JUDGMENT K. A. Srivastava, J. - This is a writ petition arising out of the following facts : 1. Bal Krishna Chaudhry petitioner was the tenant in chief of plots Nos. 462, 263, 469, 470 and 479 situated in village Kamta, Tahsil Sadar, district Lucknow. Rain Jiawan opposite-party No. 4 was the sub-tenant of the disputed plots. Ram Jiawan was shown as "farar" in the revenue records. A suit was filed by Bal Krishna Chaudhry against Rain Jiawan for his ejectment under Section 169 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. Ram Jiawan was ejected and on the basis of the ejectment decree, possession was obtained by Bal Krishna Chaudhry. Subsequently, the aforesaid village was placed under consolidation operation as provided under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the basic year, the disputed plots were recorded in the name of Rain Jiawan as sub-tenant with an entry that he was "farar". Jungu and Gurudin opposite-parties Nos, 5 and 6 contended that they were in possession of the disputed plots and by adverse possession, they had become the tenure-holders of the disputed plots. They filed an objection under Section 10 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Bal Krishna Chaudhry and Gaon Samaj also filed objections alleging that they were entitled to the disputed plots. In all these objections, Ram Jiawan was made a party. 2. The Consolidation Officer ordered that the name of Ram Jiawan be expunged and the name of Bal Krishna Chaudhry petitioner be recorded as sirdar. The objections of the other contestants were also repelled. 3. Being dissatisfied, Jungu and Gurudin opposite-parties Nos. 4 and 5 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). They made all the other contestants including Bal Krishna Chaudhry as party to the appeals. The appellate court held that Bal Krishna Chaudhry had no right to the disputed plots. The appeals were dismissed and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer was modified to the extent that the plots be recorded in the name of Gaon Samaj. Bal Krishna Chaudhry then filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation alleging that for various reasons, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was wrong in ordering his name to be expunged from being recorded as sirdar. Bal Krishna Chaudhry then filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation alleging that for various reasons, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was wrong in ordering his name to be expunged from being recorded as sirdar. This revision was dismissed and it was ordered that Ram Jiawan opposite-party No. 4 be recorded as sirdar over the disputed plots and the order entering the name of Gaon Samaj be vacated. Being dissatisfied, Bal Krishna Chaudhry invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the orders passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation on three grounds. His first ground was that Ram Jiawan opposite-party No. 4 had not filed any appeal although the judgment of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was against him, .and, therefore, the Deputy Director of Consolidation was wrong in ordering his name to be re-entered over the plots, when Ram Jiawan had not filed any revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 5. The second point was that Ram Jiawan was ejected by the petitioner under Section 169 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and the provisions of Act No. X of l y47 did not apply to the facts of this case, as Ram Jiawan was not ejected from the disputed plots under any of the sections mentioned in Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947, namely, Sections 165, 171 and 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and, therefore, Ram Jiawan had no right to get benefit of Act No. X of 1947. 6. His third ground was that Ram Jiawan was "farar" from the village for more than 12 years and, therefore, under Section 45 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, he would be deemed to have abandoned the tenancy and as such, he had no right to be reinstated as tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act or any other provision of the law. 7. I think all the three points have much force in them. Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that an order or decree can be passed even in favour of non-appealing respondents. 8. 7. I think all the three points have much force in them. Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that an order or decree can be passed even in favour of non-appealing respondents. 8. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, there was no provision to pass a decree in favour of a icon-appealing respondent or a party and therefore, without applying the above rule, the court was not competent to pass any decree in, favour of non-appealing respondents or a party. The provision of Order 41, Rule 33, C. P. C. has not been applied to the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings. Act. 9. On the other hand, appeals and revisions against the orders passed by the consolidation authorities have to be filed as provided under Chapter IX and X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Under Section 216 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, the powers of the appellate court had been enumerated. This section runs as below : "216. Powers of Appellate Court - (1) The Appellate Court may either admit or summarily reject the appeal. (2) If it admits the appeal, it may reverse, vary or confirm the order appealed against; or may direct such further investigation to be made or such additional evidence to be taken as it may think necessary; or it may itself take such additional evidence; or it may remand the case for disposal with such directions as it thinks fit." The appellate court has, therefore, power to reverse, vary or confirm the order appealed against. This goes to show that reversal, variation and confirmation of the decree appealed against has to be done in favour of the appealing party. There is no provision equivalent to Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the U. P. Land Revenue Act and, therefore, the Deputy Director of Consolidation ad no power to reverse the judgment of the subordinate authorities and to substitute it with one in favour of Ram Jiawan who hat neither tiled any objection under Section 10, nor an appeal or revision was filed by him against the order of the Consolidation Officer. The judgment of the Consolidation Officer was as much against Ram Jiawan as it was against Jungu and Gurudin opposite-parties Nos. 5 and 6. If Ram Jiawan was in. The judgment of the Consolidation Officer was as much against Ram Jiawan as it was against Jungu and Gurudin opposite-parties Nos. 5 and 6. If Ram Jiawan was in. any way aggrieved, he could very well file an