JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The question of law which has been pressed in this revision is as to whether on the facts of the instant case it can be held that a prosecution under S. 25 of the Arms Act was instituted against the applicant without sanction under S. 39 of the Act. 2. The material facts are that on May 13, 1-967 a country made pistol and two live cartridges were recovered from the possession of the applicant for which he had no license. A recovery memo-was prepared and the applicant was taken to the police station Kotwali, Fatehpur, where a case was registered against him. The case thus registered was investigated by Sub-Inspector Brij Mandan Lal Gangwar and after obtaining sanction for prosecution of the applicant a charge sheet was submitted against him by the Investigating Officer. On May 14, 1967 the applicant was produced in court and was remanded to jail custody. On May 16, 1967 an application for bail was moved on behalf of the applicant, which was allowed on May 19, 1967 and the applicant was ultimately enlarged on bail. On May 25, 1967 sanction for the prosecution of the applicant was granted by the District 11 Magistrate. On Aug. 16, 1967 the Magistrate summoned the prosecution witnesses for evidence. The trial court framed a charge under S. 25 of the Arms Act against the applicant. The applicant pleaded not guilty and denied the alleged recovery. No evidence was led by the defence. The courts below believed the prosecution evidence and convicted the applicant under S. 25 of the Arms Act. The appellate court reduced the sentence of the applicant from one years' RI which was awarded by the Magistrate to six months' RI. 3. It has been strenuously contend by Sri R.N. Upadhya appearing for t applicant that it is evident from t facts of the case that the prosecution the accused had been instituted even' prior to the grant of the sanction by the District Magistrate and hence all sub. sequent proceedings were null and void. The provision for obtaining the sanction for prosecution is contained in S. 39 of the Arms Act which reads as follows :- "39. sequent proceedings were null and void. The provision for obtaining the sanction for prosecution is contained in S. 39 of the Arms Act which reads as follows :- "39. No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence under S. 3 without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate." The present Act (Act No. 54 of 1959) was enacted in 1959 and replaced the Indian Arms Act (XI of 1878). The old Act also contained a provision for sanction. The corresponding S. 29 of the old Act was as under : "29. Sanction required to certain proceedings under S. 19. cl. (f). Where an offence punishable under S. 19, cl (f), has been committed within three months from the date on which this Act comes into force in any State, district or place to which S. 32, cl. (2) of Act XXXI of 1860 applies at such date, or where such an offence has been committed in any part of India not being such a district, State or place, no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the district, or, in presidency town, of the Commissioner of Police." A comparison of the two sections would indicate that a comprehensive safeguard has now been provided for protecting the liberty of a citizen by effecting the necessary amendments in the relevant provision. S. 29 of the old Act divided persons who may commit an offence u; S. 19 (f) of the old Act in two distinct classes (1) persons who commit the offence within that area of the country in which S. 32, cl. (2) of Act XXXI of 1860 was in force at the time when the Arms Act came into force and (2) persons committing the same kind of offence in the rest of the country. In the case of persons falling under the former class the protection of previous sanction for prosecution was given only for the first three months after coming into force of the Arms Act and was not to be available after the expiry of that period. In respect of offenders, falling in the latter class the protection was to be available at all times without any limitation. In respect of offenders, falling in the latter class the protection was to be available at all times without any limitation. This discrimination made in S. 29 of the old Act has been abolished by means of S. 39 of the present Act which makes a prior sanction imperative in case of all prosecution instituted under the Act. The Legislature in its wisdom considered it proper and salutary that before a prosecution is actually afoot under the Arms Act, some responsible authority must apply its mind to the facts of the case and arrive at a decision as to whether the prosecution should or should not be instituted. That central object of the Legislature in amending the provision relating to the sanction for prosecution must not be lost sight of. 4. The contention of Sri Upadhya was that the preliminary steps taken by the Magistrate in the case cannot be severed from the later steps which commenced with the filing of the charge sheet. According to him such action, for instance, as remanding of the accused to custody and applying a judicial mind to his proper trial and ultimately granting bail, constitute judicial proceedings and there could be no proceedings in the absence of the institution of a prosecution. This contention is untenable. Apart from other things, it is significant that the Legislature has deleted the words "proceedings" which occurred in the old S. 29. Even if it is assumed that the aforesaid preliminary steps were judicial proceedings, that by itself would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a prosecution had been instituted. The language of S. 39 as it now stands on the statute book prohibits only the institution of the prosecution; it does not forbid any proceedings as such. Therefore, the foundation on which the terminology of the old S. 29 stood has disappeared by the employment of a more restricted and specific bar embodied in S. 39 of the new Act. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant relied on three decisions in support of his contention. He referred to a decision of the Federal Court in Basdeo-Agrwalla v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1945 FC 16 which interpreted identical language used in cl. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant relied on three decisions in support of his contention. He referred to a decision of the Federal Court in Basdeo-Agrwalla v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1945 FC 16 which interpreted identical language used in cl. 16 of the Drugs Control Order, 1943, which ran as follows : "No prosecution for any contravention of the provision of this Order shall be instituted without the sanction of the Provincial Government." The facts of that case were that the accused was produced before the Chief Presidency Magistrate on May 2, 1944, for contravention of the Drugs Control Order and achallan under Rr. 81 (4) and 121, Defence of India Rules was filed on that viz. day. The Magistrate adjourned the case to allay 16, 1944 for evidence and made an order directing that the accused should give bail in Rs. 200/- to appear on 16th May. On 16th May it was noted on the order sheet that the sanction and. /cl. 16 had not been received. Nonetheless the Magistrate made further orders directing that the case be adjourned to 24th May for evidence and that the prosecution witnesses be summoned for that day. On May 24, 1944, the sanction was filed. Three prosecution witnesses were examined and a further adjournment ordered. Thereafter the case proceeded in the usual way upto conviction and sentence. It was held that the prosecution was clearly instituted without the previous sanction required by cl. 16, and as it was not possible to sever the proceedings prior to 24th May from those occurring on and after that date and as when the sanction was obtained, no new start was made, the whole proceedings were null and void. The case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that the challan or the charge sheet had been filed on May 2, 1944 whereas the sanction was obtained on May 24, 1944. Thus, the prosecution had been clearly instituted prior to the sanction. 6. The above decision of the Federal Court was followed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Girija v. King Emperor, ILR 24 Patna 641 In that case the proceeding against a person for having committed an offence punishable under S. 19 (f) of the Indian Arms Act was started on June 25, 1944 and the sanction to institute the same as required under 'S. 29 was received on August 16, 1944. It was held that the proceeding was null and void. But in that case also a charge sheet had been submitted on July 8, 1944, which was prior to the date of the sanction and hence it involved infringement of the mandatory provisions of S. 29. 7. Lastly, Sri Upadhya relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in E.P. Subba Reddy v. State, A.I.R. 1969 Andhra Pradesh 281 It was observed in that case that under S. 161 CrPC a Magistrate had to exercise his judicial mind in deciding as to whether the accused be remanded to custody or not on the material placed before him. Hence, orders passed with regard to remand or on the bail application moved by the accused person constituted proceedings contemplated in S. 195 (1) (b) of the Code. That case is completely distinguishable and does not support the contention of the applicant. It was for the limited purpose of deciding as to whether certain actions constituted judicial proceedings as contemplated by S. 195 (1) (b) of CrPC that it was held that remand orders and bail orders were comprehended within the scope of judicial proceedings. The facts of that case were that on a false complaint the accused was arrested but was released by the Magistrate on report by the police under section 173, CrPC and later the accused filed a complaint under S. 211 IPC against the complainant. It was held that the complaint of the accused could not be taken cognizance of under/S. 195 (1)(b) because the Magistrate acted in a judicial capacity in releasing the accused. Hence. the complaint by the accused was in relation to proceedings in a court for which a complaint by Magistrate was necessary... 