Ramamurti, J-In a batch of Land Acquisition cases, a common judgment was delivered by the trial Court. The State of Madras obtained 12 printed copies of judgment and filed an appeal which (for the sake of convenience) may be referred to as the main appeal. In the other appeals, the memorandum of appeal was accompanied only by a copy of the relevant decree along with a petition to dispense with the production of printed copies of judgement on the ground that in the main appeal, 12 printed copies had been filed. Along with this, a petition has also been filed, in each of these appeals, to excuse the delay, if any, in filing the appeals as they would be barred by limitation if the time taken for obtaining certified copies of the relevant decrees alone is taken into account under section 12 of the Limitation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In all cases, where a common judgment is delivered disposing of a batch of cases, the practice of this Court has been to dispense with the production of the printed copies of the judgment in the rest of the appeals provided in one appeal the requisite number of printed copies of the common judgment are filed. Following this practice, we dispense with the production of the copies of the printed judgment in the present batch of appeals. Mr. Sivamani learned Counsel for the respondent drew our attention to the decision of Byers, J., in Jami Kurmanus, In re1, in which the learned Judge after comparing the language of Order 41, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and Order 41-A, rule (2) sub-rule (i) Civil Procedure Code held that in the case of appeals to the High Court, it has no power to dispense with the production of the copier of the judgment. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., in Rayalla Ramappa, In re2, in which the learned Judge differing from Byers, J. held that the High Court has such a power. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., in Rayalla Ramappa, In re2, in which the learned Judge differing from Byers, J. held that the High Court has such a power. With respect we agree with the decision of chandrasekara Iyer, J. A reading of all the provisions of order 41-A, dealing with appeals to the High Court from the subordinate Courts shows that the provisions of Order 41 would undoubtedly apply to appeals in the High Court subject only to the modifications contained in Order 41-A. The provisions of Order 41-A, have to be necessarily read into and applied alone with the provisions of Order 41 and the provisions of Order 41-A, would prevail only to the limited extent to which there is a special provision. In other words, the procedural law governing appeals to the High Court is the combined operation of Order 41 and Order 41-A, the latter order prevailing only to the limited extent of a different specific provision. The provisions of Order 41-A cannot be applied in isolation. So far as the requirement of production of the copy of judgment is concerned, in the case of an appeal to the High Court, a memorandum, should be accompanied by printed copies and they should be twelve in number. It is only to this extent that there is a variation and in ether respects, the provision in order 41 would apply and this Court will have undoubted jurisdiction to dispense with the production of the copies of judgment in a proper case. If a sub-Court or a District Court has jurisdiction and power to dispense with the production of a copy of the judgment in an appeal preferred to it, we do not find any reason why the High Court should be denied such a power, in the case of an appeal preferred to the High Court. The provision for dispensing with is specially provided in Order 41 rule 1, only because of the clear necessity felt for such a provision, as otherwise, serious hardship and injustice would arise. In innumerable cases, the appellant may not be in a position to file the copy of the judgment and unless such a power is reserved to Subordinate Courts, the right of appeal itself would become illusory and futile. In innumerable cases, the appellant may not be in a position to file the copy of the judgment and unless such a power is reserved to Subordinate Courts, the right of appeal itself would become illusory and futile. It is obvious that the position must be the same with regard to appeals preferred to the High Court, and there is no basis to make any distinction between the two sets of appeals. That, this is the only correct view, also follows from the provisions of Order 42 governing procedure in the case of second appeals. Order 42 contains only one rule to the effect that the rules of Order 41, Order 41-A shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals to the High Court from appellate decrees. There cannot be any doubt that in the case of a second appeal, the High Court will have power to dispense with the production of judgment. The Madras amendment consist of three rules Order 42, rules 1, 2 and 3. Order 42, rule (1) states that Order 41 and 41-A shall apply to second appeals to the High Court. We are not prepared to accept any interpretation which will involve this anomaly, that the High Court will have power in the case of second appeals, to dispense with production of copies of judgment and no such power in the case of first appeals. We do not find anything either in the scheme or the language, of the provisions of Order 41-A to deny the High Court such a power which is so vital and necessary. For all these reasons and following the uniform practice of this Court, the production of the copies of judgment is dispensed with in this batch of appeals. The question next arises whether there is any delay in filing these appeals this point is linked up with the question whether the appellants are entitled to the exclusion of time taken for obtaining the printed copies of the judgment which have been filed in the main appeal. The question next arises whether there is any delay in filing these appeals this point is linked up with the question whether the appellants are entitled to the exclusion of time taken for obtaining the printed copies of the judgment which have been filed in the main appeal. Our attention was drawn to the Bench decision of Veeraswami and Natesan, JJ., reported in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajuddeen1, where the Bench following an earlier Bench decision of this Court reported in Avudai Ammal v. Ganapathi2, held the appellant was not entitled to deduct the time taken in obtaining copies of judgments filed in another connected appeal arising out of the same common judgment. A similar view taken by Kailasam, J. in C.M.P.Nos. 206 to 310 of 1966 was also referred to with approval in the said Bench decision. The identical question again came up in an unreported case in C.M.P. Nos. 2643 to 2646 of 1968, in a batch of Land Acquisition Appeals and the Bench (consisting of Srinivasan and Sadasivam, JJ.) followed the earlier Bench decision in State of Madras v.Mohammed Sirajuddeen1. At the same time the Bench rejected the argument of Counsel for the Government that applying the principle in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Additional Collector of Customs v. Best & Co.3, the appelant would be entitled to the deduction of time and that the earlier Bench decision in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen1, would no longer apply. The same argument (besides other submission, as to the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court was addressed before us by the learned Government Pleader, on the proper interpretation of section 12 of the Limitation Act. After a careful analysis of the relevant case-law on the topic (with great respect to the learned judges of this Court who rendered the decisions aforesaid) we are inclined to take the view that the appellant is entitled to a deduction of the time as claimed and consequently there has been no delay in filing this batch of appeals. After a careful analysis of the relevant case-law on the topic (with great respect to the learned judges of this Court who rendered the decisions aforesaid) we are inclined to take the view that the appellant is entitled