LODHA, J.—This case involves interpretation of sec. 12 of the Rajasthan Religious Buildings and Places Act, No. 18 of 1964, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. 2. The following question has been referred to Division Bench by Kansingh J. "Whether the word shall occurring in the words shall direct that any work which shall have been constructed in contravention of the provisions of this Act or of any permission granted thereunder shall be removed so as to restore the building or place in question to its original condition should be construed as "may". The circumstances in which this question has arisen may be set out briefly as follows: The Station House Officer, Police Station, Malsisar, District Jhunjhunu, filed a complaint against Sardar Khan and five others under sec. 6 read with sec. 11 of the Act in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Jhunjhunu No. 7-5-1963 alleging that the accused had constructed a mosque in village Debri, District Jhunjhunu without first obtaining the written permission of the Collector as required by sec, 6 of the Act and had thereby committed an offence under sec. 11 of the Act. It was, therefore, prayed that the accused may be suitably punished for having committed this offence. After recording the evidence of the parties, the learned Magistrate found that all the five accused had committed offence under sec. 6 read with sec. 11 of the Act, and consequently he convicted them for the said offence and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 25/- each, and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days each. It was further directed by him that the mosque constructed in contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be removed so as to restore the place to its original condition. 3. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Magistrate the accused filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu who made a reference to this Court by his order dated 18-5-1965 that the conviction and sentences passed by the learned trial court be set aside. This reference was partly allowed by Kansingh J (In Chambers) and conviction and sentences passed against the other four accused except Sardar Khan were set aside. The conviction and sentence awarded to Sardar Khan were, however, maintained. This reference was partly allowed by Kansingh J (In Chambers) and conviction and sentences passed against the other four accused except Sardar Khan were set aside. The conviction and sentence awarded to Sardar Khan were, however, maintained. Sardar Khan thereafter presented a review application before this Court by which it was prayed inter alia that the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate in so far as he directed the removal of the mosque be set aside. When this application came up for disposal before Kan Singh J. he held that there was no substance in the review application so far as the conviction of Sardarkhan was concerned However, he felt that so far as the question of removal of mosque was concerned the matter did require consideration and therefore he issued notice to the Government Advocate and after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the Government Advocate he has made this reference to a larger Bench for decision of the question set out above. 4. We have heard Shri Tibrewal learned counsel for the petitioner Sardar Khan, and Mr. S. K. Tiwari, Deputy Government Advocate on behalf of the State. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the use of the word shall does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory and bearing in mind the context in which the word shall occurs in sec. 12, and other relevant circumstances, it should be construed as permissible and not obligatory. In order to appreciate the point canvassed before us it would be proper to reproduce sec. 12 in extenso: 12. Removal of unauthorised work—(1) The Court making an order of conviction for any offence under sec. 11 shall direct that any work which shall have been constructed in contravention of the provisions of this Act or of any permission granted thereunder shall be removed so as to restore the building or place in question to its original condition. (2) In case of non compliance with direction made under sub-sec. (1) the court shall cause such compliance to be made through a Police Officer not below the rank of sub-Inspector at the cost of the defaulter in the prescribed manner." There is no doubt that on the face of it sec. (2) In case of non compliance with direction made under sub-sec. (1) the court shall cause such compliance to be made through a Police Officer not below the rank of sub-Inspector at the cost of the defaulter in the prescribed manner." There is no doubt that on the face of it sec. 12 appears to be mandatory, inasmuch as it uses the word "shall" The use of the word shall raises a presumption that particular provision is imperative but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences following from such construction. There are numerous cases where the word shall has been construed as merely directory. In this connection the following quotations from Crawford on Statutory Constructions Art.261 at page 516 is pertinent: "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequence which would follow from constructing it one way or the other". In State of U.P. vs. Manbodhanlal (1), their Lordships were pleased to observe, "Hence, the use of the word "shall" in a statute though generally taken in a mandatory sense does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding would be invalid." It is needless to multiply the authorities which uniformly hold that the word shall is ordinarily mandatory but it is some times not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands and the court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully examining the whole scope of the statute. