JUDGMENT Verma, J. - This is an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the order of the learned District Judge, Saharanpur, dismissing an appeal against the decision of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. 2. The facts, which are not in dispute, are these. There was a dispute between the applicant and the eighty-seven opposite parties, employees of the applicant, with regard to bonus payable for the year 1962. The dispute was referred to the Industrial' Tribunal which gave an award on 2nd November, 1964. This award was published in the gazette on 19th December, 1964 and it was to become effective after the expiry of thirty days. Payment of bonus was made by the applicant to the opposite parties in pursuance of the award. On 29th May, 1965an ordinance called the Payment of Bonus Ordinance, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Bonus Ordinance) was promulgated. This Ordinance prescribed the minimum and maximum bonus payable to employees and the effect of clauses 33 and 34 of the Bonus Ordinance was that any dispute relating to the payment of bonus for the years 1961, 1962, 1963 or 1964 pending before the appropriate Government or any Tribunal was to be governed by the provisions of the Bonus Ordinance. For the year 1964, the bonus declared under the Bonus Ordinance was 20% of the yearly wages of the opposite parties. Under the award, the bonus had been declared under the Full Bench formula and that was considerably in excess of 20%. The applicant, purporting to act under clauses 33 and 34 of the Bonus Ordinance, did not pay the full bonus for the year 1964, i.e. 20% of the yearly wages but they deducted a sum which, according to the applicant, was paid to the opposite parties under the award in excess of what they should have been paid under the Bonus Ordinance. This deduction was made on 14th September, 1965. On 25th September, 1965, the Bonus Ordinance, was replaced by the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), On 6th August, 1966, the Supreme Court struck down clauses 33 and 34 (2) of the Act. The employees thereupon applied to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, under Section 15 of that Act, alleging that the deductions made were illegal. The employees thereupon applied to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, under Section 15 of that Act, alleging that the deductions made were illegal. The Authority accepted the contention of the opposite parties and held that the deductions were illegal. He directed the applicant to pay the amounts deducted and also imposed a penalty. An appeal was filed to the District Judge, Saharanpur, under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act and that appeal was dismissed. Hence this application in revision. 3. The first contention of the learned counsel for the applicant was that bonus payable to the opposite parties does not come under the definition of 'wages' under the Payment of Wages Act and, as the Authority under that Act has jurisdiction only in respect of deductions in payment of wages or delay in payment of wages, the Authority had no jurisdiction. The word 'wages' has been defined under Section 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and the portion relevant for the payment purpose is reproduced below :- "(vi) 'Wages' means all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances, or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes (a) ............................................................. (b) ............................................................. (c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name) : The definition originally, prior to the amendment in 1957, was as follows :- "'Wages' means all remuneration .......................which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus of other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include.............." and thereafter five matters which were not to be included, were set out. 4. In Bala Subrahmanya Rajaram v. B. C. Patil. 4. In Bala Subrahmanya Rajaram v. B. C. Patil. A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 518 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that any bonus payable under an award was not covered by the definition of 'wages' prior to the amendment. Their Lordships were, however, careful to point out that bonus payable under a contract or under a statute, would he covered by the definition. After the amendment, however, the word 'contract' has been omitted in the definition and we are only concerned with the words 'if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled'. In Namdeo Surawan Lokhande v. Chocks Canning and Mining Ltd., Nagpur, A.I.R. 1962 Bombay 303, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has pointed out that by emitting the word, 'contract' in the definition, the legislature intended to expand and enlarge the meaning of the word 'wages'. The plain and simple question, therefore, is whether payment of bonus is a term of employment. Sections 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Act make it quite clear that payment of bonus is a term of employment. In Anand Swarup Saxena v. Seth Hiralal Patni, Indian Factories and Labour Reports, Volume 18 (1964) 391, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows : 'Even when some money is payable to an employee by virtue of an order having the force of law or being binding because it is an order of competent court of authority, the payment of the amount to the employee becomes a term of employment and must thereafter be held to be payable under an implied contract. Whenever orders are made for making payments like the order made by the U. P. Government on December 6, 1948, it is for the purpose of ensuring such payments to every employee on account of his doing the work as an employee. The result is that such orders are deemed to amend the terms of the contract otherwise entered into between the employer and the employee. There is the further circumstance that the definition of 'wages' itself lays down that it includes 'any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid,' and it seems to us that any dear food allowance paid in cash to an employee is payment which comes under the last clause of "other additional remuneration". There is the further circumstance that the definition of 'wages' itself lays down that it includes 'any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid,' and it seems to us that any dear food allowance paid in cash to an employee is payment which comes under the last clause of "other additional remuneration". In Indian Overseas Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, Indian Factories and Labour Reports, Volume 18 (1969) 108, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that ex-gratia payment as an act of goodwill was a term of employment. In Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Puran Singh, A.I.R. 1960 Patna 523, payment of bonus under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act was held to be a term of employment. 