Judgment Santhosh, J.- Appellants 1 and 2 were accused 2 and 3 in the Court of II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, in Sessions Case No. 24 of 1967. It may be mentioned that accused 1 Shrimant Kallappa Magadum passed away before the trial commenced. Both the appellants have been convicted of an offence under section 302 read with section 34 , Indian Penal Code, for committing the murder of Samanagouda; they have also been convicted of an offence under section 302 read with section 34 , Indian Penal Code, for having committed the murder of Malagouda; they have each been sentenced to imprisonment for life for the said offences. They have further been convicted of an offence under section 326 read with section 34 , Indian Penal Code, for having caused grievous hurt to P.W. 17 Jinagouda and each sentenced to 4 years’ rigorous imprisonment. They have further been convicted of an offence under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, for having caused hurt to P.W. 18 Madanavali and each sentenced to 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment. Both the appellants have also been convicted of an offence under section 452 , Indian Penal Code, and each sentenced to 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The sentences have been directed to run concurrently. The appellants challenge the legality and correctness of the said convictions and sentences passed on them by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows: Accused 1 and 2 were brothers. Accused 3 was a friend of accused 1 and 2. The first wife of deceased Shamanagouda was one Krishnabai, who came from the family of Magadums. It may be mentioned that accused 1 and 2 belong to the Magadum family and the deceased belonged to Patil family. Krishnabai inherited the 1-3rd share which belonged to her father Tavanappa in Magadum family, and she brought that property into the family of her husband Shamanagouda. Another girl from Magadum family, by name Godubai was married to one Honnagouda, the elder brother of deceased Malagouda. She had also inherited l/3rd share of her father Peera, who belonged to Magadum family. This Honnagouda and his brothers were members of a joint family. Because of the fact that two-thirds of the property had been taken away by the Patil family, the Magadums were on inimical terms with the Patil family. She had also inherited l/3rd share of her father Peera, who belonged to Magadum family. This Honnagouda and his brothers were members of a joint family. Because of the fact that two-thirds of the property had been taken away by the Patil family, the Magadums were on inimical terms with the Patil family. Parisha, the grandfather of accused 1 and 2 had filed a suit against Honnagouda and Shamanagouda for possession of their share of the property which had gone to the family of Patils by the said two marriages. At that time, Nasalapur, where the parties were residing was in Kolhapur State. The suit filed by Parisha went up to the Supreme Court of Kolhapur; and ultimately, in the Supreme Court, the said suit filed by the grandfather of accused 1 and 2 was dismissed. In the said suit, on behalf of Shamanagouda, his father Satagouda had prosecuted the proceedings. Soon after the decision of the suit in the Supreme Court of Kolhapur, Satagouda, father of deceased Shamanagouda, was murdered on 2nd October, 1945. The three brothers of accused 1 and 2 were prosecuted for having committed the said murder. The Supreme Court of Kolhapur confirmed their conviction and sentences of transportation for life. But all these three convicted persons were released from jail when, after the Independence, Kolhapur State was merged in Bombay State. In the house in which Malagouda was residing, one-third share of it belonged to him. This one-third share was allotted to him in a partition between himself and his brothers. In the same house, the other I-3rd share belonged to Shamana gouda which had come to him from his wife Krishnabai. Shamanagouda sold his 1/3rd share to Malagouda on 26th October, 1960. It may be mentioned that the remaining 1/3rd portion of the house was occupied by accused 1 and 2 and their father Kallagouda. After the sale of his 1-3rd share by Shamanagouda to Malagouda, disputes arose between Malagouda and the accused 1 and 2 and their father, with regard to the right of way to the backyard of the house. After the purchase of Shamanagouda's 1/3rd share by Malagouda, Malagouda filed a suit against Kallagouda and his sons, accused 1 and 2, for injunction restraining them from making use of the said common passage leading to the backyard. In the said suit, a decree was passed in favour of Malagouda. After the purchase of Shamanagouda's 1/3rd share by Malagouda, Malagouda filed a suit against Kallagouda and his sons, accused 1 and 2, for injunction restraining them from making use of the said common passage leading to the backyard. In the said suit, a decree was passed in favour of Malagouda. Shamanagouda was examined as a witness on behalf of Malagouda in the said suit. The decree in the said suit, viz., O.S. No. 227 of 1963, was passed on 7th July, 1966. To the west of the backyard of the house, there is an adjoining backyard of one Vidhyadhar Samaje and others. It may be mentioned that Vidhyadhar Samaje is the uncle of the 3rd accused Shrikant Tatya Samaje alias Chayappagol. Vidhyadhar filed a suit against Malagouda and his sons 10 restrai them from putting up Kalli fence along the b order of the backyard and Vidhya dhar obtained a decree on 13th September, 1966. Because of these litigations, accused 3 and Malagouda were not on good terms. [The Judge stated further facts and discussed the evidence and proceeded.] From the evidence on record, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the accused had common intention to commit murder of the two deceased persons and cause hurt to the other persons. The evidence clearly discloses that all these three accused came dressed in kavi coloured clothes, armed with axe, sword, and sickle respectively went and attacked the deceased Shamanagouda and caused his death. The evidence also discloses that thereafter they went into the house of Malagouda and attacked with deadly weapons, P.W. 