These two second appeals are by the plaintiff. The plain­tiff brought a suit claiming Rs. 3000/- as compensation against the defendants for damage to some bundles of black plain sheets which were booked at Scob Siding (Burnpur) to the Deputy Commissioner, Nowgong who has endorsed the consign­ment note in favour of the plaintiff. The consignment containing 217 bundles of black plain sheets was booked on 12-9-62 under Invoice No. 6-R/R 985742 of the same date. As the consignment was found damaged during the journey, assess­ment delivery was obtained. On the assessment being made, a loss of Rs, 2875.91 P. was detected. The plaintiff then issued notice under Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, as amend­ed by 1961 Act (Act No. XXXIX of 1961), hereinafter called the Act, which has come into force from 1st January, 1962 and under Section 80 of the Civil Proce­dure Code and brought the present suit. The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, decreed the plaintiff's claim only for Rs. 2250/- with proportionate costs. Against this decree, both the plaintiff as well as the defendants preferred appeals before the District Judge, who dismissed the plaintiff's appeal regarding the quan­tum of compensation, but allowed the defendants' appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit in its entirety. The short point on which the learned Judge dismiss­ed the plaintiff's claim is that the claim was barred under Section 78-B of the Act. He however held that the railways have not discharged their burden of proof to show absence of misconduct or negligence on the part of the railway employees with regard to the consignment. 2. The short point therefore that arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the learned Subordinate Judge is right in holding that the notice or notices relied upon by the plaintiff are insufficient in law for the purpose of Sec­tion 78-B of the Act. In order to appre­ciate the legal position of the notice under Section 78-B. it may be useful to briefly relate the history and the circumstances leading to the institution of the suit. It is admitted that the goods which were open to view arrived at Haiborgaon rail­way station in damaged condition. It is clearly established that after discovery of damage, the plaintiff informed the local railway authorities, who arranged for assessment delivery in the presence of appropriate officer. It is admitted that the goods which were open to view arrived at Haiborgaon rail­way station in damaged condition. It is clearly established that after discovery of damage, the plaintiff informed the local railway authorities, who arranged for assessment delivery in the presence of appropriate officer. Delivery was made to the plaintiff on 7-2-63 as per Ex. 4, which is a certificate of damage showing the assessment of damage of the goods signed by the District Commercial Superintendent, N. F. Railway, Lumding. Prior to this date, the plaintiff had already written to the Station Master on 23-12-62 (Ex. 17) and to the Commercial Inspector, N. F. Railway on 25-12-62 (Ex. 16) and on 2-1-63 (Ex. 15) and again to the Sta­tion Master, Haiborgaon station on 2-1-63 (Ex. 14) which is same as Ex. 3 and on 11-1-63 (Ex. 13). All these letters ad­dressed to these Railway Officers show that the damage of the goods had been notified before delivery and a precise claim for compensation to the extent of 30% damage amounting approximately to Rs. 3000/- was lodged vide Ex. 15 dated 2-1-63 which particularly refers to his letter of the same date No. 1101/153/62-63. As per Ex. 18, the General Manager (Claims) in September, 1963, wrote to the plaintiff referring to "your claim No. 1101/153/62-63 of 2-1-63" disclaimed any liability for compensation "since there is no evidence of negligence or misconduct on the part of the Railway Administration or its servants". It appears Ex. 13 was copied to the Deputy Commercial Superintendent, Lum­ding and to the Chief Commercial Super­intendent, N. F. Railway, Pandu, as ap­pearing at the foot of this letter. This was a letter addressed to the Station Master with copy to the above authorities, referring to the plaintiff's earlier letter dated 23-12-62 (Ex. 17), asking for assess­ment delivery. "But sorry to write that we have not heard anything from you up till now. Please note that the consign­ment is deteriorating further and request immediate assessment". All these exhi­bits clearly show that a demand for com­pensation was made in Writing to the railway authorities between 23-12-62 and 11-1-63 and in pursuance of which assess­ment delivery was made to the plaintiff on 7-2-63 by granting a certificate of damage. It is also clearly established that by Ex. 18. All these exhi­bits clearly show that a demand for com­pensation was made in Writing to the railway authorities between 23-12-62 and 11-1-63 and in pursuance of which assess­ment delivery was made to the plaintiff on 7-2-63 by granting a certificate of damage. It is also clearly established that by Ex. 18. the General Manager re­ferred to the claim of the plaintiff which is no other than a claim for compensation for damage of the goods. It is therefore clearly established from Ex. 18 that even the General Manager acknowledged the claim sometime in September, 1963, al­though the exact date is not given in this letter. The claim for compensation lodg­ed with different railway authorities namely the Station Master and the Com­mercial Inspector must have therefore reached the General Manager prior to September, 1963 in order to enable him to reply in terms of his letter. There must have been an enquiry made by the Railway Administration before the Gene­ral Manager was in a position to write in Ext. 18 that "there is no evidence of negli­gence or misconduct on the part of the railway administration or its servants". The learned District Judge also held as follows:- "In this case, even if the proper per­son is said to have received the notice, the plaintiff has failed to prove that It was within time." The learned Judge however failed to take note of Ex. 13, which, although addressed to the Station Master, Haibor­gaon station, was copied to the Chief Commercial Superintendent, which fact is not denied by the defendants in evidence in face of this exhibit. Service on the Chief Commercial Superintendent is a proper service on the Railway Adminis­tration under Section 140 (a) of the Act. Apart from this, Ex. 18 also clearly shows that the General Manager had received the written demand for compensation through official channel in due course of business. In absence of any evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that the claims lodged with the various railway authorities were duly forwarded to the appropriate authorities who are required to deal with these matters. 