8. As I indicated earlier, the term "proceedings" has a wide connotation. S. 4 (m) of the CrPC says that "Judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. The proceedings, therefore, involved in the passing of a remand order or allowing or refusing bail may be judicial proceedings in that general sense but the pertinent question in the present case is as to whether such proceedings can be deemed to be proceedings in the 'prosecution' instituted against the applicant under/S. 25 of the Arms Act. The proceedings, therefore, involved in the passing of a remand order or allowing or refusing bail may be judicial proceedings in that general sense but the pertinent question in the present case is as to whether such proceedings can be deemed to be proceedings in the 'prosecution' instituted against the applicant under/S. 25 of the Arms Act. While they may be judicial proceedings and distinguished from executive action, yet the fact remains that they are independent proceedings and are not proceedings in the prosecution instituted against the applicant. In Mohan Lahiri v. The King, A.I.R. 1950 Patna 243 the word "proceeding" in S. 29 of the old Act was held to mean legal proceedings in Court and not searches or arrests or investigation made by the police in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the CrPC or any other law. It was observed that in a sense proceedings for bail might be judicial proceedings where a Magistrate applied his judicial mind to the question as to whether bail should be granted. But that would be a separate judicial proceeding, quite apart rom the actual prosecution for an offence under the Arnis Act and, therefore, the mere consideration of the question of bail in the initial stage when the accused is sent up in custody cannot amount to the institution of proceedings in respect of which sanction is required by S. 29 of the Act. Thus, under/S. 497 CrPC a person suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence may be released on bail. This may be before the charge sheet is actually submitted against him. Therefore, the mere circumstance that bail was applied for by the applicant in the present case and granted to him would not warrant the conclusion that his prosecution had been instituted. 9. The CrPC envisages a distinction between the actual prosecution, even though the term may not have been defined, and anterior proceedings. Ch. XIV of the Code deals with investigation. S. 154 provides for information in cognizable cases. S. 167 deals with the remand of the accused. Ch. XV of the Code relates to the cognizance of offences and S. 190 provides for the various modes of taking cognizance. Ch. XIV of the Code deals with investigation. S. 154 provides for information in cognizable cases. S. 167 deals with the remand of the accused. Ch. XV of the Code relates to the cognizance of offences and S. 190 provides for the various modes of taking cognizance. In short, a court takes cognizance of the accused when it applies a judicial mind to a matter before it and this commences with the submitting of the charge sheet by the police in a case instituted on police report and on the filing of a complaint otherwise. In other words, prosecution commences after the indictment or charge sheet is received in court. It is only after the necessary material has been collected by the police by investigation that it is possible to approach the court for taking cognizan police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. The term "prosecution" has not been defined in the Code or elsewhere but it has been judicially construed and in my opinion the only precise meaning which can be assigned to the word is that it is something which commences with the presentation of a charge sheet. Halsbury in his Laws of England states that "prosecution is commenced when an information is laid before a justice." Stroud in his Judicial Dictionary observes that "a man prosecutes a charge who lays an information before a Magistrate accusing of the offence." In Wharton's Law Lexicon "prosecution' is defined to be "a proceeding either by way of indictment or information in the Criminal Courts in order to put an offender upon his trial ;" and the same is the meaning assigned to the word in the Encyclopaeda of the Laws of India. In Gopal Marwari v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Patna 245 a Full Bench of the Patna High Court held as under : "Proceedings commence only when the accused person is made a party before the court. In police cases judicial proceedings cannot necessarily be said to have commenced merely because a person is sent up and remanded to custody. In Gopal Marwari v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Patna 245 a Full Bench of the Patna High Court held as under : "Proceedings commence only when the accused person is made a party before the court. In police cases judicial proceedings cannot necessarily be said to have commenced merely because a person is sent up and remanded to custody. His prosecution has not started and does not start until the Magistrate makes up his mind to act upon charge sheet and take some overt action to implement his decision." It was further observed that the accused person may have a right to apply for hail, he may have a right to come up to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus under S. 491 CrPC. But these rights however valuable they may be, are not rights appertaining to any pending judicial proceedings against him. This decision was referred to by the Supreme Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1951 SC 207 It was held by James and Takru. JJ in ce of the matter. S. 4 (1) of the Code defines "investigation" as including all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a Dau Dayal v. State AIR 1959 Allahabad 45 that in judicial