of May 4, 1968, certain preliminary points raised by the appellant were also disposed of. It was held that the cross-examination of the respondent had been abruptly closed by the Tribunal; that the appellants applications for leave to amend the election petition had been wrongly rejected by the tribunal and that the tribunal wrongly refused to admit in evidence three documents. We permitted one witness to be examined by the appellant to prove that the respondent had paid to the Congress Part) Rs.200/- as application fee and Rs.500/- as deposit for being given, a Congress ticket, which expenses were not included in the respondent's return of election expenses. By consent of the parties and as necessited by the amendment of the election petition, we amended certain issues and framed a few additional issues. The appellant then examined Ramnarayan Purohit (P.W. 93) After that the respondent was recalled. He was further examined-in-chief and then further cross examined. The respondent was given a fresh opportunity to produce such further evidence as he chose to. He filed a list of the following witnesses:- (1) Chakrapani Shukla, resident of Baloda Bazar, District Raipur, (2) Permanand Bbai Patel, Jabalpur, (3) One Munim of parmanand Bhai Patel, Jabalpur, and (4) Laxmi Shankar Bhatt, Jabalpur. But eventually he abandoned them all, and did not examine any. 6. He filed a list of the following witnesses:- (1) Chakrapani Shukla, resident of Baloda Bazar, District Raipur, (2) Permanand Bbai Patel, Jabalpur, (3) One Munim of parmanand Bhai Patel, Jabalpur, and (4) Laxmi Shankar Bhatt, Jabalpur. But eventually he abandoned them all, and did not examine any. 6. Then, on August 29, 1968, the appellant made an application for production of three more documents: (i) A document purporting to be in the handwriting of and signed by Jaideo Satpati, about the expenditure of Rs.516/- not shown in the return of election expenses of the respondent. (ii) A document purporting to be in the hand writing of and signed by Maheshdutt Dube of Sagar, addressed to the respondent about procuring motor vehicles from Jabalpur and Sagar ;and showing the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and also expenses of petrol. (iii) A telegram dated May 4, 1963, sent from Jabalpur by "Bidiwala" (telegraphic address) to Parmanand Bhai Patel C/o Chakrapani Shukla, in order to prove the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and of Chakrapani Shukla, and also to prove that motor vehicles were procured by the respondent. Since this application was for production of additional evidence, by our order dated August 31, 1968, the application was kept in abeyance for being considered at the hearing of the appeal. If we allowed these documents to be produced, the appellant would have been further required to produce oral evidence to prove them. However, at the hearing of the appeal that application was not pressed and was impliedly abandoned. 7. In Jagjit Singh Vs. Kartar Singh [AIR 1956 SC 773], it is held:- "The jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an election appeal under section 116-A of the Act is very wide. It is open to the High Court' to re-appreciate the evidence and consider the propriety, correctness or legality of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order under appeal Naturally, as a Court of appeal, the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal, which are based merely on appreciation of oral evidence. It is open to the High Court' to re-appreciate the evidence and consider the propriety, correctness or legality of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order under appeal Naturally, as a Court of appeal, the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal, which are based merely on appreciation of oral evidence. But this is not to say that the High Court cannot so interfere, if it comes to the conclusion that impugned finding is erroneous and deserves to be reversed." Let it be mentioned at the outset that Shri Kanhaiyalal Mishra, learned Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh, who argued before us the respondent's case, frankly told us that he would support the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, but would not adopt the reasons stated in its order. And, in fact he did not refer to any part of the Tribunal's order in the course of his arguments. BRIBERY 8. The appellant's case is that one Dr. Ausaf Hussain of Sagar made an offer of Rs.50,000/- to him at Raipur, as an inducement to withdraw from the election. The appellant, as P.W. 5, states that on the morning of the April 6,1963, Ausaf Hussain went to his residence at about 5-30 and asked him brothers, Chandra Prakash Sharma, and Vyasnarain Sharma who were studying in his office, to wake him up. When he came into his office and the boys were outside Ausaf Hussain first told him that he and the respondent are both brahmins, but the respondent alone could establish a Brahmin Raj. (After discussing evidence in paragraphs 9 to 17, his Lordship proceeded-) 18. Besides, the attending circumstances do not support the allegation that that person approached the petitioner with the respondent's consent. On the appellant's own showing, he was a stranger not only to the petitioner but also to the place generally. Further, he had no notable status. It is almost impossible to believe that the respondent would fix his choice on such a person for such a huge sum as Rs.50,000. It was not as if the respondent could not find any other person at Raipur for the job. It was not as if he was a person who could exert his influence upon the appellant. It is almost impossible to believe that the respondent would fix his choice on such a person for such a huge sum as Rs.50,000. It was not as if the respondent could not find any other person at Raipur for the job. It was not as if he was a person who could exert his influence upon the appellant. Thus, it must be held that the petitioner could not prove that Ausaf Hussain was an agent of the respondent, nor could he prove that Ausaf Hussain offered the bribe to or approached the petitioner. The question of consent of the respondent does not then arise. It seems that some irresponsible person, of his own accord, or at the instance of some other supporter of the respondent, may have approached the petitioner and may have recklessly and irresponsibly thrown out a feeler to assess the strength of the petitioner. No one saw the cash which he supposedly carried in his beg. 19. For these reasons it must be held as not proved that Dr. Ausaf Hussain offered a bribe to the petitioner with the consent of the respondent. 20. The appellant's request that Dr. Ausaf Hussain should be named under section 99 of the Act must also be consequently rejected at once. Offer of bribe by a person who is not an agent of a candidate is not a corrupt practice within section 123 (1) of the Act unless it is committed with the consent of the candidate. VEHICLES : - 21. The appellant's contention is that the respondent and with his consent, his agents and workers, hired or procured on payment or otherwise, motor vehicles for conveying the electors to polling stations in the constituency and thus committed the corrupt practice as defined in section 123(5) of the Act. He gave the following particulars:- Vehicles Polling Station Voters Jeep MPR 2401 Sarkhon No. 3 Voters of village Pandariya Jeep No. MPR 5191 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Nandi Jeep No. BYJ 3902 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Hardi MPL 272 Barely No. 28 Voters of village Nargha and Darri Jeep No. MPR 5166 Siriadih No. 15 Voters of village Lata MPJ (I) 1636 Sinodha No. 14 Voters of village Deorikala 10 Bullock-Carts Sel. No. 24 Voters of village Bhusada, Chandidih and Bhanwarid MPR 183 Jeep MPL 1541 Amodi No. 25 Voters of Nawapara Jeep No. MPL 220 Jeep APX 1593 Baloda No. 10 Voters of Semara and Baloda BYJ 4749 Kadgi No. 12 Voters of village Sarwani, Lakhmmisati MPL 1839 Amarua 47 voters of village Chandan MPR 207 (Truck) PAKRID No. 48 Voters of village Charoda MPL 977 Pisid No. 33 Voters of village Charched MHN 1170 Motia No. 26 Voters of Madowa, Turkindid and Kotiodih 22. The basic ingredients of the corrupt practice under subsection (5) of section 123 of the Act, are (1) that any vehicle was hired or procured for the conveyance of voters; and (2) that such hiring or procurement was by the candidate himself or by his agent or any other person with his or his election agent's consent. Thus, the main ingredient consists of hiring or procuring of the vehicle. An election petition must furnish the names of the persons who hired or procured and such other particulars as the petitioner can possibly do It is necessary to prove that the hiring or procurement was for the specific purpose, that is for conveying the: electors to or from any polling station. The actual user of the vehicle hired or procured for carrying electors, is not an ingredient of the corrupt practice under that sub-section. Evidence of such user is, therefore, not quite essential, except in so far as it has a considerable bearing on the question of the purpose of hiring or procurement. 23. Mere reproduction of the words of a section does not constitute a pleading. The election petitioner is bound to set out in his petition the facta probanda that is, the facts on which be relies, though not facta probantia, that is the evidence or the facts by means of which they are to be proved. In the particulars supplied by the petitioner (para 6 (b) of the petition) names of the "agents and workers" of the respondent, who hired or procured vehicles, were not specified. The particulars were, therefore, not sufficient to meet the requirement of the law. That being the position, the respondent ought to have moved the tribunal to strike out paragraph 6 (a) and (b). But this was not done. The tribunal framed issue No.7 and the parties went to trial. The particulars were, therefore, not sufficient to meet the requirement of the law. That being the position, the respondent ought to have moved the tribunal to strike out paragraph 6 (a) and (b). But this was not done. The tribunal framed issue No.7 and the parties went to trial. The particulars being insufficient, the Tribunal ought to have adopted the following course: The petition could not be dismissed in limine. The Tribunal was bound to decide whether the petition was defective for want of particulars and if it so held, it should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. In the event of non-compliance with that order, the Tribunal could strike out the charge as being vague. It is an accepted rule that full particulars of a corrupt practice must be insisted upon as of paramount importance in the trial of an election petition. But, if the parties go to trial inspite of the absence of full particulars and evidence is led by them on the plea raised in the petition, the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction. In that situation, the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the plea even in the absence of particulars. The appellate Court would be justified in setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that material prejudice has resulted by reason of the absence of full particulars. But the appellate Court will give due weight to the omission on the part of the respondent to raise and press his objection about the absence of particulars before going to trial. See Balwansingh Vs. Laxminarain [22 ELR 273]. In Bhikaji Keshao Joshi Vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [ (1955) 2 SCR 428 (411)], it was observed:- "There can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of full particulars is one that has got to be complied with, sufficient fullness and clarification so as to enable the opposite party fairly to meet them and that they must be such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and roving inquisition." That case was distinguished in Bhagwan Datta Vs. Ram Ratanji [ AIR 1960 SC 200 ] where it was urged that in the absence of adequate particulars the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to admit evidence on the plea or to give a finding thereon. Their Lordships said:- "There can be no doubt that the requirement of full particulars is of paramount importance in cases of this kind as in cases of the ordinary Courts based on allegations of fraud or undue influence. But unlike the one in the above decision of this Court relied upon, in which the questions that arose was as to the validity of an order dismissing the entire election petition on the preliminary ground of absence of particulars, the question in this case is different. This is a case where notwithstanding the absence of particulars, the evidence was allowed to be given and taken. The question in such a case would not be one of absence of jurisdiction but as to whether there has been any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars. It is in that light that the validity of the objection raised by the appellant in this behalf before us has to be judged. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize the nature of the evidence on which this finding had been arrived at and to see whether the appellant had a fair opportunity of meeting it." In the present case, an issue was framed and the parties went to trial. The petitioner led oral and documentary evidence in respect of each polling station. We shall, therefore, decide the issue on merits despite want of full particulars. [After discussing evidence on this point in paragraph 24 his Lordship proceeded]. 25. Their Lordship's decision in Sheopal Singh Vs. Harishchandra [ AIR 1960 SC 1217 ], is not opposite to this case. There it was held that where a candidate after getting knowledge of the act of a corrupt practice on a polling day does not prohibit the repetition of similar acts on the following polling days, it is a reasonable inference to draw that all the acts were not haphazard but by design and that the candidate must have consented to them. 26. It was argued that it was an error to infer consent from the mere fact that the appellant had knowledge of the acts. 26. It was argued that it was an error to infer consent from the mere fact that the appellant had knowledge of the acts. It was further argued that consent to an act implied that it was given before it was done, but knowledge of an act could only mean that it was after the act was done. Therefore, knowledge cannot in itself be equated with consent. Their Lordships said: "There would have been force in this argument, if all that was established was a stray act or even a number of them 'committed on one day. But here the acts were numerous and extended over a number of days............From the above facts it is not an unreasonable inference to draw that all the above acts were committed not haphazard but by design and that applicant must have consented to them." In the present case, no material was placed before us to reach that conclusion. As regards the polling stations in group (d), Shri Munshi conceded that there is no evidence to show who hired or procured vehicles for conveying the electors to those polling stations. 27. A great deal of stress was laid by Shri Munshi on the purchase of a large quantity of petrol by the respondent on the May 3, 1963; when the poll was to be taken on the 4th May. It was argued that this large quantity of petrol could only be meant for consumption in motor vehicle which had been hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. From the return of the respondent's election expenses and from the woks of account of Nawalchand Nathmal of Bhalapara, it was clear that on the 3rd May, that is, the day proceeding the poll, 600 letres of petrol for Rs.534 besides some motor oil and brake oil, were purchased by the respondent (per voucher No. 54, filed with the return). On the respondents own showing, he had only one motor vehicle (a jeep). It could not possibly consume 600 litres of petrol within two days. The appellant, therefore, persuaded to hold that this petrol must have been used in motor vehicles which were hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. Undoubtedly; this creates a very strong suspicion because from the Bhatapara petrol pump, this was the largest quantity of petrol purchased on any particular day by the respondent. The appellant, therefore, persuaded to hold that this petrol must have been used in motor vehicles which were hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. Undoubtedly; this creates a very strong suspicion because from the Bhatapara petrol pump, this was the largest quantity of petrol purchased on any particular day by the respondent. But this suspicion is not enough to hold definitely that vehicles were hired or procured for the purpose of conveying electors to the polling stations. 28. In Josh Bhai Chunnibhai Patel Vs. Anwar Beg A. Mirza [Civil Appeal No. 799 of 1968, decided on the 19th September 1968], the Supreme Court has held that section 123 (5) requires these things:- (1) Hiring or procuring of a vehicle, (2) by a candidate or his agent, etc. and (3) for the free conveyance of an elector. In addition to proving the hiring or procuring and the carriage of electors to and from the polling station, it must further be proved that the electors used the vehicle of free of cost themselves. Their Lordships observed: "In the instant case, the vehicles were procured, but there was no proof that there was flee conveyance of the ladles in these vehicles. It is not impossible of proof because the owner of the car or the driver or the ladies could have been examined to show that the ladies have travelled free in the vehicles. Since this is not proved, toe ingredients of the section have not been established." (See Supreme Court Notes of October 15, 1968, page 384). In the present case there is no such evidence- 29. Accordingly, it must be held as follows:- (1) It is not proved that the respondent or respondent No. 2 hired or procured any vehicles for the purpose of conveying electors to any polling station, nor it is proved that either of them actually conveyed and voter of Pisid Polling Station, or any other polling station. (2) It is proved that voters were conveyed in vehicles No. BYJ 4749 to the Polling Station Katanji, but it is not proved that if was Bhuwan Bhaskar Singh who had brought them. (2) It is proved that voters were conveyed in vehicles No. BYJ 4749 to the Polling Station Katanji, but it is not proved that if was Bhuwan Bhaskar Singh who had brought them. (3) It is proved that Wasudeo Chandrakar and 2 male voters and 7 females and some children were seen together in a jeep between village Lata Siriadih Polling station, which jeep was proceeding towards the Polling Station, but it is not proved that the vehicle in which they were seen together was hired or procured by Wasudeo Chandrakar; nor is it proved that he had brought the voters from the village with the consent of the respondent. (4) It is proved that voters were conveyed to polling station Amodi from Village Nawapara in vehicles No. MPR 183 and MPL 1541, but it is not proved that it was Rohini Kumar Bajpai who had brought them or that he had any connection with either of them. (5) It is proved that 59 voters were conveyed in a truck No. MPR 207 to Pikrid Polling Station but it is proved that Munnalal Shukla or Jaideo Satpati had conveyed these electors or that they either hired or procured it. (6) The petitioner could not prove that any vehicle was hired or procured with the respondent's consent for the purpose of conveying electors. 30. Therefore, the contention must be rejected. FALSE STATEMENT 31. The appellant's next contention is that three false statements (these will hereinafter be called Annexures 1, 2 and 3 as they were called all along during the course of the hearing) in relation to his personal conduct and• character were published with the respondent's consent in the Mahakoshal and they were calculated to prejudice his election prospects. The Mahakoshal a Hindi Daily was published from Raipur and circulated in the constituency during the election period. Shyamacharan Shukla, an active supporter, worker and agent of the respondent, was its owner, printer, publisher and editor. The offending statements were published in the issues dated 12th April, 26th April and 4th May, 1963. The appellant attaches much significance to these dates in pointing out the motive and the background with which each of them was published. 32. Shyamacharan Shukla, an active supporter, worker and agent of the respondent, was its owner, printer, publisher and editor. The offending statements were published in the issues dated 12th April, 26th April and 4th May, 1963. The appellant attaches much significance to these dates in pointing out the motive and the background with which each of them was published. 32. Annexure-1 - In the issue of the 12th April, the following statement appeared in the Mahakoshal:- "On the last date for withdrawal, the P.S.P. candidate clearly stated that unless he was paid Rs.15,000/- for contesting the election, he would withdraw his candidature. According to knowledgeable sources, the PSP candidate fictitiously gave out that he had already received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/- so that if the PSP would not pay him Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw after taking Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of Mishra..................Thakur Niranjan Singh, the convenor of the P.S.P. election campaign, is somewhat dull He could not appreciate the vakil's bid of bargen and eventually Thakur Saheb 'accepted the goods' (agreed to pay) and gave him full authority to spend so that the needful be done". This statement will hereinafter be called “Annexure 1”. The petitioner is an Advocate and was the only P.S.P. candidate. The words "P.S.P. candidate" and "Vakil" in the above passage admittedly refer to him. According to the petitioner, the above statement was published for the purpose of conveying that the petitioner had been promised or had been paid Rs.15.000/- for contesting as a PSP candidate and that the petitioner had bargained for it, by threatening to withdraw his candidature and further that he would stoop so low as to accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate in order to withdraw from the contest. 33. The petitioner says that this statement was published about him. He was the only P.S.P. candidate and the only Vakil (Advocate) contesting from the Kasdol constituency. He says that these allegations were false. It was false that he threatened to withdraw his candidature, if he was not paid Rs.15,000/- or that he would accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of the rival candidate. It was false that he fictitiously gave out that he had received offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. It was also false that Thakur Niranjansingh either gave him or offered to give him Rs.15,000/- and authorised him to spend it. It was false that he fictitiously gave out that he had received offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. It was also false that Thakur Niranjansingh either gave him or offered to give him Rs.15,000/- and authorised him to spend it. In short, every part of the statement ascribed to him was false. He says that he did not meet Thakur Niranjansingh during the entire election period, that is, between the date of the notification and the taking of poll. 34. Niranjansingh (P.W. 43) supports the petitioner and says that he did not meet the latter on any days between the 3rd April and the 4th May, and that there was no such talk between him and the petitioner as was reported in the news item (Annexure I). 