5. The same result follows if the legal position is examined from another view-point. Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act authorise the State Government to refer to a Labour Court or Tribunal an existing- or apprehended industrial dispute. The Labour Court or the Tribunal after adjudicating upon the industrial dispute, submits its award. The award, therefore, is an adjudication of an industrial dispute. Clause (1) of Section 2 defines an industrial dispute to mean any dispute or difference, inter alia, between employers and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. It is thus clear that the Industrial Disputes Act aims at the settlement of a dispute relating to the terms of employment through the adjudicative machinery of a Labour Court or Tribunal. Such a dispute is resolved by an award which is enforceable between she parties. A dispute as to payment of bonus was considered to be an industrial dispute. In view of the definition of that term, the dispute as to payment of bonus, would be a dispute relating to a term of employment and so bonus would of necessity be a term of employment. 6. It is, therefore, not possible to argue that the bonus payable to the employees in the present case did not come within the definition of the word wages' under the Payment of Wages Act. In my opinion, the Authority had jurisdiction to deal with this matter. 7. 6. It is, therefore, not possible to argue that the bonus payable to the employees in the present case did not come within the definition of the word wages' under the Payment of Wages Act. In my opinion, the Authority had jurisdiction to deal with this matter. 7. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the Authority and the learned District judge were wrong in holding that the deductions were illegal because the Supreme Court had not struck down Clauses 33 and 34 (2) of the Bonus Ordinance but had struck down Sees. 33 and 34 (2) of the Act. This argument too cannot be accepted. Section 40 of the Act provides : 40. (1) "The payment of Bonus Ordinance, 1965. (3 of 1965), is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything clone or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken tinder this Act as if this Act had commenced on the 29th May, 1965." As I have said above, the deductions were made on 14th September,, 1965. By a legal fiction, therefore, the liability of payment must be deemed to have arisen under the Act and the deductions also must be deemed to have been made udder that Act. 8. Another reason for rejecting the second argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is that no dispute in respect of the payment of bonus for the year 1962 was pending before the appropriate Government or before any Tribunal. Clause 33 of the Bonus Ordinance and Section 33 of the Act both make the pendency of a dispute in respect of a bonus before the appropriate Government or a Tribunal a condition precedent to the application of the provisions of the Bonus Ordinance and the Act. It is obvious from the statement of facts mentioned above that the award had become effective and it had also been implemented long before the coming into force of the Bonus Ordinance or the Act. The argument of the learned counsel is based upon a partial reading of Clause 33 of the Bonus Ordinance and Section 33 of the Act. It is obvious from the statement of facts mentioned above that the award had become effective and it had also been implemented long before the coming into force of the Bonus Ordinance or the Act. The argument of the learned counsel is based upon a partial reading of Clause 33 of the Bonus Ordinance and Section 33 of the Act. Learned counsel apparently wants to emphasise only the words of the Bonus Ordinance, "where immediately before the 2nd September, 1964, any industrial dispute regarding payment of bonus relating to any accounting year ending on any day in the year 1962, and any subsequent accounting year was pending before the appropriate Government or before any Tribunal or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, in a State." According to him, on 2nd September, 1964, the -dispute was still pending before the Tribunal as the award was given on end November, 1964. The words of Clause 33 of the Bonus Ordinance emphasised by the learned counsel are, however, followed by the following words : "such dispute shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance." (the italicies is mine). If the entire Clause 33 of the Bonus Ordinance or Section 33 of the Act, is read, it is obvious that any award already given and which had become final, cannot be reopened under any provision of the Bonus Ordinance or of the Act. In Messrs. Jalan Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 691, paragraphs 28, 29 and 32 of the majority judgment and paragraphs 78 and 81 of the minority judgment, make this position perfectly clear. Reference in this connection may also be made to Om Prakash v. Workmen of Indra Bhavan (Boarding and Lodging) , Mysore, Indian Factories and Labour Reports, Vol. 13 (1966) 356. In this case, it was laid clown that there was no provision in the Act under which an award, which had become final, could be reopened. 9. The next argument of the learned counsel for the applicant was based upon the definition of 'salary or wage' in the Act and Section 22 of the Act. 13 (1966) 356. In this case, it was laid clown that there was no provision in the Act under which an award, which had become final, could be reopened. 