JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This petition has been referred to a larger Bench because of a conflict in the decisions given by two learned single Judges of this Court in two different cases on the question of the applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act to a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In the case of Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue Allahabad 1966 AWR 246 it was held by Singh, J. that the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to such a suit. On the other hand, a contrary view was taken by K.N. Srivastava, J. in the case of Bans Bahore and Anr. v. State of UP and Ors. 1969 AWR 219 Srivastava, J. also relied on an unreported Division Bench case of this Court in support of the proposition that Section 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to such proceedings. 2. The dispute between the parties was with regard to plot No. 161/2, area 1.63 acres, situate in village Kunwarbhatpur, district Etawah. Till 1361 Fasli (corresponding to the year 1954) this plot was entered in the name of Devi Din (father of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5). On 3-4-1957, sometime after the death of Devi Din, his two minor sons, under the guardianship of their next friend, filed a suit u/s 209 of the Act against Deshraj and others in respect of plot No. 161/2 and three other plots. A compromise was arrived at between the parties and the suit was decided in terms of the compromise, under which Deshraj (Petitioner) was declared to be the sirdar of the disputed plot. It appears that the permission of the Judicial Officer before whom the suit was pending was not obtained before the suit was compromised and a decree was passed in pursuance of that compromise. The consolidation proceedings started in the village on 5-3-1960 and an objection was filed by Ram Autar and Balak Ram (Respondents Nos. 4 and 5), sons of Devi Din, contending that the name of Deshraj had been wrongly recorded against the disputed plot and that it was their property. The consolidation proceedings started in the village on 5-3-1960 and an objection was filed by Ram Autar and Balak Ram (Respondents Nos. 4 and 5), sons of Devi Din, contending that the name of Deshraj had been wrongly recorded against the disputed plot and that it was their property. In the beginning, the Consolidation Officer dismissed the suit, but on remand by the court of appeal the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 9-3-1964, passed an order directing the names of Deshraj and others to be expunged and those of the minors recorded against that plot. In the opinion of the Consolidation Officer Section 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the claim made by the minors. On an appeal being filed, the Settlement Officer dismissed it on 18-5-1964. He was of the opinion that the compromise decree passed earlier could be avoided by the minors for the simple reason that the permission of the court had not been obtained before the decree was passed. The Settlement Officer further observed that it was difficult to understand how the Judicial Officer had in that proceeding declared Deshraj to be the sirdar of the plot. The Dy. Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision filed against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 17-7-1965. In the opinion of the Dy. Director also the claim of the sons of Devi Din was within time because it had been made within three years of the date of one of them having attained majority, the other being still a minor. 3. In the circumstances of the case it is clear that in case it is held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to proceedings u/s 209 of the Act, there could be no objection to the decisions given by the consolidation authorities. All the matters decided by them were within their jurisdiction and obviously no other error of law could be pointed out. 4. In our opinion this writ petition must fail, because it will not be possible to say that the consolidation authorities committed an apparent error of law when they held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings u/s 209 of the Act. 5. 4. In our opinion this writ petition must fail, because it will not be possible to say that the consolidation authorities committed an apparent error of law when they held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings u/s 209 of the Act. 5. It is abundantly clear and has not been disputed before us, that the Act is a special law within the meaning of Section 29 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as it provides a period of limitation different from that provided under the Limitation Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law: (a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. 6. It is therefore clear that if the case were to be governed by Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 6 of that Act could not apply to suits under the provisions of the Act for the simple reason that the Act was a special or local law. We have, however, to consider the effect of Section 341 of the Act as it stood on the relevant date and read as follows: Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court-fees Act, 1870, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, including Section 5 thereof shall apply to the proceedings under this Act. A perusal of Section 341 of the Act shows that-- (a) the whole of the Limitation Act, 1908 has been applied, and (b) in order to emphasise that provisions other than those enumerated in Section 29(2)(b) were also applicable, the words including Section 5 thereof were inserted in it by Section 282 of the UP Act 37 of 1957. 