ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - These two criminal revisions arise out of the same order passed, by the Temp. Civil and Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, on 29-5-1968 and may be disposed of together. The question of law which arises for consideration in these cases and as to whether the alleged defamatory statements made by the Applicants as accused persons in their defence u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure could form subject of their prosecution for defamation. 2. The material facts of the case are that there was a criminal case brought by one Mohammad Siddiq against Smt. Najibunnisa and Shukurulla Under Sections 494 and 497 IPC on the allegation that Smt. Najibunnisa being his wife had married Shukurulla in the life time of the first spouse and thereby she was guilty of bigamy and Shukurulla was guilty of abetment of the same, In the same complaint it was added that Shukurulla had committed adultery with Smt. Najibunnisa, the wife of Mohammad Siddiq. In proof of the fact that the accused Shukurulla had married Smt. Najibunnisa or had Committed adultery with her it was alleged by the prosecution that Smt. Najibunnisa had given birth to two children by Shukurulla. Smt. Najibunnisa and Shukurulla were examined by the court on 28-2-1966. One of the questions put to Shukurulla and the answer given by him may be translated into English as follows: Question : The prosecution has led, evidence to the effect that you knowing that Smt. Najibunnisa was the wife of the complainant Mohammad Siddiq at the time when you kept her at the place Ramai Patti and in the house in Tarkapur established illicit connection with her against the wishes of Mohammad Siddiq and without his consent and committed adultery on her whereby Smt. Najibunnisa gave birth to two children from such adulterous relationship. What have you got to say with regard to this? Answer: I did not establish any illicit connection with Smt. Najibun-nisa. Her children were born by Shah Mohammad. A similar question was put to Smt. Najibunnisa and her reply was that Shukurulla had no illicit connection with her and she had given birth to the children from Shah Mohammad. Thereafter both the accused were asked as to whether they had anything to add and they replied that they would submit in writing, They filed their separate written statements in court on 4-3-1968. Thereafter both the accused were asked as to whether they had anything to add and they replied that they would submit in writing, They filed their separate written statements in court on 4-3-1968. In the said written statements both the, accused repeated the same answers and alleged that Smt. Najibunnisa had illicit connection with Shah Mohammad and denied that she had any illicit connection with Shukurulla. 3. Shah Mohammad felt aggrieved by these statements of the accused which he claimed to be defamatory and hence he filed a complaint against each of the present Applicants, which gave rise to these revisions. 4. Both the Applicants in their respective cases admitted to have made the alleged statements in the written statements and also in their statements u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure in the earlier proceedings but denied that they had made the said statements with an intention to insult Shah Mohammad and claimed that the statements made by them were true. Shukurulla further stated that he had made the statement that the two children were born to Smt. Najibunnisa from Shah Mohammad on the basis of the information received by him from Smt. Najibunnisa. 5. Both the Applicants were charged with having made defamatory statements, contained in the written statements dated 4-3-1966. 6. I have carefully perused the charge framed against the accused in each of the two cases respectively. The charge is confined to the imputation made by the accused concerning Shah Mohammad regarding forced and illegal intercourse with the lady by filing written statements before the Magistrate in the earlier proceedings. There, was no charge relating to the oral statement made by the accused u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure in each of the two cases. Under these circumstances, the only question which arises for decision is as to whether the Applicants could claim immunity from punishment for the written statements filed by them in the earlier case. The only provision of law under which such written statements are filed is contained in Section 256(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The courts below also confined themselves to the question of the immunity arising from the filing of the written statements arid not to any protection which may accrue by virtue of giving an answer u/s 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure which was not the charge levelled against the Applicants. 7. The courts below also confined themselves to the question of the immunity arising from the filing of the written statements arid not to any protection which may accrue by virtue of giving an answer u/s 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure which was not the charge levelled against the Applicants. 7. I have heard Sri P.C. Chaturvedi, the learned Counsel for the Applicants, at considerable length and also Sri T. Rathore on behalf of the complainant and Sri M.P. Bajpai on behalf of the State. An attempt was made on behalf of the Applicants to invoke the aid of Section 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure and an argument was advanced that even a false statement, false to the knowledge of the accused making it for self protection, was immune him from punishment according to the provision of Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. The aid of that provision of law was founded on the basis that the same statement which was made u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure was repeated in the written statements filed by them and consequently the averments made in the written statements should be deemed to be part and parcel of the statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was vehemently contended by Sri Chaturvedi that it would be anomalous to hold that the same subject matter when embodied in a reply given u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure be held as protected, but should be excluded from protection when it formed the subject matter of the written statement u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 and submitted that the view of the Supreme Court was that the written statement should be deemed to be virtually a part or continuation of the plea taken u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. I have gone through the decision with care and I do not find any warrant, for such conclusion to be drawn from it. I have gone through the decision with care and I do not find any warrant, for such conclusion to be drawn from it. All, that was said in that decision was that the filing of the written statements u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure should not be deprecated and since in his examination u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure the accused had stated that he would file a written statement and the court had accepted the same, the written statement must not necessarily be regarded as being an after thought and not worthy