35. The statement (Annexure I) may conveniently be divided into four parts:- (1) The petitioner, on the last date for withdrawal made a statement threatening to withdraw if he was not paid Rs.15,000/-. (2) The petitioner had made a false statement that he had received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. (3) If the P.S.P. would not give the petitioner Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw, after accepting Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate. (4) Eventually, Thakur Niranjan Singh agreed to pay and also authorised the petitioner to spend it. The authorship of the first two parts is ascribed to the petitioner, while that of the fourth to the writer of the news item. The authorship of the third part is ambiguous. It may be construed as a statement by .the petitioner; it may also be interpreted as an expression of opinion of the news reporter. It is proved by the evidence of the petitioner that he never made the statements the authorship of which is attributed to him. The petitioner could only swear to prove a negative fact and this he did. We do not find anything in his statement for which he should not be believed. No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of any of these statements. As will be seen white dealing with another point arising in connection with this alleged corrupt practice the Mahakoshal actively supported the respondent's candidature and carried on intensive propaganda for him. So also Shyamacharan Shukla was an active supporter of the respondent. No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of any of these statements. As will be seen white dealing with another point arising in connection with this alleged corrupt practice the Mahakoshal actively supported the respondent's candidature and carried on intensive propaganda for him. So also Shyamacharan Shukla was an active supporter of the respondent. The respondent did not produce any correspondent who was the author of the news item to prove the fourth part of the statement, which obviously emanated: from him, and also to prove that the first two statements were actually made by the petitioner. In fact, truth was not pleaded in defence. The respondent admitted that there was no other Vakil or P.S.P. candidate at the election concerned. (Deposition date 9-8-1968) It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure I) related to the petitioner's personal conduct and character und that it was false. 36. It was an argument before us that Annexure I cannot be said to be a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4) of the Act, but it is a mere-expression of opinion. It is not possible to accept this argument is respect of the first part of the statement the very opening words of the news item "HUA YE KI" (it so happened) incontestably express what actually happened, that is to say, that the petitioner actually made that statement. The making of a statement is a fact and the publication of that fact is a statement of fact which, if found to be false, is within the mischief of the section. The second part is also a statement of fact inasmuch as it tells the reader that a fictitious statement had been made by the petitioner to "knowledgeable sources". The fourth part of the statement is again a statement of fact, that Niranjan Sing accepted the "goods" (meaning that he agreed to make payment to the petitioner and authorised him to spend it). 37. Subsection (4) requires: (1) there was publication of any statement of fact by a candidate or with his consent; (2) the statement is false; (3) the candidate believes it to be false of does not believe it to be true; (4) it relates to the personal character or conduct or another candidate; and (5) the statement is reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the other candidate's election. Sheopal Singh v. Ramratan [1964 (1) SCR 175]. The third element refers to the belief of the candidate publishing the statement, or, who is in the eye of law responsible for it and not the belief of the person who actually made the false statement This proposition has been succinctly laid down and fully explained by their Lordships in Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Sharma [ AIR 1967 SC 808 ], thus:- “The responsibility of the candidate for the publication arises if he publishes the thing himself. He is equally responsible for the publication if it is published by his agent. Thirdly, he is also responsible where the thing is published by any other person but with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. In all the three cases, the responsibility is of the candidate and it is ordinarily the candidate's belief that matters for this purpose. If the candidate either believes the statement to be false or does not believe it to be true, he would be responsible under section 123 (4)............... It is the candidate's belief that matter and not the belief of the person who actually made it with the consent of the candidate". Dr. Jagjeet Singh Vs. Gyani Kartar Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 773 ]. When the first part of Annexure 1 was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he said:- "I cannot say whether the statement is true or not. I would prefer to say that it is not true." With regard to the second and the fourth parts of Annexure 1, the respondent's answer is:- "I have absolutely no knowledge about its correctness or otherwise." An argument was constructed by the learned Advocate General that when a person says that he has no knowledge cannot be said that he either believes it to be false or does not believe it to be true. According to him, if a person does not believe a thing to be true, the alternatives are:- (1) He believes it to be false; or (2) he does not believe it to be true; or (3) be neither knows whether it is true or false. But in our opinion, the third also means that he does not believe it to be true, because, otherwise, he cannot say that he does not know whether it is true or false. But in our opinion, the third also means that he does not believe it to be true, because, otherwise, he cannot say that he does not know whether it is true or false. To put; it differently if one does not believe thing to be false, he either believes it to be true or does not believe it to be true. The expressions used in section 123 (4) of the Act are: "believes to be false" and "does not believe to be true". These are also the expressions used, for instance, in sections 171 (g), 191 and 199 of the Penal Code. These expressions are different from "knowing or believing to be false" as employed in sections 197 and 203, Penal Code, or "knowing to be false" in sections 196, 198, 200 and 209. 38. The next contention advanced for the respondent is that the statement (Annexure I) cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. The learned Advocate General construed the statement as to carry an effect on the electors which would raise the prestige of the petitioner either for his cleverness or honesty. The reader would think that there is nothing wrong in a candidate asking his party to finance him and the reader will also be favourably impressed by the petitioner demanding only Rs.15,000 in preference to Rs.50,000 offered him as a bribe. On this interpretation, it was argued that the statement is not within the mischief of section 123 (4), as its effect would be wholesome and would only advocate the petitioners' prospects. We are unable to accept this logic. It is first of all to he remembered that the test if not to evolve a possible or ingenious interpretation. A news item is not a matter for research of contemplation. That meaning must be attached which the news item will convey immediately and plainly at the first glance. We are clearly of the opinion that the effect which the news item (Annexure I) will at once create on the mind of the reader is that the petitioner extorted money from his party under the threat of withdrawing from the candidature. Secondly, the demand of Rs.15,000 was also exorbitant and, therefore, extortious because the permissible limit of election expenses under the law was Rs.7000. Thirdly, the expression "LATIFA SUNAYA" stamps the petitioner as a person who fabricates stories. Secondly, the demand of Rs.15,000 was also exorbitant and, therefore, extortious because the permissible limit of election expenses under the law was Rs.7000. Thirdly, the expression "LATIFA SUNAYA" stamps the petitioner as a person who fabricates stories. All this was bound to, or atleast reasonably calculated to lower the petitioner in the estimation of the electorate and thus prejudice his election prospects. 39. Shri Munshi laid a great deal of stress on the context in which the statement (Annexure I) was published (1) In the issue of the 8th April, the Mahakoshal published a report entitled as a report by "Sanjay" with the caption "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI": (Sanjay figures in the Mahabharat as one invested with the superhuman power of seeing all that was happening at the battle field and relating It to Dhritrashtra. Thus, it means a farsighted person). In that article the respondent was compared favourably with Raja Bhoj and the petitioner with Gangu Teli. The latter was shown to be a dwarf like an oil-man in contrast to the former who was styled a King. Although the aim of this article was to belittle the petitioner, it was little realised that it would offend and annoy the Teli voters, whose number was fairly large, and, further they would cast their votes, on the ground of brotherhood; in favour of the petitioner who had been stamped a Teli. (ii) The petitioner's statement about Dr. Ausaf Hussain's offer had appeared in three news-papers Nav Bharat, Nai Duniya and Yugdharma on the 10th April. To neutralise the effect created by these two, this offending statement (Annexure I) was published in the Mahakoshal of the 12th April, imputing to the petitioner that he was out to grab Rs.15,000/- by extending a threat to his party, and conveying to the electorate that the story of the offer of Rs.50,000/- was a myth. And this was quickly followed by a statement (Ex. P-76) issued by the respondent, which was published in the Mahakoshal of the 13th April. Shri Munshi argued that although this statement ostensibly expressed dis-appropriation of the article 'KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI", in reality its aim was to pacify the Teli community. In this statement (Ex. And this was quickly followed by a statement (Ex. P-76) issued by the respondent, which was published in the Mahakoshal of the 13th April. Shri Munshi argued that although this statement ostensibly expressed dis-appropriation of the article 'KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI", in reality its aim was to pacify the Teli community. In this statement (Ex. P-76) it was suggested that in the legend, it was "Raja Gangeya Deo Telangan" who had fought with Raja Bhoj, and then it became a saying "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGEYA TELANGAN", as time passed, the saying depreciated into "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI." The article then goes on to say that in the Sanskrit "Tel" means "Sneh" (affection) so that the Teli community is 'very affectionate.' 40. This background and Shri Munshi's argument we shall bear in mind when we shall deal with the question whether the statement (Annexure I) was published by the respondent or with his consent, which question remains to be seen. Since the question is common to all the three annexures, it will be convenient to deal with it at one place. 41. Annexure 2 - The second 0ffending statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal, issue dated the 26th April. It is a news item with the caption: "NEHRUJI MAHATMA GANDHI KE HATYARE KAMAL NARAYAN PAGLA GAYA". (Nehruji murderer of Mahatma Gandhi? Kamal Narayan has gone mad). The news is that on the 23rd April, "the official candidate of the P.S.P. "while delivering a speech at Bar village from a cloth shop, uttered: "RASHTRA PITA BAPU KA HATYARA NEHRU HAI" (Nehru is the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation). 42. The petiti0ner, as P.W. 5, stated that he was always in his sense and it was wrong to say that he has lost his mental equilibrium. It was also wrong to say that he had gone to Bar village on the 23rd April or that he called a meeting or that he began delivering a speech from any cloth shop and "it is also false that I said there that Nehru was the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation." The petitioner's statement on oath must be believed as it was not rebutted, nor was the news item pleaded, nor did the respondent make any endeavour to produce the news correspondent. It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure II) is false. The impugned news item is a representation of what the. petitioner reportedly uttered at a meeting. When it was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he stated:- "I have absolutely no idea whether the fact published in Annexure II is true or false. I was not present at that meeting." This means that the respondent did not believe it to be true. (Reasons already stated in connection with Annexure I). 