7. A perusal of Section 341 of the Act shows that-- (a) the whole of the Limitation Act, 1908 has been applied, and (b) in order to emphasise that provisions other than those enumerated in Section 29(2)(b) were also applicable, the words including Section 5 thereof were inserted in it by Section 282 of the UP Act 37 of 1957. 7. In case the intention of the Legislature was not to apply Sections 5 to 8 and 19 to 21 of the Limitation Act, it was not at all necessary to provide in Section 341 of the Act that the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings under that section. Even without such a provision in the Act, certain provisions of the Limitation Act, such as Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would have applied to such proceedings as they were under a special or local law (vide Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act). It must be in order to emphasise that the whole of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the Act that a mention of the Limitation Act was made also in Section 341 of the Act. 8. In the case of State of UP through Deputy Commissioner Hardoi v. Pandit Brij Mohan Narain Kaul 1958 AWR 204 an argument was entertained by a learned single Judge of this Court that in an appeal by the State Government under the Act filed in the High Court the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not apply. The contention was repelled by the learned single Judge on the ground that the period of limitation provided under the Act for filing such an appeal did not differ from that provided under the Limitation Act and therefore, the provisions of Section 29, Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act would not apply. It could be inferred from that decision that in case the period of limitation prescribed under the Act had differed from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the said Act could not have been applicable to such a proceeding under the provisions of the Act, It must be in order to remove the doubt thus created that Section 341 of the Act was further amended and it was specially provided that the Limitation Act including Section 5 thereof was applicable (to) proceedings under the provisions of the Act. 9. 9. It is to be noted that in the UP Tenancy Act there was no provision similar to that of Section 341 of the Act. It was only at a very late stage that a provision was added that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the UP Tenancy Act. It was, therefore, held in the case of Chandrapal v. Board of Revenue 1957 AWR 849 by a Division Bench of this Court that Section 6 of the Limitation Act did not apply to a suit under the UP Tenancy Act. 10. The Act brought about, a substantial change in the status of a tenant. Some of the tenants (such as bhumidhars) acquired heritable and transferable rights. The rights of such tenants could not, therefore, be treated as of transitory nature not requiring proper attention. It was also provided under the same Act that other tenants also could acquire bhumidhari rights by depositing ten times land revenue. In such circumstances the Legislature was, bound to provide for better safeguard for tenancy rights. It must be with that view that the whole of the Limitation Act was applied to the Act and as soon as a doubt was expressed by some courts that Section 5 did not apply to proceedings under the Act the provisions of Section 341 of the Act were suitably amended to make it clear that even Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings under the Act. 11. In the case of Raghubir Prasad v. Board of Revenue (supra) S.N. Singh, J. held that Section 6 could not apply to a case u/s 209 of the Act because Section 341 of the Act merely extended the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act, but inasmuch as the whole of the Limitation Act was to apply, the provisions of Section 29(2) also became applicable, with the result that Section 6 of the Limitation Act could not apply to proceedings under the Act. With great respect weareunable to agree with that reasoning. For the reasons given by us we are respectfully of the view that the case of Bans Bahore and Anr. v. State of UP and others (supra) decided by an Hon'ble Single Judge and the unreported case of Chhotey v. Board of Revenue Civil Misc. With great respect weareunable to agree with that reasoning. For the reasons given by us we are respectfully of the view that the case of Bans Bahore and Anr. v. State of UP and others (supra) decided by an Hon'ble Single Judge and the unreported case of Chhotey v. Board of Revenue Civil Misc. Writ No. 786 of 1961 decided on 28-8-1961 decided by a Division Bench of this Court laid down the correct law. 12. At the most all that can be said by the Petitioner is that there is some conflict between the provisions of Section 341 of the Act and Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Assuming that there is such a conflict, the provisions of Section 341 of the Act must prevail. 13. There is no force in this writ petition and it is dismissed with costs.