to a deduction of the time as claimed and consequently there has been no delay in filing this batch of appeals. The attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen1, was not drawn to a very important decision, of the Privy Council reported in J.N. Surly v T.S. Chettyar A firm4, referred to as Surty’s case; further the learned Judges did not have the benefit of the elecidation of the law by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Additional Collector of Customs v. Best & Co.3, which completely followed and referred to with approval the decision of the Privy Council in the Surty’s case In. the later Bench decision of this Court the earlier Bench decision was simply followed as it is binding upon them, and there is not much of a discussion. As the point raised, involves an important principle as to the proper interpretation of section 12 of the Limitation Act and the rule of procedure to be followed in numerous cases of frequent occurrence, we are of the view that it is necessary that there should be an. authoritative pronouncement by a Full Bench. We, therefore, propose to give hereunder, our reasons, for the reference to a Full Bench. Section 12 (2) of the Act amongst other things, provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, shall be excluded and section 12 (3) provides that the time requisite lor obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded. The object of this rule of exclusion is to give the litigant an effective and adequate opportunity to peruse and consider the reasonings and the findings in the judgment as well as the terms of the decree so that he can reach a final decision as to whether he should take up the matter to the higher Court. The object of this rule of exclusion is to give the litigant an effective and adequate opportunity to peruse and consider the reasonings and the findings in the judgment as well as the terms of the decree so that he can reach a final decision as to whether he should take up the matter to the higher Court. To put it negatively, the obvious intendment of this provision is that a litigant should not be bustled into taking a decision as to the further steps he should take with regard to the judgment and the decree This section is not the compliance of a mere technicality, but is in recognition of a matter of substance founded upon principles of natural justice that a litigant who prefers an appeal as an aggrieved party, must be afforded all opportunities to know for himself, how and in what manner a judgment and decree of Court, had affected his rights. The interpretation of this salutary provision should therefore be in consonance with this basic juristic concept. Unlike section 5, which confers a discretionary power in the Court under section 12, the Court is not given any discretion and the litigant is entitled as of right to the exclusion of the period, provided the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied. This right of exclusion confers a valuable substantive right upon the party and the Court cannot impose upon the litigants salutary right any condition or restriction not warranted by the section. That this right of exclusion is a matter of substance is also evident from the fact that the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment as well as the copy of the decree is to be excluded. A litigant requires the judgment to know the findings and the reasonings of the Court. He equally requires a copy of the decree to properly appreciate the repurcussions of the decree, upon his rights, financial, property personal, etc., etc. In innumerable cases where the array of parties on both sides is numerous and where competing adjustments and equities have to be worked out, it is only on a careful perusal of the decree that a litigant can properly appreciate in what manner he is aggrieved by the decree. In innumerable cases where the array of parties on both sides is numerous and where competing adjustments and equities have to be worked out, it is only on a careful perusal of the decree that a litigant can properly appreciate in what manner he is aggrieved by the decree. It is because of this principle, that the decisions have taken the view that a litigant is as of right entitled to apply for copies of judgment and decree at different times and that the rule of exclusion has to be determined by applying the principle of combined calculation-vide Silamban Chetty v. Ramanathan Chetty1, and Vellaiyammal Bibi and others v. Koolayanan Rowthan2 , The words "the time requisite" used in the section do not mean ‘requisite for preferring an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or review of a judgment, but they mean and refer to the time requisite for obtaining the copies. In Ram Kishan Siwastari v. Kashi Bai3, it was held that the words " the time requisite for obtaining copies " are not confined to cases where the person appealing has in person or by a properly authorised agent, applied for a copy of the judgment and the decree. The reasoning of Knox J., was that he was not prepared to read into section 12 of words " when the copies applied for by the party appealing or on his behalf and with the intention of appealing. ‘On Letters patent Appeal, this view was affirmed by Stanley, C.J., and Burkitt, J., in the following words: "The language in section 12 is very general. It provides that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree shall be excluded in the computation of time. The section does not say by whom the copy is to be obtained, nor does it introduce the words which have been suggested as necessarily embodied in the section showing that the copy must be obtained for the purpose of an appeal." This reasoning has been followed and referred to with approval in latter decisions of the various Courts. It is sufficient to refer to the Bench decision of this Court in Aminuddin Sahib v. Pyari Bi4, which has followed the Allahabad decision above mentioned. It is sufficient to refer to the Bench decision of this Court in Aminuddin Sahib v. Pyari Bi4, which has followed the Allahabad decision above mentioned. This rule of exclusion is a positive mandatory direction for exclusion of time and contains no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or rules made by the Court under section 122 of the Code. The positive direction for exclusion contained in section 12 cannot in any manner be controlled by the rules framed either under the Civil Procedure Code or under other statutes either requiring a memo, randum of appeal to be accompanied by a copy of judgment or decree or dispensing with such a requirement making it unnecessary. The right of exclusion will have to be determined upon a strict grammatical construction of the section, influenced by the only consideration that the time which is requisite is the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment or the decree. One can easily visualise a litigant applying for a copy of judgment (all the while thinking that the ultimate decision was in his favour) consisting of inter-connected findings on several issues, some against him and some in his favour. At that time when he applied for copy of the judgment, the litigant may not have any intention of preferring an appeal being under the bona fide impression that the judgment was in his favour, and yet he would desire to have a certified copy, merely for purposes of his record; but on a careful perusal of the judgment he may find his views about the effect of the decision were wrong and he may decide to prefer an appeal. It cannot for a moment be urged that there cannot be exclusion of time under section 12, because of the fact that at the time when he applied for copies, he had no intention of appealing. To take another illustration, a litigant may apply for a copy of judgment and decree with a view to prefer an appeal either to the District Court but after obtaining copies of the judgment and decree he would have realised that the appeal should be preferred to the High Court. To take another illustration, a litigant may apply for a copy of judgment and decree with a view to prefer an appeal either to the District Court but after