43. According to the objected statement the petitioner uttered those words factually. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that it is a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4). 44. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that to call Nebruji the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi would be an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact; it is figurative language meaning that Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, did not pursue and translate into action the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Further, this opinion will relate to the speaker's political conduct. The argument would have deserved some consideration if Mahatma Gandhi's assessination had not been a fact, which is unforgettable. The reader's mind will immediately connect the statement with it and it will register the plain and apparent meaning and its natural impact. 45. But what we are really concerned with is not what the petitioner uttered (according to the news item) but whether the statement (Annexure II) published by the Mahakoshal representing to its readers that the petitioner uttered those words, is a statement of fact or not. According to the news item, the petitioner went to the village and there started his speech with that utterance. Thus, all this is a statement of fact, which we have found to be false. Further, there can be no doubt that the objected statement relates to the personal conduct and character of the petitioner, depicting it as base and mean. In Inderlal Vs. Thus, all this is a statement of fact, which we have found to be false. Further, there can be no doubt that the objected statement relates to the personal conduct and character of the petitioner, depicting it as base and mean. In Inderlal Vs. Lal Singh [ AIR 1962 SC 1156 ], Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court, explained the distinction in these words:- "In order that the ejections should be free it is necessary that the electorate should be educated on political issues in a fearless manner and so the Legislature thought that full and ample scope should be left for free and fearless criticism by candidates against the public and political character of their opponents. But the position with regard to the private or personal character of the candidate is very different. Circulation of false statements about the private or personal character of the candidate during the period proceeding elections is likely to work against the freedom of election itself in as much as the effect created by false statements cannot be met by denials in proper time and so the constituency has to re protected against the circulation of such false statements which are likely to affect the voting of the electors. That is why it is for the protection of the constituency against acts which would be fatal to the freedom of election that the statute provides for the inclusion of the circulation of false statements concerning the private character of a candidate amongst corrupt practices. Dissemination of false statements about the personal character of a candidate thus constitutes a corrupt practice.................................In discussing the distinction between the private character and the public character sometimes reference is made to the man 'beneath the politician' and it is said that if a statement of fact affects the man beneath the politician, it touches private character and if it affects the politician, it does not touch his private character." The same distinction was expressed in Guruji Shrihari Vs. Vitthalrao [CA 1178 of 1967 decided on the 19th November 1968, (SC)] thus:- "When false allegation of fact pierces the politician and touches the person of the candidate, then section 123 (4) is contravened". 46. It was not contended before us that the impugned statement (Annexure II) was not calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. 47. Vitthalrao [CA 1178 of 1967 decided on the 19th November 1968, (SC)] thus:- "When false allegation of fact pierces the politician and touches the person of the candidate, then section 123 (4) is contravened". 46. It was not contended before us that the impugned statement (Annexure II) was not calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. 47. Shri Munshi pointed out that the setting in which this statement appeared in the Mahakoshal was this: (1) An appeal of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to vote for the respondent was widely and profusely circulated through cards and also through the Mahakoshal Pandit Nehru's photograph was also printed with his appeal. Being a very respected and beloved leader of the country, his appeal was bound to have great influence on the electorate in favour of the respondent. 48. To counteract that influence, Gopinath Sharma, a petitioner's sympathiser, published on the 23rd April a leaflet (Ex. P-135) in which was reproduced the respondents letter dated September 9, 1951, addressed to Seth Govindas, President, Mahakoshal provincial Congress Committee, by which letter the respondent resigned an offices which he held and also the primary membership of the Congress. The following passages are emphasised by Shri Munshi:- "The immediate cause for submitting the resignation is the act of the Prime Minister to turn out Shri Purushottamdas Tandon and to himself become the President and thus an absolute dictator. After the occurrence of this immediate cause, my continuation in the Congress will mean betraying the country. The removal of Rajrishi Tandon is.........murder of democracy. This sin has been committed with the help of Nehruji because of his lust for winning the election. This is the limit of degeneration of the Congress. The 8th September 1951 will be regarded as an inauspicious day in the history of India. I regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence a curse for India......". At the top of this letter its publisher (Gopinath Sharma) asks “How will Mishraji who calls Pandit Nehru a dictator and the murderer of democracy, strengthen his hands". Then he writes that the letter is being published to inform the general public to what extent the Congress candidate, Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, hates the Prime Minister of the country Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At the bottom of the letter the publisher asks the respondent four questions: (1) By re-entering the Congress are you not betraying the country? Then he writes that the letter is being published to inform the general public to what extent the Congress candidate, Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, hates the Prime Minister of the country Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At the bottom of the letter the publisher asks the respondent four questions: (1) By re-entering the Congress are you not betraying the country? (2) Has your re-entry in the Congress and the grant of Congress ticket to you stopped the murder of democracy within the Congress (3) According to your letter the Congress had reached the limit of degeneration in 1961, at what level it is now, (4) when you regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence as a curse for India, why are you seeking votes in his name ?" 49. Another leaflet (Ex. P-157) was published by one Triveni Shankar, another sympathiser of the petitioner. To this leaflet, a letter of Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, dated January 16, 1952, addressed to the President, Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee, was reproduced. In that letter, Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla wrote, inter and, that after leaving the Congress, the respondent delivered strong speeches against the Congress, in Delhi and several towns of Uttar Pradesh, from the Jan Sangh platform; that the respondent tried to create a new political body, named 'Lok Congress': and made an effort to set up candidates who would contest election against the Congress candidates from all the 232 Constituencies of Madhya Pradesh; and that when he did not succeed and foresaw", dark future, he tried to re-enter the Congress but that had become impossible Pandit Shukla referred to his letter which he had earlier given to the respondent and said that apprehending that it would be exploited, this letter was written to explain the occasion on which and the circumstances in which he had given that letter to the respondent. 50. In the said leaflet (Ex. P-157), the publisher says that Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla's aforesaid letter was published by Seth Govinddas and he asks whether the respondent, Shymacharan Shukla. Pandit Shankarlal Tiwari, or Pandit Shyam Sunder Mushran will contradict in writing the view expressed by the late Ravi Shankerji about Pandit Mishra. Mr. Munshi's contention is that the effect on the electorate of these leaflets Exs.P-157 and P-155 which were published on the and 23rd April respectively, was going to be tramendously prejudicial to the respondent's election prospects. Pandit Shankarlal Tiwari, or Pandit Shyam Sunder Mushran will contradict in writing the view expressed by the late Ravi Shankerji about Pandit Mishra. Mr. Munshi's contention is that the effect on the electorate of these leaflets Exs.P-157 and P-155 which were published on the and 23rd April respectively, was going to be tramendously prejudicial to the respondent's election prospects. Having regard to the degree of esteem and love which the people had for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, nothing could counteract that effect unless some statement involving the name of Pandit Nehru and causing hurt to the feelings of the voters, was attributed to the petitioner and published to the electorate And, nothing worse could be imagined about pandit Nehru than that he was the murderer of Bapu. It is with this hack ground and in this setting that the statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal. 51. At the end of the trial before the Tribunal, the petitioner produced Shyamlal (P.W. 91), who stated that the respondent himself was the author of the news item (annexure II). Shri Munshi relied on this direct evidence and also the attending circumstances to show that the respondent himself was the author of Annexure II, or, at any rate, it was published with his consent. This point we shall consider at its appropriate place. The learned Advocate General vehemently criticized the evidence of Shyamlal and stamped it as concocted. Judgment Shivdayal, J. 1. This is an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the people Act, 1951, as it stood before the amendment of 1966, (hereinafter called "the Act"), from a decision of the Election Tribunal, Raipur. 2. After the general elections of 1962 the Kasdol Legislative Assembly constituency was called upon to elect a person for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The appellant (hereinafter also called "the petitioner") was a candidate set up by the Praja Socialist Party; Shri D.P. Mishra, respondent No. 1, (hereinafter called "the respondent") was the Congress candidate; and one Purushottamdas was an independent candidate. Kanhaiyalal Mishra (respondent No.2) had also filed his nomination paper as a Congress candidate, but he withdrew his candidature when the respondent's nomination paper was accepted. Poll was taken on May 4, 1963. The appellant got 4611 votes; the respondent 11528 votes; and Purushottamdas 850. The respondent was declared elected. 3. Kanhaiyalal Mishra (respondent No.2) had also filed his nomination paper as a Congress candidate, but he withdrew his candidature when the respondent's nomination paper was accepted. Poll was taken on May 4, 1963. The appellant got 4611 votes; the respondent 11528 votes; and Purushottamdas 850. The respondent was declared elected. 