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. vs. The Municipal Board, Rampur(2). As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raza Buland Sugar Co. vs. The Municipal Board, Rampur(2). "The question whether particular provision of a statute on the face of it appears mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word "shall" as in the present case or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory". 5. Thus it Would be clear that no general rule can be laid down for deciding the question whether a particular provision is directory or imperative and even though in a particular case the legislature may have used the word "shall", the determining factor for deciding the question still depends upon the object and intention of the legislature in making the provision and the serious general inconvenienc or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other Learned counsel for the petitioner also invited our attention to another decision of their Lordships in State of M.P. vs. Azad Bharat Financs Co. (3) in which their Lordships laid down three tests for determining whether a particular provision is permissive or obligatory ? (1) First is if statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. (2) The second test, laid down by their Lordships, is that if it is a penal statute, it should be construed in such a way that a person who has not committed or abetted any offence should not be visited with a penalty. (2) The second test, laid down by their Lordships, is that if it is a penal statute, it should be construed in such a way that a person who has not committed or abetted any offence should not be visited with a penalty. (3) The third and the last test laid down by their Lordships is that as far as possible such a meaning should be given to a statute as may not result in striking down the provision as imposing unreasonable restrictions under the provisions of the Constitution. 6. This bring us to the examination of the facts and circumstances of the present statute in the light of what has been stated above as to the criteria for determining whether a provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. The Preamble to the Act runs as under: "Whereas with a view to avoiding a breach of the public peace and tranqulity to arise from disputes between different sections of the people of Rajasthan it is expedient to regulate the construction of public religions buildings and restrict the use of public places for religious purposes; it is hereby enacted as follows". 7. It would also be convenient here to examine some of the relevant provisions of the Act to find out the object of the statute in making the provision. Sec. 4 inter alia contains the definition of the words "public and "religious". Sec. 6 deals with the procedure to be followed before a person starts construction of any public religious building or converts any building or place into a public religious building and runs as under: "6. Constructions etc. of public religious buildings—(1) No person shall, without first obtaining the written permission of the Collector: (a) construct any public religious building, or (b) convert any private or public building or place into a public religions building; Explanation—The temporary use of a building or place for religious purposes on occasions such as Holi, Moharram and the like shall not be deemed to be the conversion thereof into a public religious building. (2) A person desirous of obtaining permission for any of the purposes mentioned in sub-sec. (2) A person desirous of obtaining permission for any of the purposes mentioned in sub-sec. (1) shall first obtain permission from any local authority or officer having jurisdiction over the area where the building or place in question lies and thereafter such person shall apply to the Collector for the requisite permission in the prescribed manner." Sec. 7 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Collector when dealing with an application made under sec. 6. sec. 8 provides for appeals from the orders of the Collector and sec. 9 provides that order passed under the Act shall not be liable to be called in question in any civil court. Sec. 11 defines the offence under the Act and also prescribes punishment. Sec. 12 provides for a direction for removal of unauthorised construction. Sec. 13 deals with cognizance of offences under the Act and sec. 14 gives power to the State Government to make rules for purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. 8. In exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 14 of the Act the Government of Rajasthan has made rules which are called the Rajasthan Religious Buildings and Places Rules, 1957 (which will hereinafter be referred to as "the Rules") which prescribe the forms of applications which may be made under the Act and also lay down the scope of enquiry by the Collector, while dealing with an application for permission for construction of a new religious building. 9. Thus it would be amply clear from the provisions of this statute that the object and intention of the legislature in making this law was that, before obtaining permission for construction of a public religious building, permission must be obtained from the Collector so that there may not be any dispute between different sections of the people and consequent breach of public peace and tranquility in respect of construction of such building. It has been laid down in the Rules that on presentation of an application under sec. 5 or sec. 6 of the Act the Collector may consult the Devasthan Department and make enquiries from the local police officers or local authorities or neighbours of the buildings as the case may be and if necessary may inspect the site. It has been laid down in the Rules that on presentation of an application under sec. 5 or sec. 6 of the Act the Collector may consult the Devasthan Department and make enquiries from the local police officers or local authorities or neighbours of the buildings as the case may be and if necessary may inspect the site. Thus the sole object behind the Act is to maintain security in the State and to avoid the breach of public peace and tranquility likely to arise from disputes between different sections of the people of the State in respect of constructions of public religious buildings. 