ORDER This revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. is directed against the order dated 21-12-1966 by which the trial Court rejected the application of the plaintiffs to prove a document (power-of-attorney) lying at present on the file of Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1965 pending in the Court of the District Judge after summoning three witnesses mentioned in the application. It was urged, in support of the prayer made, that the proof of power-of-attorney "is of a formal nature and will not affect the substantial rights, if any, of the defendants and power-of-attorney, if allowed to be proved, will not prejudice the rights, if any, of the defendants". It was also stated in the application that though the defendants had not denied in their written statement that the power-of-attorney had been executed, as mentioned in the plaint, by the defendant No. 2 in favour of M. K. Binodini Devi, and though no specific issue had been formulated by the trial Court in the connection, the necessity for proving the power-of-attorney had arisen because in one of the appeals pending in the Court of District Judge between the same parties an objection had been raised that the power-of-attorney had not been formally proved and so it could not be relied upon. It was to get over such an objection in the present suit that it was thought necessary to prove the power-of-attorney in a formal manner. 2. The prayer for summoning the witnesses and the file containing the power-of-attorney was opposed by the defendants, it appears, on the score that it was highly belated. It may be mentioned here that the suit was instituted on 27-8-1962 and that by 11-11-1965, when the application under discussion was made, almost the entire evidence of the plaintiffs had been concluded. Only a part of the statement of one of their witnesses remained to be recorded. 3. The trial Court dismissed the application on the footing that a previous application for placing on the file a copy of the power-of-attorney had been rejected on 10-1-1966 with the remark that it was mala fide and belated and unless that order was vacated by a superior Court the present application, which substantially contained an identical prayer, could not be entertained. The trial Court observed further that if the plaintiffs had moved it for review of the first order dated 10-1-1966, the situation may have been different. 4. On the authority of Kanmal Kedarmal v. Madanlal, AIR 1952 Ajmer 24 (1), it was urged by Shri Manisana Singh, appearing for the petitioners, that this Court can interfere in revision under Section 115 of the Code if the trial Court refuses to permit a party to produce additional evidence or to examine additional witnesses. I think Shri Manisana Singh stated the proposition much too widely. If such a contention were to prevail, we shall be arming unscrupulous litigants with a weapon with which to obstruct civil proceedings ever reaching the destined end. It is correct that in the Aimer case the Judicial Commissioner set aside the order of the trial Court disallowing the defendants to examine two additional witnesses, and directed the trial Court to permit the defendants to examine them. However, no discussion at all was made respecting the crucial point whether the refusal of the trial Court to a party to examine additional witnesses is an order which can be interfered with by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. Therefore, that decision is not enlightening, nor helpful, in deciding the point canvassed in this Court. As such, the reply to the question debated in this Court will have to be found either by the analysis of the provisions of Section 115 or by scrutinising the judicial pronouncements bearing on its exact scope. 5. Section 115 is in the following terms: "115, the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such Subordinate Court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit". Shri Manisana Singh did not contend that the impugned order falls within the scope of Cls. (a) and (b) of the section. He, however, submitted that that order falls within the ambit of Cl. (c). Shri Manisana Singh did not contend that the impugned order falls within the scope of Cls. (a) and (b) of the section. He, however, submitted that that order falls within the ambit of Cl. (c). The interpretation of that clause has resulted in a crop of judicial pronouncements which are not only mutually irreconcilable but occasionally confounding. However, the pronouncements of the Privy Council in regard to interpretation of that clause since the year 1884 and a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, AIR 1953 SC 28 , Nemi Chand v. Edward Mills Co. Ltd., go a long way to solve the problem. In the case of Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, (1885) ILR 11 Cal 6 (PC) the Privy Council observed as follows in regard to the exact scope of Section 622 of the former Code of Civil P. C., which was replaced by Section 115 of the present Code :- "The question then is, did the Judges of the lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity. It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them and they did decide it. Whether they decided rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." Subsequently, in the case of Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva, AIR 1917 PC 71, their Lordships of the Privy Council held :- "It will be observed that the section applied to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved". Thereafter, the Privy Council happened to examine Cl. (c) of Section 115 in the case of