appeal as was (lone by Jungu and Gurudin. Not only that he did not file an appeal or revision, but he actually submitted to the judgment passed by the Consolidation Officer. In this view of the matter, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Deputy Director had no power to vary the decree and to substitute it for one in favour of a person who had neither appealed, nor filed any revision before him. Sec. 27 of the Act No. X of 1947 reads as below "27. (1) If, on or after the first clay of January, 1940, any person was ejected from his holding or any part thereof. (a) under Section 165 of the said Act for the non-payment of any amount not exceeding one-fourth of his annual rent after taking into account the payment, if any, made by him outside the court, provided that such payment is supported by a receipt, or (b) under Section 171 of the said Act, otherwise than on the ground of an illegal transfer by way of sale or gift, or (c) tinder Section 180 of the said Act notwithstanding his having been recorded as an occupant after the first day of January, 1938 in a record revised under Chapter 1V of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, or corrected by an officer specially appointed by the Government for the correction of annual register in any tract, lie may apply, within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act, to the Court, which passed the decree for his ejectment for reinstatement in such holding or part thereof, as the case may be........ 10. A plain reading of Section 27 referred to above will show that the benefit of this section was given to those tenants who had been ejected by the landlord under Sections 165, 171 or 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In ejectment under the aforesaid sections, the tenant was deemed to 'continue to be a tenant till he was reinstated on his application made within the period of limitation. In ejectment under the aforesaid sections, the tenant was deemed to 'continue to be a tenant till he was reinstated on his application made within the period of limitation. Under Section 27 of the Act 1947, an application for reinstatement had to be made within six months from the (late of the commencement of Act No. X of 1947. Even if it be taken for argument's sake that Ram Jiawan was entitled to the benefit of Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947, there is no evidence that he made any application within the period of limitation for his reinstatement. Besides this, the Deputy Director of Consolidation recorded a clear finding that Ram Jiawan was ejected under Section 169 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. He was a non-occupancy tenant and was ejected in default for payment of rent, and, therefore, he was not entitled to the benefit of Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, who heard the revision was, therefore, clearly in error in holding otherwise. 11. So far as the third point is concerned, Section 45 of the U. P. Tenancy Act lays down that the interest of a tenant is extinguished when he dies, leaving no heir; where the land has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, or from which he has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court; if he surrenders subject to the provisions of Sections 82 to 88 of U. P. Tenancy Act or by abandonment; the land which had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and two other grounds which we are not, at the present concerned. 12. Section 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act deals with 'abandonment' and it reads as follows : "87. Abandonment- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3), a tenant, who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood, shall not lose his interest in his holding, if he leaves in charge thereof a person responsible for payment of the rent as it falls due and gives written notice to the landholder of such arrangement. Abandonment- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3), a tenant, who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood, shall not lose his interest in his holding, if he leaves in charge thereof a person responsible for payment of the rent as it falls due and gives written notice to the landholder of such arrangement. (2) If the person so left in charge is a person (a) on whom, in the event of the tenant's death, the tenant's interest would devolve, or (b) who is to manage the holding for the benefit of the person on whom in the "event of the tenant's death the tenant's interest would devolve,, the tenant shall, on the expiry of a period of five years, lose his interest in his holding unless lie, within such period, resumes cultivation thereof, and such interest shall devolve on the person on whom the tenant's interest would devolve in the event of his death. (3) If the person so left in charge is not a person mentioned in the sub-sec. (2) , the tenant shall on the expiry of the period for which he could have sublet, be presumed to have abandoned his holding, unless within such period he resumes cultivation thereof. (4) A tenant who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) , shall be presumed to have abandoned his holding." 13. It is concluded by findings of fact recorded by the consolidation authorities that Rani Jiawan has left the village without making any arrangement for payment of rent, or with a direction to any person to pay the rent on his behalf as mentioned in the section. In view of the findings recorded by the consolidation authorities, Section 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 would come in play and Ram Jiawan would be deemed to have left the village and to have abandoned his interest in the disputed land. In this view of the matter also, his right as a tenant had extinguished much before Act No. X of 1947 came into force. Any person ejected otherwise than the provisions of Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947 would not be entitled to reinstatement. All the rights and title that Ram Jiawan had in the disputed land had extinguished long back. Any person ejected otherwise than the provisions of Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947 would not be entitled to reinstatement. All the rights and title that Ram Jiawan had in the disputed land had extinguished long back. In this view of the matter also, the judgment passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is against law. The error of law in the instant case is apparent. The judgment passed by the aforesaid two consolidation authorities is, therefore, manifestly wrong. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds. 14. The order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 27-4-1963 and the judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 9-8-1963 are quashed. The petition is allowed. Costs easy.