10. The object behind sec. 12 is also clearly to avoid breach of public peace and tranquility in such matters and therefore if an unauthorised construction of a public religious building has been made the court has been given power not only to punish the persons who raised the construction without obtaining permission but also direct removal of such construction so that the public peace and tranquility may not be endangered. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has argued that sec. 12 of the Act makes it obligatory for the Magistrate to direct removal of the unauthorised construction because it has been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act irrespective of the consideration whether the construction is likely to cause any breach of public peace and tranquility? On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that such an interpretation of sec. 12 would not in any way carry out the object of the statute but may result in a serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons in certain cases. 11. After bestowing our careful consideration, we are of the opinion that sec. 12 must be read as "permissive" and not "obligatory", and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the court making an order of conviction for an offence under sec. 11 should direct that any construction made in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any permission granted thereunder shall be removed or not ? 11 should direct that any construction made in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any permission granted thereunder shall be removed or not ? If this provision were held mandatory the result would be that in all cases in which conviction for an offence under the Act is ordered the construction shall have to be removed even though no dispute is likely to arise between different sections of the people with regard to it and there may not be the least chance of there being any breach of public peace and tranquility on account of the existence of such construction. It is not difficult to imagine cases where the persons incharge of such construction may by negligence or ignorance raise construction of a public religious building without obtaining the requisite permission. The building may have been constructed at a very high cost to which several men of the public may have contributed to their utmost capacity out of sheer respect for religion and further such construction may not have caused annoyance to any section of the public, yet on the interpretation suggested by the learned Deputy Government Advocate the building shall have to be removed merely because prior permission of the Collector was not obtained. If we were to hold in no case the Magistrate has discretion in the matter, and is bound to direct removal of the building irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, it would undoubtedly lead to hardship or injustice presumably not intended by the legislature. It is remarkable that the Act does not provide the period within which such a complaint may be filed after the construction has been made and therefore it is possible that in a particular case the construction may have remained in existence for a considerably long period and the different sections of the people may be perfectly happy about it yet it would be open to file a complaint in respect of such construction on the ground that the requisite permission was not obtained. In such a case the persons who have raised construction can justifiably be punished for contravention of the provisions of the Act, but the loss caused by removal of such a construction would be suffered not by the persons, who were responsible for raising the unauthorised construction but the real sufferers would be all those innocent people who had made contributions towards the construction of that public religious building. 12. Let us look at the matter from another point of view. In a particular case the Magistrate may feel that the facts of the case do not warrant for a direction for removal of the construction, and the Collector too may feel that allowing the construction to remain as it is, would not at all be objectionable, but if it is held that S. 12 is mandatory then the Magistrate would have no option but to direct the removal of the building and the Collector would be also powerless even though as an authority under the Act he feels that the construction is not objectionable and need not have been removed. What we mean to say, is, that by construing sec. 12 as mandatory an irreparable mischief may be done which may entail not only hardship and injustice but may lead to an absurdity. On the other hand the object of the provisions can very well be carried out if sec. 12 is held to be permissible or directory. The Magistrate in that case would have ample discretion to direct the removal of the construction made in contravention of the provisions of the Act, in an appropriate case. 13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the word "shall" occurring in the first clause of sec. 12 should be construed as "may" and sec. 12 should be read as "permissive", and not obligatory or mandatory. 14. The case may now be laid before the learned single Judge for orders.