obtaining copies of the judgment and decree he would have realised that the appeal should be preferred to the High Court. It is impossible to argue that the copy of the judgment was secured for a particular purpose, viz., preferring an appeal to the District Court or Sub-Court, and the time taken for securing that copy cannot be exclused because the purpose for which it was ultimately used was different, viz., an appeal to the High Court. To take another illustration the party aggrieved may apply for certified copy of the judgment and decree with a view to file an application for review of judgment, but after perusing the judgment, he may be advised that the proper course would be to prefer an appeal. The situation also may be vice versa, i.e., getting copies for preferring an appeal but ultimately filing a review petition. It cannot be contended that because of the purpose for which the copy was secured was different from the purpose for which it was used, there cannot be any exclusion of time under section 12. It is unnecessary to multiply instances, showing how the object of the rule of exclusion would be easily defeated if we read into the section, as a necessary part of it, the intention of an appeal or the particular appeal then contemplated. The rules of procedure cannot control the mandatory provision in section 12. When an appeal is presented, the Court has only to consider whether according to the rules of procedure there has been a proper presentation complying with all the formalities. In some cases, according to the relevant rules, the filing of a copy of judgment or the decree may or may not be necessary. That requirement has nothing to do with this question of limitation. It is only after the appeal is declared as properly presented that the question of limitation arises. It is in this context that the rule of exclusion contained in section 12 must be construed. The settled practice of this Court to dispense with production of printed copies of judgment in a batch of appeals arising out of a common judgment rests essentially upon a commonsense point of view of the matter. It is in this context that the rule of exclusion contained in section 12 must be construed. The settled practice of this Court to dispense with production of printed copies of judgment in a batch of appeals arising out of a common judgment rests essentially upon a commonsense point of view of the matter. When in the main appeal, 12 printed copies have been filed, there is really no point and it is meaningless to require a similar set of 12 copies of printed judgment in each appeal. It is useless expenditure and it does not serve any purpose. What the litigant has done in one case is regarded as sufficient compliance of rules of procedure and the Court readily passes the appropriate order dispensing with the filing of the copies of the judgment. This established practice virtually amounts to adding a proviso as it were, to Order 41 rule 1 Civil Procedure Code, that in the case of a batch of appeals arising out of a common judgment, it is sufficient that the requisite number of copies are filed in one main appeal. This is the principle or irrationale underlying this long established practice. We shall now examine the relevant decisions culminating in the decision of the Privy Council in Surty’s case1, on the question of the litigants rights to exclusion of time, under section 12 when the rules governing appeals do not require copies of judgment to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The ratio underlying these decisions would equally apply to cases where the Courts following the established practice dispenses with the production of copies of judgment. Obviously both the cases must be governed by the same rule. On this aspect, there was difference of opinion, the Madras High Court and the Rangoon High Court taking the view that when the rules do not require a copy of the judgment to be filed, the appel- lant is not entitled to a deduction under section 12 while the Allahabad, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts took the view that the appellant was entitled to the deduction. In Kumar a Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu1, the question arose in connection with an appeal under the Rent Recovery Act; the appellant claimed that the time occupied in procuring a copy of the judgment should be deducted. In Kumar a Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu1, the question arose in connection with an appeal under the Rent Recovery Act; the appellant claimed that the time occupied in procuring a copy of the judgment should be deducted. But this contention was rejected by the Bench, following earlier decisions of this Court. Collins.C.J., observed that section 69 which provides for the right of appeal did not require the appellant when filing an appeal to furnish therewith a copy of the decree and judgment appealed against and the right of exclusion provided in section 12 of the Limitation Act would apply only where it is necessary to file with such appeal, a copy of the decree or judgment. A similar view was taken in Abu Backer Sahib v. Secretary of State for India2, in an appeal arising under the Forests Act, where too it was not necessary to file a copy of judgment or decree along with the appeal. Arnold White, C.J., at page 509, has observed that section 12 of the Act would not apply when the special enactment which gives a right of appeal does not require that the memo. of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against. In J.H. Surty v. T.S. Chetyar Firm3, Surtys case which was reversed by the Privy Council in J.H. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar a Firm4, the appellant filed an original side appeal waiting till he obtained a certified copy of the decree but the Bench dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. The application filed by the appellant to excuse the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that he was suffering under a bona fide mistake in thinking that the copy of the decree was necessary, was also rejected. Later on, the appellant filed an application for review of the prior decision on the ground that he would be entitled (under section 12) to deduction of the time taken for securing a copy of the decree, even though the rules provide that the memorandum need not be accompanied by a certified copy of the decree and that this aspect by oversight was not mentioned by him before the Bench on the earlier occasion. The Bench admitted the review application but at the final hearing, dismissed the same holding that the appeal was barred by limitation on the ground that the appellant would not be entitled to a deduction of the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree when the rules of the Court do not require a copy to be filed, but also further provide that the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a certified copy of the decree. The decision in the review application was rendered by Rutledge, C.J., and Chari J., in pages 277 to 283. The point posed for determination was whether it could be said that the time was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree when there was no obligation on the appellant to file a copy of the decree along with his memorandum of appeal. The Bench referred to the divergence of opinion amongst the various Courts. After referring to the following definition of the expression ‘requisite’ in the Century Dictionary: “(1) required by the nature of things or by circumstances; (2) necessary; (3) so needful that it cannot be dispensed with. (4) indispensable,” the Bench held that it cannot be said that when no copies at all, are needed for the purpose of filing appeals in accordance with law, any time is ‘requisite’ i.e., is indispensably necessary for obtaining copies. The matter went on appeal before the Privy Council in J. H. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar a firm4. The Privy Council referred to the divergent views, the view of the Allahabad, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts that the appellant would be entitled to invoke section 12 even in cases where rules of the Court do not require copies of the judgments to be filed as well as the view of the Madras High Court in Kumara Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu1and Abu Backer Sahib v. Secretary of State for India2, and held that the correct and the sounder view was that section 12 would apply and that that is the preponderance of judicial opinion. It is necessary to extract the following observations of Lord Phillimore at pages 309 and 312 to 314. “It is therefore not necessary on an appeal to the appellate side that the memorandum of appeal should have both documents annexed to it. It is necessary to extract the following observations of Lord Phillimore at pages 309 and 312 to 314. “It is therefore not necessary on an appeal to the appellate side that the memorandum of appeal should have both documents annexed to it. And if the only reason for excluding the time for procuring these documents was that they were necessary to the presentation of the appeal, it might be said that the provisions of section 12 could not have been meant to apply to such a case. Even so, however, there would be a difficulty in dealing with the grammatical construction of the words but their Lordships, if they had found a consistent course of practice, would have been disposed to accept the construction put upon them by the High Court of Rangoon. When however, the matter comes to be examined, it is found that there have been divergencies of opinion in the several High Courts, and that the more prevalent opinion is not that which has been taken by the High Court of Rangoon. The result, as has been already stated is that the preponderance of practice is in favour of the appellant. Their Lordships have now to return to the grammatical construction of the Act, and they find plain words directing that the time requisite for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Section 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure, or to any other Act. It does not say why the time is to be excluded, but simply enacts it as a positive direction. If, indeed it could be shown that in some particular class of cases there could be no object in obtaining the two documents, an argument might be offered that no time could be requisite for obtaining something not requisite. But this is not so. The decree may be complicated, and it may be open to drawn it up in two different ways, and the practitioner, may well want to see its form before attacking it by his memorandum of appeal. But this is not so. The decree may be complicated, and it may be open to drawn it up in two different ways, and the practitioner, may well want to see its form before attacking it by his memorandum of appeal. As to the judgment, no doubt when the case does not come from up country, the practitioner will have heard it delivered but he may not carry all the points of a long judgment in his memory and as Sir John Edge says, the Legislature may not wish him to hurry to make a decision till he has well considered it. There is force no doubt in the observation made in the High Court that the elimination of the requirement to obtain copies of the documents was part of an effort to combat the dilatoriness of some Indian practitioners ; and their Lordships would be unwilling to discourage any such offort. All, however that can be done as the law stands, is for the High Courts to be strict in applying the provision of exclusion. The word ‘requisite’ is a strong word ; It may be regarded as meaning something more than the word required. It means ‘propertly required, ‘and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default.” Despite this very clear pronouncement of the Privy Council,some of the High Courts still took the view that if the rules do not require copy of judgment to be filed, a party would not be entitled to a deduction of time under section 12 as unfortunately in these cases, the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the decision in Surty’s case3. The result was that when the identical question again came before the Supremo Court, in Additional Collector of Customs v. Best & Co.4, The Supreme Court referred to the decision in Surty’s case1and expressly approved the same declaring that the statement of law by Lord Phillimore was undoubtedly correct and found statement of law. While dealing with the decisions of some of the High Courts which had taken the other view the Supreme Court-has adverted to the fact that the attention of Courts concerned was not drawn to the decision of the Privy Council in Surtys’ casts1. While dealing with the decisions of some of the High Courts which had taken the other view the Supreme Court-has adverted to the fact that the attention of Courts concerned was not drawn to the decision of the Privy Council in Surtys’ casts1. In the case before the Supreme Court, the applicants applied for a certificate under Article 133 of the constitution for preferring an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the High Court. The applicants first filed the application along with the certified copy of the judgment; later on, they were furnished with a copy of the decree which however, they did not annex to their application. The High Court dismissed the application as barred by limitation observing that the application would be in time if the copy of the decree subsequently obtained was annexed to the application as soon as it was obtained or if the applicants had waited till they obtained the copy of the decree and then filed the application. It was also observed that if they had withdrawn the application and filed a fresh application annexing the certified copy of the decree, the application would be in time. The substance of the view of the High Court (which was referred by the Supreme Court) was that when the copy of the decree was not filed, it could not be said that time was requiste for obtaining such a copy within the meaning of sections especially when the Calcutta High Court rules provided that it was not necessary to file the copy of the judgment or decree along with the appeal. "The Supreme Court did not accept this view. The Supreme Court has in extenso referred to with approval the statement of the law in Surty’s case1. The question which the Supreme Court posed for decision was whether the provision for exclusion of time under section 12(2) was dependent upon whether the rules of the Court permitted a litigant to file an application for leave with or without a copy of the judgment or decree and the answer was that the party would be entitled to exclusion of time irrespective of the rules of Court which permit the party to file an appeal without annexing a copy of judgment or decree to the memorandum of appeal. One crucial aspect which requires to be noticed in this decision of the Supreme Court is the context in which the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Impend Bucket v. Sm. Bhagawati Basak2, was referred to. In the Calcutta decision the litigant had annexed a certified copy of the judgment appealed from to the memorandum of appeal, even though under the rules no certified copy was required and the time under section 12. was excluded. The Supreme Court observed: "This decision does not necessarily mean that where a copy is applied for and obtained it was for a thing not requisite. As the Privy Council observed, a party might like to examine the judgment or the decree or the order before he challenged it in a higher forum. Though the judgment states that such time would be excluded where the copy is annexed, it does not lay down that there can be no exclusion of time where it is not annexed." This clear pronouncement of the law consists of two parts (1) The word ‘requisite’ used in section 12 means and refers to the time requisite for obtaining of the judgment and not requisite for filing the appeal, for the obvious reason that the copy of the judgment or decree cannot be said to be requisite when the rules say that copies need not be filed. (2) The litigant would be entitled to the exclusion of time, even when he has obtained a copy but had not annexed the same to the memorandum of appeal. As observed earlier, we are of the view that