proceedings a prosecution commences with the lodging of a complaint. There are some observations of the Supreme Court in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah A.I.R. 1964 SC 1541 which also lend support to this view. Their lordships interpreted the words "institution of a case". It was held that an examination of the provisions of Sections 190, 193 and 194, CrPC made it clear that when a Magistrate took cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constituted such offence, a case was instituted in the Magistrate's court and such a case was one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate took cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, it was a case in the Magistrate's court on a police report. Das Gupta, J. observed as under :- "When on a petition of complaint being filed before him the Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding undee the various provisions of Ch. XVI of the CrPC, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. Das Gupta, J. observed as under :- "When on a petition of complaint being filed before him the Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding undee the various provisions of Ch. XVI of the CrPC, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. When, however, he applies his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under section 156 (3) or issues a search warrant for the purpose of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence." In my opinion the "institution of a prosecution" has virtually the same meaning as the "institution of a case" as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the above case. The conclusion which emerges is that it is only when the charge sheet is presented that the prosecution is actually instituted. 10. Sri T. N. Sinha appearing for the State relied on the division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Emperor v. Nabi, A.I.R. 1928 Patna 146 Wherein the following proposition was enunciated :- "As in the case of a suit, a proceeding is instituted when for the first time the adjudication of a Court of competent jurisdiction is sought. Therefore, the expression "proceedings" in S. 29 means legal proceedings in Court and not searches or arrest or investigation made by the police in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the CrPC or any other law." 11. There appears to be yet another reason for accepting the submission made by the learned Government Advocate. He contended that if a contrary construction was put on the provisions of S. 39 of the Arms Act the very purpose of enacting that provision would be defeated. As already observed by me, the object of the Legislature in amending the old S. 29 and substituting it by the present S. 39 was to make the obtaining of sanction a pre-requisite of instituting a prosecution. It was intended to extend that protection to all prosecutions instituted under the Arms Act. It would not be out of place to observe that the according of a sanction is not a mere formality. It has to be accorded or refused after applying a judicial mind to the entire facts and data placed before the competent authority. It was intended to extend that protection to all prosecutions instituted under the Arms Act. It would not be out of place to observe that the according of a sanction is not a mere formality. It has to be accorded or refused after applying a judicial mind to the entire facts and data placed before the competent authority. Consequently, it would be plainly erroneous to assume that the Legislature contemplated the according of a sanction from the very initial stage an accused person was apprehended or a remand was sought. The police and the investigating agency require time for collecting all the necessary data and evidence so that the same may be available to the competent authority which may scrutinise the said material and then decide to accord or withhold the sanction . This purpose would not be achieved if the requisite of a sanction was enforced even prior to the submission of a charge sheet in the case. It is only at that stage that the sanctioning authority can apply its mind to all the relevant material and it is only on the submission of a charge sheet or complaint that the prosecution is actually instituted. 12. My conclusion, therefore, is that even though an accused person may have been produced in court or may have otherwise surrendered and orders regarding his custody may have been passed or he may have applied for bail and his request for bail might have been considered, such orders do not constitute proceedings after the institution of the prosecution against him under section 25 of the Arms Act,it hey might be independent judicial proceedings, but they are not proceedings in the prosecution which comes into existence after the charge sheet is submitted in the case under the Arms Act. 13. Applying these tests to the facts of the present case it is abundantly clear that the sanction of the District Magistrate-,was obtained on 25-5-1967 whereas the charge sheet was submitted on 12-6-1967. Thus, it is not correct to state that the prosecution of the applicant was instituted without obtaining a sanction as required by S. 39 of the Act. 14. The result is that this revision fails and is dismissed. The applicant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out his sentence.