JUDGMENT-The Municipal Council of Wardha has filed this revision application against the order of the Sessions Judge, Wardha, allowing Criminal Revision Application of the Zilla Parishad, Wardha, against the order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Second Court, Wardha. 2. The respondent, Zilla Parishad of Wardha, purchased two Ambassador cars on 2-8-1965 at Nagpur and took them to Wardha. In the same manner, a third Ambassador car was purchased on 26.11.1965 and the fourth one on 23.2.1966. All these purchases were effected at Nagpur and the oars were taken to Wardha by road. The Municipal Committee, Wardha, claimed octroi tax on these four vehicles according to the rates prescribed in its schedule. It served a notice under section 150 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 on 11.7-1966. Under that notice, the octroi dues amounting to Rs. 1,372.72P. were claimed. The notice also said as required by section 150 that an appeal may be preferred by the Zilla Parishad under section 169 within the time prescribed by section 170. 3. The Zilla Parish ad is of the view that no octroi dues could be claimed from it. It has various reasons to allege for claiming that no tax could be levied on the car. The merits of those contentions are not relevant at the moment. Being aggrieved with the bill presented, the Zilla Parishad filed an appeal before the Judicial Magistrate on 22-7-1966. This appeal is within time prescribed by section 170 (a). However, the Zilla Parishad did not make payment of the tax before presentation of the appeal, or within 15 days from the date of service of notice. Later on, it made payment on 16.12.1966. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal was raised by-the Municipal Committee. The learned Magistrate heard the parties in the matter of the maintainability of the appeal. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that not only it was obligatory to file the appeal within 15 days from the date of presentation of the bill complained of, but within that time of 15 days, the amount of the bill ought to have been deposited by the Zilla Parishad in the Municipal Office. This was the requirement of clause (c) of section 170. Since this was not done, the appeal was incompetent. He rejected the appeal. 4. The Zilla Parishad filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge. This was the requirement of clause (c) of section 170. Since this was not done, the appeal was incompetent. He rejected the appeal. 4. The Zilla Parishad filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge took the view that the expression used in section 170 that "no appeal shall be entertained unless the requirements of clauses (a) to (c) are satisfied" only means that the appeal will not be entertained on merits or will not be heard. It does not mean that even the presentation of the appeal was bad as no tax was paid. Here the Zilla Parishad did not pay the tax within 15 days of the presentation of the bill but merely filed an appeal. The tax was, in fact, subsequently paid on 16-12-1966. The hearing or the entertainment of that appeal by the learned Magistrate took place after 16.12.1966. On that date, the appeal was maintainable as the tax was already deposited. Having taken that view, he allowed the revision application, set aside the order of dismissal of the appeal and directed the Magistrate to hear the merits of the application and then dispose it of according to law. Against this order, the Municipal Committee has filed the present revision application. 5. The appeal of the respondent to the Magistrate is under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. The facts are not in dispute. If at all the Ambassador oars taken to Wardha by the Zilla Parishad are liable to pay tax, then the liability arose on 2.8.1965, 26.11.1965 and 23-2-1966 Till that time, only some of the sections of the new Maharashtra Municipalities Act were applicable as from 10.9.1965. The rest of the entire Act was made applicable throughout the territory of Maharashtra State on 15-6-1966. Before 15.6.1966, the liability has already accrued. However, these dues were not recovered by the previous Council. They became dues of the successor Council, namely, the present Municipal Committee of Wardha, and are recoverable by it under the provisions of this Act. This is laid down as one of the effects of the new Act coming into force on the appointed day. The consequences are acted in section 346. They became dues of the successor Council, namely, the present Municipal Committee of Wardha, and are recoverable by it under the provisions of this Act. This is laid down as one of the effects of the new Act coming into force on the appointed day. The consequences are acted in section 346. Clause (d) of that section clearly points out that all sums due to an existing Council, whether on account of any tax or otherwise, shall be recoverable by the successor Council, and for the purposes of such recovery the successor Council shall be competent to take any measures or institute any proceedings which it would have been open to the existing Council or any authority thereof to take or institute before the appointed day. Even pending proceedings before the authorities under the old Act were deemed to have been transferred to the corresponding authorities under the new Act, under clause (g) of section 346. That being the position, the recovery by the successor Council in July of 1966 could be only under the provisions of the new Act. A bill was presented under section 150 for payment of the octroi dues. Filing an appeal against that bill was the only remedy available to the Zilla Parishad. Accordingly, it presented its appeal in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, under the provisions of sections 169 and 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. 