Kailasam, J.** - Defendants 2 and 3 in the suit are the appellants. The plaintiff who was the Headmaster of the Panchayat Board Elementary School at Mookanur Village filed the suit for recovery of his salary for the period 10th January, 1958 to 26th April, 1959. He was appointed as the Headmaster of the school on 8th April, 1951. The school vested with the Panchayat till 13th April, 1961, and thereafter with the Panchayat Union Council. The plaintiff was removed from service from 10th January, 1958. The plaintiff filed an appeal to the Divisional Inspector and the Divisional Inspector by an order, Exhibit A-1 dated 27th July, 1958, remitted the matter to the Council for fresh consideration. The plaintiff was again appointed by an order, Exhibit A-4 dated 23rd April, 1959. The plaintiff claimed his salary from the date of his removal to the date of his fresh appointment. Several issues were framed before the trial Court. But in the second appeal only one question was raised i.e., whether the suit is within time as required under section 107 (2) of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950. The trial Court found that the suit was barred by limitation and that no notice as required under section 107 was given. On appeal the lower appellate Court found that section 107 would not apply and that the suit was within time having been filed within three years from the date of reinstatement of the plaintiff. It also held that no notice as required under section 107 of the Panchayats Act was necessary. In this appeal, Mr. V.V. Raghavan, learned Counsel appearing for the Panchayat Union Council, submitted that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that section 107 of the Panchayats Act of 1950 is not applicable. Section 107 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950 is in pari materia with section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958. The petitioner was removed from service on 10th January, 1958 while the Madras Panchayats Act came into force on 22nd January, 1959. As there is no difference in the language used in section 107 of the Panchayats Act of 1960 and section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act of 1958, the provisions of the Madras Village Panchayats Act of 1950 will be referred to. As there is no difference in the language used in section 107 of the Panchayats Act of 1960 and section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act of 1958, the provisions of the Madras Village Panchayats Act of 1950 will be referred to. Section 107 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950, runs as follows: “ (1) Subject to the provisions of section 107, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be brought against any panchayat or its president or executive authority or any member, officer or servant thereof or against any person acting under the direction of such panchayat, president, executive-authority, member, officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule, by-law, regulation or order made under it, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the nature of relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of residence of the intended plaintiff, has been left at the office of the panchayat, and if the proceeding is intended to be brought against any such president, executive authority, member, officer, servant or person, also delivered to him or left at his place of residence, and unless such notice be proved the Court shall find for the defendant. (2) Every such proceeding shall, unless it is a proceeding for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose or in case of a continuing injury or damage, during such continuance or within six months after the ceasing thereof.” The material part of the section is that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be brought against any Panchayat in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule, by law, regulation or order made under it until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, etc. Sub-section (2) provides that every proceeding shall, unless it is a proceeding for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose or in case of a continuing injury or damage, during such continuance or within six months after the ceasing thereof. Before a suit as contemplated under section 107 (1) is brought against any Panchayat, the section requires that two months notice in writing should be given. The lower appellate Court has found that there had been substantial compliance of the provisions of section 170 with regard to notice and this finding was not challenged before me. Sub-section (2) provides that except in the case of suit for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, any proceeding against any Panchayat should be commenced within six months from the date of cause of action. Reading the sub-sections uninhibited by any ruling, sub-section (1) would cover any suit that may be brought against a Panchayat in respect of any act done or purporting to be done under the Act. That such proceeding against a Panchayat will also include a suit for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto can be readily inferred from sub-section (2),which provides that all suits, except those for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, shall be commenced within six months from the date of the cause of action. The cause of action for the present suit is said to have arisen when the illegal order of the first defendant dismissing the plaintiff from service was made on 10th January, 1958, and when the illegal act of the first defendant dismissing the plaintiff was set aside on appeal and in pursuance of the appellate order the first defendant reinstated the plaintiff to his post on 27th April, 1959 and on the date of demand notice, issued by the plaintiff on 27th September, 1961 etc. Section 34 (1) of the Madras Village Panchayats Act X of 1950 empowers the Inspector to fix the number, designations and grades of, and the salaries, fees and allowances payable to, the officers and servants of the panchayat. Section 34 (1) of the Madras Village Panchayats Act X of 1950 empowers the Inspector to fix the number, designations and grades of, and the salaries, fees and allowances payable to, the officers and servants of the panchayat. Sub-section (2) of that section enables the Government to make rules regarding the authorities who may appoint the officers and servants of panchayats, other than the executive officers, and the classification, methods of recruitment, pay and allowances, discipline and conduct, and conditions of service of such officers and servants. Section 34 (6) (c) provides that the executive authority may, for any good and sufficient reason, censure, fine, withhold increments or