Venkatagiri v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, AIR 1949 PC 156. It was held therein that "Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final". The Privy Council then expounded the true meaning and scope of Cl. It was held therein that "Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final". The Privy Council then expounded the true meaning and scope of Cl. (c) of Section 115 in the following terms :- "The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters: (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law. There can be no justification whatsoever for the view that Section 115 (c) was intended to authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate Courts. It would indeed be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate Courts could be measured". In this particular case, the Privy Council set aside the judgment of the High Court on the ground that the High Court had interfered with the order of the subordinate Court on the basis that "it (subordinate Court) had made a serious mistake in the construction of a will". In the opinion of the Privy Council, the High Court had acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the subordinate Court and so the order of the High Court could not be sustained. 6. The Supreme Court cited the aforementioned three authorities of the Privy Council with approval in the case of Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen, AIR 1953 SC 23 . The Supreme Court observed that the expressions "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover either errors of fact or of law, and that they do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by Cl. The Supreme Court observed that the expressions "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover either errors of fact or of law, and that they do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by Cl. (c), the Supreme Court observed further, relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. It would therefore, follow that the High Court can interfere under Cl. (c) of Section 115 only if the subordinate Court has acted in exercising its jurisdiction illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, which in other words, means some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may affect, or may have affected, the ultimate decision in the case. At page 1569 of A. I. R. Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure, 7th Edition, it is stated that where the law has prescribed the manner in which a Court shall exercise its jurisdiction and the Court acts in disregard of those provisions, it acts illegally or irregularly in the exercise of jurisdiction, and that where the Court exercises its jurisdiction in the manner prescribed but arrives at a conclusion or decision which is erroneous in law or fact, it does not act illegally or with material irregularity but only decides erroneously in the proper exercise of jurisdiction. These observations of the learned commentators are founded on a large number of authorities mentioned in the foot-note, and, if I may say so with respect, are quite helpful in understanding the true scope of Cl. (c) of Section 115. 7. In the light of principles set out above, I feel satisfied that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order. What happened in this case was that an application was made to the Court for examining additional witnesses to prove a document lying on the file of a case pending in the Court of the District Judge. Notice of this application was given to the defendants and after hearing the counsel for both the parties, the trial Court rejected the prayer. None can find fault with the procedure followed by that Court in disposing of the matter before it. Notice of this application was given to the defendants and after hearing the counsel for both the parties, the trial Court rejected the prayer. None can find fault with the procedure followed by that Court in disposing of the matter before it. The only criticism made is that since the power-of-attorney constituted an important piece of evidence in support of the plaintiffs case and since its non-production may result in the dismissal of the suit, the Court went wrong in rejecting the application. In view of the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of Venkatagiri AIR 1949 PC 156 (Supra), it cannot be said that the trial Court has committed breach of any provision of law or has been guilty of some error of procedure. The Court had the jurisdiction to decide whether the prayer made by the plaintiffs should be allowed or rejected. It was also imperative that before making up its mind the Court should allow an opportunity to both the parties to address arguments on the merits of the prayer made. All this was admittedly done and so if the decision reached was unsavoury to one party or the other, it cannot be urged plausibly that the Court had violated any provision of law or procedural rule. To quote the words of the Supreme Court in the case of Nemi Chand AIR 1953 SC 28 (Supra), the objection raised by the petitioners is against the "decision arrived at" and not against "the manner in which it is reached". Unless the Court violates a rule of law or a procedural provision prescribing the mode in which jurisdiction is to be exercised, the case would not fall under Cl. (c). The impugned order is. therefore, not hit by Cl. (c) and as such the present petition for revision is not maintainable. 8. As a result, I dismiss the revision petition but since it has been rejected on a point of law, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.