6. In the matter of presentation of this appeal, there are only two relevant circumstances which need consideration. According to the petitioner. Municipal Council, a valid appeal is presented if it is brought within 15 days next after the presentation of the bill complained of, and the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him in the Municipal Office within the same period of 15 days from the presentation of the bill. There is a third condition contained in clause (b) of section 170 but it relate exclusively to oases where tax on buildings or lands or both is sought to be recovered by the Municipality. It has no application when a tax like the octroi tax is being claimed from the respondent-Zilla Parishad. There is a third condition contained in clause (b) of section 170 but it relate exclusively to oases where tax on buildings or lands or both is sought to be recovered by the Municipality. It has no application when a tax like the octroi tax is being claimed from the respondent-Zilla Parishad. If either of these acts, namely, presentation of the appeal as well as depositing the amount in the bill in the Municipal office, is not performed within 15 days from the presentation of the bill, the appeal of the assessee cannot be entertained by the Magistrate. The say of the respondent is that the presentation of the appeal memo has got to be made within 15 days from the service of the bill and no dispute is raised in that behalf. What the respondent further says, is that he had the liberty to deposit the amount of the municipal taxes before the appeal reached final hearing when it is, in fact, being entertained by the Magistrate. Since he has done that, he has complied fully with the provisions of section 170. 7. The right of appeal is provided by section 169. According to that section, appeals against any claim for taxes or other dues included in a bill presented to any person under section 150 or any other provisions of this Act may be made to any Judicial Magistrate or Bench of such Magistrates by whom under the direction of the Sessions Judge such class of oases is to be tried. The relevant portion of section 170 which is in controversy is as follows: "170. No appeal under the last preceding section shall be entertained unless- (a) the appeal is brought within fifteen days next after the presentation of the bill complained of; and (b) • • • • • (c) the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him in the municipal office," The controversy relates to the meaning to be attached to the expression "entertained" in this section. 8. Mr. Masodkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contrasted the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act which was in force until the Maharashtra Municipalities Act replaced it. The whole of that Act was repealed by the Maharashtra Municipalities Act Section 84 of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 provided rights of appeal. 8. Mr. Masodkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contrasted the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act which was in force until the Maharashtra Municipalities Act replaced it. The whole of that Act was repealed by the Maharashtra Municipalities Act Section 84 of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 provided rights of appeal. Under sub-section (1) of section 84, it was necessary to present an appeal against any tax within thirty days from the date when the demand for the tax was made or from the date on which the refund was refused, as the case may be. Subsection (2) of section 84 enabled the appellate authority to make a direction for the deposit of the amount of the tax before the hearing of an appeal. This clause merely authorises the appellate authority and lays down that it; may give a direction for the deposit of taxes. However, it is not obligatory that the authority must demand taxes before the appeal is heard. Under section 84 (2) it was possible to imagine that appeals in some of the oases could be beard by the Magistrate without asking the assessee to deposit any amount. If, however, the appellate Court felt that the amount of the bill should be directed to be deposited such an order had to be passed before the hearing of the appeal. Payment of the amount of the bill before the presentation of the appeal or within a specified period of limitation as such from the date of presentation of the bill, was not the provision of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act. It merely contained enabling provisions which authorised the Magistrate hearing the appeal to give directions for the deposit of the tax dues. No appeal failed just because the tax was not deposited before the presentation of the appeal. 