3. Mr. Goswami, the learned coun­sel for the respondents strenuously sub­mits that the onus is on the plaintiff to clearly establish that the demand in writ­ing had reached the General Manager within six months from the date of book­ing. He contends that Ex. 3. Mr. Goswami, the learned coun­sel for the respondents strenuously sub­mits that the onus is on the plaintiff to clearly establish that the demand in writ­ing had reached the General Manager within six months from the date of book­ing. He contends that Ex. 18 does not prove service of the written demand on the railway administration within the specified period. The learned District Judge accepted this submission, The pre­cise point therefore that comes for consi­deration is when the defendants have ad­mitted to have received the claim of the plaintiff, in the entire circumstances of the case, whose burden will it be to dis­charge regarding the particular date on which the claim reached the General Manager. It is clear that the defendants having admitted receipt of all the exhi­bits addressed to the various railway au­thorities and in ordinary course of busi­ness having forwarded these to the appro­priate authorities for dealing with the claim, it will be within the special know­ledge of the defendants to prove when these letters reached the General Mana­ger, who. at long last, replied to the plaintiff's claim in September, 1963. 4. Section 106 of the Evidence Act runs as follows:- "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." This section is an exception to the general rule that the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who asserts it. In this particular case, the plaintiff has proved that he has made a written demand to some authorities of the railway dealing with the goods. He got answer from the General Manager of the Railway Adminis­tration with reference to his particular demand in writing. How on earth is it possible for the plaintiff to prove on what date the General Manager received the communications forwarded to him by his subordinates? This fact is certainly with­in the special knowledge of the General Manager or other officers of the defen­dants. I am not required to consider a case in absence of a reply like Ex. 18 in considering on whom the onus lies. Every case will have to be judged on the pecu­liar facts and circumstances appearing therein. This fact is certainly with­in the special knowledge of the General Manager or other officers of the defen­dants. I am not required to consider a case in absence of a reply like Ex. 18 in considering on whom the onus lies. Every case will have to be judged on the pecu­liar facts and circumstances appearing therein. From the several exhibits refer­red to above, I am clearly of opinion that the onus in this case was entirely on the defendants to prove on which date the letter containing the written claim of the plaintiff reached the General Mana­ger. It may be pertinent to observe here that while disclaiming the claim of the plaintiff, the General Manager, N. F. Railway did not take the objection that written claim of the plaintiff was not lodged before him within six months of the booking. It is also noteworthy in this context that another railway authority, namely the Chief Commercial Superinten­dent of the Eastern Railway as per Ex. 19, in answer to the plaintiff's notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code pointedly took exception that "there is no trace of any reference in this office from your client within six months from the date of booking as required under Section 78-B of the amended Railway Act". It therefore stands to reason that if the General Manager, N. F. Railway had not received the claim of the plaintiff within the prescribed period, he would not have lost an opportunity to state that important fact while disclaiming the liability for the plaintiff's claim. I am therefore of opinion that the defendants having re­ceived the written claim of the plaintiff and having failed to discharge their onus in the entire circumstances of this case to prove the actual date of receipt of the claim by the General Manager, the plain­tiff has discharged his burden and it must be held that the General Manager receiv­ed the plaintiff's claim conveyed in his various letters and particularly the letter dated 2-1-63 within the specified period of six months from the date of booking. The plaintiff's suit therefore cannot be thrown out on the ground that he has not complied with Section 78-B of the Act. The learned Judge clearly erred in law in holding to the contrary. Apart from this, I have already held that Ex. The plaintiff's suit therefore cannot be thrown out on the ground that he has not complied with Section 78-B of the Act. The learned Judge clearly erred in law in holding to the contrary. Apart from this, I have already held that Ex. 13 may also be construed as a written demand as envisaged under Section 78-B which is not denied to have been received by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, N. F. Rail­way, Pandu. Even this notice which is admitted by the defendants will save the plaintiff's claim from the mischief of Section 78-B of the Act. In any view of the matter, the plaintiff's suit is not liable to be thrown out on the ground of non-compliance with Section 78-B of the Act. Since there is no dispute about the plain­tiff's claim originally decreed by the learned Subordinate Judge, his suit shall stand decreed as originally awarded by that court. 5. In the result, the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge are set aside and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge is restored. The ap­peals are allowed with costs throughout. Appeals allowed.