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Allahabad High Court · body

1969 DIGILAW 424 (ALL)

Bhagwan Dei v. Munni Devi

1969-12-19

H.N.SETH, S.D.KHARE

body1969
JUDGMENT S. D. Khare and H. N. Seth, JJ. - These three first appeals can be conveniently dealt with by a common judgment. Following pedigree will be helpful in understanding the controversy raised in these cases : Plaintiff Smt. Munni Devi filed suit No. 33 of 1952 in the court of Civil Judge Allahabad for a declaration that she was the owner of house No. 46 Chak Allahabad and half share in house No. 223 Mohatsimganj, Allahabad. She also prayed for cancellation of following documents : (1) Relinquishment (teed dated 10th May, 1949 executed by her mother Smt. Mahadei in favour of Radhika Prasad. (2) Sale deed dated 19th May 1949 executed by Radhika Prasad in favour of Smt. Bhagwan Del wife of Sri Ram Das in respect of house No. 46 Chak, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as house No. 46). She also claimed a declaration that mortgage decree dated 19th December, 1956 in suit No. 1437 of 1935 of the court of Munsif (West) between Jangi Lal and Radhika Prasad was not binding on her and that her half share in house No. 223 Mohatsimganj, Allahabad, hereinafter referred to as house No. 223 was not liable to be sold in execution of the said decree. A decree for possession over her half share in house No. 223 and over No. 46 was also claimed. The plaintiff also claimed damages for use and occupation and pendente lice and future interest. 2. Briefly stated the case set out in the plaint was that Sangam Lal was married to Smt. Ganga Dei. Ganga Dei did not bear any issue and kept bad health. Sangam Lal therefore married Smt. Mahadei who was a widow and sister of Ganga Dei. Plaintiff Munni Devi was the daughter of Mahadei from Sangam Lal. She was born on 16th of September, 1941. House No. 223 was purchased jointly by Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad in the year 1934 and they had half share each in that house. Sangam Lal also purchased house No. 46 benami in the name of his wife Ganga Dei on 8-11-1939. Ganga Dei predecease(] Sangam Lal. After Sangam Lal's death on 26-9-1943, his second wife Mahadei entered into possession of the property as Hindu widow having limited estate in entire house No. 46 and half share in house No. 223. Sangam Lal also purchased house No. 46 benami in the name of his wife Ganga Dei on 8-11-1939. Ganga Dei predecease(] Sangam Lal. After Sangam Lal's death on 26-9-1943, his second wife Mahadei entered into possession of the property as Hindu widow having limited estate in entire house No. 46 and half share in house No. 223. As there was no other male member in the family Radhika Prasad brother of Sangam Lal started visiting plaintiff and her mother and fraudulently obtained a deed of relinquishment from Snit. Mahadei in his favour on 19-5-1949. This deed of relinquishment, was obtained by falsely representing Mahadei that it was a power of attorney to enable Radhika Prasad to get house and water tax reduced and to get her name entered in municipal papers. In any event plaintiff as the next reversioner of Sangam Lal was not bound by the said deed of relinquishment. After obtaining the deed of relinquishment from Smt. Mahadei Radhika Prasad sold the house to Snit. Bhagwan Dei wife of Rain Das defendant No. 10 for a sum of Rs. 14,000/-, by means of a sale deed dated 19th May, 1949, Radhika Prasad also mortgaged house No. 223 to Jangi Lal predecessor in interest of Defendants 1 to 5 for a sum of Rs. 2,5001/-, on 24-4-1950. Jangi Lal filed suit No. 1437 of 1955 against Radhika Prasad in the court of Munsif Allahabad on the basis of the said mortgage and obtained a preliminary decree on 19-12-1956. A final decree was passed on 30th April, 1960 for a sum of Rs. 6,115141-. The decree holder was taking steps for selling the house. Plaintiff being daughter of Sangam Lal and owner of halt share in house No. 223, her half share in that house was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree obtained by Jangi Lal against Radhika Prasad. As the two documents mentioned above were likely to cast cloud on rights title and interest of the plaintiff, she was entitled to get them cancelled. Two sets of written statements were filed for contesting the suit. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5, is now were the heirs of Jangi Lal filed a written statement defending the mortgage made by Radhika Prasad in respect of house No. 223. Their case was that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad were members of a joint Hindu family. Two sets of written statements were filed for contesting the suit. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5, is now were the heirs of Jangi Lal filed a written statement defending the mortgage made by Radhika Prasad in respect of house No. 223. Their case was that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad were members of a joint Hindu family. After the death of Sangam Lal his brother Radhika Prasad became full owner of house No. 223. By wav J extra precaution, Radhika Prasad obtained a deed of relinquishment in respect of the alleged share of Sangam Lal. Earlier Radhika Prasad had sold the house to one Sakina Bibi as full owner. After re-purchasing it he mortgaged the same with Jangi Lal. It was contended that as Radhika Prasad was full owner of house No. 223, the mortgage decree obtained by Jangi Lal could be executed by the sale of entire house No. 223. Second written statement was filed on behalf of Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Ram Din defendant No. 10. They defended the suit in so far as it related to the sale of house No, 46 by Radhika Prasad in her favour. She also pleaded that Radhika Prasad and Sangam Lal were members of a joint Hindu Family. After Sangam Lal's death the house came to Radhika Prasad by survivorship. She denied that there was any marriage between Mahadei and Sangam Lal and also the fact that plaintiff Munni Devi was the daughter of Mahadei from Sangam Lal. According to her Mahadei had executed a deed of relinquishment in favour of Radhika Prasad. Neither Mahadei nor Munni Devi had any interest in the house in dispute. The sale deed was executed by Radhika Prasad foil legal necessity and for payment of antecedent debts. She had been in possession over the house since the date of purchase and had been realising its rent ever since then. She had been in adverse possession of the house in suit for over 12 years and in any view of the case present suit was barred by time. A plea that she was a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice and hence the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act., was also raised. 3. A plea that she was a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice and hence the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Transfer of property Act., was also raised. 3. After considering evidence produced on behalf of the parties trial court came to the conclusion that Smt. Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal plaintiff Munni Devi was her daughter from Sangam Lal. It held that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad were separate and Sangam Lal owned house No. 46 and half share in house 223. As the deed of relinquishment was not executed by Smt. Mahadei in favour of the next reversioner of Sangam Lal it was invalid. The plaintiff neither as the heir of Mahadei nor as next reversioner of Sangam Lal was bound by it. It also found that the deed of relinquishment had been secured by Radhika Prasad by misrepresentation. There was no evidence to show that Sangam Lal had incurred any debt or that Smt. Mahadei got any amount out of the sale proceeds or mortgage money. The sale of house No. 46 and mortgage of house No. 223, were, therefore, not for any legal necessity. The court also found that defendant No. 10 was not a purchaser for value in good faith. Since the limitation for filing a suit by a reversioner, rune from the date of the death of limited owner, the present suit which had been filed by Munni Devi within three years of the death of Mahadei, was not barred by limitation and defendant No. 10 did not acquire any title by adverse possession. In view of the aforesaid findings plaintiff's suit was decreed. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the decree. Bhagwan Dei wife of Ramdin defendant No. 10, filed first appeal No. 97 of 1963 in respect of plaintiff's claim regarding house No. 46, and Bhagwan Dei widow of Jangi Lal and others who were defendants Nos. 1 to 5 in the suit, filed appeal No. 49 of 1964 in respect of the decree of the trial court regarding house No. 223. 5. It appears that Smt. Munni Devi made an execution application for obtaining possession over house No. 46 and obtained delivery of possession over that house. 1 to 5 in the suit, filed appeal No. 49 of 1964 in respect of the decree of the trial court regarding house No. 223. 5. It appears that Smt. Munni Devi made an execution application for obtaining possession over house No. 46 and obtained delivery of possession over that house. Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Ram Din defendant No. 10 filed Execution first appeal No. 116 of 1963 against the order dated 22-3-1963, directing the execution by delivery of possession over the house to proceed. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in appeal No. 97 of 1963 and 49 of 1964 urged that the court below was wrong in holding that Smt. Mahadei was the wife of Sangam Lal and that plaintiff Munni Devi was the daughter of Mahadei from Sangam Lal. They contended that the plaintiff had no interest in -house Nos. 46 and 223 and therefore she had no lochs stand to maintain the present suit. 7. Plaintiff came to court with an allegation that there was a custom of Baithaki in her caste and after the death of her first husband Suit. Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal according to that custom. The fact that there was a custom of Baithaki in the caste to which the plaintiff belonged has not been disputed by the appellants. It was also not disputed that Smt. Mahadei used to live with Sangam Lal. In his cross-examination D. W. 3 Radha Kishan admitted that Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal. Even in the sale deed executed by Radhika Prasad in favour of defendant No. 10 Smt. Mahadei has been described as the widow of Sangam Lal. Under the circumstances of the case we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that Smt. Mahadei was legally wedded wife of Sangam Lal. The defendants contended that plaintiff was not the daughter of Sangam Lal. There is no evidence produced on behalf of the defendants to show that Munni Devi was the daughter of any person other than Sangam Lal. Under the circumstances, only evidence that has to be considered on this point is that adduced on behalf of the plaintiff, and to see, whether that evidence is sufficient by proving that Munni Devi was the daughter of Mahadei from Sangam Lal. We have already found that Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal. Under the circumstances, only evidence that has to be considered on this point is that adduced on behalf of the plaintiff, and to see, whether that evidence is sufficient by proving that Munni Devi was the daughter of Mahadei from Sangam Lal. We have already found that Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal. In case it is found that Munni Devi was born to Mahadei during the subsistence of that marriage, this fact shall be conclusive proof that she was the legitimate daughter of Sangam Lal, unless it could be shown that Sangam Lal had no access to Mahadei at a time when she could have been begotten (Sec. 112 of the Evidence Act) . Ext. 11 a copy of the death register shows that Smt. Ganga Dei wife of Sangam Lal died on 26th of February, 1941. The birth register Ex. 2 shows that a female child was born to Sangam Lai on 16th September, 1941. Now on 16th September, 1941 Ganga Dei was already dead and therefore, Ex. 2 could only relate to birth of a daughter of Sangam Lal from his second wife. It has been admitted by D. W. 3 Radhika Prasad that Mahadei was married to Sangam Lal in Baithaki form and that this Baithaki took place after the death of Ganga Dei. It has not been suggested that Sangam Lal had any other wife. It is therefore clear that a daughter of Sangam Lal was born from his second wife who was Smt. Mahadei on 16th September, 1941. It is not disputed that plaintiff is the daughter of Mahadei. It is therefore clear that the birth register relates to the birth of the plaintiff. In the school register Ex. 10 the plaintiff's date of birth has been shown as 5-4-1943. It has not been suggested that any daughter was born to Mahadei through Sangam Lal in the year 1943. It appears that in the school register the age of plaintiff was under-stated at the time of her admission to the school. Even if 5-4-1943 is taken to be the date of birth of the plaintiff, plaintiff could be the daughter of Sangam Lal and not of the previous husband of Mahadei. 8. In view of the aforesaid circumstances the plaintiff's case that she was the daughter of Sangam Lal and Mahadei appears to be correct. Even if 5-4-1943 is taken to be the date of birth of the plaintiff, plaintiff could be the daughter of Sangam Lal and not of the previous husband of Mahadei. 8. In view of the aforesaid circumstances the plaintiff's case that she was the daughter of Sangam Lal and Mahadei appears to be correct. Great reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on the recitals contained in the deed of relinquishment Ex. 5 executed by Mahadei. In that deed it was mentioned that Sangam Lal did not leave any issue, and as such it could not be said that Munni Devi was his daughter. In the first place if it has been found that Munni Devi was born to Mahadei during the continuance of her marriage with Sangam Lal, this fact would be conclusive proof of the fact that Munni Devi was the legitimate daughter of Sangam Lal; unless it could be shown that Sangam Lal had no access to Mahadei at any time when she could have been begotten. No evidence has been produced for showing that Sangam Lal had no access to Mahadei at the time Munni Devi could be gotten. Evidence contained in Ex. 5 cannot be availed to rebut that conclusive evidence. In the second place the statement contained in that document to the effect that Sangam Lal did not leave any issue does not appear to be correct. As stated above, copy of birth register, dated 16th September, 1941 shows that a daughter was born to Sangam Lal. Nobody has come forward to say that the daughter born to Sangam Lai predeceased him. We are therefore of opinion that the trial court was right in holding that Munni Devi was the daughter of Sangam Lal. In view of the aforesaid finding the plaintiff would have the right to maintain the present suit, and she would succeed if she is able to establish that house No. 46 and half share in house No. 223 was the separate property of Sangam Lal and that her rights were not affected by the deed of relinquishment executed by her mother Mahadei in favour of Radhika Prasad and if her suit is not barred by limitation. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad were members of joint Hindu family and that the two houses in dispute were the joint family property. