JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - These are two connected special appeals arising out of two writ petitions; writ No. 1441 of 1956 having given rise to Special Appeal No. 436 of 1962 and writ petition No. 1442 of 1956 to Special Appeal No. 468 of 1962. The petitioners in the two writ petitions were different but the contesting opposite parties in both the writ petitions were the same. As the petitions raised identical questions they were disposed of by a common judgment by the learned Judge who heard them, and the appeals too are being disposed of by us by a common judgment. 2. Badri and KaIlu filed two applications for possession of certain agricultural lands against two sets of opposite parties under Section 232 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, claiming that they were Chivas is under Section 20 (b) of the said Act and praying that possession of the lands be delivered to them. The claim in both the applications was based on the fact that the applicants were recorded as occupants in the revenue records of 1356F. The opposite parties to the applications contested the applications and they asserted that they acquired adhivasi rights in the lands in dispute under Section 3 of the U. P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act by, virtue of their cultivatory possession of the lands in 1359F. The facts were not in dispute and the only question in controversy was which of the two rights, the right accruing under Section 20 (b) of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and the right accruing under Section 3 of the U. P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, will prevail over the other. The Sub-Divisional Officer held that the right accruing in favour of Badri and Kallu, the applicants before him under Section 20 (b) of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act had precedence over the claim of the opposite parties to the applications and, accordingly, allowed both the applications. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was upheld in appeal by the Additional Commissioner and then by the Board of Revenue. The opposite parties to the two applications then filed the two writ petitions, which have led to the present appeals, challenging the orders of the three aforesaid revenue courts. 3. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was upheld in appeal by the Additional Commissioner and then by the Board of Revenue. The opposite parties to the two applications then filed the two writ petitions, which have led to the present appeals, challenging the orders of the three aforesaid revenue courts. 3. The learned single Judge held that the view taken by the revenue courts was wrong and that a person acquiring adhivasi rights under the U. P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act is entitled to possession of a land in preference to a person who acquired adhivasi rights in that land under Section 20 (b) of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. Consequently, he allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of the revenue courts. 4. The question as to which of the two above mentioned rights has precedence over the other does not, however, now arise for consideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sonawati v. Sri Ram, 1968 ALJ 313 where it has been held that the occupation by a wrong-doer without any right to the land is not cultivators possession within the meaning of Section 3 of the U. P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act. We sent for the record of the two cases with a view to find out what the allegations of the petitioners in the writ petition were in regard to the nature of their possession. The records show that in their objections to the applications under Section 232 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act the opposite parties stated in unequivocal terms that they had taken possession of the land without the consent of the landholder. In view of this statement it is obvious that they were in wrongful possession and no right accrued to them under the provisions of the U. P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act. That being so, they could not resist the claim of the applicants in the applications under Section 232 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The orders passed by the revenue courts were, therefore, perfectly correct, although for a reason other than the one given by them. 5. In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the orders of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petitions. We, however, make no order as to costs.