JUDGMENT : J.C. SHAH, J. 1. Section 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, provides :- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant : Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation." The explanation to that clause is not relevant. The section is fairly plain. An order in ejectment against the tenant may be made under clause (e) if the landlord requires the premises for his own occupation, or if he is the owner, for the members of his family dependent on him, or for the persons for whose benefit the premises are held. Requirement of the landlord must be judged in the light of the status in lift intending to occupy, his age, state of health, the way in which his accustomed to live, the accommodation which he occupied or otherwise he is available to him and other relevant circumstances. The landlord must require the premises bonafide. It is for the Court which is invested with the power to determine whether the landlord requires the premises for occupation and whether the requirement is bonafide. 2. The appellant is the owner of a building No. 4, Original Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The family of the appellant consists of herself, her husband and her daughter. The appellant has for the last many years been living at Ambala Cantonment and now desires to shift to New Delhi. The appellant's husband is a retired official of the State of Punjab, and draws a pension of Rs. 500/- p.m. The building No. 4, Original Road, consists of a ground floor and an upper floor. The appellant has for the last many years been living at Ambala Cantonment and now desires to shift to New Delhi. The appellant's husband is a retired official of the State of Punjab, and draws a pension of Rs. 500/- p.m. The building No. 4, Original Road, consists of a ground floor and an upper floor. The ground floor has one office room, one drawing room, one dining room, four bed rooms, four verandaha two of which have been converted into rooms two stores, five bath rooms and a motor garage. The upper floor has the same living accommodation. The ground floor is lying vacant, but the appellant claims that she requires the upper floor for her personal occupation. She applied to the Controller for an order of eviction against the tenant of the upper floor on the plea that she requires the upper floor for her personal occupation. The Rent Controller granted the application. The order was confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal in appeal by the tenant. A second appeal filed by the tenant was allowed by the High Court of Punjab at Delhi. The reasons in support of the order are summarised in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment. The court observed :- "In the instant case, it is found as a fact, and that finding is not disputed before us, that the respondent has a fairly commodious and independent accommodation available to her on the ground floor. All of what is said on behalf of the respondent is that she is not used to living in a place were somebody else is living. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the social status established on the record, I am of opinion that the plea set forth does not meet the claims of a 'reasonable man'. It must follow that the circumstances of this case show that the landlady has other reasonably suitable accommodation available and consequently, she has failed to satisfy the conditions laid down in the said clause (e)." 3. Counsel for the appellant contends that the High Court has, in determining whether the appellant requires the premises for her own occupation considered the evidence in the light of a wrong test, and has erroneously set aside the decision of the Courts below. We are unable to agree. Counsel for the appellant contends that the High Court has, in determining whether the appellant requires the premises for her own occupation considered the evidence in the light of a wrong test, and has erroneously set aside the decision of the Courts below. We are unable to agree. The High Court decided that having regard to all the circumstances including the status, her age, her desire to live in her own building her accustomed mode of life and the accommodation available to her on the ground floor of No. 4, Original Road, it could not be said that the requirement of the appellant is bonafide. The accommodation available to the appellant on the ground floor was, having regard to modern conditions in New Delhi, fairly large. She claimed that she occupies twelve rooms in Ambala Cantonment but there is no evidence as to the type of accommodation. If the rent of those premises at Ambala which is Rs. 11.25 per month furnishes any information, it must be very poor. The only ground on which the appellant claimed before the High Court to obtain an order in ejectment is that she was not accustomed to live in a place where a stranger is living. Requirement founded on such a ground was rightly regarded by the High Court as not bonafide. Assuming that the appellant has an inveterate dislike against occupying a house in which a stranger is residing, a claim of requirement based on such a ground cannot be regarded as bonafide. A mere assertion that the landlord requires premises occupied by a tenant for his personal occupation is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of the claim and also to determine whether the claim is bonafide. In determining whether the claim is bonafide the Court is entitled and indeed bound to consider whether it is reasonable. A claim founded on abnormal predilections of the landlord may not be regarded as bonafide. It was said that the Court of First Instance and the Appellate Court had taken several other grounds such as the accommodation available to her at Ambala Cantonment, the disputes between her and tenant, her statues in life, her age and that the house has a common entrance for occupants of both the floors, and had made the order of eviction. But before the High Court the appellant claimed to sustain it only on the ground that she did not like to live in a house where strangers also lived. 4. The argument that the learned Judges of the High Court exceeded their jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, when they reversed the finding of bonafide requirement of the appellant, has no substance. Whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord of bonafide, within the meaning of Section 14 (1)(e) is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. An inference that the requirement of the appellant in the present case was bonafide could not be regarded as conclusive. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 5. It is stated in the judgment of the trial Court any the appellate Court that beside the appellant and her husband their daughter is living with them. In the judgment of the High Court on account of some slip it is stated that daughter is adopted by the appellant. That is an incorrect statement.