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad were members of joint Hindu family and that the two houses in dispute were the joint family property. The appellants could not point out any evidence for showing that Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad inherited any property from their father. Evidence was produced on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the two brothers were separate in residence and missing and that they were carrying on their separate business. Learned counsel for the appellant criticised the oral evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiff as unreliable. Defendants' witness Radha Kishan in his evidence stated that house No. 46 belonged to Sangam Lal and Gaiiga Prasad. The two tenants of house No. 46 also stated that it was only after the death of Sangam Lal Radhika Prasad realised the rent of the house. There is no evidence for showing that Radhika Prasad ever realised any rent from the tenants of house No. 46 during the life time of Sangan Lal or that Sangam Lal after realising the rent utilised if for the benefit of Radhika Prasad also. We also find that house No. 46 was purchased by Sangam Lal in the name of his wife. During the life time of Sangam Lal Radhika Prasad mortgaged his half share in house No. 223. In that mortgage deed it was stated that Sangam Lal was separate from his brother Radhika Prasad. These circumstances again go to support plaintiff's case that Sangam Lal was the owner of house No. 46 and half share in house No. 223 and that he was separate from his brother Radhika Prasad. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that recitals in the mortgage deed dated 26-2-1943 by which Radhika Prasad mortgaged his half share in house No. 223 was wrong and had been made for purposes of obtaining money by Radhika Prasad and as such no reliance should be placed on that recital. We are not inclined to accept this argument. If house No. 223, was joint property of Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad Sangam Lal would not have permitted the mortgage of this property for securing the amount taken by Radhika Prasad alone for his personal need. Moreover, there is nothing on the record from which an inference can be drawn that the recital in that document was wrong. 10. If house No. 223, was joint property of Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad Sangam Lal would not have permitted the mortgage of this property for securing the amount taken by Radhika Prasad alone for his personal need. Moreover, there is nothing on the record from which an inference can be drawn that the recital in that document was wrong. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the averment made by Radhika Prasad in a mortgage deed and the sale deed, that are the subject- matter of dispute in the present appeal. It was contended that, according to those averments the two properties were joint family properties of Sangam Lal and Radhika Prasad. This averment. may have been made for the purpose of. depriving Mahadei and her daughter of the right to the two houses. We are inclined to attach greater weight to the admissions made by Radhika Prasad (luring the life time of Sangam Lal rather than to those made by him after his death. In view of all these circumstances we are inclined to believe the evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiffs and to agree with the finding recorded by the trial court that Radhika Prasad and Sangam Lal were not members of a joint Hindu Family and that Sangam Lal owned house No. 46 and half share in house No. 223. 11. So far as the deed of relinquishment executed by Smt. Mahadei in favour of Radhika Prasad is concerned, it was contended that Smt. Mahadei executed the same after fully understanding its contents. After she relinquished her interest in the property Radhika Prasad became full owner of both the houses and he had absolute right to sell or mortgage them. Under Hindu Law a limited owner can surrender her interest only in favour of next revisioners. In the presence of a daughter, brother of last male holder is not the next reversioner. therefore, in the presence of Munni Devi, Radhika Prasad was not the next reversioner of Sangam Lal, if at all Smt. Mahadei could relinquish her interest in the joint family property in favour of Munni Devi. Any relinquishment in favour of Radhika Prasad was invalid and not binding upon Munni Devi. therefore, in the presence of Munni Devi, Radhika Prasad was not the next reversioner of Sangam Lal, if at all Smt. Mahadei could relinquish her interest in the joint family property in favour of Munni Devi. Any relinquishment in favour of Radhika Prasad was invalid and not binding upon Munni Devi. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether Smt. Mahadei executed the deed of relinquishment after fully understanding its contents or not. Suffice it to say that the deed of relinquishment did not confer any right on Radhika Prasad. 12. Since the properties in dispute have been held to be separate property of Sangam Lal his interest devolved on Mahadei and thereafter on Munni Devi the plaintiff and Radhika Prasad had no rights to sell or mortgage the same for any reason whatsoever. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant. Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Sri Ram Din who purchased house No. 46 then argued that the sale deed in question was executed in her favour on May 19, 1949. Immediately thereafter the appellant entered into possession of that house and started collecting rent from the tenants. The present suit was filed on 24th of July, 1961 more than 12 years after Mahadei was dispossessed of that house. It was therefore claimed that Bhagwan Dei matured her rights by virtue of her adverse possession for over 12 years before: the date of filing of the suit and the plaintiff would have no right to claim possession over the house. 14. Learned counsel has argued that on the death of Sangam Lal Smt. Mahadei inherited the property as a Hindu widow and a limited owner. Sale deed in question was executed by Radhika Prasad on 19-5-1949. According to the evidence on the record the vendees started realising rent from the tenants of in house immediately thereafter. It is therefore clear that Smt. Mahadei was dispossessed from house No. 46. She became entitled to recover possession of the same from the vendees but she did not take any such steps during the life time. Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force on 17th June, 1956. It is therefore clear that Smt. Mahadei was dispossessed from house No. 46. She became entitled to recover possession of the same from the vendees but she did not take any such steps during the life time. Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force on 17th June, 1956. According to Section 14 of the Act any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after commencement of the Act is to be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner. On 17th June, 1956, Smt. Mahadei became full owner of the property in dispute under this section and the revisioners lost all interest in that property. Under the circumstances Smt. Munni Devi as a reversioner of Sangam Lal had no locus standi to maintain the present if she could maintain a suit as an heir of Munni Devi suit. Even the suit would be barred by limitation as it was filed more than 12 years of the date of Mahadei's dispossession. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that after Smt. Mahadei h..s been dispossessed from the property in dispute on 19th May, 1949 she did not possess the house in dispute when the Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force or at any stage thereafter. She, therefore, never became a full owner of the property and the rights of the revisioners continued throughout. A suit filed by the revisioners within three years of the death of Mahadei was within limitation. 16. Answer to this controversy depends upon the correct meaning to he placed on the words "possessed by a female Hindu" as used in Section 14 of the Hindu succession Act. A number of cases were cited at the bar for showing that the word 'possessed' not only means actual physical possession but also constructive possession. It is not necessary for us to refer to all those cases as this point, in so far as it concerns the present case appears to be concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Mangal Singh v. Smt. Ratno, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786. It is not necessary for us to refer to all those cases as this point, in so far as it concerns the present case appears to be concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Mangal Singh v. Smt. Ratno, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786. "Even if a female Hindu be in fact out of actual possession, the property must be held to be possessed by her if her ownership rights in that property still exists and in exercise of these ownership rights she is capable of obtaining actual possession of it." There can be no doubt that when Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force Smt. Mahadei was not in actual physical possession of the property. But in exercise of her right of ownership she was capable of obtaining actual possession over it. In the case before the Supreme Court the position was that Smt. Harnam Kaur the limited owner was dispossessed in the year 1954 by the collaterals of the last male holder without any right or title. The Supreme Court, by interpreting Section 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act as aforesaid, held that the property involved in the suit was possessed by Smt. Harnam Koer when she died in the year 1958 and consequently Smt. Harnam Koer had become full owner of the property and after her death it possessed on to her heirs. 17. The appellants were in possession of the property of house No. 46 since 10th May, 1949 without any right title or interest, Smt. Mahadei, even as a limited owner, continued to retain the right to file the suit for recovery of possession over that house till the year 1956 when Hindu Succession Act came into force. Al- though she was not in actual possession of the house but it continued to be possessed by her within the meaning of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act and she became its full owner. Munni Devi therefore succeeded to the house as heir of Mahadei and not as next reversioner of Sangam Lal. It is only a reversioner who can claim that limitation for filing a suit for possession commences against him on the death of the limited owner. As an heir Smt. Munni Devi ..mould not have greater