3. By an election petition, the appellant challenged the election of the respondent on various charges of corrupt practice, which may be classified into four heads: (1) Bribery; (2) publication of false statements, (3) hiring or procuring of vehicles for conveyance of electors, and (4) incurring or authorising election expenses in excess of the prescribed' limit. The election petition was initially dealt with by Shri S.R. Vyas, District Judge, Raipur, who constituted the Election Tribunal under section 86 of the Act. From his decision on a preliminary point, the case went up to the Supreme Court and then came back to Raipur for trial on merits. Shri B.K. Choudhari was then specially appointed Election Tribunal for the trial of this election petition. The respondent contested the election petition. The learned Tribunal, by its order dated December 28, 1966, decided all the issues against the election petitioner and dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by that order, the election petitioner preferred this appeal on July 1, 1967. 4. The respondent raised two preliminary objections: (1) That the appeal was barred by time; and (2) that the appeal became infructuous as, in the meantime, the Assembly, to which the respondent had been returned, had been dissolved and fresh general elections had taken place in February 1967. Both these preliminary objections were rejected by our order dated May 4, 1968 [ 1970 JLJ 342 ]. 5. By the same order of May 4, 1968, certain preliminary points raised by the appellant were also disposed of. It was held that the cross-examination of the respondent had been abruptly closed by the Tribunal; that the appellants applications for leave to amend the election petition had been wrongly rejected by the tribunal and that the tribunal wrongly refused to admit in evidence three documents. We permitted one witness to be examined by the appellant to prove that the respondent had paid to the Congress Part) Rs.200/- as application fee and Rs.500/- as deposit for being given, a Congress ticket, which expenses were not included in the respondent's return of election expenses. We permitted one witness to be examined by the appellant to prove that the respondent had paid to the Congress Part) Rs.200/- as application fee and Rs.500/- as deposit for being given, a Congress ticket, which expenses were not included in the respondent's return of election expenses. By consent of the parties and as necessited by the amendment of the election petition, we amended certain issues and framed a few additional issues. The appellant then examined Ramnarayan Purohit (P.W. 93) After that the respondent was recalled. He was further examined-in-chief and then further cross examined. The respondent was given a fresh opportunity to produce such further evidence as he chose to. He filed a list of the following witnesses:- (1) Chakrapani Shukla, resident of Baloda Bazar, District Raipur, (2) Permanand Bbai Patel, Jabalpur, (3) One Munim of parmanand Bhai Patel, Jabalpur, and (4) Laxmi Shankar Bhatt, Jabalpur. But eventually he abandoned them all, and did not examine any. 6. Then, on August 29, 1968, the appellant made an application for production of three more documents: (i) A document purporting to be in the handwriting of and signed by Jaideo Satpati, about the expenditure of Rs.516/- not shown in the return of election expenses of the respondent. (ii) A document purporting to be in the hand writing of and signed by Maheshdutt Dube of Sagar, addressed to the respondent about procuring motor vehicles from Jabalpur and Sagar ;and showing the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and also expenses of petrol. (iii) A telegram dated May 4, 1963, sent from Jabalpur by "Bidiwala" (telegraphic address) to Parmanand Bhai Patel C/o Chakrapani Shukla, in order to prove the agency of Parmanand Bhai Patel and of Chakrapani Shukla, and also to prove that motor vehicles were procured by the respondent. Since this application was for production of additional evidence, by our order dated August 31, 1968, the application was kept in abeyance for being considered at the hearing of the appeal. If we allowed these documents to be produced, the appellant would have been further required to produce oral evidence to prove them. However, at the hearing of the appeal that application was not pressed and was impliedly abandoned. 7. In Jagjit Singh Vs. Kartar Singh [AIR 1956 SC 773], it is held:- "The jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an election appeal under section 116-A of the Act is very wide. However, at the hearing of the appeal that application was not pressed and was impliedly abandoned. 7. In Jagjit Singh Vs. Kartar Singh [AIR 1956 SC 773], it is held:- "The jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an election appeal under section 116-A of the Act is very wide. It is open to the High Court' to re-appreciate the evidence and consider the propriety, correctness or legality of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order under appeal Naturally, as a Court of appeal, the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal, which are based merely on appreciation of oral evidence. But this is not to say that the High Court cannot so interfere, if it comes to the conclusion that impugned finding is erroneous and deserves to be reversed." Let it be mentioned at the outset that Shri Kanhaiyalal Mishra, learned Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh, who argued before us the respondent's case, frankly told us that he would support the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, but would not adopt the reasons stated in its order. And, in fact he did not refer to any part of the Tribunal's order in the course of his arguments. BRIBERY 8. The appellant's case is that one Dr. Ausaf Hussain of Sagar made an offer of Rs.50,000/- to him at Raipur, as an inducement to withdraw from the election. The appellant, as P.W. 5, states that on the morning of the April 6,1963, Ausaf Hussain went to his residence at about 5-30 and asked him brothers, Chandra Prakash Sharma, and Vyasnarain Sharma who were studying in his office, to wake him up. When he came into his office and the boys were outside Ausaf Hussain first told him that he and the respondent are both brahmins, but the respondent alone could establish a Brahmin Raj. (After discussing evidence in paragraphs 9 to 17, his Lordship proceeded-) 18. Besides, the attending circumstances do not support the allegation that that person approached the petitioner with the respondent's consent. On the appellant's own showing, he was a stranger not only to the petitioner but also to the place generally. Further, he had no notable status. It is almost impossible to believe that the respondent would fix his choice on such a person for such a huge sum as Rs.50,000. On the appellant's own showing, he was a stranger not only to the petitioner but also to the place generally. Further, he had no notable status. It is almost impossible to believe that the respondent would fix his choice on such a person for such a huge sum as Rs.50,000. It was not as if the respondent could not find any other person at Raipur for the job. It was not as if he was a person who could exert his influence upon the appellant. Thus, it must be held that the petitioner could not prove that Ausaf Hussain was an agent of the respondent, nor could he prove that Ausaf Hussain offered the bribe to or approached the petitioner. The question of consent of the respondent does not then arise. It seems that some irresponsible person, of his own accord, or at the instance of some other supporter of the respondent, may have approached the petitioner and may have recklessly and irresponsibly thrown out a feeler to assess the strength of the petitioner. No one saw the cash which he supposedly carried in his beg. 19. For these reasons it must be held as not proved that Dr. Ausaf Hussain offered a bribe to the petitioner with the consent of the respondent. 20. The appellant's request that Dr. Ausaf Hussain should be named under section 99 of the Act must also be consequently rejected at once. Offer of bribe by a person who is not an agent of a candidate is not a corrupt practice within section 123 (1) of the Act unless it is committed with the consent of the candidate. VEHICLES : - 21. The appellant's contention is that the respondent and with his consent, his agents and workers, hired or procured on payment or otherwise, motor vehicles for conveying the electors to polling stations in the constituency and thus committed the corrupt practice as defined in section 123(5) of the Act. VEHICLES : - 21. The appellant's contention is that the respondent and with his consent, his agents and workers, hired or procured on payment or otherwise, motor vehicles for conveying the electors to polling stations in the constituency and thus committed the corrupt practice as defined in section 123(5) of the Act. He gave the following particulars:- Vehicles Polling Station Voters Jeep MPR 2401 Sarkhon No. 3 Voters of village Pandariya Jeep No. MPR 5191 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Nandi Jeep No. BYJ 3902 Bhalukona No. 20 Voters of village Hardi MPL 272 Barely No. 28 Voters of village Nargha and Darri Jeep No. MPR 5166 Siriadih No. 15 Voters of village Lata MPJ (I) 1636 Sinodha No. 14 Voters of village Deorikala 10 Bullock-Carts Sel. No. 24 Voters of village Bhusada, Chandidih and Bhanwarid MPR 183 Jeep MPL 1541 Amodi No. 25 Voters of Nawapara Jeep No. MPL 220 Jeep APX 1593 Baloda No. 10 Voters of Semara and Baloda BYJ 4749 Kadgi No. 12 Voters of village Sarwani, Lakhmmisati MPL 1839 Amarua 47 voters of village Chandan MPR 207 (Truck) PAKRID No. 48 Voters of village Charoda MPL 977 Pisid No. 33 Voters of village Charched MHN 1170 Motia No. 26 Voters of Madowa, Turkindid and Kotiodih 22. The basic ingredients of the corrupt practice under subsection (5) of section 123 of the Act, are (1) that any vehicle was hired or procured for the conveyance of voters; and (2) that such hiring or procurement was by the candidate himself or by his agent or any other person with his or his election agent's consent. Thus, the main ingredient consists of hiring or procuring of the vehicle. An election petition must furnish the names of the persons who hired or procured and such other particulars as the petitioner can possibly do It is necessary to prove that the hiring or procurement was for the specific purpose, that is for conveying the: electors to or from any polling station. The actual user of the vehicle hired or procured for carrying electors, is not an ingredient of the corrupt practice under that sub-section. Evidence of such user is, therefore, not quite essential, except in so far as it has a considerable bearing on the question of the purpose of hiring or procurement. 23. Mere reproduction of the words of a section does not constitute a pleading. Evidence of such user is, therefore, not quite essential, except in so far as it has a considerable bearing on the question of the purpose of hiring or procurement. 