JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a revision against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Mathura, affirming an order of the judicial Officer, Sadabad, dated the Nov. 6, 1969. The opposite parties Nos. 2 to 6 were accused persons in a complaint which was filed by the complainant under section 218 IPC. The complaint was filed on the allegations that Sri Kishan Singh, son of the complainant, was employed as an Assistant Settlement Officer in the Officer of the Chief Settlement Officer, that on February 19, 1967, he was on polling duty in connection with the general elections, that Shankar Lal filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge being suit no. 26 of 1963 against Sri Kishan Singh which was decreed and Shankar Lal put his decree in execution, which was registered as execution case No. 1 of 1967, In that execution case a notice was issued against Sri Kishan Singh and others. The notice was entrusted to Ram Bubu, opposite party no. 6 a peon of the court of the District Judge, Mathura, for service. By this notice Sri Kishan Singh was directed to appear on March 11, 1967. On Febuary 19, 1967, Sri Kishan Singh was alleged to be at Delhi and was accordingly said to be not present in the village when the said process server took the notice for service. The process server in collusion with the other accused persons submitted a report of service of notice by refusal and affixation. Accordingly, it was said that the accused persons had committed an offence under section 218 IPC. The Magistrate recorded evidence under section 202 CrPC and summoned the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 6. They moved an application and raised the objection that the complaint was not maintainable. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties held that the complaint was liable to be dismissed, as the offence fell under section 192 IPC. This order was challenged in revision by the applicant but the revision was dismissed and the present revision is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated March 20, 1968. 2. It has been contended by Sri G.K. Sahai on behalf of the applicant that the allegations made in the complaint made out a case either u /S. 218 IPC or S. 219 IPC and the provisions of S. 192 IPC were not attracted. 2. It has been contended by Sri G.K. Sahai on behalf of the applicant that the allegations made in the complaint made out a case either u /S. 218 IPC or S. 219 IPC and the provisions of S. 192 IPC were not attracted. It may be noted that an offence under section 193 IPC which is the penal section for an offence u /S. 195 IPC falls in the list of offences mentioned in S. 195(1) (b) CrPC and no court can take cognizance of offences under the said section except on the complaint in writing of the court in relation to which the offence had been committed or where the complaints in relation to which offences were committed are pending. The view expressed by the learned Magistrate was that the facts of the case made out a case under section 192 CrPC and hence the bar of S. 192 CrPC operated and the complaint was not competent. The question, therefore, which arises is what is the specific offence which can be made out on the allegations contained in the complaint. First, the offence under section 219 IPC may be considered. In my opinion this section is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case because the essential ingredient of the offence in the section is the making of a report which is "contrary to law,"which expression cannot be equated with a report which is contrary to facts. Thus, S. 219 IPC is ruled out. 3. The next question, therefore, is as to whether S. 192 IPC or S. 218 IPC applies to the facts of this case. It cannot be doubted that there is some resemblance between the provisions of these two sections. Nevertheless, there is one principal point of distinction between them which may be borne in mind. The essence of the offence under section 218 IPC is the intent to cause loss or injury to the public or to any person thereby to save any person from lega punishment or save any property from forfeiture or other charge etc. Although this intention cannot be totally eliminated even where the object is strict lying should be the dominant motive of the offender. Even though a transaction may partake some of the characteristics of the offences under both these sections, the dominant factor would be the principal motive of the offender. Although this intention cannot be totally eliminated even where the object is strict lying should be the dominant motive of the offender. Even though a transaction may partake some of the characteristics of the offences under both these sections, the dominant factor would be the principal motive of the offender. If the principal motive of the action was to make a false document with the object that an erroneous opinion be formed in some judicial proceeding, the provisions of S. 192 IPC would be attracted. These proceedings may be actually pending or may come into existence later and still the object can be discernible. It was held by the Supreme Court in Kamla Prasad Singh v. Hari Nath, 1967 AWR 404 SC as follows :- "Whereas in S. 192 the record was prepared for use in a judicial proceeding with the intention that an erroneous opining be formed regarding a material point the offence in S. 218 is the preparation of a false record by a public servant with the intention of saving or injuring any person or property." Thus, the proximity to a judicial proceeding pending or likely to come into existence is the test by which the applicability of S. 192 PC is to be determined. In the instant case the process server submitted a report which was unmistakably in relation to a judicial proceeding and the object clearly attributable to the accused was to create an erroneous impression that the person sought to be served with summons was present whereas according to the allegation of the complainant he was not present and was on duty elsewhere. In view of these circumstance I have no doubt in my mind that the present case came squarely within the ambit of S. 192 IPC and no court could take cognizance of a case under that section without applying the provisions of S. 195 IPC. 4. I, therefore, agree with the views of the learned Sessions Judge and dismiss this revision.