17 Jinagouda, and P.W. 18 Madanavali. The evidence further discloses that thereafter all the three accused persons went and attacked Malagouda with axe, sword and sickle and caused his death near the Maddi school. From the evidence on record, there cannot be any doubt that these accused had the common intention to cause the death of Shamanagouda and Malagouda and to cause injuries on P.W. 17 Jimagouda and P.W. 18 Madanavali. Sri Javali, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that there has been misjoinder of charges in this case. He argues that the three incidents in the case are—distinct and not parts of the same transaction. As these were three separate incidents, he contends that there should have been three separate trials. Sri Javali, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that there has been misjoinder of charges in this case. He argues that the three incidents in the case are—distinct and not parts of the same transaction. As these were three separate incidents, he contends that there should have been three separate trials. The clubbing of these different charges in one trial prejudiced the accused. The joint trial has prevented the various accused from cross-examining the witnesses effectively and putting forward their defence. Sri Javali has relied on two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, in Emperor v. Afsaruddi Naseraddi1 and Kanai Lal Paladi v. Emperor2 in support of his contentions. The question for consideration is whether these three incidents form part of the same transaction or independent transactions with no connection whatsoever. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another3. Their Lordships laid down, what is meant by the expression same transaction. In paragraph 27 of the said judgment, their Lordships have observed as follows: “We have not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would he a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction.” In view of the authoritative ruling of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to consider in detail the earlier rulings of the Calcutta High Court relied on by Sri Javali. In Emperor v. Afsaruddi Naseraddi1 there was no connection between the various incidents and hence they did not form a part of the same transaction. In Emperor v. Afsaruddi Naseraddi1 there was no connection between the various incidents and hence they did not form a part of the same transaction. Their Lordships have pointed out in the said decisions that where an accused had murdered two different persons at different times and at different places during the same night and there is no evidence to suggest any connection between these incidents, a single charge cannot be framed in respect of all these offences. The decision in Kanai Lal Paladi v. Emperor2 is of no assistance, as in that case two murders were included in one charge and their Lordships have pointed out that one of the offences would not amount to an offence under section 302 but amounted to an offence under section 304 Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, we are of opinion that the three incidents form part of the same transaction. The evidence clearly discloses that the intention of the three accused was to commit murder of two deceased persons who had appropriated 2/3's share of their joint family property. The evidence clearly discloses that these three accused dressed in kavi coloured clothes and armed with axe, sword and sickle went round the village. They first went and attacked and killed Shamans gouda. Thereafter, from there they went to the house of Malagouda with the object of murdering Malagouda. As Malagouda was not in the house, after attacking P.W. 17 Jinagouda, and P.W. 18 Madanavali, they left the place saying that ‘he is not here.‘The evidence also discloses that thereafter they were going in the direction of the garden land of Malagouda with the intention of murdering him. When they met Malagouda on the way, all of them attacked Malagouda and caused his death. It is clear from what is stated above that among the accused there was unity of purpose and design and there was also continuity of action. We are, therefore, of opinion that all the three incidents form part of one and the same transaction and that all the three accused could be tried for all the charges as per section 239 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are, therefore, of opinion that all the three incidents form part of one and the same transaction and that all the three accused could be tried for all the charges as per section 239 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 239(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: “The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely: (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction.” We are, therefore, clearly of opinion, that the joint trial of the appellants for the different charges is perfectly legal and there is no misjoinder of charges or persons. We may also point out that in the Sessions Court no objection has been taken by the appellants-accused that they should not be tried together on the various charges. We may further point out that even in the appeal grounds in this Court no grounds have been taken that there has been misjoinder of charges or that joint trial of these appellants is illegal. It was not been shown to us how the appellants-accused have been prejudiced by this joint trial. According to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on appeal or revision on account of any error including any misjoinder of charges. Explanation to section 537 Criminal Procedure Code states: “In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code had occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” It is clear from section 537, Criminal Procedure Code that on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charges including misjoinder of charges, the sentence passed by a trial Court cannot be set aside or altered by the appellate Court unless it has occasioned prejudice to the accused and has resulted in failure of justice. It has not been shown to us how the joint trial of the accused has prejudiced them and has occasioned a failure of justice. It has