rights than what were possessed by Smt. Mahadei. It is only a reversioner who can claim that limitation for filing a suit for possession commences against him on the death of the limited owner. As an heir Smt. Munni Devi ..mould not have greater rights than what were possessed by Smt. Mahadei. If after becoming full owner in the year 1956 Smt. Mahadei could not have brought the present suits on 14th July, 1961, had she been alive, it would also not be open to her heirs to file this suit. Smt. Mahadei had been dispossessed more than 12 years before the date of institution of the suit and therefore the present suit at her instance, if she had been alive, would have been barred by time. Therefore, this suit at the instance of her heir was also barred by time. Position would have been different if Mahadei had continued to be limited owner of the house in dispute in which care the suit Could have been filed by Munni Devi as reversioner of Sangam Lal. In such a case period of limitation would have commenced from the date of death of Mahadei. We are therefore unable to uphold the finding recorded by the trial court that present suit for recovery of possession over house No. 46 was not barred by limitation, 18. So far as house No. 223 is concerned, plaintiff suit is merely for a declaration that she is owner of half share in that house and that the mortgage decree obtained in suit No. 1437 of 1955 in the court of Munsif (West) between Jangi Lal and Radhika Prasad decided on 19th December, 1956 was not binding on her and that her half share in that house was not liable to be sold in execution of the said decree. Now it is not disputed that the mortgage executed by Radhika Prasad in respect of house No. 223 was a simple mortgage and as such the possession did not pass to the mortgagees. Possession over this house continued to remain with the real owner. Now it is not disputed that the mortgage executed by Radhika Prasad in respect of house No. 223 was a simple mortgage and as such the possession did not pass to the mortgagees. Possession over this house continued to remain with the real owner. So long as the right of title and interest of Mahadei and after her that of the plaintiff was not extinguished in any manner, she was entitled to a declaration that she was owner of house No. 223 and that the mortgage decree in suit No. 1437 of 1965 between Jangi Lal and Radhika Prasad decided on 19-12-1956 was not binding on her and that her half share in that house was not liable to be sold in execution of that decree. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant Smt. Bhagwan Dei widow of Jangi Lal and others in appeal No. 49: of 1964,, urged that since, Radhika Prasad was in adverse possession over the house No. 223 for over, 12 years the right of Mahadei and her heirs were extinguished by lapse of time and as such the suit instituted by the plaintiff was not maintainable. It may be mentioned that in the written statement filed on behalf of these appellants no plea was taken that Radhika Prasad had dispossessed Mahadei and had taken adverse possession over her share. It was pleaded that Radhika Prasad was full owner of the house being survivor of Sangam Lal and that Smt. Mahadei had executed a deed of relinquishment in his favour. We have already seen that the case of the appellants that Radhika Prasad was the full owner of the house by survivorship is not correct. Further the deed of relinquishment executed by Smt. Mahadei in favour of Radhika Prasad did not affect rights of Munni Devi in any manner. She continued to be the owner of the house and there seems to be no substance in the appellants' case that they could proceed to realise their dues over from the share of Smt. Munni Devi in house No. 223. 20. In view of aforesaid discussion first appeal No. 97 of 1963 filed by Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Rain Din in respect of the decree in connection with house No. 46 will have to be allowed. 20. In view of aforesaid discussion first appeal No. 97 of 1963 filed by Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Rain Din in respect of the decree in connection with house No. 46 will have to be allowed. Execution first appeal No. 116 of 1963 has now become infructuous in the sense that the appellant Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Ram Din would be able to claim restitution by virtue of decision in First Appeal No. 97 of 1963, and it is not necessary to go into the question whether possession over house No. 46 was properly delivered to the plaintiff Munni Devi or not. 21. In the result we allow First Appeal No. 97 of 1963 filed by Smt. Bhagwan Dei wife of Ram Din and dismiss the plaintiff's suit so far as her reliefs in respect of house No. 46 Chak, Allahabad were concerned. Execution First Appeal No. 116 of 1963, which was also filed by Smt. Bhagwan Dei, wife of Ram Din, is dismissed as infructuous. First Appeal No. 49 of 1964 filed by Smt. Bhagwan Dei widow of Jangi Lal and others in respect of house No. 223 Mohtsimganj, Allahabad is dismissed :and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in respect of that house are confirmed. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own cost in these appeals.