Union of India v. Chingangbam Indra Singh — 1969 DIGILAW 39 (GAU)

ORDER This is a miscellaneous application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 for condonation of delay in filing the application for review of the judgment dated 17th October 1968 of this Court by which writ of Shri C. Indra Singh, a Government Servant, against the Union of India, the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, and the General Manager, Manipur State Transport, Manipur, for quashing the order dated 9-2-1966 made against him by the General Manager was allowed. 2. The review application was filed on 14-1-1969. The time consumed in securing a copy of the judgment of which the review was sought admittedly took 26 days, the application for the copy having been made on 19-10-1968 and the copy having been supplied on 13-11-1968. The period of limitation for review is 30 days counted from the date of the decree or order sought to be reviewed - vide Article 124 of the Limitation Act. The review application should consequently have been filed within 56 days but it was actually filed 89 days after the impugned judgment. Therefore, the review application, it is not in dispute, was instituted late by 33 days. 3. Shri Ibotombi Singh, representing the applicants, submitted that in the matter of condonation of delay the Government should not be equated with private parties for the simple reason that before the Government can make up its mind on whether to go to the Court, unlike what happens in the case of an individual the relevant papers have to be examined by a number of officers and that inevitably involves longer time. In other words, his contention was that some indulgence must be shown by the Court to the Government while examining the facts relevant to the prayer made for condonation. He cited the case of K. R. Beri v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1962 Punj 308, to shore up his submission. It was held in that case that a private individual has only to make up his own mind and is normally presumed to be aware of or familiar with all the relevant factors and aspects of the case, whereas the Government has to take into consideration the public interest involved and so, comparatively speaking, longer time must, looking at things in a practical way, be required for enquiry and consideration before taking final decision and then acting on it. It may therefore be not wholly unreasonable to state, the High Court observed, that a period of time which may be sufficient for a private litigant may not necessarily be sufficient in the case of Government. These observations as also another observation made by the High Court, namely, that the statute makes no distinction between Government and private individual in the matter of condonation of delay, are clearly unexceptionable. However, the real difficulty arises in their application to individual cases. It remains to be emphasised, at the same time, that the Government officers charged with the double duty of taking the decision and instituting the proceedings in Courts must not carry the impression that they can bank on the indulgence of Courts even if they take their own time in processing the papers or making up their mind. Nothing else would be more farther from truth. Section 5 of Limitation Act envisages no distinction between the Government and a private litigant. It is the established and well known practice or the manner in which the Government machinery works which the Court can take into consideration while adjudging adequacy or otherwise of the reason for delay in filing the proceedings. The Court would certainly not put up with any laches or smug nonchalance on the part of Government officials in the matter of Court proceedings, just as it would not do in the case of a private litigant. 4. Now I proceed to examine the facts and circumstances urged in support of the prayer for condonation. In para 3 of the application made on behalf of the Government, it is mentioned that the office of the Government Advocate forwarded the copy of the judgment to the Law Department on 20th November 1968 for examination, and that the Government, after looking through the judgment, made up its mind to apply for review on 3-1-1969 when it sent back the copy to the Government Advocate with the direction to file an application for review. The Government Advocate then prepared draft of the review petition and forwarded the same on 4-1-1969 to Government for its approval. The Government approved of that draft and sent back the same to the Government Advocate on, 9-1-1969. The Government Advocate then submitted the review application to the Court on 14-1-1969. The Government Advocate then prepared draft of the review petition and forwarded the same on 4-1-1969 to Government for its approval. The Government approved of that draft and sent back the same to the Government Advocate on, 9-1-1969. The Government Advocate then submitted the review application to the Court on 14-1-1969. Assuming for the sake of argument that the matter involved was of complex nature and the Government could not make up its mind to file an application for review earlier than 3-1-1969, that the Government Advocate was justified in taking one day more in preparing the draft of the review application, and that the Government were justified in taking another 5 days, until 9-1-1969, in looking through the draft and approving the same, there appears to be no justification, nor any has been mentioned in the review application, why the Government Advocate took no less than 5 days in presenting the application to the Court after he had received the approved draft from the Government on 9-1-1969. The affidavit filed by clerk employed in the office of the Government Advocate in support of the allegations made in the review application is also silent on the point what stood in the way of the Government Advocate in filing the review application in a day or two after he had received the approved draft of the application from the Government. Therefore, I am not satisfied that there was any justification for not filing the review petition immediately after the approved draft had been received from the Government. It is also not explained in the affidavit why the Government Advocate took as many as 7 days in sending the copy of the judgment to the Government after he had taken delivery of it on 13th November 1968. 5. Another fact of which I want to take notice is that according to the affidavit of the clerk the copy of the judgment was ready for delivery on 28th October 1969 but the charges for the copy in the shape of stamps were paid to the Copying Department on 13-11-1968. It is not mentioned in the affidavit why the charges could not be deposited soon after the copy was ready for delivery. The delay of 15 days in depositing the charges apparently looks to be unjustified, and this is specially so when no explanation is forthcoming. 6. It is not mentioned in the affidavit why the charges could not be deposited soon after the copy was ready for delivery. The delay of 15 days in depositing the charges apparently looks to be unjustified, and this is specially so when no explanation is forthcoming. 6. As a result of the conclusions recorded above, I dismiss the application for condonation of delay, However, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.