the same rule should apply to cases where the rules provide that the memorandum of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of the judgment with a power in the Court to dispense with the same. We shall refer to the earlier Bench decision of this Court reported in Avudia Ammal v. Ganapathi3, which has been followed in State of Madras v. Mohamed Sirajudeen4. In the earlier Madras Bench decision, the District Judge dismissed a connected appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation as the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a copy of the judgment which however had been filed in the other connected appeal. In the earlier Madras Bench decision, the District Judge dismissed a connected appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation as the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a copy of the judgment which however had been filed in the other connected appeal. The appellant preferred a second appeal against this decision of the District Judge and on his behalf it was argued in the High Court that the District Judge should have dispensed with the production of the judgment. The High Court observed, that even so, the appellant could not claim the deduction of any period as required for obtaining a copy of the judgment, as no time could be required or could have been spent in obtaining copy of the judgment when such copy was dispensed with. It was also held that the time spent in obtaining a copy of the same judgment for purpose of filing a different appeal in another suit, though dealt with by a common judgment cannot legally be excluded under section 12. It has to be noticed that this Bench decision follows and is coloured by the then state of law in Madras, vide Kumara Akkappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Sithala Naidu1and Abu Backer Sahib v. Secretary of State for India2, (even though not referred to as such in the judgment of the Bench) to the effect that time for obtaining copies of judgment or decree cannot be said to be requisite when the same need not be filed along with the memorandum of appeal or the same is dispensed with. From what we have observed earlier, there can be no doubt about it that after the decision of the Privy Counsil in Surty’s case3, the principle of this decision cannot be followed. We may also add that if the attention of the learned Judges who decided the case in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen4, had been drawn to the decision in Surty’s case3, they would have noticed that the earlier Bench decision in Avudai Ammal v. Ganapathi5, is no longer good law. We may also add that if the attention of the learned Judges who decided the case in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen4, had been drawn to the decision in Surty’s case3, they would have noticed that the earlier Bench decision in Avudai Ammal v. Ganapathi5, is no longer good law. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view of Sadasiva Aiyar, J. in the above decision that the time spent for obtaining; a copy of the common judgment for the purpose of filing one appeal cannot be legally excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the other connected appeal, arising out of the same common judgment. While interpreting the language in section 12, we have already stressed that the section does not talk of any particular appeal nor even the intention of the appellant and that the time requisite is only to enable the appellant, the aggrieved party to know the findings and the reasonings in the judgment and the terms of the decree. When the application for copy of the judgment is made, it is so done with a view to enable the aggrieved party to know the effect of the judgment in all the cases decided against him and not in respect of any particular case or any particular appeal proposed to be filed by him. In the context, it is impossible to restrict and confine this copy application only to one case as though the party concerned did not desire to peruse the judgment in respect of the other case and has no idea of preferring appeals in respect of the other cases. His need or necessity for perusing the judgment for which he filed the application cannot in the nature of things be dissected so as to say that because one appeal was filed earlier, the application must be retrospectively held to relate to that particular appeal. How can it be doubted that when the application is filed, it was motivated by one common single intention or object of preferring as many appeals as may be advised in the light of the information conveyed by the judgment ? How can it be doubted that when the application is filed, it was motivated by one common single intention or object of preferring as many appeals as may be advised in the light of the information conveyed by the judgment ? When the established practice is to dispense with the production of similar sets of copies of judgment in the connected appeals, it is implicit, in such practice, that the copy which was obtained and was filed in one appeal can be used for the purposes of the other appeals. It is impossible to take any other view. With regard to the other appeals filed how will this Court know, what the reasonings and findings are, in regard to those points which are in dispute in the other appeals except by perusing the judgment already filed in the main appeal ? Where there is that obvious need and necessity (for the appellate Court as well as for the litigant) for using and perusing the common judgment which has been filed in the main appeal, how can it be said that the time taken for obtaining copies of these judgments cannot be said to be requisite for computing the period of limitation for the other appeals also ? With respect, we are of the opinion that the view taken in the Bench decision of the Patna High Court Mt. Ribi Umtul Rasul v. Ram Charan1, is the correct view. In that case, there was a batch of six appeals arising out of a common judgment and the copies were filed in the main appeal. Following the standing practice of that Court, similar sets of printed copies of judgment were not filed in the other appeals. The Bench held that by reason of section 12 all the appeals were in time. The Bench first observed (following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Wajid Ali Sha v. Nawal Kishore2, that the period of deduction under section 12 would apply even in cases where the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by the copy of the judgment or decree. It further observed that the copy of the judgment which was obtained must be deemed to be obtained for the purpose of each of the appeals and should not be confined to any particular appeal. It further observed that the copy of the judgment which was obtained must be deemed to be obtained for the purpose of each of the appeals and should not be confined to any particular appeal. It will be useful to extract the following observations: “It was known to the plaintiff that one copy only of the judgment would be necessary for the purpose of prosecuting the six appeals. It was not necessary for her to obtain six copies because it was well known what the practice of the Court •was, namely that one copy alone in such a case as this would be required. Therefore it seems to me that in obtaining that copy of the judgment it cannot be said that she obtained it for the exclusive purpose of any one particular appeal. A copy of the judgment was in fact obtained for the purpose of each of those appeals and it was obtained as much for the purpose of enabling the appellant to consider it as for the purpose of filing it with the memorandum of appeal which would have to be done in one at least of the cases ; so that in my opinion the copy of the judgment in this case was obtained as much for the purpose of three appeals which it is contended are now out of time as it was for the purpose of the other appeals, and I think that in these circumstances the case is one which comes within the operation of section 12, clause (3), Limitation Act.” With respect, we are clearly of the view that this statement is correct law, besides being in complete accord with the practice and commonsense view of the matter. In the Bench decision in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen3, this Bench decision of the Patna High Court was distinguished on the ground that it rested upon the practice of the Patna High Court that only one certified copy of the judgment in the case of batch of appeals need be filed. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are of the view that even if the practice in the Patna High Court formed the main basis of the Bench decision of that Court, for that very reason that decision must have been followed and not distinguished. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are of the view that even if the practice in the Patna High Court formed the main basis of the Bench decision of that Court, for that very reason that decision must have been followed and not distinguished. In the first place, the practice in this Court has also been to dispense with the production of similar sets of copies of the judgment in the batch of appeals arising out of a common judgment. In the Patna High Court, in pursuance of the rules of practice copies of the judgment were filed only in one appeal and there was no formal application for dispensing with and ‘dispensing with’ is presumed under Order 41, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. In our Court the same thing is done except the difference that a petition to dispense with is also filed. This cannot make any difference at all as this Court dispenses with copies of judgment only because of the established practice which means the party aggrieved is not required to apply for as many sets of printed copies of judgment as there are appeals to be filed. The very idea of dispensing with as a settled practice carries with it the notion that the litigant must be deemed to have done whatsoever is necessary and he is not guilty of any default or omission if he applies for only one set of copies. As observed by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Rameshayya v. Venkatarathnam 4, the section has to be interpreted in the background that the idea of reasonableness is inherent in the provision. We may also refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain5, where interpreting provisions of section 12 the Supreme Court has emphasised that the party concerned should be entitled to deduction if he has done everything which the state or rules of practice require him to do and is not guilty of any default in the steps to be taken by him in accordance with law. To sum up, we are of the view that at its inception when the litigant applies for a copy of the common judgment, he thinks of the entire batch of suits and it is to know in respect of the entire batch of suits the reasonings and findings of the Court and how far they are against him in respect of the points in controversy. When he pays the requisite charges, it is in respect of the same common purpose. In the third stage, when he obtains the copy from the Court, it is for the same purpose and when he peruses the judgment and when he is advised it is in respect of all the cases. Start to finish whatever the litigant has do, is so much for one case as for the others and it is not exclusively for one case leaving out the other cases with the result that the appellant would be entitled to deduction of time on the plain language of section 12 in respect of all the appeals. The fact that one appeal is preferred filing the copies of judgment cannot retrospectively have the effect of nullifying all the prior steps taken by him, which undoubtedly were for a common purpose. There is nothing in the language of section 12 to interpret it in such a restricted manner. In this connection we may also refer to the following rule formulated by Rajamannar, C.J., in the Full Bench case in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty1. “Though it is true that in construing statutes of limitation considerations of hardship and anomaly are out of place, it is, I think, permissible to adopt a beneficient construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible.” It only remains to advert to the offshoot or the consequences of the decision in State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen2, which also indicate that that decision requires reconsideration. It is familiar knowledge that copies of decrees are furnished to the litigants much earlier and the appeal would be in time only if the time taken for securing the judgment is deducted. The effect of the Bench decision is that time cannot be reckoned with reference to the copy of the judgment obtained and filed in one case. The delay cannot be excused after this decision lying down this law, because the litigant cannot plead ignorance of law. The effect of the Bench decision is that time cannot be reckoned with reference to the copy of the judgment obtained and filed in one case. The delay cannot be excused after this decision lying down this law, because the litigant cannot plead ignorance of law. In fact in one of the appeals Mr. Sivamani learned Counsel for the respondent raised an objection urging that under section 5 of the Limitation Act the delay cannot be excused but did not press the point further, on verification of the relevant dates. Hereafter, the litigant cannot with any justification invoke section 5 and he must apply and secure as many sets of printed copies of judgment as there are appeals to be filed ; virtually it means that the established practice and the power of dispensing with under Order 41 rule 1 become useless, it is too much to speculate as to what would happend to an application under section 5 to excuse the delay, in individual cases, as it would depend upon the attitude of the particular judge or the judges before whom the application may come up. On the other hand, if it is to be presumed that in such cases there should also be a practice that applications filed under section 5 should be excused, like the practice of dispensing with, it virtually amounts to recognising that the time taken in respect of obtaining one set of printed copies should be excluded in all the appeals under section 12. Otherwise, it will result in this anomaly, that for obtaining an order for dispensing with the party litigant is presumed to have done whatever is necessary when he applied for only one set of printed judgment, but for the purpose of limitation, what he had done is not sufficient. In other words, when both the statutes the Limitation Act and Order 41, of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be applied together one complementary to the other, as governing the procedure of appeals, the two statutes will be producing contradictory or inconsistent results. This is another crucial aspect which also will have to be taken into account. In other words, when both the statutes the Limitation Act and Order 41, of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be applied together one complementary to the other, as governing the procedure of appeals, the two statutes will be producing contradictory or inconsistent results. This is another crucial aspect which also will have to be taken into account. For all these reasons, we are of the view that there should be an authoritative decision of a Full Bench on the question whether in a common judgment disposing of a batch of suits or appeals, a party will be entitled to the deduction of time under section 12 of the Limitation Act in respect of all the appeals, though he had obtained only one set of copies of judgment. We direct the papers to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary directions. In pursuance of the aforesaid reference these petitions came on for hearing before the Full Bench. G. Ramaswami, the Additional Government Pleader on behalf of the Petitioner (in all the petitions). N. Sivamani, Advocate, for Respondent in C.M.P. Nos. 13533 and 13535 of 1967. P.S. Srisailam, for Respondent in C.M.P.No. 13534 of 1967 and for the Second Respondent in C.M.P. No. 13540 of 1967. N.K. Ramaswami, for Respondent in C. M. P. No. 13543 of 1967. The Order of the Court was made by Veeraswami, C.J.