9. Mr. Masodkar says that section 170, which is the present provision in the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, is very much different from the earlier provisions of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act. It is, therefore, intended by the Legislature now that two conditions must be satisfied simultaneously by an assessee who wants to challenge the appeal of the present type. Mr. Masodkar says that section 170, which is the present provision in the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, is very much different from the earlier provisions of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act. It is, therefore, intended by the Legislature now that two conditions must be satisfied simultaneously by an assessee who wants to challenge the appeal of the present type. He must present the appeal within 15 days of the presentation of the bill under section 150 and he must also deposit the dues claimed in the notice within 15 days of the presentation of the bill to him. Unless both these things are satisfied, the appeal is incompetent. He points out and he is supported by the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State in that behalf that this was how the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 and the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 were understood by the High Court of Bombay while making rules under the relevant provisions of those Acts. Section 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act and section no of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, are almost identical in terms. Present sections 169 and 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act are identical in words with section 110 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act and section 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. Whereas we find that in section no there are two sub-sections, sub-section (1) is now section 169 and sub-section (2) is section 170. The High Court of Bombay made rules about the presentation of appeals to the Magistrate and, in those rules, it is provided that the memo of appeal must be accompanied by the original receipt of payment of tax. Reliance is placed upon these rules that section no was understood to mean by the Bombay High Court that the presentation of the appeal as well as the payment of the tax have got to take place within the specified period of limitation for the filing of the appeal. An appeal filed within time but without the deposit being made within the period allowed for filing an appeal, is not a validly presented appeal. 10. An appeal filed within time but without the deposit being made within the period allowed for filing an appeal, is not a validly presented appeal. 10. Before I go to some of the cases that are cited at the Bar, let me point out that the Maharashtra Municipalities Act undoubtedly makes certain changes over the procedure of appeal as provided under the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act If an adjective describing the change is to be used, it could be said that the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act was more liberal and the provisions of section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act are more rigid or restrictive. It was left to the discretion of the Magistrate hearing the appeal whether to insist upon the recovery of tax before the decision was given. Under the present Act, that discretion is clearly taken away. However, when this is being done, it would be necessary to examine the intention and purpose of these provisions and the extent of change that was really sought to be made. A right of appeal is a substantive right. If two constructions are possible regarding the provisions of filing appeals, the one which is more favourable to the assessee should be accepted than the one which is more favourable to the Department or the taxing authority. Was it really intended that not only the appeal should be presented within 15 days but the amount of the bill should also be deposited in the Municipal office within the same period. On the face of it, it appears to me that a strict view of clause (c) of section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 will require an assessee to deposit the amount of the bill in the Municipal office and adopt no other mode of payment. If in a given case, the Municipal office or the staff in the municipal office were to put off receiving the amount under one pretext or the other and defer the receipt of tax beyond 15 days, could it be said that the right of appeal is lost1 The right of appeal being a substantive right shall not be made to depend upon the whim and will of the taxing authority. The use of the expression depositing the tax in the municipal office" rues counter to the concept of requiring the payment to be made within the period prescribed for the bringing of the appeal. Then again, on a plain reading of the opening clause of section 170, what is laid down in section 170 are the conditions for entertaining the appeal which is contemplated by section 169. When is an appeal entertained? This expression has been considered in relation to the various statutes and some cases have been cited before me in that behalf. I will presently refer to them. It appears plain to me that the expression "entertained" used in section 170 is in its normal dictionary meaning "to deal with or admit to consideration". Unless the rules of procedure of the Court provide for a preliminary hearing and summary dismissal of an appeal, the matter is admitted to consideration or is dealt with only when it is set down for final hearing after notice to the other side. Under the provisions of section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, no rules are yet made and none were brought to my notice. I