23. Mere reproduction of the words of a section does not constitute a pleading. The election petitioner is bound to set out in his petition the facta probanda that is, the facts on which be relies, though not facta probantia, that is the evidence or the facts by means of which they are to be proved. In the particulars supplied by the petitioner (para 6 (b) of the petition) names of the "agents and workers" of the respondent, who hired or procured vehicles, were not specified. The particulars were, therefore, not sufficient to meet the requirement of the law. That being the position, the respondent ought to have moved the tribunal to strike out paragraph 6 (a) and (b). But this was not done. The tribunal framed issue No.7 and the parties went to trial. The particulars being insufficient, the Tribunal ought to have adopted the following course: The petition could not be dismissed in limine. The Tribunal was bound to decide whether the petition was defective for want of particulars and if it so held, it should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. In the event of non-compliance with that order, the Tribunal could strike out the charge as being vague. It is an accepted rule that full particulars of a corrupt practice must be insisted upon as of paramount importance in the trial of an election petition. But, if the parties go to trial inspite of the absence of full particulars and evidence is led by them on the plea raised in the petition, the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction. In that situation, the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the plea even in the absence of particulars. The appellate Court would be justified in setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that material prejudice has resulted by reason of the absence of full particulars. But the appellate Court will give due weight to the omission on the part of the respondent to raise and press his objection about the absence of particulars before going to trial. See Balwansingh Vs. Laxminarain [22 ELR 273]. But the appellate Court will give due weight to the omission on the part of the respondent to raise and press his objection about the absence of particulars before going to trial. See Balwansingh Vs. Laxminarain [22 ELR 273]. In Bhikaji Keshao Joshi Vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [ (1955) 2 SCR 428 (411)], it was observed:- "There can be no reasonable doubt that the requirement of full particulars is one that has got to be complied with, sufficient fullness and clarification so as to enable the opposite party fairly to meet them and that they must be such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and roving inquisition." That case was distinguished in Bhagwan Datta Vs. Ram Ratanji [ AIR 1960 SC 200 ] where it was urged that in the absence of adequate particulars the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to admit evidence on the plea or to give a finding thereon. Their Lordships said:- "There can be no doubt that the requirement of full particulars is of paramount importance in cases of this kind as in cases of the ordinary Courts based on allegations of fraud or undue influence. But unlike the one in the above decision of this Court relied upon, in which the questions that arose was as to the validity of an order dismissing the entire election petition on the preliminary ground of absence of particulars, the question in this case is different. This is a case where notwithstanding the absence of particulars, the evidence was allowed to be given and taken. The question in such a case would not be one of absence of jurisdiction but as to whether there has been any material prejudice occasioned by the absence of particulars. It is in that light that the validity of the objection raised by the appellant in this behalf before us has to be judged. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize the nature of the evidence on which this finding had been arrived at and to see whether the appellant had a fair opportunity of meeting it." In the present case, an issue was framed and the parties went to trial. The petitioner led oral and documentary evidence in respect of each polling station. We shall, therefore, decide the issue on merits despite want of full particulars. [After discussing evidence on this point in paragraph 24 his Lordship proceeded]. 25. The petitioner led oral and documentary evidence in respect of each polling station. We shall, therefore, decide the issue on merits despite want of full particulars. [After discussing evidence on this point in paragraph 24 his Lordship proceeded]. 25. Their Lordship's decision in Sheopal Singh Vs. Harishchandra [ AIR 1960 SC 1217 ], is not opposite to this case. There it was held that where a candidate after getting knowledge of the act of a corrupt practice on a polling day does not prohibit the repetition of similar acts on the following polling days, it is a reasonable inference to draw that all the acts were not haphazard but by design and that the candidate must have consented to them. 26. It was argued that it was an error to infer consent from the mere fact that the appellant had knowledge of the acts. It was further argued that consent to an act implied that it was given before it was done, but knowledge of an act could only mean that it was after the act was done. Therefore, knowledge cannot in itself be equated with consent. Their Lordships said: "There would have been force in this argument, if all that was established was a stray act or even a number of them 'committed on one day. But here the acts were numerous and extended over a number of days............From the above facts it is not an unreasonable inference to draw that all the above acts were committed not haphazard but by design and that applicant must have consented to them." In the present case, no material was placed before us to reach that conclusion. As regards the polling stations in group (d), Shri Munshi conceded that there is no evidence to show who hired or procured vehicles for conveying the electors to those polling stations. 27. A great deal of stress was laid by Shri Munshi on the purchase of a large quantity of petrol by the respondent on the May 3, 1963; when the poll was to be taken on the 4th May. It was argued that this large quantity of petrol could only be meant for consumption in motor vehicle which had been hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. It was argued that this large quantity of petrol could only be meant for consumption in motor vehicle which had been hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. From the return of the respondent's election expenses and from the woks of account of Nawalchand Nathmal of Bhalapara, it was clear that on the 3rd May, that is, the day proceeding the poll, 600 letres of petrol for Rs.534 besides some motor oil and brake oil, were purchased by the respondent (per voucher No. 54, filed with the return). On the respondents own showing, he had only one motor vehicle (a jeep). It could not possibly consume 600 litres of petrol within two days. The appellant, therefore, persuaded to hold that this petrol must have been used in motor vehicles which were hired or procured for conveying electors to the polling stations. Undoubtedly; this creates a very strong suspicion because from the Bhatapara petrol pump, this was the largest quantity of petrol purchased on any particular day by the respondent. But this suspicion is not enough to hold definitely that vehicles were hired or procured for the purpose of conveying electors to the polling stations. 28. In Josh Bhai Chunnibhai Patel Vs. Anwar Beg A. Mirza [Civil Appeal No. 799 of 1968, decided on the 19th September 1968], the Supreme Court has held that section 123 (5) requires these things:- (1) Hiring or procuring of a vehicle, (2) by a candidate or his agent, etc. and (3) for the free conveyance of an elector. In addition to proving the hiring or procuring and the carriage of electors to and from the polling station, it must further be proved that the electors used the vehicle of free of cost themselves. Their Lordships observed: "In the instant case, the vehicles were procured, but there was no proof that there was flee conveyance of the ladles in these vehicles. It is not impossible of proof because the owner of the car or the driver or the ladies could have been examined to show that the ladies have travelled free in the vehicles. Since this is not proved, toe ingredients of the section have not been established." (See Supreme Court Notes of October 15, 1968, page 384). In the present case there is no such evidence- 29. Since this is not proved, toe ingredients of the section have not been established." (See Supreme Court Notes of October 15, 1968, page 384). In the present case there is no such evidence- 29. Accordingly, it must be held as follows:- (1) It is not proved that the respondent or respondent No. 2 hired or procured any vehicles for the purpose of conveying electors to any polling station, nor it is proved that either of them actually conveyed and voter of Pisid Polling Station, or any other polling station. (2) It is proved that voters were conveyed in vehicles No. BYJ 4749 to the Polling Station Katanji, but it is not proved that if was Bhuwan Bhaskar Singh who had brought them. (3) It is proved that Wasudeo Chandrakar and 2 male voters and 7 females and some children were seen together in a jeep between village Lata Siriadih Polling station, which jeep was proceeding towards the Polling Station, but it is not proved that the vehicle in which they were seen together was hired or procured by Wasudeo Chandrakar; nor is it proved that he had brought the voters from the village with the consent of the respondent. (4) It is proved that voters were conveyed to polling station Amodi from Village Nawapara in vehicles No. MPR 183 and MPL 1541, but it is not proved that it was Rohini Kumar Bajpai who had brought them or that he had any connection with either of them. (5) It is proved that 59 voters were conveyed in a truck No. MPR 207 to Pikrid Polling Station but it is proved that Munnalal Shukla or Jaideo Satpati had conveyed these electors or that they either hired or procured it. (6) The petitioner could not prove that any vehicle was hired or procured with the respondent's consent for the purpose of conveying electors. 30. Therefore, the contention must be rejected. FALSE STATEMENT 31. The appellant's next contention is that three false statements (these will hereinafter be called Annexures 1, 2 and 3 as they were called all along during the course of the hearing) in relation to his personal conduct and• character were published with the respondent's consent in the Mahakoshal and they were calculated to prejudice his election prospects. The Mahakoshal a Hindi Daily was published from Raipur and circulated in the constituency during the election period. The Mahakoshal a Hindi Daily was published from Raipur and circulated in the constituency during the election period. Shyamacharan Shukla, an active supporter, worker and agent of the respondent, was its owner, printer, publisher and editor. The offending statements were published in the issues dated 12th April, 26th April and 4th May, 1963. The appellant attaches much significance to these dates in pointing out the motive and the background with which each of them was published. 32. Annexure-1 - In the issue of the 12th April, the following statement appeared in the Mahakoshal:- "On the last date for withdrawal, the P.S.P. candidate clearly stated that unless he was paid Rs.15,000/- for contesting the election, he would withdraw his candidature. According to knowledgeable sources, the PSP candidate fictitiously gave out that he had already received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/- so that if the PSP would not pay him Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw after taking Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of Mishra..................Thakur Niranjan Singh, the convenor of the P.S.P. election campaign, is somewhat dull He could not appreciate the vakil's bid of bargen and eventually Thakur Saheb 'accepted the goods' (agreed to pay) and gave him full authority to spend so that the needful be done". This statement will hereinafter be called “Annexure 1”. The petitioner is an Advocate and was the only P.S.P. candidate. The words "P.S.P. candidate" and "Vakil" in the above passage admittedly refer to him. According to the petitioner, the above statement was published for the purpose of conveying that the petitioner had been promised or had been paid Rs.15.000/- for contesting as a PSP candidate and that the petitioner had bargained for it, by threatening to withdraw his candidature and further that he would stoop so low as to accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate in order to withdraw from the contest. 