9. The next argument of the learned counsel for the applicant was based upon the definition of 'salary or wage' in the Act and Section 22 of the Act. The definition of 'salary or wage' in the Act is as follows : "Salary or wage" means all remuneration (other) than remuneration in respect of (over time work) capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled. be payable to an employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and includes dearness allowance (that is to say, all cash payments, by whatever name called, paid to an employee on account of a rise -in the cost of living) , but does not include : (i) ............................................................. (ii) ............................................................. (iii) ............................................................. (iv) any bonus (including incentive, production and attendance bonus) " : The exclusion. of 'bonus' from the definition of 'salary or wage' from the Act is with a view to preventing liability to pay bonus after including 'bonus' in 'salary or wage'. Under Sections 10 and 11 of the Act, the bonus payable is on the basis of a certain percentage of the yearly wages. But for the exclusion of bonus from the definition of 'salary or wage', an employee could claim that salary plus bonus should be taken together and bonus should be calculated on that basis. The definition of 'salary or wage' in the Act thus can be of no help to the applicant. Section 22 of the Act reads as follows :- 22. The definition of 'salary or wage' in the Act thus can be of no help to the applicant. Section 22 of the Act reads as follows :- 22. 'Reference of dispute under the act : Where any dispute arises between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under this Act or with respect to the application of this Act to an establishment in public sector, then, such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or of any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State and the provisions of that Act or, as the case may be, such law, shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, apply accordingly." Learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the present dispute is a dispute covered by Section 22 and that, therefore, it was cognizable by Tribunals constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. The dispute in the present case is not a dispute with respect to bonus payable under the Act. In fact, the bonus payable to the opposite parties was calculated under the Act at the rate of 20% of the yearly wages by the applicant-company itself. The dispute arose because certain deductions were made on the ground of alleged over-payment made earlier under the award. Section 22 of the Act too, thus, can be of no help to the applicant. 10. The fourth and the last argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the questions raised by the dispute in the present case were complicated and the Authority, therefore, had no jurisdiction to go into the questions that arose in the case. He has relied upon certain observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Alehta, Director, The Barnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 590, Union of India v. Joginder Singh, 1964 Labour Law Journal, Volume 1, 304 and Ram Kishore Sharma v. The Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, 1969 A.L.J. 225. In the Supreme Court case, the question was whether a dispute in respect of Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could be adjudicated upon by the-Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. In the Supreme Court case, the question was whether a dispute in respect of Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could be adjudicated upon by the-Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is obvious that a dispute under Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a totally different kind of dispute from the one in the present case. In the other two cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, the question was whether an employee's dismissal was wrongful or not. This too is, obviously, a complicated question which is not within the competence of the Authority. The plain and simple question in the present case was whether the applicant was justified in making deductions from the bonus payable for the year 1964 because of an alleged over-payment of bonus for the year 1962 under the award. Once Section 33 and 34 (2) of the Act were declared ultra vires, it is obvious that the deductions could not be 'made under any provision of law. Sections 33 and 34 (2) of the Bonus Act were the only provisions which could effect the enforceability of the award. These two sections having been struck down as unconstitutional, in law, the position would be as if they were never enacted. Thus the award remained biding on the parties. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had to decide whether any illegal deductions had been made. Since the Supreme Court had struck down these two provisions of the Act, the Authority did not have to decide any dispute relating to them but only to see whether any illegal deduction had been made. 11. Whether a question is complicated or not depends upon the facts of each case and their Lordships of the Supreme Court have themselves laid down that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. In my opinion complications created by the ingenuity of counsel would not have the effect of divesting the Authority of a jurisdiction vested in it by Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. 12. Lastly, I should like to add that, admittedly, bonus at 20% was payable to the opposite parties. The deductions were made because of an alleged over-payment under an award which had already become final. 12. Lastly, I should like to add that, admittedly, bonus at 20% was payable to the opposite parties. The deductions were made because of an alleged over-payment under an award which had already become final. I find neither equity nor justice in favour of the applicant who tried to take advantage of a provision of law which was declared to be ultra vires. On these facts, I do not think there is any justification for interference in revision. 13. The application in revision is dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.