will, therefore, assume that the appeal presented under section 169 is automatically admitted and notices are issued to the other side for taking the appeal into consideration, that is, for entertaining the appeal. When that stage is reached and the parties are being beard, the Magistrate entertains the appeal. It would be enough if the assessee deposits the amount in the Municipal office before that date. Since depositing the amount in the Municipal office is necessary and since the office of the Municipality could defeat the attempt to deposit the amount, it would be appropriate to hold that the deposit could be made before the appeal is actually entertained by the Magistrate. If the appellant finds difficulty in the matter of deposit, he could take the Magistrates order directing the respondent Municipality to accept the deposit. He could satisfy the condition in clause (0) of section 170 with the assistance of the Court and thereafter the matter could be heard on merits and disposed of. This is the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge and the Municipality is questioning the correctness of this approach. 11. Mr. He could satisfy the condition in clause (0) of section 170 with the assistance of the Court and thereafter the matter could be heard on merits and disposed of. This is the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge and the Municipality is questioning the correctness of this approach. 11. Mr. Masodkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Municipality, referred me to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay v. M/s. Filmistan Lid. (1). That was an appeal under the provisions of section 30 of the Inoome tax Act. Sub-section (1) of section 30 together with the proviso fell for oonsideration by their Lordships. Sub-section (1) of section 30 provided the right of appeal but it contained a proviso in these terms: "Provided that no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-section (1) of lection 46 unless the tax has been paid." The controversy in the matter which reached the Supreme Court was slightly different. The period of appeal under that section was 30 days. The assessee had filed the appeal within 10 days and within the remaining 20 days, which were available to him for filing the appeal deposited the tax dues. The say of the Department was that under the proviso, no appeal lay unless the tax was, in fact, paid. Here the presentation of the appeal was before the payment of the tax. Hence that appeal was incompetent. The Supreme Court considered the effect of the proviso and the substantive lection. The Supreme Court accepts the proposition that payment of tax within the period of limitation is necessary. However, it is not necessary that both the acts must be simultaneous or that the tax ought to be paid first and then the appeal presented. An appeal presented on the 10th day after the date of the order would not by itself be bad if the tax is paid within the remaining 20 days provided for the filing of the appeal, and the evidence of payment is made available. The appeal memo though presented earlier would be deemed to have been presented on the date of payment. If the payment, however, is not made at all within the time prescribed, there would be no valid presentation of the appeal. This construction is made by the Supreme Court on the footing that the section contemplates that "no appeal shall lie". The appeal memo though presented earlier would be deemed to have been presented on the date of payment. If the payment, however, is not made at all within the time prescribed, there would be no valid presentation of the appeal. This construction is made by the Supreme Court on the footing that the section contemplates that "no appeal shall lie". The expression "no appeal shall lie" is very much different from the expression "no appeal shall be entertained". I do not think that any assistance could be derived from the Supreme Courts judgment in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v M/s. Filmistan Ltd. (1). 12. On the contrary, the judgment of the Supreme Court in L. E. Works v. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax (2) is nearer to the facts of the present case. Here also, the provisions regarding appeal which fell for consideration are slightly different from the provisions of section 170 under consideration. However, the discussion by the Supreme Court regarding the expression "entertained" is directly relevant for my consideration. The provisions of an appeal under the Sales Tax Act that fell for consideration were contained in section 9(i). A right of appeal was provided by that section together with a proviso that no appeal against an assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by & satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due, or of such instalments thereof as may have become payable. I may at once point out that though the wording is slightly different, the provisions contained in section 9 (i) together with the proviso are similar to the provisions contained in section 30 of the Income-tax Act. The substantive right of appeal is qualified by a proviso which lays down an additional condition to be fulfilled for exercising that right. In the case of the Sales Tax Act, the Supreme Court points out in terms in paragraph 7 that the expression "entertained" has been used in the proviso, and what is meant by "entertained" is not a matter of doubt. The dictionary meaning of the word "entertain" was referred to by the parties and both sides agreed before the Supreme Court that it meant either "to deal with" or admit to consideration. The Supreme Court endorses the agreement of the two lawyers by saying that they are also of the same opinion. The dictionary meaning of the word "entertain" was referred to by the parties and both sides agreed before the Supreme Court that it meant either "to deal with" or admit to consideration. The Supreme Court endorses the agreement of the two lawyers by saying that they are also of the same opinion. There is no doubt that the expression "entertaining an appeal" by itself would always mean the application of mind of the Court when it is dealing with it or is admitting it for consideration. 