Judgment The Appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Bangalore appointed under the provisions of section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, of offences punishable under sections 409 , 471 and 477-A of the Penal Code, and also of offence punishable under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of four months with respect to the offences punishable under the Penal Code and no separate sentences were awarded for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The preliminary argument advanced by Mr. Bhagawan was that the convictions falls to the ground since there was no proper sanction on which section 6 of the Prevention of corruption Act insists. The relevant part of section 6 reads: 6 (1) “No Court shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under sub section (2) or sub- section (3-A) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction……… (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.” The special Judge acquired jurisdiction to try the offences punishable under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by reason of his appointment as a Special Judge for that purpose under section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 which reads: “6. (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary…………” That appointment also became the source of his power to try the four offences under the Penal Code with which the accused was also charged, under section 7 (3) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 which reads: “7. (3) When trying any case, Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in section 6 with which the accused, may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial.” So the jurisdiction to try the offences punishable under the Penal Code becomes available to a Special Judge if he acquires the power to try the offences enumerated in section 6 of the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, 1952. If there be no jurisdiction to try those offences, there can be no jurisdiction to try the other offences of which section 7 (3) speaks. Mr. Bhagawan in the course of his neat argument presented before me advanced the contention that the Special Judge by reason of the absence of a proper sanction under section 6 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, did not acquire jurisdiction to try the offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act , and so did not possess the jurisdiction to try the offence under the Penal Code with which the accused was charged. If Mr. Bhagawan is right in his argument that the sanction on which section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act insists did not precede the prosecution commenced against the accused, the conviction of the accused must fail not only with respect to the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, but also in respect of the offences under the Penal Code, with which he Was charged. The prosecution case was that when the accused was working as a lower division clerk in the reservist section of the Effective Group Records of the Maratha Light Infantry, Belgaum, he committed breach of trust with respect to a sum of Rs. 159-74 nP. on 7th December, 1961. It was stated that that sum of money had been entrusted to the accused for remittance to P. W. 27 Jamedar Vithal Gaikwad towards his arrears of pay, but was misappropriated by the accused. It was also said that the accused had committed offences of forgery and falsification of accounts by manipulating the concerned records. So it was that he was charged with an offence of breach of trust, an offence of forgery and an offence of dishonest user of a forged document and falsification of accounts and dishonest misappropriation which are all offences punishable under the Penal Code , and an offence of dishonest misappropriation punishable under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It will be seen that section 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act prohibits the cognisance of an offence punishable under section 5 (2) of the Act except with the previous sanction of the authorities enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub-section. It will be seen that section 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act prohibits the cognisance of an offence punishable under section 5 (2) of the Act except with the previous sanction of the authorities enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub-section. I am not concerned in this case with clauses (a) and (b) which have no application. The authority whose previous sanction was necessary in the present case was the authority specified in clause (c), and that authority competent to remove the accused from his office. But sanction in the present case was granted by P. W. 10 who was the officer-in-charge of the Records of the Maratha Light Infantry, and Exhibit P-20 is his sanction. But Mr. Bhagawan maintained the argument that since P.W. 10 was not the authority competent to remove the accused from his office, the sanction accorded by him is not the sanction which can have any efficacy for the purpose of section 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The argument constructed was that since the accused had been appointed by the Commander of the Sub Area, Poona, who was an officer superior to P. W. 10 the Commander of that Sub Area was he person who could remove the accused from his office, and so was the person who could accord the sanction enjoined by section 6 (1) (c). P. W. 10 who was holding a lower rank than that held by the Commander of the Sub Area of the higher formation who could remove, the accused from his office, could not, it was contended, accord the sanction which had to precede the cognisance of the offence by tie Special Judge. Exhibit D-10 is the agreement under which the accused was appointed in his post on 26th May, 1954. That agreement says that he was appointed by the Commander of the Sub Area of Poona, and it is not disputed that that Commander is now the Commander of the Sub Area, Mysore, in Bangalore. Exhibit D-10 is the agreement under which the accused was appointed in his post on 26th May, 1954. That agreement says that he was appointed by the Commander of the Sub Area of Poona, and it is not disputed that that Commander is now the Commander of the Sub Area, Mysore, in Bangalore. But by an order made by the Adjutant General, Now Delhi, on 4th January, 1954 there was a delegation of the power of removal of Class III Officers to the officers-in-charge in the Records section of the Maratha Regiment in Belgaum and other officers, and since the post held by the accused was a Class III post, if nothing else could be said about it it might appear that he became liable to be removed from his post under the delegation made by the Adjutant General in that way by the officer-in-charge of the Record section of the Maratha Regiment in Belgaum. But on that power of removal bestowed on the officer-in-charge of the Record section of the Maratha Regiment in Belgaum, a fetter was imposed by paragraph 2 of the order of delegation which reads: “2. The punishment of reduction, removal and dismissal will not however be awarded without the prior approval of the next higher formation commander.” It is not disputed for the prosecution that the next higher formation commander to whom this part of the order of delegation refers, is the commander of the Sub Areas, Mysore, in Bangalore, who is no other than the commander who appointed the accused in his post under the agreement Exhibit D-10. That being so, although there was a delegation by the Adjutant General, New Delhi, under Exhibit P-59 of the power of removal of a Class III Servant, to the officer-in-charge of the Records, who, in the present case, was P. W. 10, P. W. 10 did not acquire any absolute power of removal, since that power of removal was exercisable only with the imprimatur of the commander of the next higher formation, and without such imprimatur the power of removal was not exercisable, and as order of removal made by the officer-in-charge would have no efficacy or effect until the commander of the Sub Area accorded his approval to such removal. That fetter placed on the delegate power by the Adjutant General in respect of the punishment of reduction, removal and dismissal, makes it abundantly clear that the power of removal did not effectively reside in the delegate but that it continued to reside in the next higher formation commander, who alone could make an effective order of removal by according the approval to a proposal for removal made by the delegate. The true position therefore is that under Exhibit P-59 the power which was accorded in the delegate was no more than a power to make a proposal to the next higher formation commander for removal, and that he could not make an order of removal himself without the concurrence of that next higher formation commander. So the authority competent to remove the accused from his office of whom section 6 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, speaks, was, in the present case, the next higher formation commander and not P.W. 10. The sanction Exhibit P. 20 accorded by P.W. 10 had therefore no efficacy and was as no sanction for the purpose of section 6 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. So the Special Judge; was incompetent to take cognisance of the offence punishable under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 5 (1) (c) of that Act, and, if he could not take cognizance of this offence and so could not try the accused in respect of this offence, he could not under section 7 (3) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, take cognizance of any other offence punishable under the Penal Code. The resultant position emerging from the discussion so far made is that this appeal succeeds on the ground that the prosecution was not proceeded by the sanction made imperative by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. I allow this appeal and set aside the convictions of the appellant in respect of all the Offences with which he was convicted, and the sentence imposed upon him. S.V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.