promotions from, reduce to a lower rank in the seniority list or to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale, suspend, remove or dismiss any such officer or servant. The sub-section therefore clearly includes the power of dismissal. The Government in exercise of the powers conferred under this section have framed rules and the rules make provisions for appointment and punishment of officers and servants of the Panchayat. Thus it will be seen that the Act itself contains provisions for appointment of servants of the Panchayat and their removal after disciplinary proceeding. Proceedings were taken against the plaintiff and he was dismissed. Whether the dismissal was right or wrong, there cannot be any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the executive authority was acting under the Act and as the dismissal was an act done under the Act, the provisions of section 107 would apply. But Mr. Srisailam, learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that section 107 of the Panchayats Act is a reproduction of section 225 of the Local Boards Act and section 225 has been uniformly construed by the High Court as being limited to suits for compensation and damages. In support of his contention learned Counsel relied on a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Panchayat Board, Tiruvottiyur v. Western Indian Matches1. The case arose out of a suit filed by a factory to recover taxes which the plaintiff factory had been compelled to pay. The suit was based on the ground that the taxes were illegal, but the defence was that the suit was barred by limitation under section 225 of the Local Boards Act. The case arose out of a suit filed by a factory to recover taxes which the plaintiff factory had been compelled to pay. The suit was based on the ground that the taxes were illegal, but the defence was that the suit was barred by limitation under section 225 of the Local Boards Act. The Full Bench held that where the Courts have consistently interpreted the law in a particular way for many years, it is for the Legislature and not the Courts to effect a change, if a change is desirable and section 225 of the Madras Local Boards Act is limited to suits for compensation or damages and the suit of the plaintiff-factory was not barred by limitation. Section 225 of the Local Boards Act is more or less similar to section 107 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act. Section 225 provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be brought against any Local Board in respect of any act done or purporting to be done in execution or intended execution of the Act, or any rule, by-law, regulation or order made under it or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act, or any such rule, by-law, regulation or order until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed etc. Sub-section (2) provides that every such proceeding shall unless it is a proceeding for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose. In the earlier part of this judgment of the Full Bench, after considering section 156 of the Act of 1900 and the decisions thereon, the Full Bench field that the section was construed as applying only to suits for compensation and damages. In the earlier part of this judgment of the Full Bench, after considering section 156 of the Act of 1900 and the decisions thereon, the Full Bench field that the section was construed as applying only to suits for compensation and damages. The Full Bench referred to the observation of White, C.J., in Govinda Pillai v. Taluk Board, Kumbakonam1, that the explanation of the words " unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto ‘ ‘in sub-section (3) of the Act of 1897 would seem to be that when the section was amended the Legislature was prepared to accept the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Nagusha v. Municipality of Sholapur2, to the effect that a suit in ejectment fell within the provisions of the corresponding enactment of the Bombay Act. The Full Bench expressed its view that the explanation for the insertion of the words " unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto "is that the Legislature had in mind the decision in President of Taluk Board, Sivaganga v. Narayanan3where it was held that the principle embodied in the section could not apply when the object of the suit was to obtain a declaration of title to immovable property and for an injunction to restrain interference with immovable property. The wording of section 156 of the Local Boards Act extracted in the decision in President of Taluk Board, Sivaganga v. Narayanan3, is different in that it provides for a month’s notice and also requires that every such action should be commenced within six months after the accrual of the cause of action. The clause " unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto is not found in the section as extracted. The inclusion of that clause in the sub-section under rules of normal construction would mean that the first clause would also include all suits for recovery of immovable property or for declaration of title. This aspect is not dealt with by the Full Bench. Later on in its judgment the Full Bench has referred to section 350, Clause (2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act and the decisions thereon. This aspect is not dealt with by the Full Bench. Later on in its judgment the Full Bench has referred to section 350, Clause (2) of the Madras District Municipalities Act and the decisions thereon. Section 350 (1) and (2) are extracted in the decision in Municipal Council, Dindigul v. Bombay Co. Ltd. Madras4. " 1. No suit for damages or compensation shall be instituted against the Municipal Council..................in respect of any act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of this Act or any rule................ regulation or order made under it or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act etc. 2. Every such suit shall be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose........................" Section 350 is therefore different from section 225 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920. With great respect, I find myself unable to read the clause "unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto ‘ ‘as excluding a suit for recovery of immovable property or declaration of title from the scope of section 107 (1) of the Madras Village Panchayats Act. The question that is raised is very important and is likely to come up frequently. The Panchayat Acts are subsequent enactments. To construe all subsequent enactments in a manner which is not quite consistent with the ordinary meaning of the words would be a strain on the language. In the circumstances I think it is desirable that the matter should be set at rest. I direct that the papers may be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench for deciding the question raised. * * * * In pursuance of the aforesaid order of reference this second appeal coming on for hearing before the Full Bench, the Court delivered the following Judgment. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, C.J.- The respondent instituted a suit for recovery of salary for the period from 10th January, 1958 to 26th April, 1959. The basis of the claim was that his services as Headmaster were illegally terminated by the Panchayat Board with effect from 19th January, 1958, and that the removal order was reversed on appeal and that consequently he was reinstated in service with effect from 27th April, 1969. The basis of the claim was that his services as Headmaster were illegally terminated by the Panchayat Board with effect from 19th January, 1958, and that the removal order was reversed on appeal and that consequently he was reinstated in service with effect from 27th April, 1969. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground, among others, that it did not lie under section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958. This defence was accepted by the trial Court which dismissed the suit. The respondent was, however, successful in his appeal. The Panchayat is the appellant in the second appeal. Kailasam, J., who heard the second appeal, felt the applicability of the section to the suit raised an important question of construction thereof and it should, therefore, be decided by a Full Bench. The learned Judge was also of the view that the reference was necessary as he thought that Panchayat Board, Tiruvottiyur v. Western India Matches Co.,1in interpreting the scope and effect of section 225 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, did not deal with the bearing and construction of the words " unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto " inserted in the section by an amendment of 1900. As we read section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act, we find no difficulty in interpreting its scope as limited to suits for compensation as mentioned therein. The wide scope of " any act " is limited by the words which follow, namely, " the amount of compensation claimed " which clearly indicate that the act contemplated is tortious in character. This is the interpretation which the predecessors of section 170 had uniformly received in this Court. But for Panchayat Board, Tiruvottiyur v. Western India Matches Co.1. it would have been necessary for us to notice the earlier cases. That case related to recovery of tax collected illegally. The learned Judges who made the reference to the Full Bench had no doubt that the collection of the tax illegally was an act within the meaning of section 225 of the Local Boards Act, 1920. They referred, however, the question for decision of the Full Bench as to whether the suit was of such a nature as would fall within the ambit of section 225. They referred, however, the question for decision of the Full Bench as to whether the suit was of such a nature as would fall within the ambit of section 225. The Full Bench held that the suit was not one for compensation and, therefore, was not within the ambit of section 225. In coming to that conclusion the Full Bench also pointed out that where the Courts had consistently interpreted the law in a particular way for many years, it was for the Legislature and not the Courts to effect a change, if a change was desirable. This view of the section was adopted by one of us in Krishnaswami v. Panchayat Board2, in construing section 107 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950, which is in pari material with section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958. In our view, the fact that sub-section (2) of section 170 saves from the scope of sub-section (1) "providing for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto " does not have the effect of enlarging the scope of sub-section (1) as to the nature of the suits contemplated by that provision. These words did not find a place in section 156 of the Madras Local Board Act, 1884, but were inserted for the first time by the Amending Act VI of 1900 by recasting section 150 and providing sub-section (3) of the section. But these words, as we said, did not make any difference to the interpretation of the scope of sub-section (1) of section 156 of the 1884 Act, as amended in 1900. Even as the section originally stood, which did not use the words ‘the amount of compensation claimed ‘, it had been interpreted as applicable to only tortious acts. The words " the amount of compensation " which, as we said, were introduced in the section in 1900, have been reiterated in the Act of 1920 as well as in the Panchayats Acts of 1950 and 1958. The point of construction is really controlled by the use of these words " the amount of compensation claimed," which unmistakably shows the nature or character of the claim made in the suit. The point of construction is really controlled by the use of these words " the amount of compensation claimed," which unmistakably shows the nature or character of the claim made in the suit. One of us in Krishnaswami v. Panchayat Board2, made reference to Govindram Saksrain v. Edward Rodbone3, where the Privy Council dealt with the word " compensation " and observed:- " Compensation for an advantage may appear to be a contradiction in terms, since compensation connotes a measure of loss or damage and not the value of an advantage. It would be, in our opinion, inappropriate to describe the plaint in the instant case as one for compensation. The plaintiff was certainly not suing for damages for any injury caused to him or compensation for any loss that he had sustained by reason of the order of dismissal and restoration. The claim, as we read the plaint, was based on his service which no doubt was interrupted by the order. On a true view of the plaint, it seems to us that the claim is one for salary for the period of his compulsory absence from service and not as compensation. Our answer to the question referred to us is that section 170 of the Madras Panchayats Act 1958, like section 107 of the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950, is applicable only to suits for compensation and that the words in sub-section (2) of section 170, "unless it is a proceeding for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto " do not make any difference to the interpretation. * * * * This second appeal coming on for final hearing this day, the Court delivered the following Judgment (Kailasam, J.) (6th January, 1970). In view of the opinion of the Full Bench of this Court the second appeal is dismissed with costs. V.K. ------ Appeal dismissed.