33. The petitioner says that this statement was published about him. He was the only P.S.P. candidate and the only Vakil (Advocate) contesting from the Kasdol constituency. He says that these allegations were false. It was false that he threatened to withdraw his candidature, if he was not paid Rs.15,000/- or that he would accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of the rival candidate. It was false that he fictitiously gave out that he had received offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. He says that these allegations were false. It was false that he threatened to withdraw his candidature, if he was not paid Rs.15,000/- or that he would accept Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of the rival candidate. It was false that he fictitiously gave out that he had received offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. It was also false that Thakur Niranjansingh either gave him or offered to give him Rs.15,000/- and authorised him to spend it. In short, every part of the statement ascribed to him was false. He says that he did not meet Thakur Niranjansingh during the entire election period, that is, between the date of the notification and the taking of poll. 34. Niranjansingh (P.W. 43) supports the petitioner and says that he did not meet the latter on any days between the 3rd April and the 4th May, and that there was no such talk between him and the petitioner as was reported in the news item (Annexure I). 35. The statement (Annexure I) may conveniently be divided into four parts:- (1) The petitioner, on the last date for withdrawal made a statement threatening to withdraw if he was not paid Rs.15,000/-. (2) The petitioner had made a false statement that he had received two offers of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/-. (3) If the P.S.P. would not give the petitioner Rs.15,000/- he would withdraw, after accepting Rs.50,000/- from the supporters of his rival candidate. (4) Eventually, Thakur Niranjan Singh agreed to pay and also authorised the petitioner to spend it. The authorship of the first two parts is ascribed to the petitioner, while that of the fourth to the writer of the news item. The authorship of the third part is ambiguous. It may be construed as a statement by .the petitioner; it may also be interpreted as an expression of opinion of the news reporter. It is proved by the evidence of the petitioner that he never made the statements the authorship of which is attributed to him. The petitioner could only swear to prove a negative fact and this he did. We do not find anything in his statement for which he should not be believed. No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of any of these statements. The petitioner could only swear to prove a negative fact and this he did. We do not find anything in his statement for which he should not be believed. No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of any of these statements. As will be seen white dealing with another point arising in connection with this alleged corrupt practice the Mahakoshal actively supported the respondent's candidature and carried on intensive propaganda for him. So also Shyamacharan Shukla was an active supporter of the respondent. The respondent did not produce any correspondent who was the author of the news item to prove the fourth part of the statement, which obviously emanated: from him, and also to prove that the first two statements were actually made by the petitioner. In fact, truth was not pleaded in defence. The respondent admitted that there was no other Vakil or P.S.P. candidate at the election concerned. (Deposition date 9-8-1968) It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure I) related to the petitioner's personal conduct and character und that it was false. 36. It was an argument before us that Annexure I cannot be said to be a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4) of the Act, but it is a mere-expression of opinion. It is not possible to accept this argument is respect of the first part of the statement the very opening words of the news item "HUA YE KI" (it so happened) incontestably express what actually happened, that is to say, that the petitioner actually made that statement. The making of a statement is a fact and the publication of that fact is a statement of fact which, if found to be false, is within the mischief of the section. The second part is also a statement of fact inasmuch as it tells the reader that a fictitious statement had been made by the petitioner to "knowledgeable sources". The fourth part of the statement is again a statement of fact, that Niranjan Sing accepted the "goods" (meaning that he agreed to make payment to the petitioner and authorised him to spend it). 37. The fourth part of the statement is again a statement of fact, that Niranjan Sing accepted the "goods" (meaning that he agreed to make payment to the petitioner and authorised him to spend it). 37. Subsection (4) requires: (1) there was publication of any statement of fact by a candidate or with his consent; (2) the statement is false; (3) the candidate believes it to be false of does not believe it to be true; (4) it relates to the personal character or conduct or another candidate; and (5) the statement is reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the other candidate's election. Sheopal Singh v. Ramratan [1964 (1) SCR 175]. The third element refers to the belief of the candidate publishing the statement, or, who is in the eye of law responsible for it and not the belief of the person who actually made the false statement This proposition has been succinctly laid down and fully explained by their Lordships in Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Sharma [ AIR 1967 SC 808 ], thus:- “The responsibility of the candidate for the publication arises if he publishes the thing himself. He is equally responsible for the publication if it is published by his agent. Thirdly, he is also responsible where the thing is published by any other person but with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. In all the three cases, the responsibility is of the candidate and it is ordinarily the candidate's belief that matters for this purpose. If the candidate either believes the statement to be false or does not believe it to be true, he would be responsible under section 123 (4)............... It is the candidate's belief that matter and not the belief of the person who actually made it with the consent of the candidate". Dr. Jagjeet Singh Vs. Gyani Kartar Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 773 ]. When the first part of Annexure 1 was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he said:- "I cannot say whether the statement is true or not. Dr. Jagjeet Singh Vs. Gyani Kartar Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 773 ]. When the first part of Annexure 1 was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he said:- "I cannot say whether the statement is true or not. I would prefer to say that it is not true." With regard to the second and the fourth parts of Annexure 1, the respondent's answer is:- "I have absolutely no knowledge about its correctness or otherwise." An argument was constructed by the learned Advocate General that when a person says that he has no knowledge cannot be said that he either believes it to be false or does not believe it to be true. According to him, if a person does not believe a thing to be true, the alternatives are:- (1) He believes it to be false; or (2) he does not believe it to be true; or (3) be neither knows whether it is true or false. But in our opinion, the third also means that he does not believe it to be true, because, otherwise, he cannot say that he does not know whether it is true or false. To put; it differently if one does not believe thing to be false, he either believes it to be true or does not believe it to be true. The expressions used in section 123 (4) of the Act are: "believes to be false" and "does not believe to be true". These are also the expressions used, for instance, in sections 171 (g), 191 and 199 of the Penal Code. These expressions are different from "knowing or believing to be false" as employed in sections 197 and 203, Penal Code, or "knowing to be false" in sections 196, 198, 200 and 209. 38. The next contention advanced for the respondent is that the statement (Annexure I) cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. The learned Advocate General construed the statement as to carry an effect on the electors which would raise the prestige of the petitioner either for his cleverness or honesty. The reader would think that there is nothing wrong in a candidate asking his party to finance him and the reader will also be favourably impressed by the petitioner demanding only Rs.15,000 in preference to Rs.50,000 offered him as a bribe. The reader would think that there is nothing wrong in a candidate asking his party to finance him and the reader will also be favourably impressed by the petitioner demanding only Rs.15,000 in preference to Rs.50,000 offered him as a bribe. On this interpretation, it was argued that the statement is not within the mischief of section 123 (4), as its effect would be wholesome and would only advocate the petitioners' prospects. We are unable to accept this logic. It is first of all to he remembered that the test if not to evolve a possible or ingenious interpretation. A news item is not a matter for research of contemplation. That meaning must be attached which the news item will convey immediately and plainly at the first glance. We are clearly of the opinion that the effect which the news item (Annexure I) will at once create on the mind of the reader is that the petitioner extorted money from his party under the threat of withdrawing from the candidature. Secondly, the demand of Rs.15,000 was also exorbitant and, therefore, extortious because the permissible limit of election expenses under the law was Rs.7000. Thirdly, the expression "LATIFA SUNAYA" stamps the petitioner as a person who fabricates stories. All this was bound to, or atleast reasonably calculated to lower the petitioner in the estimation of the electorate and thus prejudice his election prospects. 39. Shri Munshi laid a great deal of stress on the context in which the statement (Annexure I) was published (1) In the issue of the 8th April, the Mahakoshal published a report entitled as a report by "Sanjay" with the caption "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI": (Sanjay figures in the Mahabharat as one invested with the superhuman power of seeing all that was happening at the battle field and relating It to Dhritrashtra. Thus, it means a farsighted person). In that article the respondent was compared favourably with Raja Bhoj and the petitioner with Gangu Teli. The latter was shown to be a dwarf like an oil-man in contrast to the former who was styled a King. Thus, it means a farsighted person). In that article the respondent was compared favourably with Raja Bhoj and the petitioner with Gangu Teli. The latter was shown to be a dwarf like an oil-man in contrast to the former who was styled a King. Although the aim of this article was to belittle the petitioner, it was little realised that it would offend and annoy the Teli voters, whose number was fairly large, and, further they would cast their votes, on the ground of brotherhood; in favour of the petitioner who had been stamped a Teli. (ii) The petitioner's statement about Dr. Ausaf Hussain's offer had appeared in three news-papers Nav Bharat, Nai Duniya and Yugdharma on the 10th April. To neutralise the effect created by these two, this offending statement (Annexure I) was published in the Mahakoshal of the 12th April, imputing to the petitioner that he was out to grab Rs.15,000/- by extending a threat to his party, and conveying to the electorate that the story of the offer of Rs.50,000/- was a myth. And this was quickly followed by a statement (Ex. P-76) issued by the respondent, which was published in the Mahakoshal of the 13th April. Shri Munshi argued that although this statement ostensibly expressed dis-appropriation of the article 'KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI", in reality its aim was to pacify the Teli community. In this statement (Ex. P-76) it was suggested that in the legend, it was "Raja Gangeya Deo Telangan" who had fought with Raja Bhoj, and then it became a saying "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGEYA TELANGAN", as time passed, the saying depreciated into "KAHAN RAJA BHOJ AUR KAHAN GANGU TELI." The article then goes on to say that in the Sanskrit "Tel" means "Sneh" (affection) so that the Teli community is 'very affectionate.' 40. This background and Shri Munshi's argument we shall bear in mind when we shall deal with the question whether the statement (Annexure I) was published by the respondent or with his consent, which question remains to be seen. Since the question is common to all the three annexures, it will be convenient to deal with it at one place. 