JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This special appeal arises out of consolidation proceedings. 2. The dispute in the present case is in respect of plot No. 422 of Khata No. 105 and all the plots of Khata No. 91. One Fatta had three sons Maharam, Suggan and Udda. During consolidation proceedings in the basic year the disputed plots were entered in the name of Maharam as tenureholder. But at the time of Partal it was found that the other brothers Udda and Suggan were also in possession over the plots in dispute and their names were shown to be in possession. Maharam filed an objection on the allegation that Udda and Suggan had nothing to do with the plots in dispute and prayed for the removal of the entries of possession in their names. His case was that the plots in dispute had been settled with him when he was separated member from the other brothers as well as his father. This claim of Maharam was contested by Udda and Suggan who asserted that the tenancy had been acquired by the joint family consisting of the three brothers in the name of Maharam who was the eldest of them all and who acted as Karta of the family and that the entry of Maharam as a tenureholder was in representative capacity. In the alternative it was asserted that in any case they being in possession over the plots in dispute for more than the prescribed period they acquired sirdari right u/s 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The Consolidation Officer accepted the claim of Udda and Suggan and found that the plots in dispute had been acquired at a time when the family was joint and that the acquisition had been made by Maharam in representative capacity. In coming to this conclusion the Consolidation Officer took note of various aspects of the case. It was found that the acquisition had been made at a time when the family was joint raising the presumption of jointness in favour of real brothers. The Consolidation Officer also noted that possession of Udda and Suggan was proved by the extracts of Khasras of 1362 F. and 1369 F., rent receipts, irrigation slips and a number of pass books for the supply of the sugar canes from 1951 upto date. The Consolidation Officer also noted that possession of Udda and Suggan was proved by the extracts of Khasras of 1362 F. and 1369 F., rent receipts, irrigation slips and a number of pass books for the supply of the sugar canes from 1951 upto date. He also in the alternative held that in any case the opposite parties Udda and Suggan were entitled to get the benefit of Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 3. This decision of the Consolidation Officer was upheld in appeal by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. In revision the Dy. Director of Consolidation confined his attention only to the question of settlement of tenancy with Maharam whether it was in individual capacity or in representative capacity. It appears that, casting the burden of proof on Udda and Suggan he held that these persons not having discharged the onus that lay on them Maharam should be held to have acquired the tenancy in his individual capacity. The Dy. Director did not refer to all the documentary evidence about possession which had been referred to by the Consolidation Officer nor did he give any categorical finding as to the factum of possession of the third and the fourth Respondents. 4. Aggrieved with the decision of the Dy. Director of Consolidation Respondents Udda and Suggan filed a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge of this Court found that there existed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in the judgment of the Dy. Director of Consolidation inasmuch as he had not considered all the circumstances of the case and had made no comments on certain material evidence as such his order was illegal and suffered from mistake apparent on the face of the record. The learned Single Judge quashed the order and made comments on the question of law involved in the case. 5. Aggrieved with the above order the present special appeal has been filed. Learned Counsel for the third and the fourth Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal. It was contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was an order of remand which was passed Under Article 227 of the Constitution as such was not appealable. Learned Counsel for the third and the fourth Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal. It was contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was an order of remand which was passed Under Article 227 of the Constitution as such was not appealable. It was also contended that even if the order is considered to be one Under Article 226 of the Constitution the order under appeal is no judgment for it does not decide the final rights of the parties and leaves it to be decided by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. According to the learned Counsel such an order was not a final order as such no appeal could be filed u/Ch. VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. It was argued that the order passed in the instant case is an order of remand and since the rights of the parties have not been determined by this order the order cannot be said to be judgment as contemplated by Ch. VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. In support of this contention learned Counsel placed reliance on the cases of Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. and Ors. v. The Dominion of India and others AIR 1950 FC 77, W.O. Holdsworth and Ors. v. State of UP through Commissioner of Agricultural income tax UP Lucknow 1956 AWR 803 , Jethanand and Sons Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 794 , Duli Chand Kashi Prasad v. State of UP and Anr. 1968 ALJ 680 and Southern Roadways (P.) Ltd. Vs. P. Methurai Veeraswami (died) M. Dhanapalan and Others, AIR 1964 Mad 194 . 6. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties on this preliminary point we have no hesitation in over-ruling it (as it) was without substance. The order of the learned Single Judge clearly shows that he has passed the order Under Article 226 of the Constitution and not Under Article 227. There is nothing on the record to show that the learned Judge exercised his jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the Constitution. When there is a dispute as to whether a particular order has been passed Under Article 226 or Article 227 the Court ordinarily would accept it one Under Article 226 rather than Under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is nothing on the record to show that the learned Judge exercised his jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the Constitution. When there is a dispute as to whether a particular order has been passed Under Article 226 or Article 227 the Court ordinarily would accept it one Under Article 226 rather than Under Article 227 of the Constitution. This matter has been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Aidal Singh and Ors. v. Karan Singh and others 1957 AWR 296 . For the reasons given above and in view of this authority we hold that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is Under Article 226 and not Under Article 227. 7. An order passed in this case cannot be equated with an order of remand which is passed by a court exercising appellate jurisdiction. This Court while dealing with the writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises extra ordinary original jurisdiction. This jurisdiction being original in nature must be distinguished from an appellate jurisdiction. In the latter case the appeal under the law is a continuation of the original proceeding and when by the judgment of the appellate court a case is remanded it reopens the proceedings in a suit and the decision in the appeal cannot be regarded as finally determining the rights of the parties in controversy in the litigation. Whereas in proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court is only concerned to see whether there is any jurisdictional error or the inferior Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. As soon as it is found that either there is jurisdictional mistake or there is an error apparent on the face of the record the High Court issues writ. This issuance of the writ or refusal to issue writ finally disposes of the controversy between the parties in the proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. We have looked into the various authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents and we find that the case of Southern Roadways (P.) Ltd. Vs. P. Methurai Veeraswami (died) M. Dhanapalan and Others, AIR 1964 Mad 194 relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondents is a complete answer to the preliminary objection raised. 8. We have looked into the various authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents and we find that the case of Southern Roadways (P.) Ltd. Vs. P. Methurai Veeraswami (died) M. Dhanapalan and Others, AIR 1964 Mad 194 relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondents is a complete answer to the preliminary objection raised. In this authority it was held that: an order on an application Under Article 226, whichever way it goes, will be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as it will be a final adjudication of all matters in controversy in the writ proceedings and which will have the effect of affecting the constitutional remedy of an aggrieved party. The proceedings Under Article 226 are original in nature and founded on rights of parties aggrieved, with a view to keep the orders of statutory tribunal within the bounds of law. To put it differently, the subject matter of the petition Under Article 226 will be entirely different from the matters in controversy agitated before the inferior Tribunal, the former relating to the vindication of a constitutional right. The merits of the controversy in proceedings Under Article 226 cannot, therefore, be equated to the controversy regarding the rights or privileges asserted or claimed before the inferior Tribunal, whose order is sought to be quashed in those proceedings. Further, this jurisdiction being original in nature, must also be distinguished from an appellate jurisdiction. A court issuing a writ Under Article 226 will, unlike an appellate court, have no jurisdiction to decide those matters which the statute had entrusted to the Tribunal with an exclusive jurisdiction to decide. It must follow that the finality of an order Under Article 226 cannot be made to depend on the revival or pendency or otherwise of the controversy before the Tribunal. An order finally disposing of an application Under Article 226 cannot be regarded as any the less a final order, because certain disputes still remain outstanding between the parties before the statutory authority against whom the writ is sought. An order passed, either granting or refusing to grant a writ applied for Under Article 226, which has the effect of either reviving or leaving the controversy before the inferior tribunal for adjudication, can, therefore, be regarded as a judgment or final order Under Article 133 of the Constitution. 9. An order passed, either granting or refusing to grant a writ applied for Under Article 226, which has the effect of either reviving or leaving the controversy before the inferior tribunal for adjudication, can, therefore, be regarded as a judgment or final order Under Article 133 of the Constitution. 