of serious consideration. The position was summed up by Gajendragadkar, J. in these wards- If the written statement is filed after a long delay and contains pleas which can otherwise be legitimately regarded as matters of after-thought, that no doubt would affect the value of the plea taken in the written statement but we do not think that it would be possible to lay down a general rule that the written statement filed by an accused person should not receive the attention of the Court because it is likely to be influenced by legal advice. In our opinion, such a distrust of legal advice would be entirely unjustified. I find that in the present case also the request of the accused persons for filing the written statement was accepted by the court but it does not follow that the written statements became part and parcel of the answers submitted by the accused in reply to the questions put to them u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. In Harbhajan Singh's case (supra) their lordships merely laid down a rule of caution and held that the written statement should not be lightly brushed aside as being an after thought. In this view of the matter the short question which is left for consideration is as to whether the alleged defamatory statement made by the accused persons in the previous proceedings could furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant cases. In this view of the matter the short question which is left for consideration is as to whether the alleged defamatory statement made by the accused persons in the previous proceedings could furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant cases. Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure may be reproduced below: Power to examine the accused--(1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court may, at any stage of any inquiry or trial without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers, necessary and shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence. (2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by, giving false answers to them but the Court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks just. (3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. (4) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined Under Sub-section (1). The protection which is afforded by Sub-section (2) of Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure is not by any chance applicable to the written statement contemplated by, Sub-section (2) of Section 256 Code of Criminal Procedure. The concluding portion of Section 256(1) Code of Criminal Procedure provides that after cross-examination and re examination (if any), of the evidence pf any remaining witness for the, prosecution is finished, they shall be discharged and the accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence. Sub-section (2) of Section 256 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record. Sub-section (2) of Section 256 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record. The Legislature in its wisdom has not added any protective provision or safeguard to the written statement filed u/s 25(2) Code of Criminal Procedure I am unable to accede to Sri Chaturvedi contention that there is really speaking no such thing as a written statement in a criminal case in the sense in which a pleading or written statement is filed in a civil case. According to his contention Section 256(2) of the Code merely provides a machinery for bringing on record the answers to questions put u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. He laid stress on the fact that Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure was the only provision in the Code under which the answers given by an accused might be taken into consideration. He sought to illustrate the point by taking certain extreme examples. Thus, for instance he suggested that if questions u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure were put to a dumb person who was physically incapable of giving an oral answer, he would give his answers in toe form of a written statement. In that circumstance the statement in writing would really be an answer u/s 34 Code of Criminal Procedure and not a written statement as contemplated by Section 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. In my opinion firstly, the illustration is based on a purely hypothetical case which is at variance with the facts of the present case which I am actually called upon to decide. Moreover, the analogy cannot be pressed too far. If answers intended to be given u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure are actually filed in the shape of a statement in written owing to some disability inherent or acquired, it is professedly and avowedly a statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, even in exceptional cases a distinction is preserved, though the border line may be thin. In my opinion the law contemplates two distinct processes namely, answers to questions put u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure and a statement in writing u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. There is a distinction between these two provisions which no amount of legal sophistry can obliterate. In my opinion the law contemplates two distinct processes namely, answers to questions put u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure and a statement in writing u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. There is a distinction between these two provisions which no amount of legal sophistry can obliterate. It is not the oral or the written character of the answers given by an accused person which distinguishes the statement u/s 342 from that u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It is the occasion and the stimulus for giving the answers which provides the criterion. The moment the statement of the accused conforms to a pattern of answers to questions put to him, for the purpose of enabling him to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, those answers come within the provisions of Section 342 and fall outside the ambit of Section 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure whether they may be oral answers or answers in the shape of a statement in writing. As I have already observed, even a non oral statement can in exceptional circumstances be in reply to questions put u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure, but it must be expressly and advisedly so. 8. I am unable to find any incongruity in protection being afforded by the Legislature in respect of the same statement when made u/s 342 and withholding such protection when made in the form of a written statement u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. Protections or statutory immunities are with reference to a particular context or definite situation or occasion and in the absence of that occasion there may be no raison detre for extending the same immunity. For instance, a statement made on the floor of the Legislature may be protected, but an identical statement made outside may not be clothed With any immunity. Thus, there is no anomaly involved in the fact that the answers given by an accused u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure may be protected, but if they form the subject matter of a written statement