13. However, what is required by the proviso is that the Court must have the evidence when it entertains an appeal that the appeal memo wall accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of the tax admitted by the appellant to be due, or of such instalments thereof as may have become payable. It is the appeal memo which must be accompanied by the satisfactory proof of payment. The Court may reach the satisfaction in respect of that fact when it entertains the appeal. However, the evidence must relate back to the presentation of the appeal memo. What kind of proof may be offered, is also discussed by the Supreme Court and they pointed out that any proof which is clear enough to satisfy the Court that the requisite tax is paid, is enough. This proof may be offered at any time before the appeal is entertained, but since the requirement is that the presentation of the appeal memo must be accompanied by such proof, by necessary implication the Legislature desires that the tax is paid before the presentation of the appeal. It is in that manner, on the construction of the relevant provisions of clause (i) of section 9 together with the proviso that the Supreme Court holds that the tax has got to be paid within the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal, but the proof may be offered by the time the Court entertains the appeal. 14. This reasoning, as also the earlier discussion of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. M/s. Filmistan Ltd. (1), is similar. It clearly points out that the requisite conditions to be fulfilled before filing an appeal must be deduced from the provisions relating to appeals. 14. This reasoning, as also the earlier discussion of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. M/s. Filmistan Ltd. (1), is similar. It clearly points out that the requisite conditions to be fulfilled before filing an appeal must be deduced from the provisions relating to appeals. If the word "entertain" means "admit to consideration", then under the provisions of section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, I have little doubt that the Magistrate entertains the appeal when he sets it down for final hearing after notice to the other side. When he does that. he entertains the appeal, and if he finds that by that time the tax ill not deposited, he shall not entertain the appeal. Shri Kakade cited a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kashiram v. I.T. Commissioner (2). It is not necessary to consider that case in detail as the reasoning is similar to the reasoning of the Supreme Court judgment discussed above. 15. I am, therefore, satisfied that the stage of entertaining the appeal by the Magistrate was reached only when he began hearing the appeal. Before that, the Zilla Parishad had already deposited the full amount of the bill on 16-12.1966. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, in error in refusing to consider the appeal on merits. He should have entertained the appeal. The learned Sessions Judge was, however, right in taking a contrary view and directing the Magistrate to consider the appeal on merits. According to me, therefore, the order of the learned Sessions Judge is correct and must be upheld. 16. Before I dismiss this revision application, I might make some reference to some of the grounds that were sought to be raised before me by Mr. Kakade on the merits of the levy of the tax. According to him, the list of articles relating to the levy of octroi under the rules of the Wardha municipality did not include a motor oar at all. The Wardha Municipality had, therefore, no right to levy an octroi at all against the cars imported into its limit by the Zilla Parishad. He also said that the Zilla Parishad was exempted from the payment of octroi dues. Mr. Masodkar said that these points are not raised specifically in the appeal memo presented to the Magistrate. The Wardha Municipality had, therefore, no right to levy an octroi at all against the cars imported into its limit by the Zilla Parishad. He also said that the Zilla Parishad was exempted from the payment of octroi dues. Mr. Masodkar said that these points are not raised specifically in the appeal memo presented to the Magistrate. It is not necessary for me to express any particular view about these points. If they are not specifically raised, it is for the Zilla Parishad to move the learned Magi9trate to permit it to amend the appeal memo. If such a move is taken, the learned Magistrate will undoubtedly consider the equities of the situation and pass appropriate orders. 17. In the view I take above, the revision application fails and is dis. missed. There will be no order as to costs. Revision application dismissed.