not been shown to us how the joint trial of the accused has prejudiced them and has occasioned a failure of justice. In The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao1, referred to above, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows: “The whole question has again been examined by this Court recently in Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar2. Subba Rao, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court has stated the position thus: ‘To summarise: a charge is a precise formulation of a specific accusation made against a person of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. Sections 234 to 239 permit the joinder of such charges under specified conditions for the purpose of a single trial. Such a joinder may be of charges in respect of different offences committed by a single person or several persons. If the joinder of charges was contrary to the provisions of the Code it would be a misjoinder of charges. Section 537 prohibits the revisional or the appellate Court from setting aside a finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction on the ground of such a misjoinder unless it has occasioned a failure of justice.‘ Even if we were to assume that there has been a misjoinder of charges in violation of the provisions of sections 233 to 239 of the Code, the High Court was incompetent to set aside the conviction of the respondents without coming to the definite conclusion that misjoinder had ocassioned failure of justice.” Again in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra and another3 in paragraph 5, their Lordships have stated as follows: “As regards the second point, it is sufficient to say that it was not raised before the Magistrate. Section 537 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no judgment, conviction or sentence can be held to be vitiated by reason of misjoinder of parties unless prejudice has resulted to the accused thereby. For determining whether failure of justice has resulted the Court is required by the Explanation to S. 537 to have regard to the fact that the objection had not been raised at the trial. Unless it is so raised it would be legitimate to presume that the accused apprehended no prejudice. The point thus fails. For determining whether failure of justice has resulted the Court is required by the Explanation to S. 537 to have regard to the fact that the objection had not been raised at the trial. Unless it is so raised it would be legitimate to presume that the accused apprehended no prejudice. The point thus fails. ” In view of the circumstances mentioned above, we are of opinion that there is no merit in the contention raised by Sri Javali. It has been strenuously contended by Sri Javali that accused No. 2had no motive to join in committing the murder of Shamanagouda. It has also been argued that from the medical evidence it is not very clear whether a sickle has been used in attacking the two deceased persons. There is no force in the said contentions. When dealing with the evidence of motive, we have already referred to the dispute between Malagouda and the members of the family of accused No. 3. It is in evidence that O.S.No. 338 of 1964 (ExhibitP-24) had been filed by an uncle of accused No. 3 against deceased Malagouda. There is also evidence to show that in the said case deceased Shamanagouda gave evidence on behalf of Malagouda, against the family of accused No. 3. There is also evidence to show that Shamanagouda had initiated chapter proceedings against the members of the family of accused No. 3. There is also evidence let in on behalf of the prosecution that accused No. 3 was a friend of accused Nos. 1 and 2. P.W. 9 Jinagouda has deposed to this effect. From the subsequent conduct of accused No. 3 also, i.e., in absconding immediately after the occurrence and thereafter surrendering on the same day along with the other accused, an inference can be drawn that he was one of the person who took part in the attack on the two deceased persons. Apart from this, we have already referred to the evidence of the numerous eye witnesses who have spoken to the fact of accused No. 3 along with the other accused had taken part in the attack on the two deceased persons. We have further pointed out the corroborative evidence of other witnesses viz., P.W. 16Bharma, P.W. 26 Gundu and P.W. 27 Appanna who have stated that they saw accused No. 3 armed with a sickle in the company of accused Nos. We have further pointed out the corroborative evidence of other witnesses viz., P.W. 16Bharma, P.W. 26 Gundu and P.W. 27 Appanna who have stated that they saw accused No. 3 armed with a sickle in the company of accused Nos. 1 and 2 on the day in question. We may further point out that the medical evidence clearly shows that there are numerous injuries on the persons of both the deceased which could have been inflicted with a sickle. Further the defence itself has elicited in cross-examination of P.W. 1 Dr. Kulkarni, who conducted the post-mortem on the dead bodies of the two deceased, that injury Nos. 3, 5, 6 and 7 on the body of deceased Malagouda could also be caused by a sickle. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the argument that accused No. 3 had no motive and did not take part in the attack on the two deceased persons. Before we part with this case., we would like to mention that the investigation in this case has been very prompt and thorough. Particularly, P.W. 46, P.S.I. Malagouda B. Patil, deserves praise for the very good work done by him. He seems to have worked throughout the night and examined promptly the numerous eye witnesses in the case. The fact that not even one single contradiction under section 162 Criminal Procedure Code has been marked in the case, shows the efficient and thorough manner in which he has recorded the statements of the numerous eye witnesses. After reassessing the entire evidence in the case, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution has established by satisfactory evidence all the charges against the appellants. We, therefore, confirm the conviction and sentences passed on the appellants (accused 2 and 3) by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. S.V.S.-----Appeal dismissed.