u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure the immunity may cease to exist. It is not for nothing that the Legislature in its Wisdom has chosen to confer protection on the statement u/s 342 and not so with regard to the statement in writing u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not for nothing that the Legislature in its Wisdom has chosen to confer protection on the statement u/s 342 and not so with regard to the statement in writing u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It is noteworthy that an accused person is not at liberty to make an untrammeled statement u/s 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. The protection enjoyed by the accused is confined to only such answers as are necessary for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Such answers even if false, shall not render the accused liable for punishment. Thus, there is no license to the accused to make roving and irrelevant aspersions on others. On the contrary the language of Section 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain any such prohibition. Its language does not guard against reckless and unnecessary averments forming part of a written statement. In such circumstances, therefore, the Legislature did not consider it expedient or salutary to extend the protection to the contents of a written statement filed u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. A case decided by this Court is directly in point. In Mt. Champa Devi and Another Vs. Pirbhu Lal and Others it was held by Daniel, J. that the immunity conferred by Section 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure did not extend to a written statement by the accused. 9. Sri P.C. Chaturvedi placed great reliance on a decision of Dalai, J. in Murli Pathak Vs. King-Emperor . In that case in a prosecution u/s 499 Code of Criminal Procedure the accused's answer, alleged to be defamatory, was relevant to the matter in issue and arose out of a question put by the Court in a previous criminal proceeding against him. It was held that the provisions of Section 342(2) Code of Criminal Procedure applied and that the accused was at any rate not punishable for making, such statement. The fact of that case are clearly distinguishable. It dealt entirely with the question as to whether the allegedly defamatory statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure which was relevant to the matter in issue was protected or not. It did not consider the effect of making a defamatory statement in the form of a written statement filed u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It dealt entirely with the question as to whether the allegedly defamatory statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure which was relevant to the matter in issue was protected or not. It did not consider the effect of making a defamatory statement in the form of a written statement filed u/s 256(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It is significant that Justice Dalai noticed the earlier decision in the case of Champa Devi (supra) and did not dissent from the ratio of that case. 10. To sum up, a false statement made by an accused in reply to questions put to him u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure is protected, provided it is not reckless or irrelevant or wanting in good faith. It must be for the purpose of explaining the circumstances in the evidence appearing against him. Such statement, even though false to his knowledge, will not render him liable for defamation. But such immunity does not extend to a written statement filed u/s 256(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. The result of applying the above criteria to the facts of the present case is that the allegedly defamatory statements made by the Applicants in the earlier case against them were in the form of written statements filed by them u/s 256 Code of Criminal Procedure. As already indicated, the charge in the present case and the prosecution evidence were founded entirely on the previous written statement and not on any statements u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, no immunity could be claimed by the accused in respect of those statements with the aid of Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure unless those statements were otherwise found not defamatory. If the protection guaranteed by Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure was not available to the Applicants, they could not avoid punishment for the offence of defamation, until they could establish a qualified privilege provided under any of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC. The finding of the learned. If the protection guaranteed by Section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure was not available to the Applicants, they could not avoid punishment for the offence of defamation, until they could establish a qualified privilege provided under any of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC. The finding of the learned. Sessions Judge in this regard is that there was no good faith in the making of those statements by the accused, as it was not at all necessary to have stated that the children were born to Smt. Najibunnisa from Shah Mohammad No doubt, they had been asked in tre previous case whether Smt. Najibunnisa had given birth to two children as a result of her illicit connection with Shukurulla but the accused could deny this and still not mention the name of Shah Mohammad. On this reasoning it was found by the learned Sessions Judge that the relevant exception of Section 499 IPC did not protect the accused from punishment u/s 500 IPC. I am inclined' to endorse this finding of the learned Sessions Judge and I find no justification for the accused choosing to besmirch the name of Shah Mohammad in their written statements. The imputation made by them against him has been rightly found to be false and in that event it must be deemed to be so reckless as to be devoid of good faith. 12. In the circumstances I am of the opinion that the said written statements having been proved to be false and not protected by any of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC they were apparently defamatory and tended to harm the reputation of Shah Mohammad. Hence, the accused were guilty of an offence punishable u/s 500 IPC and the courts below were justified in convicting them. 13. In the result I affirm the conviction of the Applicants u/s 500 IPC. As regards the sentence I think a sentence of fine of Rs. 100/- each would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. I, therefore, set aside the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment imposed on each of the Applicants and instead direct them to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each. In default of payment of fine they will undergo six months rigorous imprisonment each. Fine must be paid within a month of the receipt of the record of the case in the courts below. The Applicants are on bail. 100/- each. In default of payment of fine they will undergo six months rigorous imprisonment each. Fine must be paid within a month of the receipt of the record of the case in the courts below. The Applicants are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged. They need not surrender. With this modification in the sentence the revisions are dismissed.