9. The above is a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court and it has dealt with almost all the authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondents in support of his contention and has discussed threadbare the distinction between an order of remand passed by an appellate court and an order passed by the High Court in its jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Para. 20 of this judgment has dealt with the case of Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. and Ors. v. The Dominion of India and Ors. AIR 1959 FC 77 whereas para. 21 of this authority deals with the case of Jethanand and Sons Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 794 relied on by the learned Counsel. The other cases relied on by the learned Counsel are also distinguishable and cannot be held to be applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj 1962 ALJ 819 : 1962 AWR 42 (J) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of Ch. VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. In that case a learned Single Judge dismissed an application filed for the review of his earlier order on the ground that Section 11 of the Agricultural income tax Act did not confer any such right on the Appellants. This order was held to be a judgment within the meaning of Ch. VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court noticed the various authorities of different Courts which had dealt with the scope of the expression 'judgment' occurring in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court which corresponded to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts and came to the conclusion that the order passed by this Court in proceedings Under Article 226 of the Constitution would be judgment within the meaning of that expression. Applying the principle of law of this case also, we are of opinion that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the instant case is a judgment as contemplated by Ch. VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court and is clearly appealable. We hereby overrule the preliminary objection raised. 11. Now coming to the merits of the appeal it has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that the question involved before the consolidation authorities was as to whether the settlement of tenancy was made in favour of Maharam in his individual capacity or representative capacity. According to the learned Counsel it was a pure question of fact and the decision of the Deputy Director even if it was erroneous could not be interfered with by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Apparently this argument appeared to be attractive and we were initially inclined to accept it, but after carefully going through the three judgments of the consolidation authorities we think that the decision of the learned Single Judge should be affirmed. It is true that howsoever erroneous a finding of fact may be cannot be interfered with by a second appellate court much less by a court exercising its jurisdiction Under Article 226. But it is also equally settled that if in deciding a question of fact the authority concerned commits an error of law apparent on the face of the record a writ of certiorari can be issued to correct such an error. In the instant case, the case of the Appellant was that settlement of tenancy had been made in his favour at a time when he was separate from other members of his family and that the other members of the family were not in possession of the plots in dispute. On the contrary the case of the third and the fourth Respondents was that the settlement had been made in the name of Maharam in representative capacity and that they were continuously in possession of the plots in dispute from the date of settlement. In such a case before coming to the conclusion one way or the other it was very necessary to have decided the question of possession asserted to by the third and the fourth Respondents. In such a case before coming to the conclusion one way or the other it was very necessary to have decided the question of possession asserted to by the third and the fourth Respondents. We find that although the Consolidation Officer had considered the various documents referred to in the judgment of the learned Single Judge for coming to the conclusion about the possession of Respondents 3 and 4 the Deputy Director has not noticed those documents nor has given a categorical finding about possession. It is well settled that when parties have led evidence onus of proof loses all force. It is only when on the evidence on the record the court does not come to one conclusion or the other that onus of proof becomes important. The Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to have decided the case more relying on the onus of proof rather than after weighing the evidence on the record. Even when the Deputy Director relied on the onus of proof he ignored material documentary evidence as has been referred to by the learned Single Judge. Thus he committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record justifying interference by the learned Single Judge. The learned Judge has exposed the law on the point correctly and no exception can be taken to that. 12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant wanted to raise the question of resjudicata by moving an application before this Court and the learned Counsel for the Respondents raised the question of having acquired prescriptive right by adverse possession to which an objection was taken on behalf of the Appellant that the question of adverse possession had been given up by the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Since we are affirming the decision of the learned Single Judge it is not necessary to express any opinion on these points. The order of the learned Single Judge provides sufficient scope for the parties to urge their respective points before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 13. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. But in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.