-The question we are called upon to answer is whether the benefit of exclusion of time under section 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is available to each of the appeals, which are all directed by the same appeal ant against a common judgment disposing of together certain connected land acquisition references or, to only one of the appeals in which alone certified copies of the judgment and decree were filed along with the related memorandum of appeal. The common judgment of the Court below was dated 2nd December, 1965 and an application for a copy thereof and of the decree was made on 6th December, 1965. The copies of the judgment and decrees were delivered to the appellant on 15th April, 1966 and the appeals were filed on 4th July, 1966. The common judgment of the Court below was dated 2nd December, 1965 and an application for a copy thereof and of the decree was made on 6th December, 1965. The copies of the judgment and decrees were delivered to the appellant on 15th April, 1966 and the appeals were filed on 4th July, 1966. There is no dispute that so far as the appeal in which the copies of the judgment and decree were filed is concerned, it was in time, having regard to the time to be excluded in furnishing the copies. We may mention that certified copies of the decrees were filed in each of the appeals, but, applications were filed to dispense with production of copies of the judgment in the appeals except in the main one in which, as we said, they had been produced. These applications have since been allowed. On the assumption that these appeals, except the main one, were out of time, applications also were taken out for excusing the delay in filing them. Evidently this procedure was followed because of The State of Madras v. Mohammad Sirajudeen1, which was decided by two of us constituting a Division Bench. Venkataraman and Ramamurthi, JJ., before whom the applications went up for disposal, being of the view that The State of Madras v. Mohammed Sirajudeen1, required reconsideration, they have referred the matter to a Full Bench for an authoritative decision on the point, to writ, whether in. appeals arising from a common judgment disposing of a batch of suits a party will be entitled to exclusion of time under section 12 of the Limitation Act in respect of all the appeals, though he had obtained only one set of copies of judgment. The State of Madras v. Mohammad Sirajudeen1, expressed the view that the time for preferring an appeal should be calculated on the endorsements on the copies of judgment produced in each of the appeals, even if they were filed in a batch and in one of them such copies were produced and in the rest their production was dispense with. At the same time it was felt in that case that delay, in such cases, might, however, be excused in the circumstances. At the same time it was felt in that case that delay, in such cases, might, however, be excused in the circumstances. The correctness of this view has been examined by us and we are of opinion that, on a proper construction of section 12 (2) and (3) and of the principles evolved by some of the decided cases relevant to the question, the view in The State of Madras v. Mohammad Sirajudeen1, does require modification. Section 3 of the Limitation Act directs that any appeal preferred after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule should be dismissed. Part III contains the procedure computation of the period of limitation, and section 12 allow exclusion of time in the computation. In computing time the day from which the period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. Sub-section (2), which is in point here, is “In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application of a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.” The next sub-section says that where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment, on which it is founded, shall also be excluded. On a careful reading of these provisions it is evident that they are not in any way qualified or limited in their application by anything outside those provisions. The direction by those provisions is that in computing time for purposes of exclusion the day on which the judgment appealed against was pronounced and the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree as well as of the judgment should be taken into account for exclusion. The provisions are silent as to who should apply for such copies or whether they should at all be filed along with the appeals. But Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force in this State, requires that every memorandum of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and also a copy of the judgment. But Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force in this State, requires that every memorandum of appeal should be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and also a copy of the judgment. This requisite, except as to the decree, is not an inflexible rule, as the Court has the power to dispense with the production of copies of the judgment. This provision of the Code, however, is obviously unrelated to section 12 of the Limitation Act and cannot be understood, in our view, as enjoining that exclusion for computation of time for limitation for an appeal should only be based on the endorsements in the certified copies of the judgment necessarily to be filed therewith. Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited to the procedure in filing an appeal and is concerned -with the form of the memorandum of appeal and the enclosures thereto. That rule has nothing to do with the exclusion of time which is entirely dependent on section 12 of the Limitation Act. The result of this view of the scope of section 12 of the Limitation Act and Order 41, rule 1 is that there is no interdependence or connection between them so that whether or not an appellant is entitled to exclusion of time will not depend upon any requisition for filing of copies of judgment and decree in an appeal, though of course exclusion of time has to be determined in the light of endorsements on the certified copy of the judgment or the decree, or both, as the case may be, as to the time taken in supplying them. Where, therefore, several appeals arise from a common judgment and they have been filed by the same party, there is nothing to prevent him from relying on a copy of the judgment or decree, or both, filed in only one of them, for exclusion of time in computing limitation for each of such appeals. For that purpose the party concerned is not required by section 12 (2) to file copies of the judgment and decree along with the memoranda of any of the appeals. That requisite, as we said, flows not from the provisions of the Limitation Act but from the procedure prescribed by Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For that purpose the party concerned is not required by section 12 (2) to file copies of the judgment and decree along with the memoranda of any of the appeals. That requisite, as we said, flows not from the provisions of the Limitation Act but from the procedure prescribed by Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The idea in allowing exclusion of time for computation of limitation is to allow the party concerned time to consider whether he is called upon to file an appeal. If that is borne in mind, we do not see why a copy of the judgment and decree filed in one of the appeals cannot be made use of for purposes of getting exclusion of time in the other connected appeals filed along with it simultaneously by the same party. If in such appeals it is shown with reference to the endorsements on the copies of the judgments and decrees that by the exclusion of time warranted by them the appeals are in time, the requirement of the Limitation Act is satisfied. On that view no question of limitation will, therefore, arise in the appeals. Dispensation of production of copies of the judgments is called for only because of Order 41, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The view we have just expressed, which is based on a reading of section 12, is also, as it seems to us, in consonance with the decided cases. Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar1, though not concerned with appeals from a common judgment, laid down, on a construction of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, that this section was not qualified by the Code of Civil Procedure or any other Act, but contained an independent direction for exclusion of time. The Privy Council there rejected a contention that because no enclosure was required by the procedural rules to be filed of copies of the judgment and decree along with a memorandum of appeal, it followed that limitation should be computed without exclusion of time taken for obtaining those copies. Dealing with that question, the Board observed: “Their Lordships have now to return to the grammatical construction of the Act, and they find plain words directing that the time requisite for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Dealing with that question, the Board observed: “Their Lordships have now to return to the grammatical construction of the Act, and they find plain words directing that the time requisite for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Section 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act. It does not say why the time is to be excluded, but simply enacts it as a positive direction.” The object of the exclusion, said the Privy Council, was that counsel or the party should have time to decide with reference to a copy of the decree and judgment whether it was necessary to file an appeal. The view of the Privy Council that section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act operates irrespective of the Code of Civil Procedure has been approved by the Supreme Court to Additional Collector of Customs v. M/s. Best & Company1. This is what the Supreme Court stated: “As the Privy Council has laid down the provisions of section 12 (2) and (3) are a positive direction exclusing the time taken for obtaining a copy of the judgment and decree or order as the case may be and those provisions are irrespective of the Code of Civil Procedure or the rules made by a Court under section 122: of the Code.” We are aware that neither of these two cases related to appeals from a common judgment, but, all the same, the principle is well established by them that exclusion of time under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act has no relevance and is not in any way related to the requirement of filing copies of judgments and decrees along with the memoranda of appeals. Mr. Bibi Umtul Rasul v. Ram Charan2, is directly in point here as it was concerned with the case of several appeals filed by the same party against a common judgment. The Patna High Court held that where more appeals than one were presented by the same appellant from the same judgment but with only one certified copy of the judgment enclosed with one of the appeals, they should all be held to be in time if the one with the enclosures was found to be in time. In support of this view, the Court relied on its own practice, but, obviously, this practice is certainly in consonance with the law. In support of this view, the Court relied on its own practice, but, obviously, this practice is certainly in consonance with the law. The Patna High Court pointed out, “In such a case the time requisite obtaining a copy of the judgment would be excluded under section 12 (3) in computing the period of limitation in respect of all the appeals field by the appellant, although only one copy of the judgment is filed for all the appeals.” The State of Madras v. Mohammad Sirajudeen3, had but followed an earlier Bench decision in Avudai Ammal v. Ganapathi4; Sadasiva Aiyar and Tyabji, JJ., in Avudai Ammal v. Ganapathi4, were of the view that an appellant was not entitled to a deduction of the time taken in obtaining copies of judgments filed in another connected appeal. The basis for this view was the consideration that the requirement of Order 41, rule 1 was related to the application of section 12 (2) and (3) of the Limitation Act. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., expressed his opinion thus: Order 41, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, requires the appeal memorandum to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment unless the appellate Court dispenses therewith. No such dispensation was given and hence there was an irregular presentment of the appeal on 27th July, 1910, to the District Court. Assuming however that the presentation of the copy of the judgment was dispensed with by the appellate Court the appeal was presented long out of time. The appellant could not claim the deduction of any period as required for obtaining a copy of the judgment, as no time could be required or could have been spent in obtaining copy of the judgment when such copy was dispensed with. The time spent in obtaining a copy of the same judgment for purposes of filing a different appeal in another suit (though it was a connected suit disposed of with the present suit by a single judgment) cannot legally be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing this appeal." Tyabji, J., concurred in that view. But, with respect, we may point out that no-attempt was made in that case to determine the true scope and effect of section 12 (2) and (3) ; in fact, no reference was even made in the judgment to the section. But, with respect, we may point out that no-attempt was made in that case to determine the true scope and effect of section 12 (2) and (3) ; in fact, no reference was even made in the judgment to the section. As the privy Council pointed out in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar1, the learned Judges lost sight of the true position that exclusion of time for purposes of limitation was not in any way controlled or affected by the requirements in the Code of Civil Procedure of filing of certified copies of judgment and or decree with the memoranda of connected appeals from a common judgment. In the course of the argument before us the discussion was widened to the proposition that once a certified copy of the judgment and decree furnished the basis for, exclusion under section 12 (2) and (3), it would enure to the benefit of not merely the appellant who had secured them but also to other parties to the judgment appealed against, whether or not they filed appeals together or separately on the same day or different dates. Having regard to the limited scope of the reference before us, in the light of the facts, we do not think it necessary to cover that area and express our view. It will suffice to say that Aminuddm Sahib v. Pyari Bi2, and Ram Kishan Shastri v. Kashi Bai3, do not, as we are inclined to think, contribute to such a proposition. In the first of these cases all that was held was that an appellant was required to file with his memorandum of appeal copy of the decree appealed from, might file a copy obtained by another party and that under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act he was entitled to a deduction of the time taken to . obtain that: copy. In Ram Kishan Shastri v. Kashi Bai3, it was held that the words "the time requisite for obtaining a copy " in section 12 (2) and (3) were not confined to cases where the person appealing had in person or by a properly authorised agent applied for a copy of the judgment or decree. But that is not the question under our consideration. But that is not the question under our consideration. We are of the view, in these cases, that the common appellant having filed a copy of the judgment in one of the connected appeals and filed copies of decrees in each of all the appeals, the benefit of exclusion, on the basis of the endorsements, of the time taken in furnishing the certified copy of the judgment would not merely be available; to the appeal in which the certified copy of the judgment was filed but would enure also to the other connected appeals filed by the same party against the common judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the appeals were all within time, and, that on that view, the petitions for excusing the delay are unnecessary. They are, therefore dismissed. No costs. S.V.J. ----- Order accordingly