41. Annexure 2 - The second 0ffending statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal, issue dated the 26th April. Since the question is common to all the three annexures, it will be convenient to deal with it at one place. 41. Annexure 2 - The second 0ffending statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal, issue dated the 26th April. It is a news item with the caption: "NEHRUJI MAHATMA GANDHI KE HATYARE KAMAL NARAYAN PAGLA GAYA". (Nehruji murderer of Mahatma Gandhi? Kamal Narayan has gone mad). The news is that on the 23rd April, "the official candidate of the P.S.P. "while delivering a speech at Bar village from a cloth shop, uttered: "RASHTRA PITA BAPU KA HATYARA NEHRU HAI" (Nehru is the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation). 42. The petiti0ner, as P.W. 5, stated that he was always in his sense and it was wrong to say that he has lost his mental equilibrium. It was also wrong to say that he had gone to Bar village on the 23rd April or that he called a meeting or that he began delivering a speech from any cloth shop and "it is also false that I said there that Nehru was the murderer of Bapu, the father of the nation." The petitioner's statement on oath must be believed as it was not rebutted, nor was the news item pleaded, nor did the respondent make any endeavour to produce the news correspondent. It must, therefore, be held that the statement (Annexure II) is false. The impugned news item is a representation of what the. petitioner reportedly uttered at a meeting. When it was put to the respondent in cross-examination, he stated:- "I have absolutely no idea whether the fact published in Annexure II is true or false. I was not present at that meeting." This means that the respondent did not believe it to be true. (Reasons already stated in connection with Annexure I). 43. According to the objected statement the petitioner uttered those words factually. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that it is a statement of fact within the meaning of section 123 (4). 44. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that to call Nebruji the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi would be an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact; it is figurative language meaning that Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, did not pursue and translate into action the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. 44. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that to call Nebruji the murderer of Mahatma Gandhi would be an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact; it is figurative language meaning that Pandit Nehru, as Prime Minister of India, did not pursue and translate into action the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Further, this opinion will relate to the speaker's political conduct. The argument would have deserved some consideration if Mahatma Gandhi's assessination had not been a fact, which is unforgettable. The reader's mind will immediately connect the statement with it and it will register the plain and apparent meaning and its natural impact. 45. But what we are really concerned with is not what the petitioner uttered (according to the news item) but whether the statement (Annexure II) published by the Mahakoshal representing to its readers that the petitioner uttered those words, is a statement of fact or not. According to the news item, the petitioner went to the village and there started his speech with that utterance. Thus, all this is a statement of fact, which we have found to be false. Further, there can be no doubt that the objected statement relates to the personal conduct and character of the petitioner, depicting it as base and mean. In Inderlal Vs. Lal Singh [ AIR 1962 SC 1156 ], Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court, explained the distinction in these words:- "In order that the ejections should be free it is necessary that the electorate should be educated on political issues in a fearless manner and so the Legislature thought that full and ample scope should be left for free and fearless criticism by candidates against the public and political character of their opponents. But the position with regard to the private or personal character of the candidate is very different. Circulation of false statements about the private or personal character of the candidate during the period proceeding elections is likely to work against the freedom of election itself in as much as the effect created by false statements cannot be met by denials in proper time and so the constituency has to re protected against the circulation of such false statements which are likely to affect the voting of the electors. That is why it is for the protection of the constituency against acts which would be fatal to the freedom of election that the statute provides for the inclusion of the circulation of false statements concerning the private character of a candidate amongst corrupt practices. Dissemination of false statements about the personal character of a candidate thus constitutes a corrupt practice.................................In discussing the distinction between the private character and the public character sometimes reference is made to the man 'beneath the politician' and it is said that if a statement of fact affects the man beneath the politician, it touches private character and if it affects the politician, it does not touch his private character." The same distinction was expressed in Guruji Shrihari Vs. Vitthalrao [CA 1178 of 1967 decided on the 19th November 1968, (SC)] thus:- "When false allegation of fact pierces the politician and touches the person of the candidate, then section 123 (4) is contravened". 46. It was not contended before us that the impugned statement (Annexure II) was not calculated to prejudice the petitioner's election prospects. 47. Shri Munshi pointed out that the setting in which this statement appeared in the Mahakoshal was this: (1) An appeal of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to vote for the respondent was widely and profusely circulated through cards and also through the Mahakoshal Pandit Nehru's photograph was also printed with his appeal. Being a very respected and beloved leader of the country, his appeal was bound to have great influence on the electorate in favour of the respondent. 48. To counteract that influence, Gopinath Sharma, a petitioner's sympathiser, published on the 23rd April a leaflet (Ex. P-135) in which was reproduced the respondents letter dated September 9, 1951, addressed to Seth Govindas, President, Mahakoshal provincial Congress Committee, by which letter the respondent resigned an offices which he held and also the primary membership of the Congress. The following passages are emphasised by Shri Munshi:- "The immediate cause for submitting the resignation is the act of the Prime Minister to turn out Shri Purushottamdas Tandon and to himself become the President and thus an absolute dictator. After the occurrence of this immediate cause, my continuation in the Congress will mean betraying the country. The removal of Rajrishi Tandon is.........murder of democracy. This sin has been committed with the help of Nehruji because of his lust for winning the election. After the occurrence of this immediate cause, my continuation in the Congress will mean betraying the country. The removal of Rajrishi Tandon is.........murder of democracy. This sin has been committed with the help of Nehruji because of his lust for winning the election. This is the limit of degeneration of the Congress. The 8th September 1951 will be regarded as an inauspicious day in the history of India. I regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence a curse for India......". At the top of this letter its publisher (Gopinath Sharma) asks “How will Mishraji who calls Pandit Nehru a dictator and the murderer of democracy, strengthen his hands". Then he writes that the letter is being published to inform the general public to what extent the Congress candidate, Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, hates the Prime Minister of the country Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. At the bottom of the letter the publisher asks the respondent four questions: (1) By re-entering the Congress are you not betraying the country? (2) Has your re-entry in the Congress and the grant of Congress ticket to you stopped the murder of democracy within the Congress (3) According to your letter the Congress had reached the limit of degeneration in 1961, at what level it is now, (4) when you regard Pandit Nehru's politics and influence as a curse for India, why are you seeking votes in his name ?" 49. Another leaflet (Ex. P-157) was published by one Triveni Shankar, another sympathiser of the petitioner. To this leaflet, a letter of Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, dated January 16, 1952, addressed to the President, Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee, was reproduced. Another leaflet (Ex. P-157) was published by one Triveni Shankar, another sympathiser of the petitioner. To this leaflet, a letter of Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, dated January 16, 1952, addressed to the President, Mahakoshal Provincial Congress Committee, was reproduced. In that letter, Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla wrote, inter and, that after leaving the Congress, the respondent delivered strong speeches against the Congress, in Delhi and several towns of Uttar Pradesh, from the Jan Sangh platform; that the respondent tried to create a new political body, named 'Lok Congress': and made an effort to set up candidates who would contest election against the Congress candidates from all the 232 Constituencies of Madhya Pradesh; and that when he did not succeed and foresaw", dark future, he tried to re-enter the Congress but that had become impossible Pandit Shukla referred to his letter which he had earlier given to the respondent and said that apprehending that it would be exploited, this letter was written to explain the occasion on which and the circumstances in which he had given that letter to the respondent. 50. In the said leaflet (Ex. P-157), the publisher says that Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla's aforesaid letter was published by Seth Govinddas and he asks whether the respondent, Shymacharan Shukla. Pandit Shankarlal Tiwari, or Pandit Shyam Sunder Mushran will contradict in writing the view expressed by the late Ravi Shankerji about Pandit Mishra. Mr. Munshi's contention is that the effect on the electorate of these leaflets Exs.P-157 and P-155 which were published on the and 23rd April respectively, was going to be tramendously prejudicial to the respondent's election prospects. Having regard to the degree of esteem and love which the people had for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, nothing could counteract that effect unless some statement involving the name of Pandit Nehru and causing hurt to the feelings of the voters, was attributed to the petitioner and published to the electorate And, nothing worse could be imagined about pandit Nehru than that he was the murderer of Bapu. It is with this hack ground and in this setting that the statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal. 51. At the end of the trial before the Tribunal, the petitioner produced Shyamlal (P.W. 91), who stated that the respondent himself was the author of the news item (annexure II). It is with this hack ground and in this setting that the statement (Annexure II) was published in the Mahakoshal. 51. At the end of the trial before the Tribunal, the petitioner produced Shyamlal (P.W. 91), who stated that the respondent himself was the author of the news item (annexure II). Shri Munshi relied on this direct evidence and also the attending circumstances to show that the respondent himself was the author of Annexure II, or, at any rate, it was published with his consent. This point we shall consider at its appropriate place. The learned Advocate General vehemently criticized the evidence of Shyamlal and stamped it as concocted.